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The aim of this PhD project is to conduct a critical geopolitical analysis of the meaning 
of Eurasia for Russia and Turkey. More generally, it focuses on the importance of ‘space’ 
and the geographical situation of a country in the formulation of its foreign policy. This 
project has two aims. First, it aims to depict the place of Eurasia in Russia’s and Turkey’s 
foreign policy outlook in terms of their regional and geographical orientation. More 
generally, it is interested in Russian and Turkish self-perception of their place in the 
international system. On a second level, this project is interested in the concept of 
‘geopolitical space’ and the way in which geographical and geopolitical imaginations 
influence Russian and Turkish foreign policy. This thesis treats geography not only as a 
fixed entity but also as a discursive practice. Hence, governing elites, policy makers and 
other actors attach meaning to geographical space through discourse. With regard to 
foreign policy practice, the geopolitical imagination and personal interpretations of 
geographical realities by governing elites play a crucial role. Given these considerations, 
this thesis is grounded in a critical geopolitical understanding of international relations. 
 
This thesis studies the meaning of Eurasia for Russia and Turkey and its place in their 
respective foreign policy. It does so via an analysis of the two countries’ government 
discourse, that is all public speech acts such as interviews and political speeches. Notions 
of national identity, geopolitical imagination and how they influence foreign policy are 
thus at the core of this research project. This thesis postulates that Eurasia emerged as a 
new object of study following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, because this major 
historical event and the disappearance of the most important Eurasian empire freed up the 
interpretative space for new discussions about the meaning of Eurasia. This applies to the 
case of Russia and Turkey, where Eurasia occupies an important position, while there 
obviously are diverging interpretations and historical conceptions of Eurasia in the 
Russian and Turkish contexts. The main argument is that the concept of Eurasia is a 
central feature in Russian and Turkish government discourse. It is also an instrumental 
concept in that it allows the attribution of different characteristics to Russian and Turkish 
foreign policy. As such, Eurasia functions as an important zone for Russia’s and Turkey’s 
economic development, their political power or role as powerful and influential players 
in the international system. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The aim of this PhD project is to conduct a critical geopolitical analysis of the meaning 
of Eurasia for Russia and Turkey. More generally, it focuses on the importance of 
‘space’ and the geographical situation of a country in the formulation of its foreign 
policy. This project has two aims. First, it aims to depict the place of Eurasia in 
Russia’s and Turkey’s foreign policy outlook in terms of their regional and 
geographical orientation. More generally, it is interested in Russian and Turkish self-
perception of their place in the international system. On a second level, this project is 
interested in the concept of ‘geopolitical space’ and the way in which geographical 
and geopolitical imaginations influence Russian and Turkish foreign policy. 
 
At the centre of this thesis is the study of the meaning of Eurasia for Russia and Turkey 
and its place in their respective foreign policy. It does so via an analysis of the two 
countries’ government discourse, that is public speech acts such as interviews and 
political speeches. Notions of national identity, geopolitical imagination and how they 
influence foreign policy are thus at the core of this research project. These notions are 
arranged in a triangular relationship with reciprocal influence. This means that the 
geopolitical imagination of a country’s elite influences foreign policy, while national 
identity considerations equally have an impact on the formulation of foreign policy. 
At the same time, external events and political developments impact the elite’s 
perception of their country’s national identity and thus also potentially changes their 
geopolitical imagination. All this is linked to geographical space and Russia’s and 
Turkey’s interpretation of the geographical reality they inhabit. 
 
This thesis treats geography not as a deterministic entity, but as a discursive practice. 
Methodologically, it employs a discourse analysis studying speeches and interviews 
by the principal political actors of both countries. Speaking about and formulating the 
meaning of geographical entities is an inherently geopolitical practice. Hence, 
governing elites, policy makers and other actors attach meaning to geographical space 
through discourse. This thesis follows Starr’s argument that ‘geography is “dynamic” 
in that the meaning of space, distance, territory, and borders can change in the 
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perceptions of peoples and foreign policy-making elites’.1 With regard to foreign 
policy practice, the geopolitical imagination and personal interpretations of 
geographical realities by governing elites play a crucial role. Given these 
considerations, this thesis is grounded in a critical geopolitical understanding of 
international relations, focusing on notions of identity and discourse and how ‘global 
space is incessantly reimagined and rewritten by centers of power and authority’.2 
 
This thesis focuses on the geopolitical concept of Eurasia and the way in which the 
Turkish and Russian governing elites attribute meaning and value to it. Russia and 
Turkey inhabit regional environments which influence their national interests and 
foreign policy orientation. However, the way in which the respective governing elites 
of these two countries make sense and interpret this regional environment plays a 
crucial role in their countries’ foreign policy orientation. Hence, foreign policy is 
influenced by national identity considerations combined with foreign policy objectives 
derived from national interests and the geopolitical imaginations of various actors. 
Gerald Toal (O Tuathail) refers to this as a state’s geopolitical culture, defining the 
concept as follows: ‘[geopolitical culture] can be defined as the prevailing sense of 
identity, place, and mission in the world […]. A geopolitical culture is, first and 
foremost, about the identity of a territorial entity and the locational narrative it presents 
to itself and the world’.3 The central idea here is the absence of a deterministic 
framework which intrinsically links a country’s foreign policy and geopolitical 
imagination to its geographical location. Although certain premises vary according to 
factors including a country’s geographical location or the nature of neighbouring 
countries, the much more important issue is the way in which any given state interprets 
these circumstances. In short, the main idea is perfectly summed up by Toal: ‘There is 
no objective relationship between the geographic location of a territorial entity and its 
geopolitical culture. Geography as earthly location and resource endowment is what 
states make of it’.4 
                                                 
1 Starr 2013: 439 
2 O Tuathail 1996: 249 
3 Toal 2017: 39 
4 Toal 2017: 40 
11 
 
1.1 Scope and purpose of research 
At the centre of this thesis is the concept of Eurasia and its meaning for Russia and 
Turkey. Eurasia is a contested geopolitical concept, not only for Russia and Turkey, 
and thus serves as the ideal space for doing a discourse analysis. As such, Eurasia 
always occupied an important position when it came to geopolitics in that it was the 
key aspect of several geopolitical theories (for example, Mackinder’s heartland 
theory). In general, as this thesis will argue, Eurasia is a contested term and 
geopolitical concept to which many different meanings are attached. There is no single 
definition of what Eurasia constitutes. Still, at the centre of the vast Eurasian landmass, 
with part of their country in both Europe and Asia, lie Russia and Turkey. Put 
differently, Russia and Turkey are the quintessential Eurasian countries. 
 
At the outset, my research was guided by concerns with the meaning and importance 
of geography for the definition of a country’s national identity and the way in which 
geography influences foreign policy. More generally, the focus lay on an attempt to 
conceptualise the meaning of geographical regions and geopolitical spaces in the 
context of international relations as a social practice, where ideas and identities matter. 
My purpose broadly is to contribute to a deeper understanding of the nuances of 
Russia’s and Turkey’s geopolitical discourses and imaginaries. Furthermore, through 
the uncovering of these structures of meaning within the Russian and Turkish foreign 
policy elite, I aim to analyse the way in which they impact on political practice. 
Specifically with regard to Eurasia it aims to highlight the plasticity of this geopolitical 
space in Russian and Turkish discourse and uncover the plethora of meanings, themes, 
actors and feelings attached to it. However, Eurasia is not a hegemonic discourse and 
other geopolitical discourses exist in Russia and Turkey. 
 
The essence of this thesis is thus concerned with analysing the place and relevance of 
Eurasia in Russian and Turkish foreign policy elite discourse. The findings of my 
research will be of interest not only for the academic community, but particularly for 
policy-making circles. Especially from a Western and European perspective, Russia 
and Turkey are important states being both European but also at the margins of Europe. 
The way in which these states see and interpret the Eurasian region has obvious 
implications for Western policy in this space. Although Eurasia is a frequent reference 
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in general writings, it means a plethora of things. While this thesis will argue that this 
is precisely the nature of the space of Eurasia as well as its advantage, with regard to 
policy-making, conceptual clarity is required. This thesis will form a small 
contribution to inform the interested reader with an in-depth analysis of the meaning 
of Eurasia, its place in Russian and Turkish geopolitical imagination and foreign policy 
practice.  
1.1.1 Case studies: Russia and Turkey 
The rationale for selecting Russia and Turkey as case studies is based on several shared 
characteristics: first, their geographical location at the intersection of Europe and Asia 
with parts of their territory on both continents, makes them the only truly Eurasian 
countries. Second, a similar historical experience stems from their position as the 
power centres of large, contiguous land-based empires for many centuries, and thus a 
post-imperial identity influences their foreign policy. Having inhabited the space of 
Eurasia for many centuries, which led to the creation of sustained political, cultural 
and linguistic links as well as economic and security-related interests across this space, 
Eurasia occupies an important place in the practice of Russian and Turkish foreign 
policy. Furthermore, Russia and Turkey are interesting case studies because of the 
prevalence of geopolitics in these two cases in the context of the (re-)emergence of 
geopolitics in Europe and ‘foreign policy identity crises’ as a result of the end of the 
Cold War.5 Hence, a critical theoretical framework is useful in enhancing our 
understanding of contemporary Russian and Turkish foreign policy. 
 
Geopolitical thinking became widespread among Russian intellectuals and the foreign 
policy elite following the dissolution of the Soviet Union because it offered simple 
ways out of the conundrum of defining a new sense for Russia’s being.6 In general, the 
question of ‘where Russia belongs’ and how it should be defined, which in turn 
prompts the question of where it should orient its foreign policy, received much 
attention.7 Geography strongly influences Turkish foreign policy due to Turkey’s 
strategic location at the intersection of continents. This results in the prevalence of 
                                                 
5 See Guzzini 2012 and the chapters on Russia (Astrov and Morozova 2012) and Turkey (Bilgin 2012) 
respectively. 
6 Kerr 1995; Smith 1999; Kolossov and Turkovsky 2001; Tsygankov 2003 
7 Light 2003; Tsygankov 2007 
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geopolitical images among Turkey’s elite.8 The thinking of Turkish foreign minister 
and prime minister Davutoğlu, for instance, was influenced by traditional geopolitics 
and he often referred to some of these concepts in his writings.9 Based on Turkey’s 
geographical realities and following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 
opening-up of this space to outside actors, focusing on Turkey’s Eurasian discourse 
has become relevant again. 
1.1.2 Discourse analysis 
Being interested in the place of Eurasia in Russia’s and Turkey’s geopolitical 
imagination, or more precisely, the geopolitical imaginations of the two countries’ 
governing elite, the object of study of this thesis is elite discourse. Focusing on the 
official view and representation of Eurasia in Russian and Turkish foreign policy, I 
concentrate on a select number of government officials and representatives, or put 
differently, people authorised to speak on behalf of the country. Their geopolitical 
imagination and the structures of their public discourse are thus at the centre of this 
research, which focuses on public texts and speeches. Hence, the methodological 
foundation of this thesis is discourse analysis. 
 
Discourse analysis can be done in a number of different ways and there is no single 
definition of what a discourse is. Put briefly, ‘discourses are systems of meaning-
production that fix meaning, however temporarily, and enable actors to make sense of 
the world and to act within it’.10 The main contribution of discourse analysis is thus 
the uncovering of structures of meaning, in this case the importance of Eurasia in 
Russian and Turkish foreign policy. As a result, a large number of speech acts by 
Russian and Turkish government officials over a time period of roughly fifteen years 
(ranging from 2000 to 2015 for Russia and from 2002 to 2015 for Turkey) have been 
collected. Using a methodological framework, this thesis intended to distil the various 
meanings and characteristics of the concept of Eurasia in Russian and Turkish foreign 
policy discourse. In addition, the discourse analysis has been combined with a 
chronological discussion focusing on major political developments, thus describing 
                                                 
8 Bilgin 2007, 2012; Yanik 2009; Larrabee 2010 
9 Erşen 2014b; Ozkan 2014 
10 Dunn and Neumann 2016: 4 
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the context in which the discourse operates and the way in which this context 
influences both discourse and policy. 
1.2 Research questions 
Below are outlined the questions which were guiding this research from the outset and 
helped formulate the analytical framework for the subsequent discourse analysis. 
 
What does Eurasia mean for Russia and Turkey? Russia and Turkey are the 
quintessential countries inhabiting the ‘geopolitical space’ of Eurasia. It is therefore 
assumed that both countries consider Eurasia to be of particular importance for their 
foreign policy, geopolitical imagination, national interests and political and economic 
development. In order to answer this question, this thesis relies upon a comprehensive 
discourse analysis of speech acts by Russia’s and Turkey’s governing elite. It focuses 
on several general themes such as geography, history, culture and the economy, which 
are central for Russian and Turkish conceptions of Eurasia. 
 
How important is their country’s ‘Eurasianess’ for Russia/Turkey? This thesis sets out 
to determine the degree to which the geopolitical space of Eurasia and their country’s 
Eurasian identity matters for Russia and Turkey. In so doing, it also takes into account 
other identities in Russia and Turkey, especially their traditionally strong European 
orientation. Furthermore, it investigates the centrality of Eurasia in Russian and 
Turkish foreign policy and how it influences their respective worldview and foreign 
policy options. 
 
Do Russia/Turkey see themselves at the centre of Eurasia? This question alludes to the 
way in which Moscow and Ankara perceive their respective role and position within 
Eurasia. The notion of centrality is an important one in that it helps explore the 
predominant geopolitical vision in both countries. In addition, it analyses which role 
conceptions are at the centre of Russian and Turkish government discourse. For 
instance, it illustrates whether Russia sees Eurasia primarily as a place where Russian 
power is grounded, whether Turkey’s vision of Eurasia leads to a particular role for 
the country in global affairs, or whether the importance of Eurasia lies particularly in 
the political and economic opportunities it offers Russia and Turkey. 
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1.3 Main findings 
At the centre of this thesis is the discourse of Russia’s and Turkey’s political elite, 
their geopolitical imagination and the way in which these elites attribute meaning to 
the geopolitical space of Eurasia. The concept of Eurasia is a heterogeneous concept 
with a variety of meanings. As this thesis argues, Eurasia is not just a philosophical or 
ideological construction, but also a pragmatic political and economic concept. What is 
more, one of the key analytical values of the concept of Eurasia is its flexible character 
and the fact that it is defined in different ways by different countries depending on 
their respective historical, political and economic experiences. In general, this thesis 
postulates that Eurasia emerged as a new object of study following the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, because this major historical event and the disappearance of the most 
important Eurasian empire freed up the interpretative space for new discussions about 
the meaning of Eurasia. This applies particularly to the case of Russia, where Eurasia 
and Eurasianism are historically rooted, but also to Turkey, where Eurasia emerged as 
a new political and geographical reality in the 1990s. 
 
In Russia, for instance, there is a long philosophical tradition of Eurasianist thought 
going back to the early 20th century, which experienced a revival in the post-Soviet 
period, thus receiving much scholarly and political attention. In terms of concrete 
political ideas, the Russian government has been active in recent years in 
implementing a new regional integration project in Eurasia with the idea of fostering 
a new greater Eurasian space. The concept of Eurasia in Turkey does not rely on a 
similar philosophical tradition, but discussions about Turkey’s Eurasian character have 
been ongoing since the 1990s. Following the rise to power of Erdoğan’s Justice and 
Development Party (AKP), the definition of Eurasia was enlarged and a new 
civilisational focus was developed. In general, Eurasia also functions as a pragmatic 
concept in Russia and Turkey, where the focus lies on national interests, security 
considerations and economic opportunities. 
 
Based on an in-depth analysis of Russian government elite discourse on Eurasia over 
the years 2000 to 2015, this thesis argues that the geopolitical concept of Eurasia is a 
central element in Russian foreign policy. Geographical images, such as Russia’s 
geographic location as well as the country’s size, placing Russia right at the centre of 
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Eurasia, are at the core of the elite discourse. More importantly, discourse analysis 
reveals that Russia’s centrality in the Eurasian geography serves as the foundation for 
its position as a great power in global affairs. This geographical focus is coupled with 
a strong emphasis on Russia’s historical experience, namely the role Russia played as 
the imperial centre of subsequent regional and global empires. It is understood that this 
has implications to the present day. Indeed, Eurasia is the region in which Russia’s 
imperial past is grounded and the concomitant connections with other countries in this 
space are an important element in Russian foreign policy. For instance, frequent 
references by Russia’s governing elite to the existence of a historic community in 
Eurasia illustrate the importance of this region for Russia’s economic and political 
development. Eurasia is thus seen as an important part of Russia’s identity. However, 
it is important to note that identity considerations are not the most important element 
of Russian elite discourse on Eurasia. Eurasia is certainly part of Russian identity, but 
not the only one. There is a constant emphasis in the governing elite’s discourse on 
Russia having a dual or multiple identity, consisting of European, Asian and Eurasian 
traits. Furthermore, the economy and economic integration in Eurasia, are a crucial 
component of Russian government elite discourse, in that Eurasia occupies an 
important place as a synonym for regional integration. With the implementation of the 
Eurasian Economic Union, Russia being its principal promoter, Eurasia has developed 
into a distinct region in global affairs. Given Russia’s dominant position in this setting 
and its role as the driving force behind Eurasian integration, its position as an important 
and influential global actor is secured. 
 
The analysis of Turkey’s governing elite’s discourse over the years 2002 to 2015 
reveals that geography is the dominant theme in Turkish government discourse on 
Eurasia. The key factors here are Turkey’s geographic location at the intersection of 
different continents, its concomitant belonging to both Europe and Asia and, as a 
consequence of these two factors, its centrality in the Eurasian, or according to Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, Afro-Eurasian region. Various exponents of Turkey’s governing elite 
evoked geopolitical images, such as Turkey as a central country and Turkey as a 
bridge, and they have become fixed notions in Turkish conceptions of Eurasia. 
Furthermore, references to Turkey’s historical experience as a regional empire and the 
ensuing cultural and ethnic links across the former Ottoman imperial territories and 
the vast Eurasian region, can be considered foundations of Turkey’s role in Eurasia. 
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For instance, these historical links are highlighted when Turkish officials emphasise 
the importance of Eurasia and especially of the countries in Central Asia for Turkish 
foreign policy. What becomes clear is that Turkey does not consider Eurasia to be a 
defining trait in terms of its national identity. In general, Turkey’s identity oscillated 
between multiple identities such as European, Eurasian, but also Middle Eastern. 
However, over the years, and in particular due to the increasing influence of Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, this multiple identity evolved into one dominant identity, namely that of 
Turkey as a Afro-Eurasian country. What this meant in terms of policy was an 
increased focus on Turkey’s regional environment and its historical Ottoman 
territories while emphasising the country’s geographical uniqueness as a defining 
feature. Lastly, economic considerations, and above all the central element of energy, 
are substantial parts of Turkey’s Eurasian discourse. The goal of Turkey’s energy 
policy is to develop the country into an energy hub connecting the East and West. This, 
of course, is linked to the country’s geographical situation and its position as a 
connecting link at the centre of Eurasia. 
 
In addition to these general themes (geography, history/culture and 
economy/integration) in Russian and Turkish discourse on Eurasia, this thesis 
highlights four notions – power, role, identity and opportunity – which are central to 
understanding the place of Eurasia in the geopolitical imagination of Russia’s and 
Turkey’s governing elite. However, there is a hierarchy in that the notions of role and 
power are most central to Russia’s and Turkey’s Eurasian discourse. 
 
One of the fundamental principles of Russian foreign policy and the Russian political 
elite’s understanding of their country is Russia’s position as one of the great powers 
and an influential and important pole in a multipolar global order. This means that the 
concept of Eurasia in turn occupies a central position in the conception of Russia’s role 
in the international system in the sense that Russia’s power is grounded in its role as 
the centre of gravity and hegemon in the Eurasian region. This is also concretely 
manifested in the Eurasian integration project in that it institutionalises Russia’s power 
in Eurasia, while linking it permanently to other states in this geopolitical space. 
Russia’s governing elite characterises the international system as being multipolar 
with ongoing competition between different geopolitical zones. This view was 
reinforced following the Ukraine crisis and the growing friction in relations between 
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Russia and the West. In this context, Eurasia is seen as one of the geopolitical zones 
which stands in competition to other regions. Given that Russia considers itself to be 
the dominant power in Eurasia, Eurasia is thus directly related to Russia’s role as a 
global great power. What is more, Russia’s political survival and relevance in global 
affairs depends on its role as the leader of Eurasia, as Putin argued in his inauguration 
speech as president in 2012: ‘We must all understand that the life of our future 
generations and our prospects as a country and nation depend on our ability to become 
a leader and centre of gravity for the whole of Eurasia’.11 This also demonstrates that 
in the context of the increasing tensions between East and West, which culminated in 
the Ukraine crisis, the governing elite’s discourse on Eurasia was principally oriented 
towards the West. Especially the discourse on Eurasian integration painted an image 
of Russia as an indispensable part of Europe’s development and an ideal link between 
Europe and Asia. In combination with the conviction that the international system was 
characterised by multipolarity, Eurasia then became a region clearly distinct from the 
Euro-Atlantic and the Asia-Pacific. And as the hegemon in Eurasia and principal 
promoter of Eurasian integration, Russia demonstrated its willingness to maintain its 
place as one of the great power poles in the multipolar order. 
 
At the foundation of Turkish foreign policy is the understanding by the governing elite 
that Turkey occupies the position of a central country and concomitantly as an 
influential global actor. This is primarily based on a geopolitical reading of Turkey’s 
position at the centre of (Afro-)Eurasia. However, this is also coupled with a historical 
understanding, because the country’s legacy as the heir of the Ottoman Empire and its 
role as a bridge between civilisations, positions Turkey as the leader of its own 
civilisational basin. Hence, Turkey’s central position, which is also related to Eurasia 
both geographically and culturally, provides the country with manifold links to other 
countries and regions, thus making it a powerful country on the global stage. 
 
In sum, although a number of similarities exist between Russia and Turkey, each 
country has a unique and individual understanding of the ‘geopolitical space’ of 
Eurasia and its importance in their foreign policy. In the case of Russia, Eurasia is a 
central feature in government discourse which became more important over time, 
                                                 
11 Putin 2012b 
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whereas in Turkey, its importance decreased over the years. Eurasia is also an 
instrumental concept in that it allows the attribution of different characteristics to 
Russian and Turkish foreign policy. As such, Eurasia functions as an important zone 
for Russia’s and Turkey’s economic development, for the projection of their political 
power and thus emphasises their role as powerful and influential players in the 
international system. The conceptualisation of Eurasia and Russia’s and Turkey’s role 
within this geopolitical space are not identical. Eurasia is a discursive notion lacking a 
uniform set of characteristics. Indeed, one of the principal postulates of this thesis is 
that Eurasia functions as a flexible concept, being shaped and re-shaped by the 
discourse of Russia’s and Turkey’s governing elite on the basis of changing 
geopolitical visions. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter two presents the theoretical reflections 
and methodological framework underlying this thesis. It is divided into two parts: the 
first part discusses critical geopolitics theory and its relevance to foreign policy 
analysis and describes what discourse analysis is and how it is to be done. The second 
part details the methodological framework and its qualitative analysis approach 
including a discussion on sample and selection criteria. 
 
To provide a foundation for the subsequent analysis, Chapter three offers a general 
overview of Russian and Turkish foreign policy. The focus lies on the post-Cold War 
era and especially on the more contemporary period over the last fifteen years or so, 
starting with Putin’s accession to the presidency in Russia in 1999/2000 and the AKP’s 
and Erdoğan’s first electoral victory in 2002 in the case of Turkey. 
 
Chapter four provides an in-depth discussion of the concept of Eurasia in general, as 
well as specifically in the Russian and Turkish cases. In the first part, the emergence 
of Eurasia as a geopolitical concept after the Cold War and its use in academia and 
policy circles are described. Thereafter, the discussion moves on to the concept of 
Eurasia in Russia, ranging from classical Eurasianism to Eurasian ideas in Russia 
today, and in Turkey, focusing on diverging visions of Turkish Eurasianism and the 




The analytical core of the thesis is formed by Chapters five and six, which present the 
results and an in-depth discussion of the analysis of Russian and Turkish discourse on 
Eurasia. Both chapters are structured in the same way, starting with a thematic 
discussion focusing on the prevalent themes in Russian and Turkish discourse on 
Eurasia, namely geography, history/culture and economy/integration, before moving 
on to a chronological analysis of the evolution of Russian and Turkish government 
elite discourse on Eurasia. 
 
Chapter seven presents a concise analysis of how the concept of Eurasia is linked to 
the Russian and Turkish governing elites’ understanding of their country’s place in the 
global system. In a second part, it briefly discusses the importance of other geopolitical 
regions for Russia and Turkey. Finally, Chapter eight offers an overall conclusion and 
a summary of the main findings of this thesis.
21 
 
Chapter 2: Theory and methodological framework 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the theoretical and methodological foundation for 
the subsequent analysis of Russian and Turkish discourse on Eurasia. Focusing on the 
discourse of political elites means that their geopolitical imagination and the way in 
which these elites attribute meaning to the geopolitical space of Eurasia are at the core 
of this research. Furthermore, questions of geographical assumptions, national 
identity, as well as foreign policy discourse and practice are discussed. This calls for a 
theoretical framework which is particularly well suited to integrate all these elements. 
Critical geopolitics offers precisely this. To briefly summarise, as the subtitle of 
Gearoid O Tuathail’s 1996 landmark book Critical Geopolitics says, critical 
geopolitics is the ‘politics of writing global space’.1 Critical geopolitics is a theory 
which emerged within political geography and focused on a critical reading of and 
engagement with hegemonial geopolitical discourses. The essential claim of critical 
geopolitics is that geography is not a fixed or static entity but that ‘geography as earthly 
location and resource endowment is what states make of it’.2 As a result, geopolitical 
discourses, and above all governmental elite discourses, are at the core of critical 
geopolitical analyses. The link to foreign policy is direct in that discourses condition 
possible actions and limit the playing field. As Kuus argues, critical geopolitical 
scholarship ‘investigates how geographical claims and assumptions function in 
political debates and political practice’.3 Hence, the main point is not just to identify 
and study powerful discourses but to investigate how precisely they are powerful and 
how they make certain foreign policy practices possible and more likely than others. 
 
The principal object of study in this research is the discourse of Russia’s and Turkey’s 
governing elites. In practice, this means that a dataset was put together, consisting of 
a large number of political speeches, articles published in the media and interviews 
with the media from the two countries’ top government officials. This study has a 
limited time frame, ranging from the year 2000 to 2015 in the case of Russia, and from 
2002 to 2015 in the case of Turkey, and all the speeches and interviews took place 
over that period. In most cases, the source for the primary data were the websites of 
                                                 
1 O Tuathail 1996 
2 Toal 2017: 40 
3 Kuus 2010: 683 
22 
 
the Russian and Turkish governments and ministries, which provided English-
language translations of the speeches. 
 
Every researcher working with such material is confronted with the question of how 
to do discourse analysis properly. There is no one size fits all solution and the method 
of doing discourse analysis needs to be tailored to the object under study. I thus 
elaborated a methodological framework which started with a two-step reading process, 
consisting of an exploratory phase and an explanatory phase. This process allowed me 
to identify the main issues and themes emanating from Russian and Turkish 
government discourse on Eurasia (which are described in detail later and analysed in 
chapters 5 and 6). Discourse analysis is a qualitative approach with a variety of tools 
and choices to be made along the way. On the other hand, every research project also 
has its limitations, ranging from the question of which texts to select, to questions of 
access, to the absence of texts, or to the practical need of having to limit the research 
to one particular aspect. This research, for instance, focuses on elite discourse and thus 
leaves aside a number of highly relevant and interesting other elements, such as 
popular discourse. However, focusing on elite discourse in the realm of foreign policy 
nonetheless provides crucial insight into a country’s geopolitical imagination and the 
elite’s perception of their country’s place in the global system. 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical foundations for my research. The first section 
briefly presents the principal concepts and ideas of critical geopolitics. In a second 
step, the notions of foreign policy analysis and discourse analysis in relationship to 
critical geopolitics are discussed. In the second part of the chapter, I lay out my 
methodological framework detailing the way in which the discourse analysis of 
Russian and Turkish foreign policy was conducted. Finally, I consider issues related 
to sample selection and interviews, and I reflect on the limitations of my approach. 
2.1 Geopolitics, foreign policy and discourse 
This thesis studies the meaning of Eurasia for Russia and Turkey via an analysis of the 
two countries’ government discourse. At the core of this research project are notions 
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of national identity, geopolitical imagination and their influence on foreign policy.4 
Focusing on the construction of ‘geopolitical spaces’ by a country’s political elite 
means that official state discourse, defined here as discourses by the country’s top 
government officials in the realm of foreign policy, is at the core of this analysis. My 
argument is that the notions of national identity, geopolitical imagination and foreign 
policy are linked to each other in a triangular relationship, in which each of these 
aspects influences and in turn is influenced by the others. Rather than being in a 
hierarchical relationship, where for instance the country’s national identity determines 
the elite’s geopolitical imagination which then in turn leads to a specific foreign policy 
course or action, this thesis claims that there is a horizontal relationship between each 
of these elements. They are in a constant conversation and have reciprocal influence 
on each other. 
 
For instance, according to Prizel, national identity and foreign policy are linked 
together in a ‘dialectical relationship’ in the sense that ‘all countries frequently use 
national identity to articulate their foreign policies and in turn, rely on foreign policy 
as a foundation of their legitimacy’.5 Hence, national identity does influence the 
country’s geopolitical imagination, but at the same time, foreign policy actions and 
their outcomes have an influence on national identity. As Hansen argues, ‘foreign 
policies rely upon representations of identity, but it is also through the formulation of 
foreign policy that identities are produced and reproduced’.6 Similarly, a specific 
geopolitical imagination might lead the country’s leaders to pursue a particular course 
of action, but while doing so, it influences the way in which they see the country’s 
national identity. Studying the foreign policy of multi-ethnic states with Ukraine as an 
example, Shulman for instance noted that ‘foreign policy becomes a key element in 
the construction of national identity and an object of political contestation between 
groups with different visions of that identity’.7 My framework goes even further in that 
the domestic political contestation and the diverging visions of a country’s national 
identity equally influence foreign policy. There is an interplay between discourse and 
                                                 
4 For a select sample of work discussing (at least some aspects of) the relationship between national 
identity, geopolitical imagination and foreign policy, see Campbell 1992; Dijkink 1996; Prizel 1998; 
Hopf 2002; Waever 2002; Hansen 2006; Guzzini 2012; White and Feklyunina 2014. 
5 Prizel 1998: 19 
6 Hansen 2006: 1 
7 Shulman 1998: 124 
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external events which both influence and shape foreign policy choices. I thus differ 
slightly from Dijkink’s definition which is based on a hierarchical ordering which 
understands ‘geopolitical visions as translations of national-identity concepts in 
geographical terms and symbols’ while ‘geopolitical visions may be described as just 
a subset within the foreign policy belief-system’.8 
 
This research project incorporates approaches and ideas from post-structuralism and 
critical geopolitics, a set of theories which are epistemologically compatible, and 
which provide particularly useful concepts for the analysis of geopolitics, identity and 
foreign policy on the basis of a discourse analysis. The basic tenet adopted here is that 
geographical space is not a fixed entity but is shaped and defined through discourse. 
Similarly, it is based on the assumption that ‘geography is “dynamic” in that the 
meaning of space, distance, territory, and borders can change in the perceptions of 
peoples and foreign policy-making elites’.9 Similarly, following Larsen, ‘we cannot 
take as a given that a particular geographical location always leads to one particular 
attitude or discourse. Geographical or geopolitical facts can be mediated quite 
differently’.10 Hence, it is only through the discursive practices of foreign policy elites 
that meaning is attached to geopolitical space. Given these considerations, this thesis 
is grounded in a critical geopolitical understanding of international relations, focusing 
on notions of identity and discourse, and how ‘global space is incessantly reimagined 
and rewritten by centers of power and authority’.11 Critical geopolitics is interested in 
how geopolitical analysis functions as an aide in the conduct of a state’s foreign policy 
and this strand of ideas and theories is thus particularly relevant for my research topic. 
I thus follow Agnew in his argument that ‘one expropriation of the term [geopolitics] 
ascribes to it a more specific meaning: [the] examination of the geographical 
assumptions, designations and understandings that enter into the making of world 
politics’.12 Or, to use the words of O Tuathail, ‘geopolitics is a writing of the 
geographical meanings and politics of states’.13 
 
                                                 
8 Dijkink 1996: 14-15 
9 Starr 2013: 439 
10 Larsen 1997: 23 
11 O Tuathail 1996: 249 
12 Agnew 2003: 5 
13 O Tuathail 1999: 109 
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Critical geopolitics emerged on the margins of political geography in the 1990s, and 
has since moved into the mainstream, crossing disciplinary boundaries and being 
frequently applied by international relations scholars. As a research programme it is 
ideally suited to bridge the gap between disciplines, thus following Kadercan’s call for 
more interaction between political geography and international relations.14 While 
much of this work is informed by international relations scholarship, especially 
constructivist work on the foreign policy-identity nexus, including country specific 
work,15 the main concepts and methodological framework are derived from critical 
geopolitics for their relevance in studying foreign policy discourses, especially from 
an elite perspective. In what follows I will present a discussion of critical geopolitics, 
its main concepts and the uses of critical geopolitics in analysing foreign policy and 
government discourses. Hence, the way in which I use discourse analysis and foreign 
policy analysis are all linked to my basic methodological framework derived from 
critical geopolitics. 
2.1.1 Critical geopolitics 
Critical geopolitics first emerged as a critical study of classical geopolitical thought. 
Classical geopolitics is a theory that blends geography and statecraft and was first used 
towards the end of the 19th century by European imperial geographers, who were 
analysing the territorial composition of the world in order to present possibilities to 
maintain and augment their country’s influence in global affairs.16 As such, as O 
Tuathail has noted, geopolitics was first and foremost a European imperialist concept 
by which the European empires divided up the yet unconquered global space between 
them, and thereafter fought for influence and control over that space.17 According to 
this conception, the aim of geopolitics was to present the world map in a form that 
would allow the imperial powers to exert control over it and prevent other powers from 
doing so.  
 
Critical geopolitics, arguing that geopolitics is a condition defined by states and thus 
differs according to the viewpoint of each state, stands in opposition to those viewing 
                                                 
14 Kadercan 2015 
15 For Russia, Hopf (2002) and Clunan (2009) are among the most prominent examples. See 
Bozdağlioğlu (2003) for a constructivist study of Turkish foreign policy. 
16 Flint 2006: 17 
17 O Tuathail 1996: 15 
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geography as given and for whom geopolitics designates the world political map which 
determines the way in which states act. Put differently, geopolitics is thus either a static 
or flexible condition. These two diverging views are briefly exemplified below by 
contrasting two authors, Jakub Grygiel and Gearoid O Tuathail.18 Grygiel, who can be 
seen as a representative of the first reading of geopolitics, for instance argues that 
‘geopolitics is an objective reality, independent of state wishes and interests, that is 
determined by routes and centers of resources’.19 According to this view, geopolitics 
is a situation that exists, a fixed entity in world politics. The perception policy-makers 
have of these centres of resources and the routes connecting them are not important 
because they cannot change the fundamentally geographical layout of the world. 
Grygiel argues that ‘states cannot alter geopolitics to match their interests’ because ‘a 
change in geopolitics involves a change in routes or in the location of resources’.20 
This approach does not take into account social accounts of power and the way in 
which political perceptions and misperceptions can have an influence on a state’s 
foreign policy. 
 
For O Tuathail, on the other hand, geopolitics is typically a state practice and not a 
fixed notion which is out of a state’s purview. Hence, geopolitics and especially the 
texts which came to define the field of geopolitics are ‘governmentalized forms of 
geographical knowledge [...] that sought to organize and discipline what was 
increasingly experienced as unitary global space into particularistic regimes of 
nationalistic, ideological, racial, and civilizational truths’.21 According to this second 
reading of geopolitics, its aim is to divide the global map into different places or 
regions which are being attributed a value that allows states to categorise these places 
and regions, mostly in terms of whether they are important for a state’s foreign policy 
(for example with regard to resources or alliances) or not. States not only act within a 
geopolitical landscape, they actively define and develop it too. Furthermore, states also 
have identities which change and evolve, not necessarily always in conjunction with 
changes of the global system. 
 
                                                 
18 For a very helpful general overview and systematic comparison between classical and critical 
geopolitics see Kelly 2006. 
19 Grygiel 2006: 24 
20 Grygiel 2006: 25 
21 O Tuathail 1996: 15 
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In the mainstream, classical geopolitical writing has come to be understood as a way 
of trying to make sense of the world map as an orientation for a country’s or empire’s 
foreign policy. Put differently, as an end product of a geopolitical analysis, one would 
get an amended political map of the world, which puts countries and regions into 
perspective according to a highly subjective value-system. The attribution of value to 
areas and places is inherently geopolitical. The defining texts of traditional or classical 
geopolitics, for instance, all served clear political and/or military purposes. According 
to Kearns, four thinkers who ‘were passionately interested in the territorial struggles 
between states and in the rise and fall of empires’ were instrumental in establishing 
geopolitics: ‘the naval strategist from the United States, Alfred Mahan (1840-1914), 
on sea-power; the German geographer, Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), on Lebensraum; 
Halford Mackinder (1861-1947), on land-power; and Rudolf Kjellen (1864-1922), a 
Swedish political scientist, on regional blocs’.22 Alfred Mahan, for instance, argued 
that sea powers as opposed to land powers were better positioned to dominate global 
politics because of the contiguous and united nature of oceans.23 The imperial British 
geographer, Sir Halford Mackinder, characterised the composition of the global 
geographical space from Britain’s perspective in order to derive an understanding 
which would further Britain’s global position.24 He expanded upon these ideas in his 
book Democratic Ideals and Reality, published in 1919, where he aimed at dividing 
the world map into different territorial swathes which were needed for global control 
and domination, arguing that control of the massive land area of Eurasia, called the 
‘heartland’, was primordial for the survival of empire.25  
 
In contrast, but inspired by the latter, Nicholas Spykman (1893-1943), a professor of 
international relations, for instance argued that control of the ‘rimlands’, 
corresponding to the densely populated outer crescents of the Eurasian heartland, was 
more important for global domination. Spykman’s ideas were driven by the goal to 
help the US government maintain its global influence and propose a strategic vision 
for ‘an active, non-isolationist’ foreign policy.26 A similar, more recent, example of 
                                                 
22 Kearns 2009: 3-4 
23 Mahan 1890 
24 Mackinder 1904. For a more detailed deconstruction of Mackinder’s lecture, see O Tuathail (1996: 
25-35). 
25 Mackinder 1919 
26 Flint 2006: 22 
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classical geopolitical writing is the book The Grand Chessboard by Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, a former US National Security Advisor, in which he outlines his 
geopolitical vision of the world following the breakdown of the bipolar Cold War 
system. Brzezinski instrumentalises the notion of chessboard to visually demonstrate 
the importance of the Eurasian region as a means to control and dominate global 
politics.27  
 
The view which this thesis takes it that geopolitics is not a fixed entity or a static 
division of the world. Rather, geopolitics designates a country’s attempts to make 
sense of the global political map according to its foreign policy priorities. In the 
subsequent analysis of Russian and Turkish government discourse on the meaning of 
Eurasia, the way in which value is added to a place, is central. However, the focus is 
not on material factors, such as military movements or supply chains, but on the 
ideational meaning of Eurasia for Russian and Turkish foreign policy. As such, a 
critical analysis of such visions and writings is needed in order to understand the real 
truth behind those geopolitical ideas. The aim of critical geopolitics is to move beyond 
existing imperial understandings of geopolitics and deconstruct the existing 
geopolitical explanations of global politics. 
2.1.1.1 The foundations of critical geopolitics 
Critical geopolitics emerged as a set of ideas and concepts in the early 1990s, within 
the general intellectual context of emerging post-positivist and post-structuralist 
approaches to social science, fuelled by the rejection of the modern geopolitics of the 
bipolar, Cold War era.28 Towards the end of the 20th century, there was a growing 
sentiment among political geographers and international relations scholars that global 
politics could not be understood solely from the point of view of traditional geopolitics, 
but that globalisation and its epiphenomena called for new approaches. Hence, 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which brought about a new visualisation 
of the hitherto fixed global map in terms of controlled and contested territories,29 there 
was a need for new visions of the geopolitical order. In this context, critical geopolitics 
emerged and aimed at deconstructing the classical claim that geography and 
                                                 
27 Brzezinski 1997 
28 Kuus 2010 
29 O Tuathail 1997: 44-45 
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geopolitics are fixed entities to which states are subjected in their conduct of foreign 
policy. Indeed, as O Tuathail argues:  
 
[Critical geopolitics] problematizes the “is” of “geography” and 
“geopolitics”, their status as self-evident, natural, foundational, and 
eminently knowable realities. It questions how “geography” and 
“geopolitics” as signs have been put to work in global politics in the 
twentieth century and how they have supervised the production of 
visions of the global political scene.30 
 
As the above quote demonstrates, critical geopolitics moves on from a static 
understanding of the influence of geography on foreign policy and takes a more actor-
specific approach in that it analyses the way in which specific actors, such as 
governments, speak about geography and attribute value to territory. Thus, critical 
geopolitics is interested in ‘how global space is produced and organized by 
governmentalizing intellectuals of statecraft’.31 
 
At this point it is necessary to add a caveat. Despite the increasing prominence of 
critical geopolitics and its wide-spread use in both political geography and 
international relations, critical geopolitics is not a homogenous set of theories and 
ideas. Rather, it assembles various strands of critical thinking, and a multitude of 
definitions as well as methodological applications exist.32 One definition of critical 
geopolitics is provided by Dodds, Kuus and Sharp:  
 
This critical work approaches geopolitics not as a neutral 
consideration of pre-given “geographical” facts, but as a deeply 
ideological and politicized form of analysis. It shows that 
geographical claims are necessarily geopolitical, as they inscribe 
places as particular types of places to be dealt with in a particular 
manner.33 
 
Kuus also adds that in ‘eschewing the traditional question of how geography does or 
can influence politics, [critical geopolitics] investigates how geographical claims and 
assumptions function in political debates and political practice’.34 In a similar vein, 
                                                 
30 O Tuathail 1996: 68 
31 O Tuathail 1996: 18 
32 Dalby 2010: 280 
33 Dodds, Kuus and Sharp 2013: 6 
34 Kuus 2010: 683 
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Müller argues that ‘critical geopolitics examines the very construction and social 
effects of geopolitical imaginations and geopolitical identities – the imaginary spatial 
positioning of people, regions, states and the shifting boundaries that accompany this 
positioning’.35 Finally, O Tuathail defines critical geopolitics as ‘a problematizing 
theoretical enterprise that places the existing structures of power and knowledge in 
question’ and in which ‘[…] knowledge is always situated knowledge, articulating the 
perspective of certain cultures and subjects while marginalizing that of others’.36  
 
As this very brief discussion demonstrates, critical geopolitics is a set of ideas about 
the way in which geographical knowledge is used, produced and emphasised by 
powerful actors. Hence, geopolitics cannot be considered a static vision of global 
politics, nor does it advance a unitary representation of the world map. Rather, all those 
involved in the making of politics project meaning upon the space which they inhabit. 
Territory, space and geographies are being actively (re)formulated by those in power 
in order to attribute value to them. Geopolitics is a discursive practice trying to 
represent the world in terms that are understandable and acceptable both for the 
political leaders as well as the population of a country. As John Agnew rightly argues:  
 
The world is actively spatialized, divided up, labelled, sorted out into 
a hierarchy of places of greater or lesser “importance” by political 
geographers, other academics and political leaders. This process 
provides the geographical framing within which political elites and 
mass publics act in the world in pursuit of their own identities and 
interests.37  
 
Discursive practices and discourse are important concepts in critical geopolitics. 
Meaning is conferred upon states and regions by policy-makers’ discourses and 
subsequent backing through policy measures. As Bassin argues:  
 
Space becomes a discursive subject, and whatever meaning or 
significance it may possess is not inherent or a priori, but rather is 
projected onto it – in a ceaselessly revolving kaleidoscope of 
signification – by political or geopolitical discourses. It is these 
discourses themselves, consequently, which become the proper 
object of critical-geopolitical analysis.38  
                                                 
35 Müller 2008: 323 
36 O Tuathail 1999: 107-108 
37 Agnew 2003: 3 




It is against this backdrop that critical geopolitics provides useful analytical tools to 
examine foreign policy and state actions.  
 
While there are diverging definitions of critical geopolitics, it is commonly accepted 
that there are three analytical strands within it: formal, practical and popular 
geopolitics. The framework of critical geopolitics is graphically shown in Figure 2.1. 
As O Tuathail and Dalby note, popular geopolitics can be ‘found within the artifacts 
of transnational popular culture’, including newspapers, magazines, movies and many 
other public forms of communication.39 In contrast, as Mamadouh and Dijkink 
observe, formal geopolitics is the ‘domain of academics and advisors’.40 It focuses on 
the more theoretical writings of strategists and analysts and is thus distinct from the 
third strand, practical geopolitics, which is the realm of ‘state leaders and the foreign 
policy bureaucracy’, and focuses on the formulation and execution of foreign policy 
or geopolitical reasoning behind a state’s actions and the discursive practices which 
lead to those actions.41 According to the definition of O Tuathail and Agnew in their 
seminal article published in 1992: 
 
Practical geopolitical reasoning is reasoning by means of consensual 
and unremarkable assumptions about places and their particular 
identities. This is the reasoning of practitioners of statecraft, of 
statespersons, politicians and military commanders. […] practical 
geopolitical reasoning tends to be of a common-sense type which 
relies on the narratives and binary distinctions found in societal 
mythologies.42 
 
Put differently, practical geopolitics comprises the every-day geopolitical assumptions 
of a country’s governing elite and the way in which they make sense of the world and 
the most acute problems arising in the international system. In studying foreign policy 
discourse, practical geopolitics is particularly relevant because it reminds us of the 
processes of idea formation within bureaucracies and the communication of those 
ideas to the public through speech acts. It is obvious, that practical geopolitics is 
closely interrelated with the other two strands. Hence, formal geopolitical writings will 
                                                 
39 O Tuathail and Dalby 1998: 4. For a good example of popular geopolitics, see Sharp 2000. 
40 Mamadouh and Dijkink 2006: 355 
41 O Tuathail and Dalby 1998: 4; Mamadouh and Dijkink 2006: 355 
42 O Tuathail and Agnew 1992: 194 
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inform the practical geopolitical vision of policy-makers while the latter’s discourses 
and actions might be reflected in a popular cultural format such as a movie, while the 
same in reverse is also true. However, every strand has a particular analytical value in 
itself. For the purpose of this study, practical geopolitics is particularly useful, given 
the focus on the geopolitical representations of the geographical space inhabited by 
Russia and Turkey and how the government elite in these countries perceives that 
geopolitical reality. As O Tuathail has argued, practical geopolitics is synonymous 
with foreign policy analysis within international relations scholarship, especially with 
regard to social constructivist writings which is particularly close to critical 
geopolitics.43 Hence, in the next section, I will discuss the relevance of critical 
geopolitics in analysing foreign policy. 
 
Figure 2.1 The framework of critical geopolitics (O Tuathail and Dalby 1998: 5) 
 
 
2.1.2 Foreign policy analysis and critical geopolitics 
Focusing analytically on practical geopolitics brings foreign policy into the fore. 
Foreign policy can be considered the translation of the policy-makers’ geopolitical 
imaginations into practice. Indeed, as Dodds argues, critical geopolitics as a field of 
research can be particularly useful in foreign policy analysis:  
                                                 




The practice of foreign policy is inherently geopolitical because it 
involves the construction of meaning and values of spaces and 
places. [...] critical geopolitics seeks to examine how geographical 
representations are constructed and how those representations in 
turn structure the perceived reality of places.44 
 
This emphasis on the discursive notion and power of foreign policy is central. 
According to Kuus, ‘state identity and interest do not precede foreign policy, but are 
forged through foreign policy practices. The enactments of state interest and identity 
are therefore among the key themes of critical geopolitics’.45 Hence, foreign policy as 
state practice has the practical aim of naming places in order to confer meaning upon 
them. Hansen argues that foreign policy is both predicated upon ‘representations of 
identity’ while simultaneously also formulating and producing a state’s identity. In so 
doing, discourses mix the material and ideational worlds to produce a single narrative 
for a country’s foreign policy.46 
 
Through the formulation of foreign policy, which in turn is often based on a 
geopolitical understanding of global politics and the region which is inhabited by the 
country in question, a state’s national identity is also defined. States, or rather their 
political elite, conceptualise their state identity, or their state’s ‘geopolitical code’, by 
answering the question ‘where are we?’ in addition to ‘where are our friends and where 
our enemies?’.47 Essentially the same idea is behind Dijkink’s concept of ‘geopolitical 
visions’, which are defined as ‘any idea concerning the relation between one’s own 
and other places, involving feelings of (in)security or (dis)advantage (and/or) invoking 
ideas about a collective mission or foreign policy strategy’.48 Hence, geopolitical 
visions, which are of course strongly influenced by – and simultaneously influence – 
national identity are a function of a state’s foreign policy. Using foreign policy 
discourses as a means to define a stable identity makes sense because this requires a 
simultaneous answer to the two questions mentioned above and a definition of the ‘us’ 
and ‘them’. For Diez, however, the way in which discourse and foreign policy inform 
national identity is not by directly defining it, but rather by showing which are the 
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limits or boundaries of the country’s national identity.49 Independently of this, it would 
be wrong to assume that foreign policy is a stable practice. Instead, it continuously 
reproduces and reformulates state identity not least also because there are diverging 
fractions within a given foreign policy community, each advocating different identities 
and practices. 
 
In sum, critical geopolitics moves away from the traditional texts which presented 
geography as an objective truth and formulated foreign policy strategies accordingly. 
Foreign policy is no longer simply a tool to achieve control over a fixed territorial 
entity, rather foreign policy is also a tool to define and re-define new spaces and places, 
attributing value to them on the basis of the geopolitical vision of the governing elite. 
At the core of critical geopolitical analyses of foreign policy is thus the concept of 
discourse. Even though foreign policy needs actions to be relevant and efficient, those 
actions are backed by justifications and explanations. Therefore, the notion of 
discourse remains crucial in order to understand a country’s foreign policy. The next 
section offers a brief discussion of the concept of discourse and discourse analysis 
within critical geopolitics. 
2.1.3 The notion of discourse in critical geopolitics 
To start the discussion of discourse in critical geopolitics, two definitions of the 
concept will be presented. The first definition by O Tuathail and Agnew focuses on 
the comprehensive nature of discourses as value systems and defines them beyond a 
narrow understanding of discourse as written or verbal texts: 
 
Discourses are best conceptualized as sets of capabilities people 
have, as sets of socio-cultural resources used by people in the 
construction of meaning about their world and their activities. It is 
NOT simply speech or written statements but the rules by which 
verbal speech and written statements are made meaningful. 
Discourses enable one to write, speak, listen and act meaningfully.50 
 
The second definition by O Tuathail then specifically focuses on geopolitical 
discourses and how they play an important role in policy-making: 
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Geopolitical discourse encompasses all the languages of statecraft, 
is drawn upon and used by officials and leaders to constitute and 
represent world affairs – its constituent locations, defining dramas 
and leading protagonists – and their own role and strategies in these 
dramas.51  
 
As we see from these definitions, discourses are more than just words added up to text 
or speech. Discourses take place and they define social and political actions and in the 
end help to make sense of these actions. Especially in the domain of foreign policy 
making, discourses occupy an important function. In contrast to traditional geopolitics 
which is all about practice, O Tuathail and Agnew argue that political practice alone 
is not sufficient to explain the behaviour of a particular state. Instead the analysis 
should focus on discourse because ‘it is through discourse that leaders act, through the 
mobilization of certain simple geographical understandings that foreign-policy actions 
are explained and through ready-made geographically-infused reasoning that wars are 
rendered meaningful’.52 This is not to say that actions as such are void of any meaning, 
but rather to caution that actions alone do not possess enough meaning and that they 
only make sense when being legitimised through a discursive act.  
 
However, when embarking upon a critical geopolitical analysis of foreign policy 
discourse, one should keep in mind Kuus’ four ‘methodological nuances’ which 
provide the framework for such analyses.53 First, the aim of discourse analysis is not 
to find the truth or the true meaning behind a discourse. According to Kuus, ‘discourses 
are neither true nor false. Their significance lies in producing certain claims as 
meaningful and true’.54 The second nuance focuses on language and the content of 
discourse in that a discourse analysis is not so much focused on what is exactly said in 
a given text but on how it links to practice by providing the boundaries for which 
practices are acceptable and which are not. Based on this, the third nuance focuses on 
the link between discourse and practice by arguing that discourses ‘frame political 
debate in such a way as to make certain policies appear reasonable and feasible while 
marginalizing other policy options as unreasonable and unfeasible’ instead of directly 
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causing a particular policy outcome.55 Finally, the fourth methodological nuance 
concerns disagreements meaning that ‘discourses do not enforce complete agreement 
or a unified methodology’ but rather that they are composed of a variety of practices.56 
 
While for the most part geopolitical discourses are specific to the situation of one 
country, there are also some geopolitical discourses of global dimensions. Here we 
come back to the international state system as the prevailing form of organisation in 
global politics and also to the origins of geopolitics as imperial form of knowledge. 
Thus, some states, normally called great powers, have more power than others in 
global politics. As a result, their way of representing the world carries more weight 
than that of others, especially since actions by great powers ultimately have an 
influence on a large number of other states or regional actors. As an example, Dalby 
mentions the actions of the United States (US) in the context of the ‘war on terror’ 
through which the US redefined on a global level who its friends and foes were 
(‘coalition of the willing’ versus ‘axis of evil’), and which regions were safe and which 
dangerous. This US geopolitical discourse, of course, had a wide impact beyond the 
borders of the United States.57  
 
The same can be said about Russian discourses on Eurasia or the Eurasian Economic 
Union since it encompasses other countries in the region which, although sharing a 
common history with Russia, might have a different view on the region. Toal for 
instance defines the post-Soviet space as a ‘contested geopolitical field’ comprising 
five different actors, ranging from the state to movements within the state, to regional 
organisations, as well as to the external power complex.58 In such a context, Russia is 
but one among many actors and the various meanings and stakes of the regional 
environment depend on the geopolitical imagination of every one of these actors. 
However, given its powerful position as former imperial centre with a wide network 
of remaining economic, cultural, security and other links to its neighbouring countries, 
its geopolitical vision might be considered as particularly influential in the post-Soviet 
space. Indeed, as O Tuathail and Agnew argue: 
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Intellectuals of statecraft from core states – particularly those states 
which are competing for hegemony – have disproportionate 
influence and power over how international political space is 
represented. [...] Their power is a power to constitute the terms of 
geopolitical world order, an ordering of international space which 
defines the central drama of international politics in particularistic 
ways.59  
 
Formulated differently by Mamadouh and Dijkink, ‘only very powerful or hegemonic 
states can link geopolitical visions with an international power practice changing world 
order. Most other states will use geopolitical representation as a domestic justification 
for certain (realistic) international routines’.60 
2.1.4 Discourse analysis 
Discourse analysis is a broad term for a wide array of methods and methodologies used 
across different disciplines. Indeed, as Müller argues, ‘discourse analysis is sometimes 
(mis-)taken to be a method of data analysis, just like content analysis or factor analysis. 
Yet, more than only a method, above all discourse analysis is a methodology’.61 In its 
essence, discourse analysis focuses on the study of texts, speech and language more 
generally. The main theoretical foundation of this thesis is critical geopolitics and the 
subsequent discussion focuses on the utility of the critical geopolitical framework for 
doing discourse analysis. However, it shares a number of characteristics with post-
structuralist discourse analysis which has a similar understanding of discourses as 
encompassing both ideational and material factors and being highly constitutive of 
social reality.62 Thus, before considering discourse analysis and critical geopolitics, a 
brief introductory discussion of some general concepts of discourse analysis will be 
presented. 
 
A good starting point for this discussion is the question of what discourse analysis 
actually is. A simple definition comes from Dunn and Neumann: ‘in general, discourse 
analysts tend to interrogate the ways in which specific systems of meaning-production 
have been generated, circulated, internalized, and/or resisted’.63 Similarly, 
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Holzscheiter argues that ‘discourse analysis is an engagement with meaning and the 
linguistic and communicative processes through which social reality is constructed’.64 
In a seminal article, Milliken discusses the emergence of discourse analysis within 
international relations and argues that there are three underlying theoretical claims to 
which discourse analysts subscribe.65 First, discourses function as ‘structures of 
signification which construct social realities’, that is the material world only acquires 
meaning through discourse. The second notion focuses on the delimiting capability of 
discourses, or the way in which ‘discourses make intelligible some ways of being in, 
and acting towards, the world, and of operationalizing a particular “regime of truth” 
while excluding other possible modes of identity and action’. Finally, the third claim 
focuses on discourses as unstable and in need of being rearticulated constantly or, as 
Miliken puts it, ‘being unstable grids, requiring work to “articulate” and “rearticulate” 
their knowledges and identities (to fix the “regime of truth”) and open-ended meshes, 
making discourses changeable and in fact historically contingent’.66  
 
What becomes clear from this brief overview is that there is no single definition of 
discourse. In their essence, ‘discourses are systems of meaning-production that fix 
meaning, however temporarily, and enable actors to make sense of the world and to 
act within it’.67 That is to say that without discourses, the social reality would still 
exist, but it would be impossible to define its importance and meaning. Discourse 
analysis thus uncovers the structures of meaning, makes apparent what is hidden, and 
brings the material and ideational to life in that it studies the consequences and political 
effects of discursive practices. It is important to note that the aim of discourse analysis 
is not necessarily to find out precisely which actions are determined by a given 
discourse but rather ‘specifying the bandwidth of possible outcomes’.68  
 
Another critical aspect pertains to the divergent conceptions of discourse analysis and 
its function as either an explanatory strategy or a critical enterprise. The distinction is 
whether the researcher is interested in explaining foreign policy strategies and 
outcomes or in uncovering the hegemonic meaning and delimiting function of a 
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discourse. Diez argues that discourse analysis should primarily be concerned with a 
critical enquiry aimed at ‘problematising prevailing understandings in politics’. 
However, given that ‘discourse provides the context in which individual policy 
articulations are set’ they nonetheless provide important and interesting clues for 
explaining foreign policy.69 
 
One of the principal questions for every researcher engaging in discourse analysis is 
how to actually conduct discourse analysis. As already mentioned above, discourse 
analysis is a methodology with a plethora of methods and essentially every discourse 
analyst has to define their own method which best suits the research question and the 
data. While Müller agrees with this, he nevertheless calls for more theoretical 
engagement with discourse analysis and a methodological discussion of one’s own 
approach.70 In the second part of this chapter, I will thus discuss my methodological 
framework and detail the way in which I proceed in my discourse analysis. However, 
one overarching feature is common to all discourse analysis, namely that there is 
nothing beyond the discourse and that ‘the analyst has to work with what has actually 
been said or written, exploring patterns in and across the statements and identifying 
the social consequences of different discursive representations of reality’.71  
 
Nevertheless, there exist a number of models and strategies of structuring a discourse 
analytical research model. Neumann, for instance, uses a three-step model: in the first 
instance, texts are delimited, which means narrowed down to a comprehensive set of 
data. The second step consists of mapping representations, that is identifying the 
various representations present in the discourse. Finally, in the third step discourses 
are layered to demonstrate the differences between the discourse such as their 
dominant or marginalised position or their historical weight.72  
 
Another way of doing discourse analysis is by adopting one of three strategies 
‘focusing on continuity, change, or rupture’ or as Mutlu and Salter also call them, 
plastic, elastic and genealogical discourse analysis.73 Plastic discourse analysis is thus 
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interested in the ‘persistence of particular metaphorical schema’ focusing on how 
discourses are connected to each other and referenced on a nodal point discourse thus 
using the method of intertextuality. Elastic discourse analysis then focuses on how 
discourses change over time and aims to ‘trace the new relations between signs, tropes 
or metaphorical schema’. Finally, genealogical discourse analysis focuses on the 
absent and the supressed in that it ‘seeks ruptures, silences, breaks, marginalized 
voices or subjugated knowledges’ which are just as important as what is present in the 
discourse.74 My own approach comes closest to elastic discourse analysis since I am 
interested in the presence and evolution of the concept of Eurasia in the discourse of 
Russian and Turkish government elites. In the next section, I turn to the discussion of 
the specific methodological framework of this thesis. 
2.2 Methodological framework 
Critical geopolitics and its concepts provide a particularly useful framework for the 
analysis of foreign policy, especially since the level of analysis lies with the 
government and the highest echelons of power in Russia and Turkey. In what follows, 
I will describe the methodological approach which frames my research. The first 
section will touch upon the criteria for the selection of data and the sample size. In a 
second step, I will detail the way in which I proceeded with the analysis of this data. 
The final section presents a brief discussion about fieldwork and conducting 
interviews. 
2.2.1 Sample and selection criteria 
In order to engage in discourse analysis, one has to have a sample of texts to read. 
Which texts to choose and when to stop adding material is a crucial question.75 There 
is no general answer to this question as each research project has different needs and 
the researcher needs to define a suitable sample. This research project is interested in 
the geopolitical imagination of Russia’s and Turkey’s governing elite. More 
specifically, it researches the way in which Eurasia is being portrayed in their discourse 
and how meaning is attributed to it. Furthermore, it investigates the link between 
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geopolitical imagination and foreign policy practice. What this thesis is thus interested 
in is the official discourse emanating from the two countries’ government elites, and 
as a result, at the centre of this research is a relatively small number of protagonists: 
the top government officials of Russia and Turkey (see Table 2.1 and Table 2.2). 
Obviously, a complete picture of Turkey’s and Russia’s geopolitical imagination and 
discourse on Eurasia would only be complete when integrating a large number of other 
actors and viewpoints, ranging from popular views to academic discourse or literary 
oeuvres, as well as a wide array of historical material. However, for the purpose of this 
study, which focuses on the importance of geopolitical imaginations on the 
formulation of foreign policy, a narrow engagement with the governing elites of Russia 
and Turkey is necessary.  
 
This thesis is interested in the official view and representation of Eurasia in Russian 
and Turkish discourse. In particular, this research is interested in the way in which 
Russia’s and Turkey’s governing elite explain their foreign policy to external 
audiences instead of their own population (the two obviously being connected). This 
means that the focus lies on the public discourse and on people authorised to speak on 
behalf of the country. In most cases, these are senior government officials and 
representatives. Their geopolitical imagination and the structures of their public 
discourse are thus at the centre of this research, which focuses on public texts and 
speeches. According to Waever, this is a huge methodological advantage when 
studying foreign policy because especially in foreign policy ‘much is hidden’ and 
focusing solely on publicly available texts, instead of trying to figure out what 
government elites really think, will lead to a clearer argument.76 In addition, focusing 
on public texts provides many advantages, ranging from accessibility to providing a 
large sample over a longer time frame. 
 
The next question to tackle is how to select personalities to include in the sample, to 
decide who is indeed authorised to speak as well as how representative of official 
discourse they are. For the sake of simplicity, but also for pragmatic methodological 
reasons, the approach chosen in this thesis has been very narrow in that only a small 
number of actors have been included in the sample. This research thus focuses on the 
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highest echelons of the Russian and Turkish governments. Only a select number of 
functions such as President, Prime Minister or Foreign Minister were included on the 
basis of their function and capacity to speak authoritatively about their country’s 
foreign policy to an international audience. As Toal argues, a decisive factor in this 
regard is the political organisation of the state in question:  
 
If decision-making authority is vested in a single central institution, 
such as a presidency, the power of that officeholder to determine the 
geopolitical orientation of a state is considerable. They have the 
power to creatively synthesize the different traditions in a state’s 
geopolitical culture into specific geopolitical-policy storylines.77 
 
Russia and Turkey both fit the above description. Both countries can be considered 
semi-authoritarian states where decision-making in foreign policy is highly centralised 
and limited to a very small circle of officials within the central government. In the case 
of Russia, President Putin has established a ‘power vertical’ at the top of which he sits, 
in order to control as many political decisions as possible.78 In Turkey, President 
Erdoğan has consolidated his hold on power over the years and after being elected 
president in 2014, strove to change the country’s constitution in order to introduce a 
presidential system guaranteeing him wide ranging powers.79 In both Russia and 
Turkey, the current presidents have been an enduring presence and the dominating 
political figures for the last fifteen years. Their long tenure provides continuity to this 
research and affects the size of the sample in that the number of officials selected for 
this research is fairly limited. In the end, the sample selection was reduced to a small 
number of top officials occupying central functions with regard to the formulation and 
execution of foreign policy. The two tables below (Table 2.1 and Table 2.2) list their 
names, functions and dates of their tenure. 
 
Table 2.1 Sample selection: Russian government officials and their function 
Name Function Date No. of speeches 
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Sergei Ivanov Minister of defence 03/2001-02/2007 11 
Sergey Lavrov Minister of foreign 
affairs  
03/2004- 113 
Igor Ivanov Minister of foreign 
affairs 
09/1998-02/2004 5 
   285 
 
Table 2.2 Sample selection: Turkish government officials and their function 









Ahmet Necdet Sezer President 05/2000-08/2007 4 









Ali Babacan Minister of foreign 
affairs 
08/2007-05/2009 24 
Ahmet Davutoğlu Advisor to Prime 
minister 













Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu Minister of foreign 
affairs 
08/2014- 5 
   175 
 
After selecting the officials whose discourses will be studied, the next question is 
which texts to read. The focus lies on public discourses, hence public appearances and 
texts have been chosen. These texts need to convey a sense of the governing elite’s 
geopolitical imagination and also relate to foreign policy. As a result, the sample 
consisted of public speeches, both domestic and international, lengthy interviews with 
the media as well as articles written by government officials published in newspapers 
and journals. On the importance of political speeches, O Tuathail and Agnew note that 
they ‘afford us a means of recovering the self-understandings of influential actors in 
world politics’ and thus contribute to our understanding and uncovering of the 
country’s geopolitical imagination.80 A political speech is a specific scripted speech 
act in which politicians lay out their country’s viewpoint, convey messages and 
important decisions, as well as promote their policies. They take place on a regular 
basis, which allows for a continuous analysis, including tracing the evolution of 
                                                 
80 O Tuathail and Agnew 1992: 191 
44 
 
discourse over time. In most instances, a political speech is written by a number of 
people on the basis of diverse inputs from within the administration or ministry and 
thus provides a broad, politically comprehensive spectre. The same applies to an article 
written by a government official and published in a newspaper or magazine. In addition 
to speeches, interviews with the media provide the politician with a more flexible 
format, leaving more room for improvisation and, given the conversational style, more 
direct statements. They also provide an interlocutor which serves as an opposite and 
allows them to dramatise the speech act. 
 
In the Russian case, the Foreign Policy Concept additionally serves an important 
function in outlining the country’s foreign policy. The Concept outlines the main axes, 
regional issues and priorities of Russian foreign policy. For the period under study, 
three different versions were available (2000, 2008, 2013). These documents are 
highly valuable in that they provide the blueprint for Russian foreign policy and a 
synthesised version of the country’s geopolitical imagination. These ‘canonical texts’, 
as Dunn and Neumann call them, serve as ‘anchor points’ and objects of reference for 
other texts such as regular policy speeches.81 In the case of Russia, they also allow for 
an observation of the evolution of Russian discourse since the format and structure of 
the document usually remains the same and thus one can see where variations occur. 
Hence, these documents have also been included in the sample. Unfortunately, Turkey 
does not publish a similar official foreign policy concept or white paper. The only text 
coming close to this form is a regularly updated short synopsis of Turkish foreign 
policy, outlining in very general terms its main principles, published on the website of 
the Foreign Ministry.82 However, it is not included in the sample because of its 
changing and unsubstantial nature. 
 
The next step in the process consists of data collection and setting up a data set. For 
this research, a number of sources were used to collect the speeches and interviews by 
Russia’s and Turkey’s governing elite.83 In the case of Russia, most speeches and 
interviews were derived directly from the official websites (their respective English 
language version) of the Presidency (http://en.kremlin.ru/), the Russian Government 
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(http://government.ru/en/), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(http://www.mid.ru/en/main_en). All the speeches were obtained in English 
translation, the translations being provided directly by the respective government 
authority or ministry. In addition, several speeches and interviews were taken directly 
from the websites of news media, TV stations or think tanks in which the respective 
speaker appeared. In the case of Turkey, most speeches and interviews were obtained 
from the websites of the Presidency (https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/) and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/default.en.mfa). However, Turkish 
government offices were less systematic in translating and providing their leaders’ 
speeches on the government’s websites.84 Hence, a large number of articles, speeches 
and interviews, especially those given by Prime Minister/President Erdoğan, had to be 
researched online on a variety of platforms, including directly with the respective 
media institution or think tank in which the speech was given. 
 
All the speeches and interviews were obtained in their English translation or, in rare 
cases, the English original. This obviously raises important questions as to the 
authenticity of the material. As Neumann argues, ‘cultural competence’ is an important 
prerequisite when doing discourse analysis.85 This is needed in order to situate the 
research material, understand cultural references and generally grasp the political 
environment under study. A major limitation of my research thus is that I do not speak 
Russian and Turkish fluently, which prevented me from reading and analysing all the 
speeches and interviews in their original language. Therefore, I had to revert to 
translations into English. 
 
In summary, the data set for the subsequent analysis of Russian and Turkish 
government discourse on the meaning of Eurasia consists of a sample of a total of 463 
speeches, interviews, articles and concepts (see also Table 2.1 and Table 2.2). The 
Russian sample includes 285 speeches and interviews as well as the three foreign 
policy concepts covering the period from 2000 (Putin’s first election as President) to 
2015. The distribution of speeches according to each speaker was as follows: Sergey 
Lavrov: 113 speeches; Vladimir Putin: 82 speeches; Dmitry Medvedev: 74 speeches; 
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Sergey Ivanov: 11 speeches; Igor Ivanov: 5 speeches. We can thus observe that the 
bulk of the speeches derive from only three politicians, a consequence of the fact that 
these politicians have been in office for a long time. The Turkish sample is comprised 
of 175 speeches and interviews ranging from the year 2002 (the AKP won the 
parliamentary election and Erdoğan became Prime Minister) to the year 2015. Six 
speakers make up the sample and the distribution of speeches among these politicians 
is as follows: Abdullah Gül: 64 speeches; Ahmet Davutoğlu: 41 speeches; Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan: 37 speeches; Ali Babacan: 24 speeches; Ahmet Necdet Sezer: 5 
speeches; Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu: 4 speeches. Again, the foreign ministers account for the 
highest number of speeches, followed by the long-standing Prime Minister and later 
President Erdoğan. 
2.2.2 Qualitative analysis 
For the analysis of the data material, I proceeded in two steps. Before reading the 
complete set of speeches and interviews, I read a sample of discourses from both case 
studies in order to identify the principal themes and keywords with regard to 
geographical and geopolitical assumptions in Russian and Turkish discourse and 
national identity conceptions. Keeping in mind the general research question which 
focuses on the importance of Eurasia in Russian and Turkish foreign policy, four broad 
categories were identified. Each category comprises several key words and jointly they 
cover the basic conceptions of and references to Eurasia in Russian and Turkish 
discourse. This thus led to a taxonomy of the dominant themes in Russian and Turkish 
government discourse on Eurasia, which served as a grid of analysis for the second 
reading of the collected data (see Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3). I call this the exploratory 
grid because it allows for a classification of all the discourses within the four categories 
along the defined keywords. 
  
Figure 2.2 Exploratory grid I: dominant themes and keywords in Russian discourse 
Category 1: Geography 
Keywords: Centrality; Geopolitical 
position; Bridge; Duality 
Category 2: History 
Keywords: Historical space; Historic 
community; Common experience 
Category 3: Culture 
Keywords: Civilisational dialogue; 
Linguistic ties; Crossroads 
Category 4: Economy 
Keywords: Integration; Regional 





Figure 2.3 Exploratory grid II: dominant themes and keywords in Turkish discourse 
Category 1: Geography 
Keywords: Centrality; Geostrategic 
location; Interconnector; Bridge 
Category 2: History 
Keywords: Heritage; Common 
experience; Imperial legacy 
Category 3: Culture 
Keywords: Heritage; Kinship ties; 
Linguistic ties 
Category 4: Economy 
Keywords: Energy hub; Transit; 
Corridor 
 
The entire collection of speeches from Russian and Turkish policy makers was 
analysed through this grid. Whenever there was a mention of, or reference to, Eurasia 
in a speech, it was classified in one of the four categories on the basis of the respective 
keywords. Each category refers to a broad and dominant theme in Russian and Turkish 
government discourse about Eurasia: geography, history, culture and economy. These 
categories remain identical for both case studies. Based on a preliminary reading of a 
sample of discourses, several keywords are defined within each category. These 
keywords refer to specific characterisations and mentions of Eurasia and its place in 
Russia’s and Turkey’s foreign policy in the government elites’ discourse. For example, 
the characterisation of Russia as a Eurasian bridge is part of the first category, 
‘geography’, since it refers primarily to a geographical feature of Eurasia in Russian 
discourse. On the other hand, the repeated emphasis on Turkey’s kinship ties across 
the Eurasian landmass with the Turkic states of Central Asia is based on a cultural 
reading of Eurasia’s place in Turkish foreign policy. The ensuing detailed analysis of 
Russia’s and Turkey’s government elites’ discourse on Eurasia in chapters 5 and 6 is 
structured along the thematic classification as outlined in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3. 
In short, using this exploratory reading grid helps to distil the principal and most 
prevalent meanings of the concept of Eurasia for Russian and Turkish foreign policy. 
 
This approach has both advantages and inconveniences. In terms of advantages, it 
allows for a structured and guided analysis of a wide range of material from different 
actors covering a time period of almost fifteen years. Furthermore, it allows for the 
comparison of Russian and Turkish discourse, even though the primary nature and 
objective of this thesis is not the conduct of a comparative study. Finally, given the 
methodological openness of discourse analysis, it is important that the researcher 
develops a methodological framework that is consistent and transparent, thus making 
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the process, and ultimately the results, of the actual analysis intelligible and 
comprehensible for the reader.86  
 
However, such a rigid grid does not allow for a lot of flexibility because it forces the 
researcher to classify each event according to one of the keywords. Naturally, the 
boundaries between these categories are fluid and many references to Eurasia in 
Russian and Turkish discourse refer to multiple categories. For instance, the bridge 
discourse in Turkey not only refers to Turkey’s geographical position between and 
linking Europe and Asia, thus part of the first category, but also to its role as a mediator 
between civilisations, which is part of its cultural identity, and thus classified in the 
third category (see Figure 2.3). Given the social nature of this research, this was to be 
expected and the subsequent analysis takes this into account by linking and 
synthesising the various meanings and interpretations of Eurasia in Russian and 
Turkish government discourse. 
 
Following the classification of the discourses along the lines of the above categories, 
in a second step, an explanatory framework is developed to serve as a guide for the 
interpretation of the discourses. Discourses by the political elite embed the state’s 
position and its foreign policy in a broader understanding of the global system. Given 
that this thesis is interested in these states’ foreign policies, the starting assumption is 
that Eurasia is an important concept in Russia’s and Turkey’s perception of their role 
in global affairs. However, as has been discussed above, discourses are formative of a 
state’s national identity and provide the boundaries for social practice, thus they 
function on many levels, both in the domestic as well as foreign realm. 
 
Furthermore, in order to offer an interpretation of Russia’s and Turkey’s foreign policy 
practice, four factors or role conceptions, which arise from the governing elites’ 
discourse, have been identified. The four factors are power, identity, role and 
opportunity. The way in which these factors should be used in interpreting foreign 
policy is outlined by the following questions. It is important to analyse whether the 
discourse on Eurasia is related to the issue of power, namely Russia and Turkey as 
important regional or great powers and whether Eurasia is an inherent part of the 
                                                 
86 See also Holzscheiter 2014 
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country’s national identity. Alternatively, this study is also interested in whether the 
discourse on Eurasia is a pragmatic discourse that evolves around the notion of 
political and economic opportunities. Furthermore, the study is interested in whether 
Russia and Turkey see their role in the international system in a way that leads them 
to formulate certain specific geopolitical images of Eurasia. Or, finally, whether the 
discourse on Eurasia is all of the above combined. After the analysis of Russian and 
Turkish discourse in chapters 5 and 6 respectively, the importance and place of these 
factors in that discourse will be discussed in chapter 7.  
 
As this indicates, this research aims not only to explore the concept of Eurasia in 
Russian and Turkish government discourse, but to study the concept’s place in the 
country’s foreign policy. Proceeding from an exploratory stage to an explanatory stage 
is to lay the foundation for analysis first before proceeding to a description and 
interpretation of events. Such a two-step model also allows for tracing ‘change over 
time’, that is the evolution of the concept of Eurasia in Russian and Turkish discourse. 
Given that the exploratory frame remains the same, we can trace how different 
influencing factors, such as changing national identity conceptions or new economic 
opportunities, might have influenced Russian and Turkish foreign policy over the years 
as well as which factor or which factors are dominant at any given time. For this 
purpose, a chronological description of Russian and Turkish government discourse of 
Eurasia for the entire period under study, including the most important foreign policy 
events, is provided in the form of a table (see Table 5.2 and Table 6.2). Likewise, the 
main analytical chapters of this thesis, focusing on Russian and Turkish discourse on 
Eurasia, contain a section which traces the evolution of the discourse over time and 
tries to connect discourse to practice. It is here where my approach mixes critical 
engagement with the discourse with an explanatory approach attempting to explain 
foreign policy changes. It thus follows the approach outlined by Thomas Diez, who 
argues that while the critical engagement with policies and politics is the central aspect 
of discourse analysis, it nonetheless also offers avenues for the explanation of said 
policies since discourse also ‘provides the context in which individual policy 
articulations are set’.87 This will permit tracing the evolution of Russian and Turkish 
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discourses and see which developments – both domestic and international – have an 
impact on ideas and subsequent discourses as well as foreign policy practice. 
 
Let me now briefly come back to Neumann’s three step model for doing discourse 
analysis, presented above, which consists of delimiting texts (step 1), mapping 
representations (step 2) and layering discourses (step 3), and apply it to my research 
framework in order to summarise my approach.88 The first step concerns the question 
of which texts to study and when and where to stop collecting texts. On the basis of 
the time frame defined for both the Russian and Turkish case, corresponding to the 
time in office of Presidents Putin and Erdoğan, a period of fifteen years for Russia and 
twelve years for Turkey has been studied. Focusing on elite discourse in the realm of 
foreign policy narrowed down the potential actors whose discourse to study to the top 
government officials such as head of state and foreign minister. Public speeches, 
interviews with the media and published articles by government officials were 
included in the sample since foreign policy discourse is a public undertaking. This 
approach has resulted in the collection of 463 documents. 
 
The second step consists of mapping representations and identifying which is the 
dominant representation but also what other representations exist. This thesis is 
interested in Russian and Turkish government discourse on Eurasia. However, as has 
been noted, a discourse does not evolve in a vacuum and in the case of Russia and 
Turkey, the discourse of Eurasia cohabited with discourses on Europe, the Middle East 
and other geographical regions. One of the key undertakings thus will be to study how 
the discourse on Eurasia evolved and how it became the dominant discourse, as in 
Russia’s case, or how it lost some of its appeal, as in the case of Turkey. 
 
Finally, in step three, discourses are layered, which means identifying which is the 
historically most stable or most dominating discourse. Following from what has just 
been said above, here it is critical to account for other discourses in Turkey and Russia. 
In the case of Turkey, Eurasia is just one discourse and discourses such as Neo-
Ottomanism or Europeanization are also dominant in the public discourse.89 With 
regard to Russia, it is essential also to focus on the discourse on Europe, the Euro-
                                                 
88 Neumann 2008a: 66-73 
89 See for example Oğuzlu 2008, 2011; Dal 2012; Taşpınar 2012; Macmillan 2013 
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Atlantic and the Asia-Pacific.90 Identifying which is the most stable or dominant 
discourse is the task of subsequent chapters. 
2.2.2.1 Limitations of my approach 
At the centre of this thesis are Russia’s and Turkey’s governing elites or more 
specifically, a small number of selected policymakers. It is their ideas and geopolitical 
vision which are being examined here. However, in order to fully understand the 
complexity of global affairs and analyse all the nuances of foreign policy discourse, a 
variety of discourses and actors should be studied. As Neumann argues, ‘discourses 
should be accessed at many different points’, which means that not only actions of 
policymakers but also their meaning for the people concerned should be analysed.91 
Indeed, focusing on government discourse provides a singular point of view and 
neglects other forms of discourse, such as popular or academic discourses, which are 
needed to paint a comprehensive picture of a country’s geopolitical imagination. With 
regard to Russia, there is a wide variety of scholarship focusing on other actors such 
as students, academics, and the general public.92 The literature on Turkish foreign 
policy is overwhelmingly focused on the elite discourse and practical geopolitical 
analyses,93 although Bilgin provides an analysis of the geopolitical ideas and their 
influence by military actors and academics.94 The interesting aspect with regard to 
analyses of formal geopolitics (academic discourses) in Turkey is that one of its most 
prominent proponents, Ahmet Davutoğlu, moved from the realm of formal geopolitics, 
being an academic, to the realm of practical geopolitics, becoming the country’s 
Foreign Minister in 2009.95  
 
It is thus clear that elite discourse not only has an influence on the state’s identity and 
foreign policy, but also that the viewpoint and emotions of the population are 
                                                 
90 See for example Baranovsky 2000; Rangsimaporn 2006; Kuhrt 2012; Sakwa 2012; Neumann 2016 
91 Neumann 2008a: 76 
92 Müller (2009), Mäkinen (2016) and Kasamara and Sorokina (2017), with different methodologies, 
all focus on the geopolitical imagination of university students in Russia, while Tsygankov (2003) 
reviews the geopolitical arguments as expressed by select academics. Finally, O’Loughlin and Talbot 
(2005) and O’Loughlin, O Tuathail and Kolossov (2005, 2006) study the geopolitical perceptions of 
ordinary Russians through large-scale public opinion surveys. 
93 Yanik 2009; Yeşiltaş 2013; Başer 2015 
94 Bilgin 2007, 2012 
95 Erşen 2014b. In this study, the focus is almost exclusively on Davutoğlu’s writings and speeches as 
politician and his academic work is only treated in passing. 
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significant. That is to say that discourses do not exist in a vacuum and are mutually 
constitutive. Hence, one should aim to include as many actors and viewpoints as 
possible in order to provide a complete picture. However, for practical reasons and 
questions of scope, such an approach is rarely feasible. In this research, I chose to 
focus on government elite discourse because foreign policy tends to be primarily 
defined within the inner realms of central governments.96 Therefore, this thesis 
concentrates on and remains within the limited realm of policymakers and their 
discourses. 
2.2.3 Fieldwork/Interviews 
In addition to the speeches and interviews from Russia’s and Turkey’s principal 
political leaders, which formed the overwhelming part of the data analysed in this 
thesis, a number of personal interviews with Russian and Turkish academics, think 
tank analysts and diplomats have been conducted. The interviews were semi-
structured, relying on a set of prepared questions, while leaving room for both the 
interviewer and the interviewee to delve into other subjects.97 All the interviews were 
conducted personally over a period of six months in Turkey (Ankara and Istanbul) and 
Russia (Moscow) during my research stays at Bilkent University in Ankara from 
January to March 2015 and the Higher School of Economics in Moscow from April to 
June 2015. In total, I conducted 22 interviews (12 in Turkey and 10 in Russia), 
primarily with academics and think tankers. For the purpose of utmost openness and 
upon request of most of the interviewees, anonymity was guaranteed to all 
interlocutors and their statements are reproduced here by providing only a general 
description of their respective professional position. 
 
The initial motivation for doing qualitative interviews with policy-makers, and to a 
lesser extent with scholars, was to add an additional perspective to the exhaustive 
amount of primary data already collected, namely the speeches and interviews from 
government officials. The list of questions prepared for the interviews reflected the 
general research questions guiding this project. Since my methodological framework 
was already elaborated and the principal themes and issues in Russian and Turkish 
                                                 
96 Hill 2003: 55-56 
97 The list of prepared questions is provided in the appendix. Some inspiration for doing fieldwork and 
interviews in Russia has been drawn from Richardson 2014. 
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discourse on Eurasia identified, I could thus ask specific questions focusing on these 
themes and issues. My hope was to move beyond the publicly available discourse and 
get a deeper sense of the meaning of Eurasia for Russia’s and Turkey’s governing elite. 
Therefore, the aim was to conduct the interviews in an informal setting so that they 
would provide a conducive environment for an open and frank conversation. However, 
when I started organising the interviews in Turkey and Russia, I quickly realised that 
my aims were too ambitious, for reasons which are outlined below. 
 
Every researcher attempting to conduct interviews will be faced with a number of 
challenges.98 In my case, three particular challenges can be highlighted: access, 
openness, and immersion. One of the principal challenges, especially when doing 
research on foreign policy and practical geopolitics which focuses on the top 
government officials, is access. Whereas it is relatively simple and straightforward to 
obtain meetings and interviews with academics and think tank representatives, the 
same is not true for government officials. Despite contacts with diplomats from both 
the Russian and Turkish foreign ministry, I was not able to organise a significant 
number of interviews with policy-makers beyond a couple of informal meetings. There 
are two aspects to this challenge. First, many government officials and diplomats 
prefer not to talk openly about their work to a researcher. This seems especially true 
in countries like Turkey and Russia, where the governments are keen on controlling 
the flow of information. Second, as a doctoral researcher, one often lacks the necessary 
credentials or societal position to obtain meetings with high-ranking officials.99 In 
general, access to the right interlocutors is one of the biggest challenges for any 
researcher doing interviews and needs to be taken into consideration when designing 
the research. Therefore I had to change strategy and focus almost exclusively on doing 
interviews with academics and think tank analysts. While the prepared questions 
remained the same, the answers and ultimately the outcome of the interviews was more 
analytical. As a result, I chose not to add the interviews to the sample of collected 
speeches and interviews by government officials and subject it to the same 
methodological reading. Instead, the interviews were used to emphasise certain 
                                                 
98 For a concise overview of approaches to and challenges of elite interviews, see Richards 1996; 
Harvey 2011. 
99 This I personally experienced when a senior official working for the protocol division of the 
Russian foreign ministry explained to me that meeting with (senior) diplomats was impossible due to 
my position as a junior researcher. 
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elements in Russian and Turkish discourse on Eurasia or to provide an additional 
comment on ideas outlined in official discourse.  
 
A further challenge for the researcher conducting interviews with policy-makers and 
foreign policy analysts is to get the interviewee to speak as openly as possible and not 
merely repeat the standard government position. In countries like Russia and Turkey, 
where the government controls many areas of opinion building, this is an additional 
challenge and many interlocutors, despite being critical of government action, will not 
make openly critical statements in an interview.  
 
Finally, a third challenge for the researcher engaging in discourse analysis and 
interviews is proximity to the subject and/or immersion in the subject. This is 
especially true for the researcher engaged in an analysis of practical geopolitics since, 
as O Tuathail argues, ‘it requires near total immersion in the everyday world of foreign 
policy discourse and practice. Researchers need to become ethnographers of foreign 
policy behavior, yet without ever having direct access to the micro-world of their 
subjects’.100 As a result, what remains are the speeches and interviews from top 
government officials provided either through official channels or the media. Therefore, 
one has to work with what there is and focus on the essential which is the text. 
2.3 Conclusion 
This chapter laid out the main concepts and ideas providing the basis for the 
subsequent analysis of Russian and Turkish government elite discourse on Eurasia. 
This thesis is based on a critical geopolitical framework, which is particularly well-
suited to investigate how political elites infuse meaning into geography and make 
sense of the world surrounding them. In its essence, critical geopolitics focuses on how 
‘global space is incessantly reimagined and rewritten by centers of power and 
authority’.101 It furthermore ‘investigates how geographical claims and assumptions 
function in political debates and political practice’.102 The notion of discourse and the 
power of speech are central to critical geopolitics. The main approach selected herein 
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is the strand of practical geopolitics, which focuses on state officials and the highest 
echelons of power. As a result, foreign policy practice is an equally important object 
of study as elite discourse. This leads to one of the core formulas underlying this 
research, which is the interdependent nature of foreign policy discourse and 
geopolitical imaginations. 
 
Discourse analysis is a central element of critical geopolitical scholarship. Studying 
the way in which actors make sense of the world, how they make reference to existing 
discourses and attribute meaning to places, is a first step in trying to understand a 
country’s foreign policy and its position in global politics. Discourse analysis as a 
method offers many advantages but also challenges, which need to be mediated, not 
least in terms of data selection and interpretation. The methodological framework 
elaborated in this thesis accounts for these complexities by proposing a discourse 
analysis consisting of two steps: first an exploratory and then an explanatory phase. In 
subsequent chapters (Chapters 5 and 6), the discourse of Russia’s and Turkey’s 
government elites with regard to Eurasia will be analysed on the basis of this 
framework. In order to further prepare the groundwork before moving on to the main 
analytical part of this thesis, the next chapters will provide more general discussions 
on the subject of contemporary Russian and Turkish foreign policy (Chapter 3) as well 
as on the concept of Eurasia, both in general as well as specifically in the case of Russia 
and Turkey (Chapter 4).
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Chapter 3: Russian and Turkish foreign policy since the 1990s 
This chapter aims to provide a brief and concise overview of Russian and Turkish 
foreign policy since the 1990s. While it engages with the existing literature on Russian 
and Turkish foreign policy, the chapter follows a chronological structure describing 
the evolution and major changes in the two countries’ foreign policy. For Russia, the 
main focus lies on the period starting in 2000, with Putin’s accession to the presidency, 
and the Turkey section concentrates on foreign policy developments following the 
AKP’s first parliamentary victory and designation of Erdoğan as prime minister in 
2002.  
 
The first half of the chapter is dedicated to Russia. The first section briefly looks back 
at the foreign policy during the first decade of the newly independent Russian 
Federation, which was characterised by domestic instability and changing foreign 
policy orientations. Thereafter, the focus turns to foreign policy under Putin from 2000 
to 2015, including the Medvedev presidency from 2008 to 2012. It is argued that after 
a brief phase of Westernisation, the principal goal of Putin was to restore Russia’s 
place in the international system as an important and respected actor or, put differently, 
a great power. This not only meant expanding Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet 
space but increasingly also countering what was seen as the West’s and NATO’s 
expansion as well as US unilateral actions globally. Following his return to the 
presidency in 2012, Putin quickly started implementing his plans for the establishment 
of a Eurasian (Economic) Union which would provide an institutional framework for 
integration in the post-Soviet space and help cement Russia’s role as the regional 
hegemon. Furthermore, relations with the West further plummeted due to the Ukraine 
crisis in 2014 and attempts at diversifying Russia’s foreign policy options, including a 
supposed turn to the Asian vector, became central elements of Russian foreign policy. 
The last section then discusses the key concepts and ideas which build the foundation 
for Russian foreign policy, namely great power status, multipolarity and sovereignty. 
 
The second half of the chapter focuses on Turkish foreign policy. It starts with a 
discussion of the structural determinants of Turkish foreign policy, such as the legacies 
of the Ottoman Empire and Atatürk’s rule, as well as Turkey’s geopolitical realities. 
The chapter then turns to a brief overview of the 1990s, a period which was 
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characterised by political instability in the domestic context and a sudden opening up 
of Turkey’s geographical environment, thus creating new options in the foreign policy 
realm. The third section examines the evolution of Ankara’s foreign policy under the 
new AKP government, which offered a new vision and role for the country as a 
regional power, on the basis of being the leader of its civilisational basin, striving for 
more influence at the global level. While accession to the European Union (EU) 
remained a major goal in the early years, a diversification of Turkish foreign policy, 
including a turn to the Middle East, followed in the later years around 2007-2009. One 
of the principal architects of the new Turkish foreign policy was Ahmet Davutoğlu, a 
professor of international relations who was an advisor to Prime Minister Erdoğan 
before becoming foreign minister and finally prime minister himself. His strategic 
depth theory focused on Turkey’s historical and geographical characteristics as 
determinants of Turkey’s position as a central country in global affairs. As a 
consequence, Turkish foreign policy should be active with the aim of establishing 
Turkey as the regional leader and a global influencer. 
 
The last part of the chapter briefly looks at the historically confrontational relationship 
between Russia and Turkey and how it evolved over the years leading to a pragmatic 
and cooperative bilateral relation. The chapter proceeds chronologically describing 
first Russia’s and then Turkey’s foreign policy. However, the chapter is not intended 
as a pure chronological description of events in both countries but rather as a 
background to the subsequent discussion of Russian and Turkish discourse on Eurasia. 
Hence, I aim at describing the key thinking and elements of Russian and Turkish 
foreign policy throughout the last two decades or so. This review chapter is principally 
based on secondary literature and is intended to provide an overview, lacking, due to 
space constraints, a detailed historical discussion of Russian and Turkish foreign 
policy as well as their experience as imperial centres of the Russian Empire/Soviet 
Union and Ottoman Empire, respectively. 
3.1 Russian foreign policy in the post-Cold War era 
3.1.1 Russian foreign policy, 1991-2000 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the emergence of fifteen newly 
independent states from its ruins had far-reaching consequences, both regionally and 
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globally. For Russia, as the legal successor of the USSR and by far the most powerful 
of the Soviet successor states, this meant a new start with different premises. Whereas 
a lot of the Soviet Union’s material assets and international obligations remained in 
Russia’s hands, its ideology and statehood were gone. According to Ted Hopf, in that 
moment ‘Russia found itself between two different modern identities – that of the 
Soviet past and that of the western present’ – forming the background against which 
its current leadership had to define a new identity.1 This opened the floor for debate 
among the many political factions about the meaning of the Russian state, its place in 
the world and who its friends and enemies were. 
 
Russia’s first post-Soviet president, Boris Yeltsin, was one of the principal actors who 
helped trigger the breakup of the Soviet Union and thus contributed to the emergence 
of the Russian Federation as an independent state.2 As Arbatov argued, during the first 
year of Yeltsin’s presidency, there was a clear lack of a defined national identity and 
Russian foreign policy was thus in flux.3 Several observers argue that given the fact 
that Russia’s new national identity following the collapse of the Soviet Union was 
being debated, there was infighting among different factions of Russia’s political elite, 
each with its own ideological viewpoints, about the future course of the country.4 
 
Russian foreign policy in the 1990s can roughly be divided into two phases. First, 
under Andrei Kozyrev as foreign minister, Russia had a pro-Western approach and 
aimed at integrating with the West and Western institutions.5 According to Andrei 
Tsygankov, the civilisational idea of the ‘West’ was prevalent during Andrei 
Kozyrev’s term as foreign minister in the early years of Russia’s independence from 
1991 to 1993. It reflected a view of Russia as essentially a part of the Western 
civilisation with the aim of fully integrating Russia with the West.6 As Aron argues, 
around 1993, a set of commonly accepted foreign policy assumptions (a ‘tripartite 
strategic agenda’) emerged within the Yeltsin presidency. This agenda consisted of 
                                                 
1 Hopf 2002: 155-156 
2 See Shevtsova 1999 for an overview of the Yeltsin presidency. 
3 Arbatov 1993 
4 Buszynski 1996: 1-28; Larrabee and Karasik 1997. 
5 Donaldson and Nogee 2005: 124-126; Tsygankov 2007: 383 
6 Tsygankov 2007: 382-388 
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‘nuclear superpowership, regional dominance, and the acceptance of a diminished 
global status, and, with it, the engagement in the world as one of the great powers’.7  
 
Thereafter followed the second phase, which represented a slight departure from the 
previously overly pro-Western stance. The deterioration of the economic situation in 
Russia combined with a general disappointment with the West due to the latter’s 
reluctance to integrate Russia, benefited the nationalistic domestic opposition, which 
then went on to score higher results and gain more seats in the 1993 Duma elections 
than the pro-government parties. According to Valdez, all of this compelled Yeltsin to 
alter his foreign policy.8 Furthermore, as Tsygankov argued, domestic instability and 
the first Chechen war in 1994, as well as Western policies such as the decision to 
expand NATO eastwards benefited the statist coalition in Russia.9 As a result, Yeltsin 
nominated Yevgeny Primakov as foreign minister in 1996. Primakov saw Russia as a 
Eurasian great power opposed to Western dominance and especially the United States’ 
unilateralism and attempts to enlarge NATO. Generally, he favoured a more assertive 
and multi-vector foreign policy that would see Russia increasingly engaging with other 
regions such as the Middle East and East Asia. Hence, Tsygankov identifies 
Primakov’s policies as being influenced by the civilisational idea of ‘Eurasia’ 
understood as the opposite of the West, considering Russia’s spatial belonging to be 
located in the East and Asia.10  
 
In general, the 1990s were seen in Russia as a chaotic period, defined by political and 
economic instability. According to Bobo Lo, uncertainty and inconsistency were the 
defining features of Russia’s post-independence foreign policy, which was 
additionally dominated by short-term strategic thinking instead of long-term 
considerations. As Lo further argues, given that Russia lacked clearly defined national 
interests which it could pursue strategically, it preferred to act in the short term by 
simply reacting to emerging developments instead of developing a coherent strategy.11 
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The principal reason therefore, as Lo notes, was the absence of a clear ‘consensus as 
to either Russia’s identity or the nature of the post-Cold War environment’.12 
3.1.2 Russian foreign policy under Putin, 2000-2008 
Vladimir Putin became Russian president in 2000, after having briefly served as prime 
minister in 1999, and as acting president following Boris Yeltsin’s early resignation. 
In general, different observers argue that Putin was responsible for implementing a 
new approach to Russian foreign policy and restoring Russia’s ‘place’ in global affairs, 
thus ending the years of unstable foreign policy-making characteristic of the Yeltsin 
years.13 As Richard Sakwa notes, the recollection of the instability and chaos 
experienced by Russians in the early years of the newly established Russian federation 
became an important part of Putin’s political project to promote his rule and depict 
him as having restored order and Russia’s rightful place in the world.14 Still, Grachev 
argues that during Putin’s first term (2000-2004), his foreign policy lacked a clear 
direction and was characterised by ‘political manoeuvring’ in order to consolidate 
domestic and foreign policies after the chaotic years of the Yeltsin presidency.15 
During this time, when Igor Ivanov served as foreign minister, Russian foreign policy 
was characterised by Russian attempts to foster a strategic partnership with the EU and 
hints at better cooperation with the US (despite being a strong critic of NATO actions 
and bombings in Yugoslavia in 1999). For instance, as Stent noted, in a highly 
symbolic act, Putin was the first world leader to call US President Bush after the 9/11 
attacks and promised Russian cooperation in the ensuing war on terror, including not 
opposing the installation of US military bases in the former Soviet republics of Central 
Asia.16 However, this foreign policy proved to be rather short-lived. Putin’s second 
term, starting in 2004, saw the implementation of a new foreign policy vision. Sakwa 
termed this foreign policy approach the ‘new realism’.17 Sakwa argues that Putin’s 
‘new realist’ foreign policy vision can be characterised by seven features: first, 
‘economisation’ which means that domestic economic interests determine foreign 
policy; second, ‘Europeanisation’ which consisted of integrating Russia into the Euro-
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Atlantic bloc; third, ‘securitisation’, that is the importance of national and territorial 
security; fourth, ‘autonomy’ as a fully-fledged global actor; fifth, relations with other 
states would rather take place on a bilateral basis emphasised by good personal ties; 
sixth, ‘constrained great powerism’ (Derzhavnost) on the basis of cooperation with the 
West but as an independent international power; and, finally, the normalisation of 
relations with the West.18  
 
In general, Spechler argues that during his second term, Putin adopted a more assertive 
stance in foreign policy.19 This was epitomized by his famous discourse at the Munich 
security conference in 2007, in which he rejected the current international system 
dominated by the United States and its liberal, Western ideology while promoting the 
idea of a multipolar global order.20 A number of events provoked in Putin a sense of 
rejection and perceived lack of respect by the West for Russian interests. The 
continued enlargement of NATO (and to a much lesser degree that of the EU), which 
also included states bordering Russia, was seen as a threat by Moscow and as a failure 
to live up to the assurances supposedly given by Western leaders in 1990, that NATO 
would not enlarge. Over subsequent years, this proved to be a sustained point of 
contention between Russia and Western states, each promoting a diverging 
interpretation of the matter. While Russia insists that the West issued assurances to 
Russia that NATO would not expand any further eastwards after the reunification of 
Germany, Western leaders and NATO argue that no such assurances were given. 21 
Thus a seed was planted for the eventual degradation of relations between Russia and 
the West, culminating in the Ukraine crisis.22 Another issue which strongly alienated 
Russia was the so-called Bush doctrine and the United States’ unilateral military action 
against Iraq, bypassing the UN security council.23 In addition, the colour revolutions 
in the post-Soviet space, the Rose revolution in Georgia in 2003, the Orange revolution 
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in 2004 in Ukraine and the Tulip revolution in 2005 in Kyrgyzstan, startled Russia by 
demonstrating the instability of its neighbourhood and the influence of Western actors 
there.24 
 
There is widespread agreement that under Putin’s leadership, in contrast to the 1990s, 
Russian foreign policy was consolidated. Still, assessments about the extent to which 
Putin managed this consolidation differ. Stent, for instance, argues that ‘under Putin, 
Russia developed a new national idea, largely based on traditional nationalism and the 
Orthodox Church’ which would guide Russian foreign policy,25 while Averre argues 
that Russian politics were less guided by a coherent ideology than by external 
circumstances such as the formation of the new world order following the United 
States’ relative decline, as well as a sharp increase in energy prices.26 As Sussex notes, 
it is clear that the – in Russia’s view – fortunate development of global energy prices 
provided Russia with the necessary material capacities to support and implement its 
foreign policy.27 Increasing energy prices provided Russia with the necessary means 
to adopt a more assertive foreign policy. The economic factor in Russian foreign policy 
thus became more important, leading to what Wallander termed ‘transimperialism’, 
namely a system in which rent-seeking among Russia’s elite and the search for 
possibilities to advance Russia’s economic interests in the global economy have 
become priorities in Russian foreign policy.28 In general, Russia’s leaders were 
convinced that Russia’s place in the world was as a great power among others which 
would help maintain the current order and shape new ideas for the future.29 
 
As we have seen earlier, one of the initial problematic issues in Russian foreign policy 
was the absence of a clearly formulated strategy, and more importantly, its lack of 
consistency and continuity. According to Spechler, also during Putin’s first eight years 
in office, Russian governmental political thinking changed rather frequently from an 
originally quite liberal framework to an increasingly assertive and activist position.30 
Notwithstanding these frequent changes in posture, Matthew Sussex argues that at its 
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base Russian foreign policy remained the same, ‘because its national interests – to 
secure the post-Soviet space, to generate economic prosperity and to become a member 
of prestigious international institutions and organizations – have also remained largely 
unchanged’.31 In sum, Stent characterised Putin’s foreign policy as one of both 
‘restoration and revolution’ based on the premise that as a ‘key actor’ in global affairs 
Russia needed an open and diverse foreign policy.32 Furthermore, as Mankoff 
highlights, Putin’s pragmatic foreign policy was subordinated to his overall policy 
vision, namely the re-emergence of Russia as an influential great power in 
international affairs.33 
3.1.3 Russian foreign policy under Medvedev, 2008-2012 
After two consecutive terms as president, Vladimir Putin was barred by the 
constitution from running again for the presidency in 2008. He did however select a 
successor, Dmitry Medvedev, who in turn promised to offer Putin the position of prime 
minister in case he was elected. Medvedev was clearly Putin’s candidate being bound 
to him by friendship and not being a member of any of the opposing factions among 
the Kremlin elite. Hence, as Sakwa argues, ‘the choice of Medvedev was a way of 
shaping Putin’s legacy’.34 In 2008, Medvedev was duly elected as Russian president 
and Putin became prime minister, marking the debut of what would become known as 
the Putin-Medvedev tandem. Instead of changing something to the power structure 
within the Russian government, Shevtsova and Kramer argued that this arrangement 
demonstrated that it was Putin who remained the main power holder.35 
 
Pacer argues that the arrangement between Putin and Medvedev with regard to foreign 
policy was that the latter was in charge, and indeed Medvedev did differ in some 
respects from his predecessor, not only in rhetoric but also in his approach to Euro-
Atlantic security for instance.36 According to Pacer, Medvedev painted an image of 
Russia as a cooperative security actor by proposing a new European security 
architecture and under his leadership Russia abstained from vetoing the UN security 
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council decision to intervene militarily in Libya in 2011.37 Nevertheless, Tsygankov 
argued that on the whole Medvedev’s presidency can be seen as a continuation of 
Putin’s policies – although Putin and Medvedev differed in style, they did not differ in 
their strategic outlook for Russia.38 This becomes evident when looking at the five 
principles of Russian foreign policy outlined by Medvedev in an interview with three 
Russian TV channels in 2008. These five principles were: firstly, the primacy of 
international law; secondly, the promotion of a multipolar order and refutation of US 
unilateralism; thirdly, the principle of developing friendly relations with other states; 
fourthly, the absolute protection of the rights and the well-being of Russian citizens 
abroad; and, fifthly, the fact that Russia had ‘privileged interests’ in certain regions, 
which ‘are home to countries with which we share special historical relations’.39 
Russian foreign policy principles under Putin as president would not have looked very 
different. In the end, however, according to Lukyanov, despite Medvedev’s pro-
European rhetoric, his policies did not lead to any meaningful rapprochement with the 
West and actually prepared the ground for the ensuing stand-off between Russia and 
the West, which fully took off after Putin returned to the presidency in 2012.40 
 
An assessment of Medvedev’s foreign policy reveals that he was successful in 
promoting an image of Russia as an influential regional (and thus global) power and 
in preventing the further expansion of Western institutions into the post-Soviet space. 
The 2008 war in Georgia, which was Medvedev’s first foreign political endeavour as 
president, prevented any long-term prospect of Georgia joining NATO and effectively 
halted further NATO enlargement. Thereafter, Medvedev proposed the establishment 
of a new European Security Treaty, replacing the existing security architecture of the 
Euro-Atlantic space (which was perceived as excluding Russia).41 While the reaction 
from Western states was overwhelmingly negative, this proposal demonstrated 
Russia’s willingness and its assertiveness in becoming a crucial player in European 
security. Hence, although being considered a Western-leaning, modernising liberal, 
Medvedev’s policies on the international scene did not represent a rupture with 
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previous policies but rather a ‘period of stabilisation’, as Lukyanov demonstrated.42 
This is not surprising given the fact that Putin remained the most influential politician 
in Russia during this period and that after all Medvedev’s political upbringing took 
place under the wings of Putin. 
 
Indeed, in 2011 the decision was taken between Putin and Medvedev to reverse their 
roles for the upcoming presidential election. Putin thus presented himself as candidate 
for the presidency while publicly stating that he would offer the position of prime 
minister to Medvedev if elected. According to Trenin, Putin took the decision to return 
to the presidency following an assessment of Medvedev’s foreign policy. Despite 
having achieved major objectives, such as halting NATO enlargement, finalising 
Russia’s entry into the WTO or promoting further integration in the post-Soviet space, 
Putin viewed Medvedev’s foreign policy negatively, especially the failure of 
Medvedev’s European security treaty proposal and general rapprochement with the 
West and the failure of Russia to veto the UN security council resolution of March 
2011 to establish a no-fly zone in Libya.43 This context is important for the subsequent 
analysis of Putin’s third presidential term. As Trenin argued, upon evaluating 
Medvedev’s policies, Putin came to the conclusion that the West was not interested in 
cooperating with Russia on an equal level but only on terms decided upon in the 
West.44 This resentment with Western policies led Putin to adopt a more 
confrontational stance towards the West, which he considered to be hostile to Russia’s 
interests. 
3.1.4 Russian foreign policy under Putin 2.0 
As already argued, Medvedev and Putin did not differ in their principal foreign policy 
outlook which was the establishment of Russia as an independent power centre in 
global affairs combined with the rejection of a unipolar world order dominated by the 
US. According to Trenin, the Medvedev presidency was a sort of ‘scouting mission to 
the West’ in which Putin left Medvedev the foreign policy lead for the latter to attempt 
to improve relations with the West. However, Putin’s assessment with regard to 
Russia-West relations after the Medvedev presidency was hardly positive in that he 
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concluded that Western partners still did not respect Russia’s interests.45 After his 
return to the presidency, Putin thus formulated three new ‘pivots’ in Russian foreign 
policy. The first one was a ‘pivot to itself’, meaning the consolidation of Russian 
domestic politics under Putin’s control while shielding the country from foreign 
influence. The second was a pivot to Eurasia in the form of the proposed Eurasian 
(Economic) Union (EAEU), which was eventually implemented in 2015.46 Finally, the 
third pivot was towards Asia with the aim to foster better ties with China and to 
develop Russia’s Far Eastern regions and Siberia economically.47 In short, according 
to Trenin, the key goal of Russian foreign policy was to achieve ‘full sovereignty’ for 
the country, meaning that Russia would be able to pursue its national interests abroad 
and to prevent other states from interfering in its domestic affairs.48 
 
Yet, establishing Russia as a major power and being able to confront the US as an 
equal, also required that Russia better define what its identity was. Indeed, as Linde 
and also Hill argue, Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012 led to a ‘civilisational 
turn’ in Russian foreign policy in which Putin defined Russia as an independent 
civilisational pole.49 According to Tsygankov, three factors are behind this 
development: ‘the West’s continued global assertion of its values, the rise of non-
Western nations, and Russia’s ongoing domestic crisis’.50 Partly due to the inability to 
reform and modernise the Russian economy, but mainly due to the brokered power 
succession and return of Putin to the presidency, in combination with electoral fraud 
during the 2011 Duma elections, massive protests against the Russian government 
erupted in several Russian cities (for which Putin blamed the US). In addition to a 
generally more critical tone emanating from the West and attempts to support the 
protesters, Putin increasingly turned against the West. Keeping with the overall policy 
of establishing Russia as a major centre of power in global affairs, Tsygankov notes 
that Putin chose to add a culturally and ideologically defined vision of Russia as a 
distinctive country.51 According to Trenin, Putin redefined the answers to the questions 
of what Russia was and what it wanted to do. Hence, Putin defined Russia as a ‘distinct 
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civilization’ on the basis of the Russian world notion and argued that Russia should be 
‘the centrepiece of a large geoeconomic unit’.52 
 
One of the primary areas of focus of Russian foreign policy during Putin’s third term 
was the issue of Eurasian integration. In one of several policy articles describing his 
political programme and published before his election as president, Putin outlined his 
vision of a Eurasian Union.53 This new union went further than any previous 
integration structures in the post-Soviet space with the aim to establish a political and 
economic union akin to the EU.54 Putin, in his article, called it an ‘integration project 
for the 21st century’ whose principal goal was to build a ‘powerful supranational 
association capable of becoming one of the poles in the modern world and serving as 
an efficient bridge between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific region’.55 Indeed, 
this union distinguished itself from previous attempts to deepen regional integration 
by the speed and determination of its founding member to establish a legal and 
institutional framework, including a Eurasian commission and Eurasian court.56 
 
While Putin’s project of a Eurasian Union was initially seen as an open initiative 
embedded in the discourse of regional integration and economic cooperation, it 
increasingly came to be seen as a further step in Russia’s alienation from the West. 
This was mainly due to the simultaneously evolving crisis in neighbouring Ukraine 
starting at the end of 2013, which poisoned relations and led to the biggest crisis 
between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War. However, Russia’s actions 
in response to the events in Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea in March 
2014 and military support for the separatists in Eastern Ukraine, can be viewed as the 
logical conclusion of the Russian world view under Putin. On the basis of the 
cornerstones of Russian foreign policy under Putin, such as the restoration of Russia 
as a great power, the unconditional defence of Russia’s national interests, especially 
in the post-Soviet space, and the continued sense of rejection by the West, Russian 
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intervention in Ukraine seemed inevitable. As Tsygankov argues, ‘the West’s lack of 
recognition for Russia’s values and interests in Eurasia, on the one hand, and the 
critically important role that Ukraine played in the Kremlin’s foreign policy 
calculations, on the other’, were the sources behind Russia’s actions in Ukraine.57 
According to Götz, however, geopolitical considerations such as Russia’s strategic and 
military goals of preventing Ukraine from joining a military alliance and protecting 
Russia’s Western flank provide the best explanation for Russia’s actions in Ukraine.58 
Furthermore, based on an analysis of Russian discourse over the last twenty-five years, 
Hopf argues that Ukraine was always presented as a crucial component of the ‘Slavic 
family’ and thus also a natural member of all regional organisations under Russian 
leadership.59 In the context of Russia’s civilisational turn, in which Russia increasingly 
defined itself as a civilisational pole apart from Europe, Ukraine’s importance for 
Russia increased. As Hopf noted, ‘Ukraine was becoming an increasingly intrinsic 
constitutive part of the Russian Self, one whose separation from Russia was 
increasingly understood as unnatural, unthinkable, and, indeed, dangerous’.60 
Therefore, the Russian reaction to the crisis in Ukraine and the overthrow of the 
Ukrainian President Yanukovich was determined and substantial in making sure that 
Russian interests were defended. The Ukraine crisis thus also demonstrated the 
importance of Russia’s new civilisational discourse permeating Russian foreign policy 
under Putin. 
 
The simultaneous developments of promoting further Eurasian integration and 
establishing the EAEU in combination with the Ukraine crisis and the subsequent rift 
in Russia-West relations were significant in cementing Russia’s foreign policy vision 
with regard to Eurasia. They reinforced Putin’s ambition to position Russia as a 
Eurasian power at the centre of the vast Eurasian region and thus an important global 
player tantamount to other states such as the US and China.61 Overall, Russian foreign 
policy since Putin returned to the presidency in 2012 was based on the traditional 
principles on which Russian foreign policy rests, namely multipolarity, great power 
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status and sovereignty. These fundamental principles will be examined in the next 
section. 
3.1.5 Principles of Russian foreign policy 
Many analysts argue that among the underlying principles of Russian foreign policy, 
the quest for great power status has been a constant feature of Russian politics and 
foreign policy for the last two centuries.62 This idea is based on a historical identity 
constructed on the image of Russia as a strong and powerful state, a full member of 
the international community of states and an influential force in global developments. 
Hence, as Lo argues, the status of great power is assumed to be a permanent and natural 
attribute of a country the size and historical stature of Russia independent from the 
actual political and economic situation of the country.63 As a consequence, Moscow 
should implement a foreign policy which cements Russia’s image as an independent 
pole and one of the principal actors in global politics. The foreign policy concept of 
2013 clearly states that one of the principal goals of Russian foreign policy is ‘securing 
its high standing in the international community as one of the influential and 
competitive poles in the modern world’.64 
 
The preoccupation with status and the role which has been conferred upon Russia by 
its history and geography is understood by many analysts to be an elementary 
characteristic of Russian foreign policy. Especially in the post-Soviet period, when the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union led to debates about Russia’s identity, the idea of 
Russia as a great power was one of the undisputed principals Russia inherited from the 
Soviet Union. As a result, Clunan argues that post-Soviet Russian foreign policy was 
built on ideas of status rather than on an objective assessment of Russia’s material 
conditions and rational interests.65 The word used in Russia to describe this 
phenomenon is derzhavnost, ‘referring to a preoccupation with great power status 
regardless of whether Russia has the military and economic wherewithal’.66 As Smith 
highlights, Russia’s quest for great power status is thus based on ‘an emotion, it is a 
craving for a status that most Russians strongly believe is theirs by right, by virtue of 
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the enormous size of the country, its resources, its history’.67 The idea of Russia as a 
great power is something both elites in Moscow and the general population of Russia 
share. However, as Lo cautions, there is an important clarification to be made with 
regard to Russia’s feeling and identity as a great power and its actual policy. According 
to Lo, Russia wants: 
 
Acknowledgment of a right of interest in any issues it chooses, and 
of the principle of Russian indispensability. […] In the end, the value 
of “indispensability” comes not from being expected to deliver 
results – indeed, this is an unwelcome burden – but from others 
accepting Russia’s importance and greatness as incontestable 
truths.68  
 
The same seems to be true with regard to the place of Eurasia in Russian foreign policy. 
Russia considers Eurasia to be its almost exclusive region of privileged and special 
interests and it expects other states to respect this. As such, Russian domination of 
Eurasia is part and parcel of Moscow’s foreign policy strategy establishing the country 
among the global great powers. 
 
In addition to Russia’s great power status, two other principles are particularly relevant 
in analysing Russian foreign policy: multipolarity and sovereignty. Russia’s insistence 
on sovereignty as a foundational principle of global politics and its calls for the 
establishment of a multipolar global order are closely interlinked with the great power 
discourse. Multipolarity (or polycentrism, according to the Russian use of the term) is 
an important principle in Russian foreign policy and deeply embedded in official 
discourse as the following statement from the 2013 foreign policy concept makes 
abundantly clear: ‘international relations are in the process of transition, the essence 
of which is the creation of a polycentric system of international relations’.69 For 
Russia, polycentrism essentially signifies that a number of great powers, each 
dominating its respective geopolitical zone, manages the world’s major problems and 
crises and thereby guarantees the maintenance of global order. For instance, as Lo 
argues, ‘in the case of Russia, its enduring influence in post-Soviet Eurasia 
substantiates its claim to be a truly independent center of global power’.70 The same 
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goes for other great powers, whose existence Moscow acknowledges. This illustrates 
that in Russia’s use of the term, multipolarity is essentially a conservative notion of 
how to maintain the global order and more importantly Russia’s position in that order. 
Ambrosio put forward an even narrower definition of Russia’s defence of multipolarity 
as being inherently defensive in attempting to avoid US domination and unilateralism, 
thus guaranteeing Russia a rightful place in global politics.71 Hence, several observers 
noted that multipolarity is closely linked to Russia’s perceived great powerness being 
highly instrumental in serving concrete foreign policy goals and legitimising Russia’s 
position as a global great power.72 
 
In addition, the discourse on multipolarity should also be understood in Russia’s 
attempt to counter US hegemony and the Western liberal order which dominated 
international relations in the post-Cold War period. As Chebankova argues, the notion 
of civilisation is an important element in Russian conceptions of multipolarity in that 
‘large cultural and political spaces would form the core of international dialog, 
promote regional integration, and fend for the particularity of world cultures and 
political forms’.73 Hence, the way in which multipolarity is promoted in Russian 
discourse can be seen as an ‘appeal to civilisational diversity vis-à-vis American 
unipolarity, hegemony, democracy promotion, and regime change’.74 As a result, 
multipolarity is not so much a noble goal, but a discursive tool to delegitimise the 
actions of others and legitimise its own actions. As Makarychev and Morozov argue, 
‘being to a large extent a reaction against Western “collective unilateralism,” [the 
Russian doctrine of multipolarity] is more often used to legitimize unilateral policies 
that are designed as countermeasures to the alleged interventionism of the West’.75 
Hence, Russia’s leadership argues that in a polycentric global order, there is a variety 
of political concepts, none of which is universal or dominant. Hence, beyond 
countering US unilateralism and advancing its own interests, ‘Russian officials portray 
multipolarity as enabling a more efficient and just international system’, contrary to 
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the system under Western hegemony which imposed a particular ideological and 
political framework on other states.76  
 
Multipolarity is thus closely linked to the concept of sovereignty and the concomitant 
idea of non-interference in another country’s domestic affairs, which is understood by 
the Kremlin as an indispensable rule guiding relations between states. According to 
Chebankova, there are two dimensions of the concept of multipolarity with regard to 
sovereignty, the theoretical and the practical. From a theoretical point of view, 
multipolarity would lead to states giving up some of their sovereignty for the benefit 
of belonging to a regional or political group. From a practical viewpoint, however, 
sovereignty is still viewed as the principal guarantee for safeguarding the country’s 
security and national interests in an unstable international system.77 Indeed, in practice 
and in discourse, the idea of sovereignty is an instrument in cementing and defending 
Russia’s place in global politics. It is not only important in the external realm in which 
sovereignty for state actions is a key principle, but it is also linked to the domestic 
conception of ‘sovereign democracy’ which foresees a unique path of development for 
Russia (in contrast to the classical notion of democracy prevalent in the West).78 The 
concept of sovereignty is thus closely linked to the idea of Russia as great power. Being 
one of the global great powers, Russia not only occupies a dominant position in Eurasia 
(its sphere of influence) but also enjoys the right to conduct sovereign actions intended 
to advance its national interests. As Deyermond argues, the Russian discourse on 
sovereignty serves: 
 
To enhance Russian security; to challenge, at both conceptual and 
practical levels, US primacy and the extension of influence in the 
post-Soviet region by the US and its “Western” allies; and to 
enhance Russia’s position as both a regional power and a significant 
power in an emergent multipolar order.79 
 
The instrumental nature of this discourse becomes even clearer when examining 
Russia’s use of the concept of sovereignty in the post-Soviet space. While in general, 
the Russian leadership promotes the sovereign right of states as an undisputable 
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principle of international relations, Deyermond argues that inside the post-Soviet 
space, Russia’s use of the concept is fundamentally different. As such, in the post-
Soviet space ‘state sovereignty is regarded as porous in relation to Russia while 
remaining impermeable in relation to states outside the region’.80 This essentially 
means that Russia acts as a hegemon in this region (which is considered to be its 
“pole”) while expecting other states to respect this order, which in turn is based on the 
idea of a multipolar world in which a selected number of great powers determine global 
rules. 
 
All these aspects are important in discussing Russian discourse and policy on Eurasia 
since the concept of Eurasia is at the very centre of this worldview. Hence, Eurasia is 
Russia’s pole in which it acts as the enforcer and guarantor of sovereignty and which 
provides it with the necessary status to be considered and to act as a great power in 
global politics. Furthermore, the push for economic integration in Eurasia, culminating 
with the establishment of the EAEU, demonstrates Russia’s willingness to shape 
regional order. Putting the emphasis on the cooperative nature of this new regional 
union, which is described like a large-scale integration project, also helps position 
Russia as an important partner, not only for the West but also for the East. Russia 
would thus become a non-negligible actor in Eurasia by developing new economic and 
trade ties between Europe and Asia, while remaining at the very centre of these 
developments. 
3.2 Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era 
3.2.1 The structural determinants of Turkish foreign policy 
Before describing the evolution of and main developments of Turkish foreign policy 
in the 1990s and the 2000s,81 the next paragraphs will briefly outline the foundational 
principles or what Aydin called the ‘structural determinants’ of Turkish foreign 
policy.82 Four aspects, which all had and still have a lasting impact on Turkish foreign 
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policies, will be described: the Ottoman legacy, Atatürk’s ideology, the geopolitical 
realities and the duality of Turkish politics. 
 
The birth of the Turkish republic amid the crumbling of the Ottoman Empire was 
accompanied with pressure from outside powers and Turkey’s struggle to maintain an 
independent Turkish state. The victorious powers of the first World War broke up the 
Ottoman Empire, leaving Turkey with a small rump state at the heart of Anatolia. Only 
the subsequent war for independence, which lasted from 1919 to 1923, reversed this 
course, leading to a new treaty and the establishment of the Turkish republic in its 
modern form. Hence, right from the start, Turkey had to fight for its right of existence 
as a nation against external powers, causing a national trauma which left important 
imprints ‘upon both subsequent Turkish attitudes vis-à-vis foreign powers and on their 
nation-building efforts’.83 
 
Two further aspects of the Ottoman legacy on Turkish foreign policy need to be 
mentioned: the country’s westward orientation and more recent claims of being or 
becoming a regional power. As Aydin argues, ‘throughout their history, the Turks have 
been connected to the West, first as a conquering superior and enemy, then as a 
component part, later as an admirer and unsuccessful imitator, and in the end as a 
follower and ally’.84 This alignment with the West also had to do with a Turkish sense 
of superiority and a negative view about the ‘backward’ Middle East, which was 
derived from the century long domination of this region by the Ottoman Empire.85 The 
consequence of this viewpoint was that for a long time, Turkey had almost no relations 
with and involvement in the Middle East, a situation which only really changed after 
the AKP came to power in the early 2000s. 
 
However, in contrast to this viewpoint, the Ottoman legacy also conferred upon Turkey 
a belief in the country’s strength and its important position in global politics.86 This 
also included relations with the Middle East which increasingly came to be seen as a 
region in which Turkey could play a leading role, not least because of its past as an 
imperial power. In accordance with its growing power and material capabilities in the 
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mid-2000s due to its growing economy, Walker argued that ‘Turkey now has the 
opportunity to reassert itself in a way unprecedented by modern Turkish Republican 
standards, but quite normal by Ottoman standards’.87 While it took Turkey quite some 
time to come to terms with its Ottoman legacy, it seems that it finally found a way to 
derive something positive from it. As a result, Turkey increasingly positioned itself as 
a leading regional and thus global actor. 
 
In the early years of the Turkish republic, the country’s political destiny was dominated 
by its founding father and first president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. His rule was 
characterised by a highly personal approach and he remained in power for fifteen years 
until his death. As a result, his vision for Turkey and the ideology he espoused were to 
have lasting imprints on Turkish domestic and foreign policy.88 The basic tenets of 
Atatürk’s ideology (Kemalism) consisted of making Turkey a modern country and 
integrating it into the international system. According to Aslan, the principal aims of 
Kemalists were the ‘production of a secular-nationalist nation’, the creation of ‘a 
regional order based on the Westphalian polity’ and the ‘integration of the Turkish 
state into the modern (Western) world’.89 This last point illustrates the fundamental 
principle of Turkish foreign policy, which has only recently lost some of its 
importance, namely its Western orientation. This was a consequence of Atatürk’s 
belief that Turkey should be modelled after the modern states of Western Europe and 
should reject its Eastern heritage.90 The concomitant foreign policy implications were 
Turkey’s alliance with the West through NATO and, ultimately, its quest for EU 
membership as well as a negligent attitude towards the Middle East.91 
 
These considerations have dominated Turkish foreign policy for over seventy years. 
Only the far-reaching geopolitical changes after the end of the Cold War and Turkey’s 
new environment led to a rethinking in Turkish foreign policy. While Europe and the 
West still remain the principal vector of Turkish foreign policy, both the Middle East 
and the countries of the former Soviet Union have gained importance in Turkey’s 
strategic calculus. However, it can be argued that Kemalist ideas are still very much 
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present since Turkey’s foreign policy approach is based on ideas emanating from its 
founding father, not the least of which is Turkish attempts to play the role of mediator 
and stabiliser in its neighbourhood. 
 
Turkey has a unique location at the intersection of different geographical regions and 
cultures. According to Aydin, this situation has allowed Turkey ‘to play a role in world 
politics far greater than its size, population, and economic strength would indicate’.92 
It is clear that such a geographical and geostrategic location has an influence on foreign 
policy. Hence, Robins has called Turkey a ‘double gravity state’ because throughout 
its existence there have been constraints and opportunities coming from different 
geographical directions.93 A more recent characterisation has referred to Turkey as a 
‘cusp state’, simultaneously belonging to various regions at the same time, while also 
negotiating different identity conceptions, both in domestic and foreign policy, related 
to these belongings.94 
 
Turkey’s stance during the Cold War exemplifies the impact of its geography on its 
foreign policy. Sitting on the front line of the East-West confrontation, while being 
surrounded in the East by the Soviet Union, not only a world superpower but also a 
century-long rival, Turkey sought security in NATO membership which it acquired in 
1952. After the end of the Cold War, Turkey found itself bordering newly independent 
states in highly unstable regions. While the Soviet threat was gone, fears remained as 
to potential outbreaks of conflicts in its neighbourhood. Therefore, security 
considerations are traditionally at the forefront of Turkish foreign policy thinking.95 
More recently, however, Turkey’s geographical situation came to be perceived as an 
advantage rather than a liability. With growing confidence in its own power and a more 
active foreign policy under AKP rule, Turkey started to capitalise on its geography by 
orienting its foreign policy towards all the neighbouring regions while seizing 
economic and political opportunities and striving for greater influence in its 
neighbourhood. 
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In addition to these structural determinants of Turkish foreign policy, a fourth aspect 
can be added, namely the underlying duality in Turkish history, geography and policy. 
As such, Turkey’s trajectory was not linear because its policy options were 
consistently influenced by competing forces and factors. Among the most important 
forces, according to Robins, were the following dualities. The ‘duality of bipolarity’ 
which strongly influenced Turkey’s attitude and foreign policy during the Cold War, 
the ‘duality of a global, strategic versus a regional policy divide’ which reflects 
Turkey’s attempt at being a regional leader while increasingly also arguing for a 
greater role in global politics, the ‘enduring duality of Turkey’s normative geography’ 
meaning the geopolitical realities as outlined above, and finally, the ‘internalized 
duality’ between the traditional Kemalist establishment and the newly formed political 
elite under AKP leadership.96 
 
Arguably, Turkey is not the only country that experiences various and diverging pulls 
on its strategic thinking and foreign policy orientation. Nevertheless, all these forces 
and dualities are linked to each other and provoke consistent debates about the 
country’s politics, its orientation and the principles of Turkish foreign policy. In what 
follows, I will briefly describe the main developments and issues of Turkish foreign 
policy in the post-Cold War era, focusing on the period starting in 2002 when the AKP 
under Erdoğan’s leadership came to power, which had a lasting impact on Turkish 
politics and foreign policy. 
3.2.2 Turkish foreign policy, 1991-2002 
During the Cold War, Turkey’s external policies were characterised by a strong 
alliance with the West (NATO membership) and a status quo approach to foreign 
policy. However, the changed circumstances and unravelling events of the early 1990s 
represented a serious challenge for Turkey, forcing it to rethink its foreign policy. 
Robins distinguished three subsequent phases in the evolution of Turkey’s foreign 
policy during and after these far-reaching changes, the first of which, from 1986 to 
1991, was characterised by the ‘overriding personal approach’ of Prime Minister 
Turgut Özal, who aimed at establishing Turkey as a major and influential player in the 
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post-Cold War world.97 Similarly, Aras and Gorener argue, that Turgut Özal was the 
driving force behind a new approach in Turkish foreign policy which put more 
emphasis on multi-dimensional relations with various actors and regions.98 However, 
Özal also put in place a foreign policy decision-making process which was essentially 
tailored upon himself, neglecting cooperation with the bureaucracy.99 In contrast to 
this approach, in the second phase, from 1991 to 1994, Turkey consolidated its foreign 
policy and its position in global affairs and elaborated some clear foreign policy 
guidelines under the leadership of Prime Minister Demirel.100 The third phase then, 
from 1994 to 1999, was characterised by the quick succession of several foreign 
ministers and the lack of real political leadership, which Robins called a ‘weak, 
fragmented, competitive approach’.101 During this time, Turkey experienced political 
instability also domestically with a succession of a number of prime ministers from 
different parties and a ‘soft coup’ by the military in 1997 dismantling the first Islamist 
government under Prime Minister Erbakan.  
 
Overall, it can be argued that the 1990s were a very critical phase because it ultimately 
led to the revitalization of Turkish foreign policy.102 This decade, symbolised by 
Turgut Özal’s foreign policy opening, Turkey’s engagement with the European Union 
and the latter’s decision to accord Turkey candidate status in 1999, as well as Turkey’s 
continuing support for multilateral organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and 
NATO, laid the basis for Turkey’s future foreign policy.103 Furthermore, the 
emergence of newly independent states in Turkey’s neighbourhood, especially the 
Turkic republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus, offered new opportunities, thus 
provoking a rethink of Turkish foreign policy. According to Kösebalaban, several 
actors with diverging understandings of Turkey’s identity and civilisational belonging 
contributed to a diversification of Turkish foreign policy: 
 
Özal’s quest for leadership in the newly emerging vast Ottoman-
Turkish cultural geography, the military’s pursuit of security 
alliance with Israel, Erbakan’s quest for leadership in the Islamic 
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world, and finally Ismail Cem’s attempts to cash in Turkey’s Muslim 
identity so as to convince Europe of its strategic importance.104 
 
Yet, Turkey’s identity evolved during this period not just due to these changes. As Tür 
and Han argue, it was not only the rediscovery of its new neighbours that shifted 
Turkey’s orientation, but also a new perception of the EU’s and the West’s attitude 
towards Turkey. Having witnessed the open way in which the countries of the former 
Eastern bloc were welcomed by European countries, while at the same time feeling a 
strong sense of rejection (as exemplified by the European Commission’s deferral of 
Turkey’s accession bid in 1989), Turkey started distancing itself from its hitherto 
traditional Eurocentric stance in order to ‘search for a new, more self-reliant identity’, 
an endeavour which was ongoing throughout the 1990s.105 
3.2.3 2002: the AKP and Erdoğan come to power 
The general elections in 2002 resulted in a victory for the newly formed Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) thus marking the beginning of Erdoğan’s rule. The AKP 
was formed by a group of politicians that split from the religious Welfare Party (against 
whose government the military launched the ‘soft coup’ in 1997), claiming to be a 
political and not religious party. As such, it initially subscribed to the traditional 
vectors of Turkish foreign policy.106 As a result, the AKP has been called a ‘post-
Islamist’ movement because of its Islamist roots, yet decisive rejection of their 
influence, on its policies (at least during the early years of the party’s existence).107 In 
its first years in power, the AKP government clearly oriented its foreign policy towards 
the West and Europe and its principal objective was working towards EU 
membership.108 The adoption of this policy was motivated by various considerations. 
Not only did it underline Turkey’s long-standing alliance with the West and its 
willingness to play a greater role in Europe, it can also be seen as a defence mechanism 
against the Kemalist opposition at home because adopting standards and regulations 
required by the EU would help the AKP implement reforms and curtail the overarching 
power of the secularist military establishment.109  
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In general, Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government can be divided into two 
phases. The first phase, corresponding with the first term in office of Prime Minister 
Erdoğan from 2002 to 2007, was characterised by the above described pro-European 
orientation. Following a major electoral win in 2007, the AKP government grew more 
assertive, leading to a reformulation of Turkish foreign policy. Henceforth, while 
Turkey still aimed for EU membership, it considerably enlarged its foreign policy 
vision, striving for greater influence in other regions, particularly in the Middle East. 
Similarly, as Öniş and Yilmaz argue, Turkey’s relations with the EU evolved and two 
distinct phases can be identified. The first period, starting with the AKP’s accession to 
power until the end of 2005, can be called the ‘golden age of Europeanization in 
Turkey’.110 During this period, Turkey pushed for full membership in the EU and 
undertook numerous efforts, such as economic and judicial reforms, in order to comply 
with EU demands. After finally opening accession negotiations with the EU in 2005, 
the wind started to turn. As a result, the second phase of Turkey-EU relations ‘deviated 
from an all-out Europeanization drive to a possible retreat to what could be described 
as a kind of “loose Europeanization” or “soft Euro-Asianism” strategy’.111 The 
development came hand in hand with the realisation that Turkey should aim at playing 
a bigger role in global politics, notably by developing a stronger posture in its regional 
neighbourhood. This deflected some of the attention away from the EU towards other 
regions. 
 
Indeed, over the last decade and especially under Erdoğan’s leadership, Turkey’s 
relations with the Middle East grew closer. Since the AKP’s rise to power, its Islamist 
background has spurred debates about Turkey’s policy towards the Middle East. 
Reference was made to a Turkish ‘rediscovery’ of the Middle East,112 or even to a 
‘Middle Easternization’ of Turkish foreign policy.113 As Stein argues, Ankara sought 
to reconnect with its neighbours in former Ottoman lands ‘through a concept of 
Muslim unity’ and thus expand its influence in the Middle East.114 In general, both a 
closer affinity with the Middle East among AKP politicians as well as the general shift 
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in perception of Turkey’s regional role contributed to this development. As Dal argues, 
on the basis of Turkey’s new-found geopolitical identity as a central country in the 
international system and consequently as a member of many regional subsystems, the 
Middle East became more important.115 The main reasons for Turkey’s renewed 
interest in the Middle East were determined by both economic and civilisational 
concerns. Hence, the religious background of the AKP helped foster a new image of 
Turkey in the Middle East and ‘led to an increase in the country’s consciousness 
toward a potential regional leadership role based on a new civilizational rhetoric’.116 
In addition, economic considerations played an important role. Since the AKP came 
to power, in an attempt to diversify its exports and find new markets for Turkish 
products, Turkey increased its trade activities with the Middle East, a dynamic which 
was strongly supported by the new businesses popping up in central Turkey (the so-
called Anatolian tigers), which formed a core constituency of the AKP.117  
 
In addition, Turkey’s relations with the West and the accession process with the EU 
provided further impetus for Turkey’s involvement in the Middle East. As such, 
‘strategic calculations and pragmatism aimed at increasing Turkey’s bargaining power 
vis-à-vis the West, especially in its complex relations with the EU’ played an important 
role in depicting Turkey as a crucial regional and global actor.118 In general, it can be 
argued that Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East did not replace Turkey’s 
traditional westward orientation but rather it testifies to a more assertive approach 
under Erdoğan and to a general ‘gradual diversification of Turkish foreign policy’.119 
Turkey’s involvement in what used to be part of the Ottoman Empire was thus part of 
the general foreign policy goal of establishing Turkey as an important actor in regional 
and global politics on the basis of the country’s strategic geographical location and 
cultural diversity. 
 
Erdoğan and the AKP government considered Turkey to occupy an important position 
in international politics and in consequence they promoted a more active Turkish 
foreign policy. Several factors explain this new approach in Turkish foreign policy, 
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among them the influence of the former advisor and later Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, the re-formulation of Turkey’s identity as well as the growing importance 
of economic factors and Turkey’s role as a trading state. The new geopolitical 
discourse which emerged under the AKP was a consequence of both domestic and 
international changes, where global economic developments opened up a new zone of 
engagement for Turkey in its neighbourhood and the power struggle with the Kemalist 
and military establishment led to a reformulation of Turkey’s identity towards a more 
conservative and Islamist stance.120 One of the principal ruptures in the new foreign 
policy under the AKP was a shift towards a civilisational geopolitics approach, 
meaning that concepts such as culture and religion are predominant in defining the 
international system, which in the case of Turkey meant that its ‘centrality in terms of 
representation of Islamic civilization is underlined’.121 
 
In general, however, this new foreign policy does not represent a complete departure 
from traditional values but should rather be considered a subtle reorientation. For 
instance, as some scholars argue, the new AKP approach can also be seen as a 
continuation of efforts first made by Turgut Özal towards the end of the Cold War, 
who emphasised the country’s geographical position and its historical weight in order 
to claim a greater role for Turkey.122 Similarly, Başer analyses the often-cited shift of 
axis argument in Turkish foreign policy under the AKP and comes to the conclusion 
that the national role conceptions most frequently used by AKP leaders were also used 
by predecessor governments. As Başer observes, there was, however, a change in 
terms of Turkey’s level of activism in foreign policy, especially with reference to the 
roles of ‘regional leader and global system collaborator’, which were particularly 
prominent under the AKP government.123 It should be noted though, that part of this 
activism might also be explained by the fact that Turkey was again operating in a stable 
and indeed growing economic environment domestically. 
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3.2.4 Reformulation of Turkish foreign policy (and the impact of Davutoğlu) 
There has been a significant evolution in Turkish foreign policy under the AKP, 
especially following their decisive electoral victory in 2007. An important figure in 
this regard is Ahmet Davutoğlu who is the mastermind behind the new Turkish foreign 
policy approach.124 A professor of international relations, Davutoğlu became advisor 
to Prime Minister Erdoğan before becoming minister of foreign affairs in 2009 and 
eventually prime minister in 2014, replacing Erdoğan after the latter moved on to 
become president. Davutoğlu had a clear vision for Turkish foreign policy, which he 
was then able to put into practice himself while his scholarly theses provided the 
blueprint for Turkish foreign policy. However, the evolution of Turkish foreign policy 
in the late 2000s cannot singlehandedly be explained by the figure of Davutoğlu, other 
factors such as external events in Turkey’s neighbourhood and economic factors also 
play an important role. 
 
The core idea of Davutoğlu’s vision for Turkey is his ‘strategic depth’ doctrine which 
he outlined in a book titled Strategic Depth, published in 2001.125 This concept makes 
allusion to Turkey’s historical experience as part of the Ottoman Empire as well as its 
geographical situation at the intersection of different regions and civilisations.126 This 
doctrine marks a departure from Turkey’s traditional Kemalist approach to foreign 
policy. At the core of the strategic depth doctrine, are the two concepts of ‘historical 
depth’ and ‘geographic depth’. First, historical depth is a characteristic of a country 
which, according to Davutoğlu, is ‘at the epicentre of [historical] events’ often 
implying that this country has once been part of an empire.127 Coupled with this 
understanding of Turkey’s past is an emphasis on cultural and civilisational aspects, 
which according to Davutoğlu, have a crucial influence on Turkish foreign policy. 
Thereby, on the basis of its Ottoman legacy and shared Islamic heritage, Turkey is 
ideally placed to develop strong links to its neighbouring states, even acting as a leader 
within this community.128 Second, the concept of ‘geographic depth’ is a function of 
‘historical depth’ and makes allusion to the past and present geographic spread of a 
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country and thus ‘places Turkey right at the centre of many geopolitical influences’.129 
For Davutoğlu, this reading of Turkey’s geography as geostrategically lying at the 
epicentre of many regions, conditions its foreign policy practice. 
 
The consequence of Davutoğlu’s strategic depth doctrine for foreign policy is an 
understanding that Turkey should be conscious of its history and its geography and 
take these two factors as guiding lights in the definition of its foreign policy. 
Emanating from these reflections is one of the core concepts of Turkish foreign policy 
as envisaged by Davutoğlu, namely the central country concept, which stipulates that 
a central country ‘is geographically and geoculturally located at the intersection of 
self-contained regional systems’.130 Indeed, in one of his articles, Davutoğlu argues 
that Turkey’s geography and history define it as a central country, the result of which 
being that Turkey should adopt an active foreign policy because a ‘central country with 
such an optimal geographic location cannot define itself in a defensive manner’.131 
According to Yalvaç, the strategic depth doctrine as a geopolitical discourse 
‘represents a secularized form of Islamic politics oriented towards increasing the 
power of Turkey in those regions with which it had close ties historically during the 
Ottoman Empire’.132 In sum, this illustrates the willingness of Turkey’s leadership to 
increase its position in regional and global politics and has major influence on events 
in its neighbourhood. 
 
In addition to this rather geostrategic doctrine, Davutoğlu also outlined five practical 
principles guiding his vision for Turkish foreign policy.133 First, in order to have 
influence abroad, a ‘balance between security and democracy’ at home was needed. 
Second, the importance of the regional environment for Turkey is taken into account 
in the ‘zero problems with neighbours’ policy. Third, and this is a consequence of the 
previous principle, the establishment of good relations with regions such as the 
Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia is a key priority. Fourth, Turkey 
should conduct a ‘multi-dimensional foreign policy’ in which its relations with 
different global actors are ‘complementary, not in competition’. The fifth and final 
                                                 
129 Quoted in Murinson 2006: 952 
130 Kardaş 2012b: 3 
131 Davutoğlu 2008: 78 
132 Yalvaç 2012: 167 
133 Davutoğlu 2008 
85 
 
principle was the development and implementation of a ‘rhythmic diplomacy’ which 
means to have a particularly active diplomacy by hosting important international 
meetings and conducting frequent state visits.134 
 
In accordance with Davutoğlu’s viewpoints outlined above, the AKP government 
reformulated Turkey’s position in the international system. However, this is not purely 
a consequence of Davutoğlu’s influence, but also of the changed geography of the 
post-Cold War world. The erosion of the Soviet threat eased Turkey’s security needs 
and the necessity to align with the West. Simultaneously, it opened up new areas for 
security cooperation and economic opportunities, especially in Turkey’s 
neighbourhood. This led to a ‘de-securitisation’ of Turkish foreign policy, meaning 
that security considerations, traditionally the principal vector in Turkish foreign 
policy, became less important.135 This also meant that, while politically, Turkey was 
interested in becoming a part of Europe through EU membership, in security terms it 
was less dependent on it. As a result, opportunities were opening up for Turkey to 
venture into new geographical regions. Indeed, as Yeşiltaş argues, instead of 
securitisation, flexibility became the new framework for Turkey’s approach to its 
geographical environment.136 Turkey’s leadership realised that their country could be 
more than the eastern-most partner in a Western alliance. Under AKP rule, Turkey 
tried to emancipate itself from the traditional vectors of its foreign policy and the 
government aimed to reposition the country on the world map. The AKP leadership 
thus adopted national role conceptions, which according to Aras and Gorener, defined 
the country as a ‘regional leader’, ‘regional protector’ and ‘global system 
collaborator’.137 In general, following the AKP’s rise to power, Turkey came out of its 
foreign policy isolation and, probably naturally so, targeted the states in its immediate 
regional environment. 
 
Furthermore, economic considerations became more important. As Fisher Onar 
argues, there were four main discourses in the AKP government with regard to 
Turkey’s foreign policy orientation, the overarching of which being the ‘Turkey Inc.’ 
discourse. According to this discourse, the AKP aims at ‘establishing Turkey as a (soft) 
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power – a hub and gateway – for transactions across its multiple regions and 
hinterlands’.138 In addition to the decrease of security considerations, the increase of 
economic opportunities and commercial links became major drivers behind the new 
Turkish foreign policy. Under the AKP the importance of trade and economic 
exchanges in foreign policy significantly increased. With reference to this 
development, Kirişci adopted the concept of ‘trading state’ to Turkey whereby he 
refers to the importance of economic factors and commercial opportunities in 
determining the orientation of Turkish foreign policy.139 In addition to the general 
growth of Turkey’s economy and concomitant increase in trade relations, there are 
several reasons for this development. First, the ‘de-securitisation’ of Turkish foreign 
policy and Turkey’s relations with its neighbours has led to a shift in the policy-
makers’ thinking away from security concerns to economic considerations.140 Second, 
in accordance with general global tendencies and the shift from the West to the East 
in terms of economic activity, Ankara increasingly also turned towards other regions, 
such as the Middle East, in order to diversify its trade relations.141 The economic 
troubles of the EU and Eurozone, as well as a general dissatisfaction among Turkish 
businesses with European partners, further fostered this dynamic.142 Finally, Turkey’s 
leadership quickly realised that in order to be more influential in global and regional 
politics, Turkey needed to have the means to back such ambitions. Hence, the AKP 
government increasingly combined foreign policy with economic relations by 
promoting Turkish businesses on state trips and bringing along large delegations of 
business people.143 
 
Since the AKP came to power in 2002, Turkish foreign policy has moved away from 
some of its long-standing determinants. As Yeşiltaş puts it, the ‘AKP has a liberal-
oriented geopolitical practice in shaping Turkey’s regional policy, but at the same time 
it has a conservative and Islamist geopolitical vision in terms of connecting history 
and culture to foreign policy’.144 Turkey became a more active player in international 
affairs and a lot of it was due to the attitude and the vision of the AKP leadership. 
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Given its history and its geographical position, Turkey has manifold political and 
economic interests and seeks a position of influence in different regions. The AKP 
government capitalised on this situation and, while still striving for EU membership, 
diversified its foreign relations, especially with its immediate neighbourhood and the 
Middle East. As a result, Turkish foreign policy has become more pragmatic in that it 
is based on an evaluation of the country’s interests and domestic needs. 
3.3 Russia-Turkey relations since the end of the Cold War 
The previous sections briefly discussed the major developments in and evolution of 
Russian and Turkish foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. The next section 
offers a brief description of Russia-Turkey relations and how they evolved from a 
complicated relationship in the 1990s to a strategic partnership in the 2000s. The 
bilateral relationship improved to such a point that some observers even raised the 
question whether the two countries would eventually form a ‘Eurasian axis’.145 Russia 
and Turkey indeed share a number of similarities with regard to their historical 
experience and geographical characteristics. Furthermore, as illustrated above, 
Russia’s and Turkey’s relationship with the West is complicated and fraught with 
misunderstandings which have important consequences for their foreign policy 
orientation as well as self-perception of their place in the world. This thesis focuses on 
these two countries and their respective government elites’ discourse concerning the 
importance of Eurasia. The subsequent chapters discuss these two states’ Eurasian 
discourse separately while the concluding chapters will offer a synthesis and only 
certain elements of a comparison. Nevertheless, it seems relevant to provide a very 
cursory overview of Russia-Turkey relations in order to understand the complexities 
in their bilateral relationship and what this means for their respective perception of and 
policies with regard to Eurasia.  
 
Turkey and Russia share a history of competition, warfare and mistrust. The Russian 
and Ottoman Empires fought numerous wars with each other in the 18th and 19th 
centuries over territory and influence in their shared neighbourhood. During the Cold 
War, Turkey was an ally of the US and the West, becoming a member of NATO in 
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1952, largely due to the perceived Soviet threat to Turkey’s security.146 Following the 
end of the Cold War, Ankara and Moscow had to rethink their relationship to try to 
put it on a new, constructive basis. At the same time, the emergence of newly 
independent states in Turkey’s neighbourhood considerably changed the 
circumstances, especially since some of the states in the Caucasus and Central Asia 
had historical, cultural, religious and linguistic links to Turkey. Relations between 
Turkey and Russia since the end of the Cold War can be roughly divided into two 
periods. The first period, from the end of the Cold War until 2002, when the AKP 
came to power in Turkey, was characterised by a hesitant approach between the two 
countries. On the other hand, the second period, starting in 2002, has led to a stable 
relationship, which overall can be characterised as cooperative based on strong trade 
and energy ties between the two countries, despite occasional disagreements.147 
 
Turkey-Russia relations in the early 1990s began on a negative footing. As a result of 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new space for Turkish foreign policy opened up in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus and Ankara tried to gain advantage from this position. 
As a result, the ‘1990s can be classified as the “lost years” in Turkey-Russia relations’ 
due to their continuing rivalry and competition.148 Still, the last decade of the twentieth 
century certainly led to a normalisation in relations between Ankara and Moscow. This 
and the fact that both countries came to realise that they share a number of converging 
interests, mainly related to the instability in their common neighbourhood, led to 
increased cooperation.149 Overall, the nature of the relationship between the two 
countries in the 1990s can be characterised as ‘routine “normalization”’, but not (yet) 
leading to ‘genuine rapprochement’.150 
 
In the 2000s then, following Erdoğan’s rise to power in Turkey, relations with Russia 
started to improve.151 For instance, Vladimir Putin’s visit to Turkey in 2004 was the 
first time after the end of the Cold War that a Russian president would visit the Turkish 
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republic. Thereafter, a series of bilateral visits and meetings between Putin and 
Erdoğan were organised and the two leaders openly and frequently expressed their 
willingness for stronger cooperation and friendship between the two countries. As 
some argue, despite differences on a number of foreign policy issues, the personal 
relationship between Putin and Erdoğan considerably helped reduce the complexities 
of the bilateral relationship and drove cooperation forward.152 Another reason for the 
improvement was also Turkey’s ‘zero problems with neighbours’ policy, which also 
included Russia and with which Turkey aimed to foster positive relations with Russia, 
also by acknowledging Russia’s importance for stability in Eurasia.153 In general, the 
positive attitude of both countries in seeking opportunities for cooperation and 
mutually beneficial policies led to the ‘maturation’ of Turkish-Russian relations.154 
This is exemplified by the establishment of the High-level Cooperation Council in 
2010, which institutionalised an annual meeting between the two countries’ leaders 
with the aim to further promote cooperation on a wide variety of issues. It can thus be 
argued that the 2000s were a decisive ‘turning point’ in Russia-Turkey relations.155  
 
While at first strategic considerations and stability in the region stood at the forefront, 
economic considerations and trade relations, above all in the tourism and energy 
sectors, eventually became the most important issues. Indeed, the bilateral trade 
turnover multiplied from a total of about $4 billion in 2000 to over $30 billion in 2013, 
thus making Russia Turkey’s biggest trading partner besides the EU. As Erşen argues, 
the warming of relations between Russia and Turkey was thus principally fuelled by 
‘pragmatic economic interests of two “trading states”, rather than well-formulated 
long-term strategies’.156 While commercial relations and tourism between the two 
countries have soared, the most important factor in Turkish-Russian relations is 
energy.157 This is emphasised by a look at the trade data: 65 percent of Turkish imports 
from Russia are either natural gas or oil products.158 Furthermore, a direct gas pipeline 
runs from Russia to Turkey under the Black Sea and initial construction work has 
started on an additional pipeline, termed the Turkish Stream project. Since Russia is a 
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net energy exporter and Turkey a net energy importer, it is not surprising that energy 
occupies such an important place in their commercial relationship since the two 
countries perfectly complement each other.  
 
The improvement of relations between Turkey and Russia in the 2000s led some 
observers to reflect on the nature of this relationship and discuss the potential for the 
formation of a Russia-Turkey axis.159 Such statements should be read in the context of 
Russia’s and Turkey’s respective relations with the West and Europe. According to 
some, ‘alienation’ from the West and Europe was a driving force behind the Ankara-
Moscow rapprochement.160 According to this logic, Turkey and Russia moved closer 
because they were both excluded from Europe. Both countries consider themselves to 
be part of Europe, both geographically and culturally, and they resent the European 
Union for assuming a sort of monopoly in defining Europe’s identity, thus making 
them ‘outsiders’.161 Secondly, Russia and Turkey perceive themselves as regional 
powers with some leverage and influence over the states in their neighbourhood but 
both countries lament that neither the EU nor the US respect this sense of regional 
leadership.162 Furthermore, the US role and interventionism in their neighbourhoods, 
such as the invasion of Iraq, was another common point of agreement.163 In general, 
according to Aktürk, ‘Turkey and Russia, remaining on “Europe’s fringes”, both had 
a very ambivalent and often adversarial relationship with Europe, serving as the 
constitutive “Other” of European identity’.164 
 
Despite these commonalities and a strongly increased commercial basis for their 
relationship, Russia-Turkey relations remain contested. On the basis of shared 
interests, Ankara and Moscow built a pragmatic relationship with reciprocal benefits. 
However, their relationship never moved towards forging a closer alliance or axis as 
some in the West feared. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, Russia-Turkey relations 
remain caught in equal measures between cooperation and competition.165 
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The aim of this chapter was to provide a concise summary and overview of Russian 
and Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s and 2000s while touching upon the most 
important developments as well as some underlying features and principles of this 
policy. The emphasis lay primarily on the more recent period, in the case of Russia 
starting with Putin’s election as president in 2000, and in the case of Turkey starting 
in 2002 with the AKP’s first electoral win. 
 
In sum, the Russia part of the chapter argued that after a brief phase of Westernisation, 
the principal goal of Putin was to restore Russia’s place in the international system as 
an important and respected actor, or put differently, a great power. This not only meant 
expanding Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space but increasingly also countering 
what was seen as the West’s and NATO’s expansion, as well as US unilateral actions 
globally. Following his return to the presidency in 2012, Putin quickly started 
implementing his plans for the establishment of a Eurasian (Economic) Union, 
providing an institutional framework for integration in the post-Soviet space, and thus 
helping cement Russia’s role as regional hegemon. Furthermore, relations with the 
West further plummeted due to the Ukraine crisis starting at the end of 2013, and 
attempts at diversifying Russia’s foreign policy options, including a supposed turn to 
the Asian vector, became central elements of Russian foreign policy. 
 
Turkish foreign policy under the new AKP government offered a new vision and role 
for the country as a regional power, on the basis of being the leader of its civilisational 
basin, while simultaneously striving for more influence at the global level. Accession 
to the European Union remained a major goal in the early years and a diversification 
of Turkish foreign policy, including a turn to the Middle East, followed in the later 
years around 2007-2009. The chapter also focused on the reformulation of Turkish 
foreign policy under Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, whose strategic depth theory 
focused on Turkey’s historical and geographical characteristics as a determinant of 
Turkey’s position as a central country in global affairs. 
 
As has become clear from the above discussion, both Russia and Turkey see 
themselves as important countries not only in regional but also global politics. Owing 
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to their geographical location as well as historical experience as centres of regional 
and global empires, Russia and Turkey strive to maintain their status as powerful and 
central countries. In the case of Russia, its status as a global great power with interests 
everywhere and its role as a balancing force in the multipolar international system are 
key to understanding the country’s geopolitical imagination. Turkey’s position as a 
central country, both geographically between different regions, but also on a 
civilisational basis as the leader of its civilisation, is a crucial element in guiding the 
country’s foreign policy. As we will see in subsequent chapters, the concept of Eurasia 
plays a role in all these considerations. Before moving to a detailed discussion about 
the place of Eurasia in Russian and Turkish government discourse, the next chapter 
will offer an overview of the various conceptions of Eurasia, the philosophy of 
Eurasianism and a more philosophical discussion (as opposed to the geopolitical 





Chapter 4: The concept of Eurasia 
This chapter offers a discussion about the concept of Eurasia in general as well as in 
the Russian and Turkish contexts. This chapter does not consider Russian and Turkish 
official discourses on Eurasia, which are discussed in later chapters. The following 
sections will illustrate the heterogeneity of the concept of Eurasia and its different 
meanings across disciplines and regions. In short, I will attempt to demonstrate and 
outline several points. In discussing Eurasia, and its relevance for Russia and Turkey, 
geography takes centre stage. However, geography is never considered in a vacuum 
and is always complemented with other elements such as history, culture, or 
linguistics. In Russia, Eurasian ideas are grounded in the philosophical tradition of 
Eurasianism, an ideology promoting the vision of Russia as a Eurasian empire. Yet, as 
will be argued below, Eurasia is not just a philosophical or ideological construction, 
but also a pragmatic political and economic concept. Russia developed and 
implemented, jointly with some of its neighbouring states, an integration project in 
Eurasia, the Eurasian Economic Union. Turkey’s understanding of Eurasia is 
principally based on pragmatic interests and economic opportunities arising from its 
Eurasian geography. 
 
Generally speaking, one of the key characteristics of Eurasia is its analytical flexibility. 
As a result, Eurasia is generally understood in many different ways depending on the 
country, historical context but also on one’s political identity. In sum, this chapter 
argues that for a variety of reasons, Eurasia is a central concept for the study of Russia. 
Also in the case of Turkey, Eurasia has entered the political realm following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, albeit less prominently than in the case of Russia. Still, 
Eurasia as a geopolitical concept is evoked in many different ways by diverse 
constituencies in both countries. Exploring these ways is the goal of this chapter. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. In the first part, the chapter will look broadly at 
Eurasia as a geopolitical concept that re-emerged after the end of the Cold War, 
attracting substantial academic interest. Thereafter, I will focus on the readings of 
Eurasia in Russia starting with the ideas of classical Eurasianism, its post-Soviet 
variation of Neo-Eurasianism and more pragmatic ideas in contemporary Russia, after 
which I describe more recent political efforts at integrating the Eurasian region. The 
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final section will look at Turkey, its discovery of Eurasia following the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union and provides an overview of the different versions of Eurasianism. 
4.1 Eurasia as a geopolitical concept after the Cold War 
There are generally a large number of different characterisations and definitions of 
Eurasia. This region, covering a large continuous landmass, was an arena for great 
power rivalry, imperial domination and, more recently, instability. While theoretically, 
Eurasia could be defined simply in geographical terms as the combination of the 
European and Asian continents, in practice the term cannot be removed entirely from 
its historical (Eurasianism) and contemporary political connotations (Eurasian 
Economic Union).1 After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Eurasia emerged as a new 
geographical and geopolitical entity. Especially with reference to traditional 
geopolitical theories and imperial geopolitics, various scholars described the region of 
Eurasia as opening up and re-emerging onto the global scene.2 In these accounts, the 
Eurasian landmass regains importance as the ‘heartland’, a concept coined by the 
British geographer Mackinder in the early 20th century, which refers to the division of 
the world map into different territorial swathes, control of which was needed in a world 
of imperial competition for regional and ultimately global influence.3 Russia and 
Turkey both occupy a particularly central geographical location in this heartland. 
 
Eurasia’s historical experience is dominated by imperialism under various forms and 
shapes. Hence, Kotkin proposes a different nomination for the space of Eurasia, 
namely ‘ab imperio’, literally meaning ‘from empire’, to characterise the centrality of 
the imperial legacy of contemporary Eurasia.4 Among the different empires that 
controlled Eurasia, Kotkin singles out the Mongol empire because it primarily focused 
on exchanges, and less on cultural dominance, throughout the territory under its 
control. It was these exchanges that helped form a somewhat coherent entity in Eurasia 
and especially provided a framework for analysis today which is not focused on 
nationalities or cultures, but on exchanges and more broadly on governance or the lack 
                                                 
1 Hutchings 2016: xiii-xiv 
2 Brzezinski 1997; see also Sengupta 2009 
3 Mackinder 1904. 
4 Kotkin 2007 
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thereof.5 For Kotkin, Eurasia is an arena that cannot be studied and analysed under the 
guise of specific geographic, linguistic or cultural characteristics. For instance, he 
argues that Eurasianism is not a helpful analytical category because it is historically 
grounded and associated with nationalism and thus a phenomenon related to a specific 
period and politics. Essentially, Kotkin advocates the use of a pragmatic and flexible 
definition of Eurasia, ‘that seeks to acknowledge interregional or cross-regional 
phenomena that arose via the formative frame of empire’.6 Indeed, the analytical 
substance of Eurasia seems to lie in the variety of regional stakes and actors with an 
interest in them. Tsygankov singles out the importance of political, economic and 
cultural factors. Hence, politically Eurasia was controlled and dominated by various 
political entities lacking clear geographical boundaries most of the time. 
Economically, the vast resources of the region and the transportation links connected 
to them fostered important connections between continents. And, culturally, Eurasia 
was a melting pot of different cultures and influences in an open nature.7 In sum, 
‘politically, economically and culturally, the region has functioned as a unity in 
diversity, serving as a hub of various influences’.8  
 
While there are a number of caveats to the use of the geopolitical concept of Eurasia 
as an analytical concept, it is nonetheless helpful when studying the region. As the 
above discussion demonstrated, a multitude of definitions and changing meanings of 
Eurasia exist in various contexts. There is no single Eurasia, because geographically 
there is no unanimity as to its definition, politically there is no single country 
dominating it and historically there is no single point of reference allowing for a clear 
definition of Eurasia. However, the absence of a single definition and the multitude of 
meanings attached to Eurasia can also be considered an advantage. Gabowitsch, for 
instance, argues that it would even be dangerous to ignore the multitude of ‘Eurasias’ 
and ‘Eurasianisms’ because we would blind ourselves to the diverging interpretations 
of what Eurasia means for the variety of actors in the region using it.9 As such, and as 
                                                 
5 Kotkin 2007: 508-510 
6 Kotkin 2007: 508 
7 Tsygankov 2012: 2 
8 Tsygankov 2012: 2 
9 Gabowitsch 2009: 25 
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Dressler and Richard rightly point out, Eurasia is above all an analytical concept and 
functions as a ‘place and object of discourse’.10 
 
When looking at the different interpretations of Eurasia’s principal characteristics, it 
seems that observers prefer to refer to Eurasia without clear geographical references. 
Dressler and Richard conclude that the principal characteristic of Eurasia, and 
therefore the inability to define its borders clearly, is it being primarily a place of 
passage or a transit zone.11 This definition refers to both Eurasia’s historical experience 
and its geographical spread. A large number of peoples, political entities, powers and 
countries inhabited this space, which inevitably also led to a lot of trade and 
commercial exchanges. Similarly, and due to these factors, Eurasia was also always a 
contested zone in which different interests and powers clashed. This was especially 
true following the break-up of the Soviet Union, when all the actors in the region and 
particularly Russia, had to adapt to the new circumstances. 
 
In sum, when speaking of Eurasia, we are looking at a vast geographical space that 
experienced a great number of different political systems and ideologies, provided the 
foundation for numerous commercial activities and was the scene for cultural 
interactions. As a result, contemporary Eurasia carries a rather large and significant 
heritage and eschews a homogeneous characterisation. In this sense, Von Hagen 
proposes to use Eurasia as an ‘anti-paradigm’ which allows for a fresh look at the 
region devoid of the constraints of previous analyses. As a result, Eurasia is stripped 
from the attachment to a single historical reference point, such as the Russian Empire 
or the Soviet Union, and opens up new spatial and temporal boundaries for analysis.12 
While Von Hagen’s argument refers to historical scholarship, the following argument 
is also true for other disciplines, namely that the idea of the Eurasian anti-paradigm is 
‘to indicate an opening up of the horizon of historical scholarship to new framings, 
topics, and dynamics and to “return” the Eurasian space to world history after nearly 
a century of Cold War isolation’.13 
 
                                                 
10 Dressler and Richard 2009: 385-386 
11 Dressler and Richard 2009: 398 
12 Von Hagen 2004: 448, 459 
13 Von Hagen 2004: 468 
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This brief discussion illustrated that Eurasia has a number of different meanings and, 
as Trenin observes, has become an ‘increasingly interconnected economic, political 
and strategic concept’.14 In general, it seems that the keywords with regard to the 
definition of contemporary Eurasia are ‘connection’ and ‘instability’, highlighting 
both historical and current tendencies. We should thus agree that there can be no one 
Eurasia, only many, and that this is precisely the analytical value in studying this large 
region. This characterisation is useful for the purposes of this study because it does not 
see Eurasia through the lens of a single narrow analytical paradigm but encourages a 
diversity of explorations on what Eurasia is and what it means for a variety of actors. 
For instance, Russia’s and Turkey’s discourse on Eurasia differ on many points but 
both are valuable in studying Russian and Turkish foreign policy and in analysing the 
role of these countries in international affairs. 
4.1.1 Eurasia in academia and policy circles 
Despite its frequent use in academic and policy circles, Eurasia remains a vague 
concept and as Von Hagen reminds us, Eurasia’s boundaries ‘remain ill-defined and 
dynamic’.15 For instance, as Stephen Kotkin notes, a large number of university centres 
and research institutes as well as academic journals carry the term Eurasia in their 
name. However, their understanding of Eurasia varies strongly. Whereas some 
institutions chose the designation Eurasia to replace the Soviet Union or post-Soviet 
space, others deliberately left the definition of the space of Eurasia open.16 
 
This lack of clarity within academia reflects the above discussion about the multitude 
of definitions of the concept of Eurasia.17 Kotkin, for instance, comes to the conclusion 
that ‘there is no underlying or overall coherence to Eurasia. Eurasia is not a system; it 
is an arena’.18 Similarly, after leading a collective research project examining the idea 
of Eurasia, Smith and Richardson conclude that ‘any singular notion of Eurasia is 
shattered, and instead it emerges as ephemeral, shifting, and somehow always beyond 
our grasp. Instead we find a Eurasia of myriad forms, shaped by ideologies and 
                                                 
14 Trenin 2013 
15 Von Hagen 2004: 446 
16 Kotkin 2007: 487-490 
17 Thus, there has been a range of literature in the West analysing the meaning and definition of the 
concept of Eurasia from different perspectives and angles. See for example Kaiser 2004; Von Hagen 
2004; Kotkin 2007; Dressler 2009; Gleason 2010.  
18 Kotkin 2007: 508 
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identities, defined by inconsistencies and incoherence’.19 We start thus from the 
assumption that the concept of Eurasia is a fluid one and cannot be defined 
conclusively. In any case, as Djalili and Kellner caution, geopolitical concepts such as 
Eurasia, are dynamic by nature and must evolve in order to be able to make sense of 
the region they are supposed to cover.20 
 
Most frequently, however, Eurasia is considered as synonymous with the post-Soviet 
space. In this regard, organisations like the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) could find a new post-Soviet meaning, despite being merely a leftover from the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union.21 Laruelle argues that ‘the term “Eurasia” largely 
attained greater visibility for want of something better: it expresses conveniently, and 
in a rather intuitive way, the historical space of Russia and its “peripheries.”’.22 
Similarly, Gleason argues that Eurasia as a term just replaced what had been Soviet 
territory. At the same time, he cautions against the analytical use of the term since 
there is no unity in the Eurasian space.23 Vinokurov and Libman, however, argue 
against using Eurasia as a synonym for the post-Soviet space, because they see Eurasia 
as ‘a continent and a venue for the emerging transcontinental processes of economic 
integration’.24 
 
Two interpretations can be highlighted with regard to Russia’s role in the concept of 
Eurasia. Laruelle, for instance, sees three distinctive labels of Eurasia in use. In her 
interpretation, Eurasia can be seen as ‘a geopolitical principle – that is, Russia’s claim 
to be the “pivotal” state and “engine” of the post-Soviet world’ or a ‘philosophical 
principle – that is, Russia’s status as the “other Europe,”’ where Eurasia then becomes 
‘a mirror of Europe and the West, a response to what is perceived as a challenge that 
would undermine Russianness’.25 The third use of Eurasia, according to Laruelle, is 
‘that of memory, mourning, and commemoration’, through which the Russian society 
can come to terms with and understand the country’s historical experiences (both 
imperial and Soviet) thus allowing for the ‘closing of these historical chapters, [while] 
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at the same time integrating them into a national grand narrative’.26 According to 
Tsygankov, Russian discourses on Eurasia can usefully be divided into two distinct 
groups each with its own metaphor, namely that of the ‘fortress’ and ‘bridge’: ‘While 
the “fortress” metaphor presents Eurasia as a community with fixed cultural, political, 
and economic boundaries shielded from the outside, particularly the Western world, 
the “bridge” makes sense of the region in terms of its relative openness to outside 
influences’.27 
 
In recent years, there has also been a new trend to look beyond the traditional definition 
of Eurasia as post-Soviet space. Dutkiewicz thus calls for the revision of both the 
concept of and approach to Eurasia, arguing that the previous definition has become 
outdated.28 It is not surprising that the idea and contours of Eurasia have attracted 
renewed interest following President Putin’s call for the foundation of a Eurasian 
Union in 2011, and the subsequent efforts to foster economic integration in the region 
which ultimately led to the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015. 
Given that in 2013 China launched its own regional initiative, the One Belt, One Road 
initiative (OBOR), the space of Eurasia has opened up to new ideas, projects and 
concepts.29 
 
In the same context, Dutkiewicz advocates for an inclusive and open definition of 
Eurasia ‘in classical geographic, spatial, “supra-territorial” or “transnational” terms, 
so it “does not belong” to and is not “embodied by” any particular state’.30 This is also 
a call to move away from the traditional Russia-Eurasia binomial. Similarly, Hann 
argues in favour of a united Eurasia instead of a juxtaposed Europe and Asia. In his 
anthropologically grounded analysis, Hann argues that for centuries, Eurasia was 
characterized by its interconnectedness and should therefore be considered in a 
maximally inclusive way.31 Also Evers and Kaiser emphasise this notion and point out 
that ‘the division of this vast area into two continents [Europe and Asia] is a pure 
                                                 
26 Laruelle 2015a: 3 
27 Tsygankov 2016a: 64-65 
28 Dutkiewicz 2015: 2 
29 The Chinese One Belt, One Road initiative, launched by Chinese leader Xi Jinping in 2013 as his 
major foreign policy initiative, envisages a series of infrastructure and connectivity projects across the 
vast territory of Eurasia connecting China to many other parts of the world to enhance cooperation in 
the region of the ancient Silk Road (see Aris 2016; Godehardt 2016 for more detail).  
30 Dutkiewicz 2015: 5 
31 Hann 2016. 
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fiction of the imagination of the human mind, a social and cultural construction of 
geographical space’.32 This position overlaps with my own approach in this study, 
which is to consider Eurasia as a geopolitical space that is constantly redefined by the 
political leaders of the countries in this space. 
4.2 The concept of Eurasia in Russia 
Russia is closely interlinked with the Eurasian space and for many centuries formed 
the core of a Eurasian empire. Over the course of its history, from the 16th century 
onwards, Russia’s predecessor entities (the Tsardom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire 
and the Soviet Union) have continuously and contiguously expanded into the 
geopolitical space of Eurasia. For the last few centuries, Russia was the most central 
and most powerful actor in Eurasia which rendered the distinction between Russia and 
Eurasia somewhat obsolete.  
 
There are many facets to Russia’s relationship with and discourse on Eurasia. The 
subsequent section will shed light on some of these facets by first reviewing the 
philosophical current of Eurasianism, which emerged in the early 20th century, and 
Neo-Eurasianism, which gained popularity in post-Soviet Russia, before turning to 
contemporary debates on Eurasia including a discussion of the ongoing efforts to foster 
Eurasian integration. The focus lies on scholarly works on Eurasia and Eurasianism as 
well as the thinking of some notable Russian foreign policy analysts and thinkers. The 
governmental discourse on Eurasia is treated in depth in the following chapter on 
Russian foreign policy discourse on Eurasia. 
4.2.1 Classical Eurasianism 
Classical Eurasianism emerged in the 1920s among members of the Russian émigré 
society in Europe, most of whom fled the October Revolution in Russia. In short, its 
main argument is that Russia forms a distinct Eurasian civilisation which is neither 
European nor Asian. According to Badmaev, the conceptual foundation of 
Eurasianism contains three elements. The first one sees ‘Eurasia as a specific cultural-
geographical and sociohistorical entity’. The second element is the ‘recognition that 
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independent development based on national cultural traditions, practices and values as 
well as centuries of contact between the Eurasian peoples is the only promising path 
for Eurasia’. And the third element is ‘a multi-linear approach to understanding history 
that rejects the existence of a universal formula for cultural and historical 
development’.33 
 
Scholarship on the theories and ideas of Eurasianism is extensive and has received 
considerable attention following the dissolution of the Soviet Union both in Russia as 
well as abroad.34 Since this study is concerned with contemporary ideas of Eurasia and 
the interpretation of Eurasia in Russian (and Turkish) foreign policy discourse, 
classical and neo-Eurasianism will only be treated briefly. Nevertheless, in order to 
embed the contemporary discourse in a historical context, it is important to set out the 
main arguments and ideas of Eurasianism and some of its most prominent thinkers 
such as Nikolai Trubetzkoy (1890-1938), Petr Savitsky (1895-1968) and George 
Vernadsky (1887–1973). Generally, Eurasianism unites a heterogeneous group of 
thinkers and as Bassin cautions, ‘it is simply impossible to reduce Eurasianism in any 
meaningful way to a common set of doctrinal denominators’. Still, as he continues, 
one outstanding principal emerges which is that ‘Eurasianism everywhere claims to 
represent some unique synthesis of European and Asian principles’.35 Despite the 
argument that Eurasianism constitutes a heterogeneous group of thinkers and ideas, 
three overarching, yet strongly interlinked, themes can be identified: the Eurasianists’ 
rejection of European modernity and domination; their interpretation of Eurasia as a 
contained geographical entity distinct from Europe and Asia, and Russia’s centrality 
within this geography; and, their reading of Russian history focusing on the importance 
of the Mongol Empire as a building block for Russia’s Eurasian destiny. 
 
One of the key premises of Eurasianist thought was to set Russia apart from Europe. 
The general trend in Russia in the past and especially following the rein of Peter the 
Great, was to pursue a path of Europeanization, seeing Russia as a part of Europe. The 
Eurasianists, on the other hand, were critical of the European path to modernity and of 
                                                 
33 Badmaev 2015: 33-34 
34 See, inter alia, Bassin 1991; Shlapentokh 1997; Laruelle 1999; Bassin 2003; Glebov 2003; Titov 
2005; Wiederkehr 2007; Bassin 2008; Laruelle 2008a; Torbakov 2008; Glebov 2011; Bassin, Glebov 
and Laruelle 2015a. 
35 Bassin 2008: 281 
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what Trubetzkoy called the ‘Romano-Germanic’ world for its imperialism and 
contempt for the rest of the world. In his foundational treatise, Europe and Mankind, 
Trubetzkoy described a polar opposition and struggle between Europe and the non-
Romano-Germanic peoples (‘mankind’) who had been colonialised by Europe and 
who needed to finally emancipate themselves. This especially applied to Russia, which 
due to its Eurasian identity, could assume a leadership role in this struggle.36 
Eurasianism sees the world as being divided into distinct but equal cultures and 
civilisations with their own path of development.37 As such, the cohesion of the 
Eurasian civilisation was formed over centuries, starting with the expansion of 
Genghis Khan’s Mongol empire across Eurasia. Bassin aptly summarises 
Trubetzkoy’s point of view on this matter:  
 
The Eurasian continent had served as the arena for the formation and 
development of a distinct civilization and culture, a civilization that 
absorbed and blended both European and Asiatic elements, 
transforming them in the process into a homogeneous synthesis that 
belonged to neither realm.38 
 
The Eurasianists thus acknowledged the importance of Asian influences on Russia’s 
culture and in so doing downplayed the dominance of European influences. As a result, 
Russia was presented as part of a distinctive Eurasian culture with its own 
developmental path. This directly brings us to the second element, namely the 
geographical explanation of Russia’s Eurasian identity. 
 
The Eurasianists based their postulates on a scientific foundation derived from a 
geographical reading of Eurasia. As such, they argued that ‘the unity of Eurasian 
territory is visible in its geometric and system nature […], in the degree to which it 
lends itself to rationalization and explanation, and in its subjection to demonstrable 
scientific principles’.39 Hence, Laruelle interprets Eurasianism as a ‘geographical 
ideology’.40 Savitsky is the key thinker associated with the geographical theories 
behind Eurasianism. The premise for Savitsky’s vision of Russia’s and Eurasia’s 
geography becomes evident in this statement: 
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Eurasia is indivisible. And therefore there is no “European” or 
“Asiatic” Russia, for the lands that are usually so designated are 
identically Eurasian lands. The Urals […][merely] divide the 
country into cis-Urals Russia and trans-Urals Russia. We shall hear 
objections that the replacing of terminology is an empty pursuit. No, 
it is not: the preservation of the terms European and Asiatic Russia 
is incompatible with the understanding of Russia […] as a special 
and integral geographical world.41  
 
As a result, and given Russia’s belonging to Eurasia and its distinctiveness from 
Europe, Savitsky designated the term Russia-Eurasia to demonstrate the inseparability 
of the two. The Eurasianists went to great lengths to prove their theories by arguing, 
for instance, that the ‘Eurasian space was determined by the systemic correspondence 
between landscape, flora and fauna, and climate’.42 In addition, Savitsky argued that 
Eurasia was a ‘quatro-partite’ landmass, composed of four horizontal stripes classified 
from north to south as tundra, forest, steppe and desert.43 Despite the existence of four 
different categories, Savitsky argued that these stripes ‘were welded together by a 
special unity that he derived (rather obscurely) from a physical-geographical balance 
or “symmetry” that he identified between the northern and southern extremes’.44 This 
was the basis for the unity of the geographical entity Russia-Eurasia. However, among 
these four zones, the steppe zone stood out: ‘The steppe is the linchpin of Eurasia: it 
is the only strip that spreads across the whole Eurasian space from east to west and 
links the different civilizations of the Old Continent’.45 This line of argument is 
important when we consider the third major argument present here, namely the 
historical interpretation of the Mongol experience as the stepping stone for the 
development of Russia-Eurasia. 
 
At its origin, Eurasianism was primarily based on geographical, economic and 
linguistic theories, but it lacked historical depth. This is where Vernadsky comes into 
play, whose role in the Eurasianist movement was to provide the historical backbone 
for the theories of Trubetzkoy and Savitsky and presented Russian history as 
                                                 
41 Quoted in Bassin 1991: 14 
42 Glebov 2003: 18 
43 Bassin 1991: 15 
44 Bassin 1991: 15 
45 Laruelle 2008a: 33 
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interlinked, if not synonymous, with Eurasian history.46 On the basis that Eurasia was 
considered an undividable entity, Vernadsky theorised the history of Eurasia as a 
sequence of attempts by political units to gain control over this vast area. Among these, 
the Mongol empire attracted particular attention for its crucial role in uniting Eurasia. 
As Trubetzkoy argues:  
 
Genghis Khan was successful in accomplishing the historical task 
set by the nature of Eurasia, the task of unifying this entire area into 
a single state, and he accomplished this task in the only way possible 
– by first unifying the entire steppe under his power, and through the 
steppe, the rest of Eurasia.47 
 
The Eurasianists’ view was infused by historical determinism which defined the only 
possible existence of Eurasia as a single state unity. Genghis Khan and the Mongols 
were the first to achieve such unity and Russia was seen as their successor. As Laruelle 
argues, ‘the Mongol Empire crystallized an experience of self-realization, formulated 
Eurasian identity geographically, and thus became the true driving force of Russia’s 
entry into history’.48 According to this line of argument, Russia merely took over from 
the Mongols and accomplished the task. As a result, according to Trubetzkoy, ‘it was 
now possible for Russia-Eurasia to become a self-contained cultural, political, and 
economic region and to develop a unique Eurasian culture’.49 However, it is interesting 
to note that ultimately the Eurasianists’ reading of Eurasia’s historical destiny as a 
single state comes to its end once Russia takes over as the shaper of and dominant 
power in Eurasia. It is at this moment, that Russia’s history becomes synonymous with 
Eurasia’s history and, as a consequence, ‘reveals the Eurasianist agenda: to preserve 
the unity of the former imperial space at all costs’.50  
 
To summarise, the main elements of classical Eurasianism are to demonstrate 
Eurasia’s geographical, cultural and historical cohesion and its existence as a unified 
civilisation distinct from Europe. As Trubetzkoy argued, ‘by its very nature, Eurasia 
is historically destined to comprise a single state entity’.51 Within this logic, Russia 
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occupies a central role as the unifier of Eurasia fulfilling the latter’s historical destiny. 
One should not forget the historical context in which the Eurasianists developed their 
ideas. Having witnessed the crumbling of the Russian Empire and the rise of the 
Bolsheviks, which drove the Eurasianist thinkers into exile, they thought about ways 
to preserve Russian dominance over the vast area of Eurasia now that the Russian 
empire was gone. There is an interesting paradox here in that Eurasianism ‘tried to 
preserve the Russian empire by denying its existence. There was no Russian empire, 
no Russia, only Eurasia, a harmonious, symphonic, organic association of peoples 
which constituted a higher historical and cultural unity’.52 Nevertheless, there can be 
no doubt about the Eurasianists’ vision of Russia’s role in Eurasia as the dominant 
power and unifying element. Laruelle neatly summarises the way in which Russia is 
at the centre of Eurasia: 
 
The Russian people are in fact unlike any other people in Eurasia 
because they serve as the connecting element of Eurasian national 
diversity; without them, there would be no movement from one 
Eurasian element to another, there would be no whole giving 
meaning to its components. It is therefore solely under the aegis of 
the Russian people that the Eurasian nation is constituted. […] 
Russia is Eurasian in its very principle, with or without Eurasia. The 
Eurasian supranationality actually constitutes a new expression of 
Russianness, which already includes national diversity.53 
 
Given the dominance of communist ideology, Eurasianist ideas were almost non-
existent in Russia during Soviet times. In the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, however, Russians rediscovered geopolitical thought and with it the ideas of 
Eurasianist thinkers. Russia’s new situation after the former Soviet territories became 
independent countries changed its geographic outlook because it was now 
simultaneously further away from Asia and from Europe, leading to the emergence of 
geopolitical theories and a revival of Eurasianist ideas.54 According to Laruelle, the 
fact that neo-Eurasianist ideas provided Russia with an opportunity to ‘restore a sense 
of Russia’s continuity from its troubled history by recasting it in spatial rather than 
temporal terms’ is what made it popular in the troubled early years of the existence of 
the Russian federation.55 An important figure was Lev Gumilev (1912-1992) who can 
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be considered as the connecting link between classical and neo-Eurasianism, having 
stood in close contact with people such as Savitsky and Vernadsky and whose ideas 
experienced a remarkable revival in the post-Soviet period. 
4.2.2 Neo-Eurasianism 
This section will discuss the re-emergence of Eurasianist ideas in post-Soviet Russia. 
Arguably, the most important figure in this context is the geopolitician, philosopher 
and ideologue Alexander Dugin. Before examining his ideas, however, we will look 
at Lev Gumilev, the connecting link between classical and post-Soviet Eurasianism. 
Gumilev is essentially a Soviet thinker, having lived during the times of the Soviet 
Union, and he died shortly after the breakup of the USSR. He was an eclectic thinker, 
developing a wide range of ideas and theories. However, there is a debate whether 
Gumilev can actually be considered a Eurasianist or not. Laruelle, for instance, argues 
that Gumilev disagreed with many concepts of classical Eurasianism, and despite his 
correspondence with Savitsky and Vernadsky, Gumilev’s ideas evolved in a different 
political and historical context, and he probably also lacked in-depth knowledge of the 
complete writings of Eurasianists.56 The fact that Gumilev is considered a Eurasianist 
and gained much public accolade in post-Soviet Russia is because his disciples 
elevated him into this rank being the only Soviet scientist having worked in a 
Eurasianist framework.57 A number of Gumilev’s ideas are indeed strongly aligned 
with the classical Eurasianists and also resonate positively among the neo-Eurasianists. 
Among them are Gumilev’s negative view of the West while considering Russia as an 
inherent part of Eurasian civilisation, his reading of geography as deterministic for the 
development of Russia-Eurasia and his positive interpretation of the influence of the 
Mongol Empire on the development of Russia as a Eurasian empire. 
 
Gumilev’s principal scholarly interest was the study of ethnic units (ethnos-ethnies) as 
principal ‘categories of human organization’ and the way in which they came into 
being and evolved over a specific period of time (ethnogenesis).58 Russia’s historical 
experience, according to Gumilev, is based on the ethnogeneses of various steppe 
peoples in the vast geographical space ranging from Eastern Europe to Mongolia, 
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eventually forming a Eurasian community which was the basis for Russia’s own 
development.59 Within this historical Eurasian community, seven superethnies existed 
alongside each other, Russia being one of them. Interestingly, Gumilev’s argument 
that Russia-Eurasia was comprised of seven different superethnies was in stark 
contrast to the classical Eurasianists who identified the same space ‘as a single 
cultural-historical zone’.60 However, in the last years of his life, Gumilev changed his 
mind and his thinking came to be aligned more directly with the classical Eurasianists. 
Instead of the seven superethnies making up the Eurasian space, he started to speak of 
a ‘Eurasian superethnos’ which included the Soviet Union but also other countries like 
Mongolia. What is more, the ‘Eurasian superethnos’ was also characterised by a 
political organisation and state structure, an argument on the basis of which ‘Gumilev 
drew the obvious geopolitical conclusion that “any territorial question can be decided 
only on the basis of Eurasian unity”’.61 What laid the basis for Russia’s territorial 
expansion across Eurasia and the eventual formation of the Russian Empire and later 
the Soviet Union, was a ‘natural affinity’ between two of the superethnies in Eurasia: 
the Russian and the Steppe people.62 As we will see later, the Mongol empire was seen 
by Gumilev as instrumental in the foundation of Greater Russia and the subsequent 
central position of Russia in Eurasia. 
 
Like the classical Eurasianists, Gumilev rejects Europe as a model of development for 
Russia on account of the neat geographical separation between Russia and Europe and 
the different stages of the European and Russian ethnos in their respective 
ethnogenesis, Russia being 500 years behind.63 Furthermore, and this is where 
Russia’s relations with the steppe people and the Mongols become crucial, Europe was 
seen as the principal enemy and menace for the development of the Russian ethnos. 
Contrary to the traditional reading of the Mongol yoke as a dark period of foreign 
occupation, Gumilev actually argued that ‘the Mongols protected the nascent Russian 
ethnos from the Western military and religious aggression at a crucial time’.64 While 
the Kievan Rus, which represented the first cycle of the Russian ethnogenesis, was in 
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decline in the 12th century, the European (“Romano-Germanic”) superethnos was in 
expansion, aiming to absorb new lands and thus directly threatening the existence of 
the Rus.65 At this crucial moment, Gumilev argues, the armies of the Mongols invaded 
Russian lands, but did not subjugate the peoples and thus prevented their domination 
by the West. Gumilev thus did not consider this period of Mongol domination 
(‘Mongol yoke’) negatively, but argued that it was a natural state of affairs, given the 
complementarity between the Russian and Steppe ethnies.66 On the basis of this 
symbiosis, the Great Russian superethnos, which eventually came to dominate Eurasia, 
emerged in the 14th century following the gradual erosion and decline of the Golden 
Horde: ‘In the end it had been a natural development for the tsars of Moscow to assume 
the role of the Khan after the collapse of the Golden Horde’.67 Gumilev’s interpretation 
of Russian history was highly favourable of the instrumental influence of the Mongol 
empire in the formation of Russia-Eurasia. As Bassin argues, in Gumilev’s view, ‘the 
legacy of Genghis Khan was not the destruction of the civilization of Ancient Rus’ but 
rather the creation of the modern Russian ethnos’.68 As a result of this re-interpretation 
of Russian history, the idea of Russia having a European orientation or even being 
European is dismissed in favour of perceiving Russia as an inherently Eurasian 
entity.69 
 
Despite not being perfectly aligned with all of the ideas of classical Eurasianism, 
Gumilev nonetheless provides a line of continuity for the Neo-Eurasianists. One of the 
principal reasons for Gumilev’s popularity (not only among modern day Eurasianists) 
is the vast array of theories and ideas he developed, allowing other thinkers to cherry-
pick their favourite elements and ideas. Indeed, as Bassin argues, ‘Gumilev has 
become a universal point of reference and metadiscourse in his own right: a venerable 
and apparently inexhaustible wellspring of ideas and inspiration for pretty much 
anyone seeking to make sense of the Russian past, present, and future’.70 Over the last 
years, since the return of Putin to the Russian presidency in 2012, Gumilev also 
became a favourite in Kremlin circles and his ideas have been absorbed by many, 
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including Putin, who used some of his ideas and notions in his speeches.71 
Furthermore, Gumilev was a crucial influence for the most prominent contemporary 
advocate of Eurasianism, Alexander Dugin,72 whose ideas are the subject of the next 
section. 
 
Alexander Dugin (born in 1962), a former dissident and fringe political figure, has 
become a well-known person in Putin’s Russia and his ideas are circulated widely. 
Especially among the security establishment, Dugin’s ideas have received widespread 
attention.73 Dugin is most famous for his geopolitical theories, which are influenced 
by European imperial geopolitics from the likes of Mackinder, but also from the ideas 
of classical Eurasianists. Indeed, Dugin sees himself as the contemporary 
representative of classical Eurasianism. Not only is his own thinking infused by their 
ideas, Dugin also contributed to the revival of Eurasianism in post-Soviet Russia 
through the dissemination of Eurasianist ideas by editing and reprinting their classical 
works.74 The principal ideas of Dugin’s theories with regard to Eurasia are his 
insistence on the singular character and imperial nature of the Eurasian civilisation 
(with Russia at its centre) and the geopolitically determined opposition between land-
based Eurasia and the sea-based Atlantic world. 
 
For Dugin, the main usefulness of Eurasianism is to justify and restore Russia’s 
continuous imperial expansion across the former Soviet lands.75 He highlights the 
decisive influence of the Mongol Empire on Russia’s development, providing the latter 
with an ‘empire building impulse’ thus setting the basis for Russia’s geopolitical 
mission in Eurasia.76 Seeing Russia as the successor of Genghis Khan’s Eurasian 
empire has important implications for Dugin’s vision of the Russian state. As 
Shlapentokh argues, ‘Russians care about the great Eurasian empire and they are not 
concerned with the well-being of Russia as a small state with a particular ethnic 
group’.77 This interpretation is based on the reading of Russian history as essentially 
tied up with the formation of subsequent empires on the Eurasian landmass starting 
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with the Mongol empire. Following this argument, Russia has never been a nation-
state in the European understanding, but always a multi-ethnic entity. This essentially 
leaves Russia with two options: either evolve into a monoethnic state which is 
eventually poised to disappear or develop along the traditional axis, which signifies 
continuous expansion across Eurasia. It is obvious that Dugin only considers the 
second option to be viable given that ‘the imperial mission is actually implanted in 
Russia as a sort of historical genetic code’.78 On top of this argument’s historical 
foundation, Dugin adds a geopolitical layer. Arguing that control over territory is a 
crucial component for guaranteeing the survival of the Russian state (or any state for 
that matter), Dugin naturally comes to the conclusion that ‘Russia must be a Eurasian 
empire’ or otherwise it will perish.79 
 
In his most important book, The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future 
of Russia, published in 1997, Dugin develops the geopolitical theories which 
determine Russia’s position and its future in global affairs. His overarching concern is 
the preservation of Russia’s control over Eurasia and the continuation of the Russia-
Eurasia empire. Dugin identifies one principal fault line in global geopolitics: the 
opposition between land-based Eurasianism and sea-based Atlanticism. This 
opposition is seen as inherently natural in that it is determined by geopolitical 
conditions. However, as Bassin maintains, Dugin departs from the classical 
Eurasianists with this definition since ‘Dugin no longer refers to [Eurasia’s] opponent 
as the West (zapad) but rather as the Atlantic world or, more simply, Atlanticism’.80 
Dugin thus updates Eurasianism to make sense of the Cold War bipolarity opposing 
the Soviet Union to the United States or the more recent political context which 
essentially signifies a global standoff between Eurasia and the United States.81 The 
struggle between Eurasia and the US for global dominance is not confined but takes 
place on a global level. Eurasia, led by Russia, thus becomes a ‘universal project’ and 
a ‘global alternative’ to US hegemony.82 In order to achieve parity, Russia needs to 
form alliances with other countries in the Eurasian heartland against the Atlanticist 
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world island. Three axes should be formed: in the West, a Moscow-Berlin axis, in the 
East, a Moscow-Tokyo axis and in the south, a Moscow-Teheran axis.83 As Laruelle 
argues: 
 
Dugin characterizes this quadruple alliance of Russia-Germany-
Japan-Iran, which would react against the thalassocracies (the 
United States, Britain in Europe, China in Asia, and Turkey in the 
Muslim world), as a “confederation of large spaces”, because each 
ally is itself an empire that dominates the corresponding 
civilizational area.84 
 
However, despite acknowledging the imperial nature of its allies, Dugin leaves no 
doubt that Russia is the central actor in this alliance and the main building bloc of 
Eurasia ‘as it is geographically identical with the heartland, the most important space 
in Eurasian geopolitics, and is home to the Russian people, who are bearers of the 
unique Eurasianist mission’.85 Interestingly, and in contrast to his Eurasianist 
predecessors, Dugin does not regard Europe as Russia’s main enemy. Rather, 
according to Dugin’s geopolitical determinism, Europe, being continental, should be 
opposed to Atlanticism and as such could actually become an ally for Russia in its 
struggle against US hegemony.86 Despite this difference, in many aspects there is 
coherence between Dugin’s views and classical Eurasianism, most importantly in their 
view of Russia as a unique civilisation distinct from the West, their reading of 
Russian/Eurasian history, their understanding of Russia-Eurasia as composed of 
multiple ethnic layers and their insistence on empire as the only viable organisational 
unit for Russia. This last point is crucial and exemplified by the historical and political 
contexts in which Eurasianism and neo-Eurasianism developed, namely the breakup 
of the preeminent political unit in Eurasia into different states. The trauma of 
witnessing the demise of the Eurasian empire ultimately dictated their most important 
political goal: ‘the imperative to rescue out of the postrevolutionary chaos the 
traditional geopolitical cohesiveness of Eurasian space and reestablish thereby a 
unitary Eurasian state’.87 
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It has been argued that Dugin became a prominent figure in post-Soviet Russia and 
that his ideas have spread widely. Some analysts even argue that Dugin’s theories 
reached the highest echelons of Russian power, influencing President Putin’s 
policies.88 However, Dugin’s real influence remains unclear. Shekhovtsov, for 
instance, argues that while some of Putin’s actions, such as the war in Georgia in 2008 
and Russia’s intervention in Ukraine starting in 2014, are certainly in line with Dugin’s 
thinking and his blueprint for Russia, Putin’s worldview is less ideological than 
Dugin’s and he also never referred to Dugin in his speeches.89 Dugin’s position in 
Russian society and public life (as a former professor at Moscow State University and 
frequent public commentator), according to Umland, should be understood with regard 
to the concept of political technology which needs fringe figures to infuse the public 
space with their extreme ideas in contrast to which the Kremlin’s own projects and 
ideas (such as the EAEU for example), seem rational and realistic.90 However, it seems 
safe to affirm that Dugin’s ideas, having inundated the discursive space of Russian 
politics and foreign policy over the last two decades, have not gone unnoticed and also 
entered official politics, if only via the backdoor.91 
 
This cursory overview of the Eurasianist and neo-Eurasianist movements and ideas 
provides the background for the ensuing discussion on the concept of Eurasia in 
contemporary Russia. Hence, contemporary ideas are grounded in an established 
philosophical tradition, although one with a variety of proponents and theories. 
Precisely this, it has been argued, is one of the principal reasons for Eurasianism’s 
increasing appeal in the post-Soviet period. It is important to note, however, that 
Eurasianism is not just a philosophical tradition, but also a political doctrine. 
Especially in its modern or Duginesque version, it offers political solutions and 
concrete prescriptions for Russia’s development. In the past, the ideas of Eurasianists, 
especially those developed in exile, did not penetrate the walls of the Kremlin. In 
recent years, starting with Putin’s third presidential term, the political context changed. 
With the implementation of Putin’s pet project, the Eurasian Economic Union, a new 
vision for the post-Soviet development of Eurasia was formulated. In addition, the 
overall discourse in Russia became strongly infused with nationalistic and 
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civilisational references, often along the lines of Eurasianist ideas.92 The classical 
Eurasianists would probably be surprised to learn that their long-forgotten ideas gained 
considerable political relevance in contemporary Russia. 
 
Moving on from the philosophical discussion of Eurasianism, the following section is 
more interested in policy-relevant debates about Eurasia. Hence, the focus lies also on 
the link between Eurasianist ideas and the governmental elite’s discourse as well as on 
Russian foreign policy. In this context, the recent Eurasian integration initiative and 
the newly established Eurasian (Economic) Union deserve special attention. 
4.2.3 Eurasian ideas in Russia today 
As the above discussion on Neo-Eurasianism demonstrated, the concept of the 
geopolitical space of Eurasia remains present in both Russian and general 
consciousness. Indeed, the continuous Russian expansion and incorporation of new 
Eurasian lands during imperial and Soviet times is one of the principal factors 
explaining the importance of Eurasia for Russia today.93  
 
We can trace the evolution of Russian thinking on Eurasia until the present moment. 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian state found itself in a 
different geopolitical environment and its power was much reduced. Trenin called this 
the ‘end of Eurasia’, since Russia was no longer the nucleus of an empire and had lost 
its status as the ‘center of gravity on the continent’.94 In the 1990s, Russia did indeed 
withdraw from the wider Eurasian region and focused primarily on domestic issues. 
Ten years later, the very same author revoked his statement, claiming Eurasia was 
back, albeit with a new definition.95 In the 2000s, after Russia stabilised and regained 
some of its regional power, Eurasia suddenly was a contested region. As such, Eurasia 
was not fully under Russian control but instead open to interactions among many 
actors and subject to influences from outside powers. In this space, Russia was just 
one among many actors with a diversified Eurasian strategy towards the different 
countries occupying the Eurasian space.96 As Trenin argued, Moscow’s position in 
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Eurasia changed in that Russia became ‘merely an element of the highly complex 
picture, no longer its core’.97 
 
However, this situation was also not long-lasting. While preparing his new and third 
bid for the presidential office in Russia, Vladimir Putin published several newspaper 
articles in 2011-2012 detailing his policy ideas. Among them was the proposition to 
establish the Eurasian Union, an integration project for the post-Soviet space. In so 
doing, Putin tried to reverse the picture painted by Trenin, restoring Russia as the 
central actor in Eurasia. When Putin re-acceded to the presidency in 2012, he swiftly 
moved to implement his Eurasian integration project which finally came into being in 
the form of the Eurasian Economic Union in January 2015. This final step, but also the 
changing international environment and geopolitical context in Europe, led some 
Russian observers to claim that 2015 was the ‘Eurasian year’ in Russian foreign 
policy.98 Russia has thus come back to occupy – or at least to strongly claim – a central 
position in Eurasia. However, the exact form and definition of Eurasia is still unclear, 
and many different versions exist. As Eltchaninoff argues in a study about the 
philosophical underpinnings of Putin’s rule, Eurasia is a flexible idea which easily 
allows to move from the fixed geographical arena to the theoretical realm.99 Laruelle 
makes a similar argument when stating that ‘in Russia, the term “Eurasia” has easily 
made a mark thanks to a certain terminological vacuum, enabling it to be adapted to 
shifting contexts and different realities’.100  
 
An important point in this context, and one that has also been made by Putin regarding 
Russia’s centrality in Eurasia, is the similarities between Russia and Eurasia. Put 
differently, Russia can be seen as a sort of ‘mini-Eurasia’. As Eltchaninoff argues, 
Russia being a vast, multi-ethnic country, can be considered a Eurasia in mini-format 
and thus predetermined to be a leader in Eurasia.101 Two Russian writers, who can be 
considered modern Eurasianists, emphasise the importance of the multi-ethnic nature 
of countries like Russia and Kazakhstan in their Eurasian endeavours. As such, 
‘Eurasianism has a coherence that neither overpowers nor assimilates distinctive 
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ethnic groups, but rather is nurtured by their distinctiveness’.102 In this reading, Russia 
is predestined to be a Eurasian power and lead Eurasian integration because of a similar 
experience in domestic politics, where Russia had to devise policies that 
accommodated a large number of different groups and constituencies. 
 
As we have seen so far, the central element with regard to contemporary Russian ideas 
of Eurasia is Russia’s centrality. However, there are two more elements that are also 
important to understanding Russian policies in Eurasia: Russia’s quest for great power 
status and its defence of a multipolar world order. The former pertains to Russia’s 
historical role in Eurasia in relation to the historical/imperial legacy dominated by 
Russia’s contiguous imperial expansion across the Eurasian space, which conferred 
upon Moscow the status of a great power. The latter makes reference to the rejection 
by Russia’s ruling elite of the unipolar world order under US hegemony while 
defending the realpolitik view of a multipolar world with a number of great powers 
co-existing in a sort of balance of power.  
 
Moscow’s self-perception as a great power and its efforts to maintain this status is a 
defining trait of its foreign policy.103 The geopolitical theories and debates about 
Russia’s place in the world following the dissolution of the Soviet Union led to the 
combination of the emerging discourses on Eurasia with Russia’s status as a great 
power. In a survey of different geopolitical discourses, Berryman concludes that what 
they all have in common is the claim that if ‘Russia wishes to remain a great power it 
needs to remain the strategic axis of Eurasia’.104 Hence, Russia’s global status as an 
important power is tied up with its presence in Eurasia and the dominating role it plays 
there. In addition, Russia also advocates for the establishment of a multipolar world 
order and rejects the global hegemony emanating from the US. The Russian academic 
Natalia Eremina, for instance, argues that in opposition to this unipolar US 
globalisation project, we are witnessing the establishment of a new Eurasian 
civilisational project which is held together by a common vision of the main Eurasian 
powers such as Russia, China and India. This project is defined by the rejection of the 
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unipolar world order and instead ‘manifests multipolarity and multilateralism’.105 On 
a national level, Russia developed the position that the new multipolar system was 
characterised by realpolitik and defence of national interests. In this context, Lukyanov 
argued, Russia concentrated on being the major power in Eurasia:  
 
Moscow is now convinced that the future world order will be based 
on competitive interactions of principal centers of power and not on 
any one power’s domination. With this belief in future power 
structures, Russia has limited its immediate interests to Eurasia.106 
 
This short survey of Eurasian ideas in Russia today has illustrated the complexity of 
the concept of Eurasia and its various meanings. There are a number of strands within 
Eurasianist discourses advocating distinctive political visions and ideas. However, one 
can safely claim that Eurasia occupies a major role in Russian political and 
philosophical discourses. Yet, the extent to which such ideas influence the Russian 
political elite inside the Kremlin remains debated. As it is commonly argued, 
Eurasianists do not directly influence Putin and his inner circle, but their ideas have 
become more commonplace and mainstream in Russia in general.107 This is echoed by 
some members of the analytical and academic community in Moscow, who argued 
that although the Eurasianists are gaining influence, they do not have impact on foreign 
policy even if their ideas are sometimes instrumentalised to justify certain actions.108 
As Schmid argues, the Russian state ideology is based on three strands which are neo-
imperialism, a religious legitimation through the orthodox church and, thirdly, a 
Eurasianist geopolitical underpinning.109 However, reality is more complex and it is 
clear that Eurasianism is just one part of a broader policy. For instance, in a book 
chapter on the influence of the nationalist Izborsky Club, Tsygankov argues that the 
Kremlin does use some of the ideas of these nationalists and neo-Eurasianists while 
making clear that the Kremlin has the autonomy and flexibility to define its own 
Eurasianist agenda as it pleases.110 Hence, these people and their ideas can be used 
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when needed, but overall the Kremlin and Putin have a more pragmatic discourse and 
outlook.111  
 
In the end, given the long journey of Eurasianist ideas from their original inception to 
contemporary Russian foreign policy, a lot of substance has been lost on the way. As 
Laruelle pointedly argues, ‘the more “Eurasia” invades Russia’s public space, popular 
culture, and state-produced narratives in Russia, the more forgetful of its Eurasianist 
founding ideologists it seems to be’.112 Liik also makes a very similar point with regard 
to the Eurasian Union project: ‘the overlap between Putin’s project and the historical 
and theoretical Eurasianism put forward by earlier thinkers is almost accidental – 
except that both have their roots in Russia’s eternal need to define its place between 
Asia and Europe’.113 As has been demonstrated here, the flexible nature of the concept 
of Eurasia and its adaptability to different contexts is one of the major appeals of 
Eurasianist ideas, not just in philosophical circles but also at the centre of Russian 
power in the Kremlin. 
4.2.4 Eurasian integration 
In 2011, the concept of Eurasia experienced a new turn in Russian policy. In an article 
in the Izvestia newspaper, Putin outlined his vision of a Eurasian Union. It foresaw the 
establishment of a ‘powerful supranational association capable of becoming one of the 
poles in the modern world and serving as an efficient bridge between Europe and the 
dynamic Asia-Pacific region’.114 Putin described the proposed Eurasian Union as an 
open project and invited other countries, especially CIS members, to participate in the 
project. This was only logical, given that Putin stated that ‘the Eurasian Union will 
become a focal point for further integration processes since it will be formed by the 
gradual merging of existing institutions, the Customs Union and the Common 
Economic Space’.115 It took a few years to put the plan into practice. In May 2014, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia signed the treaty for the establishment of the Eurasian 
Economic Union. This union focused principally on economic and not political issues 
and officially came into force in January 2015. In the same year, Armenia and 
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Kyrgyzstan joined as additional members. The Eurasian (Economic) Union added a 
new component to the discourse on Eurasia by trying to link it up with an institutional 
framework. As one think tank analyst argued, the EAEU can be considered Putin’s 
‘pet project’ and something he wants to leave as his legacy.116 For the first time after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a clear idea for the organisation of the space of 
Eurasia was proposed. As outlined by Putin, the Eurasian Union was a practical 
proposition devoid of a strong ideological foundation. However, as Pozo importantly 
reminds us, Putin’s integration initiative and calling the proposed union ‘Eurasian’, 
prepared the ground for a variety of interpretations and a move of Eurasianist thought 
from the fringes of society to its centre stage.117 
 
Furthermore, given the flexible nature and adaptability of the concept of Eurasia, the 
Eurasian Union project takes on a number of different meanings. For Richardson, 
Putin’s reading of the EAEU is ‘dialectical’ in that it combines divergent strands of 
Eurasianist thinking ranging from civilisational to politico-economic 
interpretations.118 In general, we can distinguish between two sets of motives behind 
this Eurasian integration project. On the one hand, there are the economic motives such 
as the promotion of economic integration and trade, new economic opportunities and 
Russia’s pivot to Asia. On the other hand, there are the geopolitical motives like 
Russia’s claim to great power status, the promotion of a multipolar world order 
combined with countering Western hegemony and the will to establish Eurasia as a 
global region.  
 
As Popescu argues, ‘there are two Eurasian Unions: one real, and the other 
imaginary’.119 Libman uses the same analogy in arguing that there is a real EAEU and 
an imagined EAEU also in the discourse of the Russian academic community.120 The 
‘real’ EAEU is a regional organisation with member countries and institutions set up 
for running it. Similar to the European Union, the organisation is based on a treaty and 
there is a Eurasian Economic Commission and other institutions such as the Court of 
the Eurasian Economic Union. Indeed, the EAEU seemed to emulate integration 
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processes taking place elsewhere and was considered a forward-looking and pragmatic 
modernisation project.121 According to Libman, the ‘real’ EAEU is an organisation 
which actually shapes economic policy, but not always to the benefit of the Russian 
state, a fact which is often neglected in Russian discourse.122 While all this is certainly 
true, Roberts and Moshes argue that due to the unwillingness of member states to 
delegate sovereignty to a supranational institution the future development of the EAEU 
will be modest and probably meet with a similar fate as previous regional integration 
mechanisms.123  
 
The ‘imaginary’ Eurasian Union, on the other hand, is grounded in geopolitical 
aspirations to cement Russia’s position as a great power.124 As Libman argues, the 
‘imagined’ EAEU is the one mostly used in discourses by Russian politicians and 
academics, who see it as an ordering enterprise fostering Russia’s role in global politics 
as a positive force and as a leader of a real economic bloc.125 Similarly, Russian 
political analyst Lukyanov argues that the EAEU is grounded in two motives. 
Originally economic, it then moved to become something bigger with a civilisational 
underpinning: ‘Eurasian integration was initially political and economic in nature, 
whereas now it has become part of the domestic discourse on Russia’s new identity’.126 
The EAEU is thus a perfect political vehicle for Russia to achieve its foreign policy 
goals. As Bordachev and Skriba argue, Russia’s efforts to integrate Eurasia are also 
driven by Russia’s quest to be a great power. As a result, ‘regaining geopolitical 
control over the post-Soviet space through the Eurasian project is thus more a means 
than an end in itself’.127  
 
As has been illustrated earlier, among Russia’s foreign policy priorities are the 
establishment of a multipolar world order and the restoration of Russia’s great power 
status. In this context, the world is divided into regions dominated by the respective 
regional hegemon. A role which Russia takes on in Eurasia. As Sakwa argues:  
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the development of what has now become the EEU [EAEU] is an 
attempt to establish Eurasia as a distinct pillar of a multipolar 
international system – to maintain its political subjectivity in the face 
of a potential struggle between external hegemonic powers.128  
 
Therefore, Lukin argues, the Eurasian integration project should not be seen as a neo-
imperial project, but merely responding to the developments in global politics which 
are slowly overcoming the unipolar moment with the ‘rise of the East’ and China in 
particular.129 In addition, Lukin argues that the unipolar moment has pushed countries 
like Russia to pursue their own integration projects because they were rejected by the 
West as equal partners.130 The EAEU thus also becomes an important instrument in 
Russian attempts to counter US hegemony. As Podberezkin and Podberezkina argue, 
one of the principles of the EAEU is ‘a multi-polar world opposed to US hegemony’.131 
In such a system, ‘the balance achieved by several regional poles of influence will lead 
to a fair system for allocating forces and dividing up spheres of influence’.132 Therefore 
Russia invests a lot of financial and diplomatic capital in promoting and developing 
this union as a long-time investment in hedging against the influence of other actors 
such as the EU and China in the post-Soviet space.133 Hence, the EAEU is not just a 
regional integration initiative, but there is also a wider geopolitical rationale to it.  
 
In addition, in recent years, and especially following the deterioration of relations 
between Russia and the West in the context of the Ukraine crisis, yet another 
dimension was added to the EAEU. Sergey Glazyev, Putin’s top advisor for Eurasian 
integration, argues that while economic integration is currently at the core of the 
EAEU, a stronger ideological component should eventually be included as well. In his 
view, the EAEU needs ‘to rise above pure economics, which is currently the essence 
of integration, and expand the definition to include the philosophical origins of 
Eurasianism and the coherent nature of the new association’.134 In another piece, 
Glazyev and Tkachuk argue that what makes Eurasian integration distinctive from 
other integration projects is ‘its ideological foundation’, which is based on ideas 
                                                 
128 Sakwa 2016: 16 
129 Lukin 2014b 
130 Lukin 2014a: 46 
131 Podberezkin and Podberezkina 2015: 51 
132 Podberezkin and Podberezkina 2015: 51 
133 Pozo 2017: 172 
134 Glazyev 2015: 87 
121 
 
developed by the early Eurasianists who argued that ‘Eurasian states share a cultural 
and historic environment, as well as an entrenched Eurasian political tradition and 
principles of governance’.135 Therefore ‘economic integration in the post-Soviet space 
should be viewed as a logical, historically justified and economically viable 
process’.136 Similarly to others, Glazyev argues against seeing the EAEU in a neo-
imperial light and sets it apart from previous Russian experiences such as the Soviet 
Union and the imperial periods before it. The reason therefore is that Eurasian 
integration is ‘based on the philosophy of Eurasianism, whose basic principles were 
set forth by 20th century Russian thinkers as they pondered over forms of post-Soviet 
unification of the peoples of the former Russian Empire’.137 Glazyev is not the only 
one to think in those terms. In the context of what Russia perceives as the global 
imposition of the US/Western model and values (which it rejects), the EAEU gains a 
new meaning. As Lukin argues, ‘the culture and values of many former Soviet 
republics really do differ from what prevails in the West’.138 Lukin narrows down the 
‘clash of values’ to the rejection of Western liberalism, with its ideals of personal 
freedom and self-fulfilment, by many people in the post-Soviet states from Russia to 
Central Asia who from a religious standpoint cannot share what they see as Western 
decadence. As a result, according to Lukin, ‘these beliefs have propelled to power 
leaders who support the integration of the former Soviet republics’.139 On a more 
political and state level then, other values emerge. In this regard, as Podberezkin and 
Podberezkina argue, ‘the originality of Eurasian civilization and the need to preserve 
and develop it as a guarantee of national and state sovereignty are currently emerging 
as the informal ideological basis of efforts to promote Eurasian integration’.140 
Glazyev also stresses the importance of state sovereignty as a key element in the 
Eurasian integration project and a pull-factor for potential member states by declaring 
that ‘mutual respect for national sovereignty is what makes the Eurasian integration 
different from all previous models’.141 However, Roberts and Moshes argue that 
despite some early achievements, the EEU is very much limited to reproducing 
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sovereignty rather than transforming it, marking a clear disconnect between rhetoric 
and reality.142 
 
To summarise, there are three dimensions to the EAEU project: the economic, the 
geopolitical and the civilisational. Political analysts as well as Russia’s governmental 
elite have alluded to all three levels when speaking about Eurasian integration. The 
EAEU is thus best explained by seeing it as a hybrid project with both pragmatic 
political and economic components as well as a tool for Russian foreign policy in order 
to achieve its principal goals such as establishing a multipolar world order with Eurasia 
as a core region and reinstating Russia’s great power status based on its claim for 
leadership in Eurasia.143 
4.3 The concept of Eurasia in Turkey 
Turkey’s geography and concomitant geopolitical significance by being the meeting 
point of continents and cultures has a strong impact on Turkish foreign policy. 
Together with Russia, Turkey is the only country that straddles both the European and 
Asian continents. From a purely geographical point of view, Turkey is a Eurasian 
country. However, the concept of Eurasia in Turkey and Turkish Eurasianism are much 
less prominent than in the case of Russia. Similarly, a philosophical tradition akin to 
Eurasianist thought in Russia is absent in the case of Turkey. It was only through 
external circumstances that Eurasia started to occupy a more central position in 
Turkey. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new 
independent states in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Turkey started taking a stronger 
interest in the Eurasian region.144  
4.3.1 The discovery of Eurasia 
In the years following the end of the Cold War, Eurasia provided the Turkish political 
elite with a geopolitical identity and discourse it could use in order to shape a new 
place for itself in the changed international system. Since the establishment of the 
republic in 1923, Turkey was firmly rooted in and oriented towards the West, since 
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the 1950s as part of NATO, and the eastern-most frontier against the Soviet threat. 
Based on an analysis of political discourses with regard to the geopolitical metaphor 
of Turkey as a ‘bridge’, Yanik argues that: 
 
suddenly other continents worth “bridging” appeared on the maps of 
Turkish officials: Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, but most 
importantly, Eurasia. Turkish officials perceived and portrayed 
Turkey as located in the “heart” of Eurasia, and as helping to reunite 
two continents that had been separated for years: Europe and Asia.145  
 
Eurasia was not a familiar concept in Turkey until the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union after which it became increasingly popular.146 In the 1990s, Eurasia was mostly 
used to denote the newly independent states of the Caucasus and Central Asia (thus 
replacing the traditionally used term ‘Turan’),147 most of whom share religious and 
ethnic ties with Turkey.  
 
This sudden Eurasian opening provided new opportunities for Turkey. On the basis of 
the argument that Turkey shared a common history and linguistic ties with the Turkic 
peoples of Central Asia, Ankara saw itself as a ‘big brother’ to these countries, 
facilitating their integration into the global system.148 Prime Minister Demirel, in 
office from 1991 to 1993 (and then President until 2000) was an early promoter of the 
idea of Eurasia, referring to the area stretching ‘from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall 
of China’ populated by Turkic peoples.149 Such claims were not based on an 
ideological or civilisational understanding of foreign policy. Rather, this was based on 
pragmatic considerations trying to strengthen Turkey’s position as a regional power 
and opening up new avenues for economic opportunities. As Prime Minister Demirel 
stated, Turkey would support the countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus, which 
he called a Eurasian community, and ‘lead them to the world’.150 Similarly, for 
Demirel, Turkey’s Eurasian geography was instrumental in relations with the EU since 
this would help the latter establish relations with countries in Eurasia while Turkey 
would act as a ‘door to Eurasia’.151 Concretely, Turkey’s ruling elite at the time 
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foresaw the construction of pipelines passing through Turkey which would allow the 
newly independent states to its east an alternative route to export their energy resources 
to Europe. Prime Minister Demirel referred to this goal as the ‘Eurasian project’.152 
Hence, Turkish policy makers were prompted ‘to place Turkey in the “center” or “hub” 
of Eurasia’.153  
 
Two of the most influential politicians with regard to Turkey’s vision of Eurasia 
(before the AKP period which started in 2002 and which is the main focus of this 
thesis) were Turgut Özal, who was Turkey’s prime minister from 1983 to 1989 and 
then president from 1989 to 1993, and Ismail Cem, Turkey’s foreign minister from 
1997 to 2002. These two politicians are also important in that they laid the basis for 
Turkey’s ‘new geographic imagination’, which was later espoused by the AKP 
government, by opening up the space of Eurasia to Turkey.154 Foreign Minister Cem 
was an especially prominent and vocal promoter of Turkish engagement in Eurasia. 
His foreign policy vision and goals will be discussed in detail here because some of 
his ideas later reappeared in the AKP discourse, particularly in Ahmet Davutoğlu’s 
thinking. However, the policies under Prime Minister and later President Turgut Özal 
laid the foundation for Cem’s approach. Turgut Özal’s time in power coincided with 
the end of the Cold War and the sweeping changes to Turkey’s neighbourhood with 
the independence of the former Soviet republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia. For 
Özal, this new environment provided important opportunities for Turkey to play a 
bigger role in regional politics, but also to demonstrate its continued importance to its 
Western allies.155 What is important here, is that Özal based his foreign policy vision 
on a historical reading of Turkey as the heir of the Ottoman empire. As a result, Turkey 
was portrayed as a Eurasian power as opposed to being a European country with no 
links to the East. In this conception, the Muslim countries in the Balkans and the Turkic 
republics of the former Soviet Union received special attention.156  
 
While conceding that Turgut Özal was instrumental in building relations to the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, Cem credits himself with having introduced the Eurasian 
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dimension into Turkish foreign policy: ‘The Eurasian dimension is a new element that 
I have introduced to our foreign policy. […] Turkey has all the strategic, historical and 
cultural attributes, which provide it the opportunity to play a decisive role in the 
emerging Eurasian reality’.157 In the first press conference Cem gave as foreign 
minister in 1997, he made the following statement about Turkey’s role in Eurasia and 
the international system more generally, which is worth reproducing here in full:  
 
Turkey is now able to stand out in the international arena as a 
genuine and influential actor, as a player with an identity that is 
unique and strong. Within this promising environment, the dynamics 
of Turkey’s aspiration to be a Eurasian power center are taking 
shape. Eurasia is the union of Europe and Asia, two continents that 
are becoming increasingly more interdependent and complementary 
in the new realities of globalization and technology. Eurasia will be 
the powerhouse of global development in the 21st century thanks to 
its energy resources and to the rapid growth in trade opportunities. 
In this process, Turkey ceases to be a suburb or an outpost of Europe. 
Turkey of course is European and has been so for the last seven 
hundred years. But her horizons are not limited to that. Turkey is 
confronted by two great goals that are equally important: the first is 
to become a member of the European Union; the second is to 
become a decisive center in a Eurasia that is no longer just a 
geographical concept but is on the way to becoming an economic, 
social and political reality.158 
 
The Caucasus and Central Asia occupy a central role and provide the backbone for this 
historical and cultural reading of Turkish foreign policy. Thanks to the changing 
regional dynamics in the post-Cold War world, Turkey could claim a central position 
in Eurasia. As Cem argued, ‘out of the multitude of those “new” states, almost all – in 
the Balkans, in the Caucasus or in Central Asia – are those with whom Turkey shares 
a mutual history, religion or language’.159 As a result, and ‘by virtue of her historical 
and cultural attributes and her privileged identity, European as well as Asian, Turkey 
is firmly positioned to become the strategic “center” of Eurasia’.160 Hence, Cem was 
pivotal in developing a vision of Eurasia and Turkey’s place within this environment. 
Based on the shared history and culture with the Turkic republics in Central Asia and 
on Turkey’s geographical location on both the European and Asian continent, Cem 
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aimed for Turkey to occupy a ‘pivotal role in the emerging Eurasian reality’.161 His 
ideas and his emphasis on historical and cultural factors as fundamental elements of 
Turkish foreign policy had a lasting impact. 
 
Based on a geopolitical reading of Turkey’s geographical location at the intersection 
of continents and regions coupled with the changed regional environment and the 
emergence of newly independent countries, the concept of Eurasia quickly attained the 
highest levels of Turkey’s governing elite during the 1990s. This also remained the 
case in the 2000s, even though the meaning of Eurasia and its interpretation by the 
ruling elite evolved. Indeed, in Turkey there were different competing visions of 
Eurasianism which will be examined in more detail in the next section.  
4.3.2 Diverging visions of Turkish Eurasianism 
Eurasianism as a philosophical current in Turkey is much less developed than in 
Russia. In recent years, however, both the concept of Eurasia and Eurasianist 
discourses have become more prominent. Aktürk for instance argues that Eurasianism 
developed into a school of thought and a geopolitical identity – a ‘fourth pole’ next to 
Westernism, Turkism and Islamism.162 According to Erşen, the changed geopolitical 
landscape in the post-Soviet period had an important impact in that it ‘has turned 
Eurasia into a unique concept in Turkish geopolitical thinking – one that has blended 
discourses like Pan-Turkism, Eurasianism and Neo-Ottomanism, each searching for a 
new regional leadership role for Turkey in the twenty-first century’.163  
 
In the Turkish context, there is no single ideology of Eurasianism but a variety of 
interpretations and meanings.164 Within this hybrid geopolitical concept, we can 
identify three different versions of it in contemporary Turkey, each of which again is 
a mix between diverse strands and groups. As a result, the characterisation of each 
version either makes reference to its ideological or geographical roots. The first 
version is Kemalist/socialist Eurasianism or, according to its geographical focus, 
‘Asia-centered’.165 The second version is the Nationalist or ‘Turkic-world-centered’ 
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Eurasianist tradition.166 The third version of Eurasianism in Turkey is conservative or 
‘Moslem-world-centered’.167 
 
Adherents of the socialist/Kemalist version of Eurasianism perceive Turkey’s 
traditional European orientation as contrary to Turkey’s interests.168 Instead, the 
orientation of socialist Eurasianism is towards other Eurasian powers, such as Russia, 
China, but also countries like Iran and India, which are seen as partners and allies 
against the West. In terms of historical reference, this version of Eurasianism sees 
Turkey as part of an anti-imperial Western movement due to the revolutionary nature 
of the early years of the establishment of the republic.169 This tradition of Eurasianism 
is rather marginal, albeit it gained some traction in the 1990s due to the EU’s reluctance 
to favour Turkey’s accession and later on following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004, as well as a general warming of relations 
with Russia.170 According to Akçali and Perinçek, ‘the anti-imperial dimension of 
Kemalism’ provided the backbone for this Eurasianism and the emphasis on the need 
to ally with other anti-Western forces in the Eurasian space, such as Russia and China, 
was thus particularly strong.171 Overall, this tradition defines Eurasia less in 
geographical then in ideological terms as anti-West and regrouping the oppressed third 
world peoples.172  
 
This school of thought has also been called ‘Dugin’s Turkish branch’, since it comes 
close to the thinking of Russian Eurasianist Alexander Dugin.173 Dugin indeed 
attempted to expand his Eurasianist movement into Turkey and promoted close 
relations between Russia and Turkey, especially in the context of a common Eurasian 
identity. Some of his writings have been translated into Turkish and he managed to 
gain some marginal influence and followers among military circles and left-wing 
political parties. Especially his partnership and alliance with the leader of the Workers’ 
Party, Dogu Perinçek, allowed him to anchor his Eurasianist movement in Turkey and 
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somewhat expand his influence. However, given Perinçek’s own weak standing in 
Turkish politics (his party usually performed very poorly in elections) and the fact that 
he spent six years in prison following the infamous Ergenekon investigation, Dugin’s 
overall influence in Turkey remained limited.174 
 
The ‘Russian dimension’ is an important theme in the socialist Eurasianist discourse. 
In contrast to the above discussion, Aktürk puts forward a narrower definition of 
Turkish Eurasianism which is based on a ‘pro-Russian orientation abroad and 
socialist–nationalist government at home’.175 In his view, Europe is seen as Turkey’s 
‘Other’ and the Eurasianist vision is developed as a reaction to the ‘European idea’ 
which promotes Turkish membership in the EU.176 Eurasianism is a revisionist 
geopolitical vision in that it tries to ‘reconcile and overcome five centuries of 
uninterrupted rivalry and enmity between Turkey and Russia’.177 As such, this version 
of Eurasianism distinguishes itself from the Pan-Turkist version of Eurasianism which 
also advocates for Turkey to expand its power across Eurasia, but in competition to 
Russia instead of with Russia as an ally. On the contrary, the principal goal of 
Eurasianists, according to Aktürk, is ‘to change Turkey’s foreign policy such that 
Russia would be Turkey’s primary ally’.178  
 
The nationalist or Turkic-world centred geopolitical vision of Eurasia is closely linked 
to the Turkic post-Soviet republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus. This vision has 
been dominant in the 1990s with attempts by Ankara to increase its influence in Central 
Asia and essentially promotes a strong alliance with these countries.179 Eurasianism 
becomes almost synonymous with Pan-Turkism, a political movement that aims to 
bring together all the Turkic people in an alliance, and provides the ideological 
foundation for Turkey’s attempts to draw the other Turkic countries into its orbit.180 
There are essentially two definitions of Eurasia in this version. The more geographical 
definition considers Eurasia simply as the region where Europe and Asia meet, with 
Turkey in a prime location, and Azerbaijan serving as the geographical link between 
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Turkey and Central Asia.181 The second definition is more ideological or ethnic in that 
it refers to the entire area of ‘Turkistan’ in which Turkic peoples and communities 
live.182 
 
At the heart of this version of Eurasianism, which is close to the nationalist MHP party, 
are notions of ethnic, cultural and linguistic closeness between Turkey and the Turkic 
peoples living in the heart of Eurasia. The nationalist version of Eurasianism is thus a 
rather narrow and exclusive concept based on a common Turkish identity.183 In 
addition, it is also historically rooted by referring to the pre-Ottoman history of Turkish 
tribes and peoples living in the Eurasian space. As a result of this ethnic and cultural 
definition, nationalist Eurasianists consider ‘regionalization in Eurasia a sociological, 
historical and political necessity’.184 Contrary to the socialist/Kemalist vision of 
Eurasianism, the Turkic-world-centred approach argues that Turkey occupies a central 
position in Eurasia. However, there is disagreement about the role of other powers, 
above all Russia, in this conception of Eurasia. For some, Russia is included in the 
concept and is even a partner,185 while others argue that Russia is a competitor for 
influence in Eurasia.186 In general, this version of Eurasianism has had a lasting impact 
on Turkish foreign policy under a different heading. As Köstem argues, the ‘Turkic 
world’ concept, which calls for the establishment of close political, economic and 
cultural ties with the Turkic states of Eurasia and was originally integrated into Turkish 
foreign policy discourse by non-state actors, has become an ‘institutionalized’ concept 
also during the AKP government.187  
 
The conservative or Moslem-world-centred strand of Eurasianism can actually only 
marginally be considered a Eurasianist geopolitical vision. Its focus lies on 
‘establishing a sphere of influence in the former territories of the Ottoman empire’.188 
However, the Ottoman Empire’s geographical reach only touched the frontiers of 
Eurasia and was oriented much more towards the Middle East, Northern Africa and 
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Southeast Europe. In this regard, conservative Eurasianism refers to the ‘Ottoman 
world within its broadest boundaries’ and sees a prominent role for Turkey as a leader 
in this geography.189 The reference points are cultural closeness and a shared religion 
as well as historical references to Turkey’s role as centre of the Ottoman Empire and 
the necessity to revive that role in a modern version.190 In a sense, the Moslem-world-
centred Eurasianism is a grandiose concept in that it reunites a ‘much larger geography, 
one including not only Central Asia and the Caucasus, but also the Middle East and 
even North Africa’.191 Hence, there is ‘mutual complementariness of Turkish 
Eurasianism and neo-Ottomanism’,192 which makes conservative Eurasianism a rather 
hybrid and analytically vague concept. However, it is interesting to note the 
geopolitical and cultural associations made in this version of Eurasianism. We will 
come back to this in the next section when analysing the geopolitical vision of Ahmet 
Davutoğlu. 
 
In sum, these three versions of Eurasianism have all had some impact in Turkey while 
remaining rather marginal. Interestingly, it can also be argued whether they deserve to 
be called Eurasianist visions. According to Eren-Webb, ‘among the three, only 
socialist Eurasianists openly claim that Turks are Eurasians. To conservative democrat 
Eurasianists, Turks are Ottomans (a reference to religion) and for nationalist 
Eurasianists Turks are Turks (a reference to ethnicity)’.193 In addition, Eurasianist 
discourses in Turkey are generally based much more on a pragmatic understanding of 
Turkish interests and ambitions than on an ideological understanding. Therefore, 
Eurasia’s boundaries and the geographical description of the Eurasian space in Turkey 
varies. As Erşen argues, the important aspect is that the concept of Eurasia serves ‘to 
highlight the “exceptional geopolitical importance” of Turkey as a country that bridges 
and influences different regions, continents, religions and civilizations’ and that 
ultimately, ‘Eurasia only acquires geopolitical significance when Turkey is imagined 
as its focus or leader’.194 A former Turkish diplomat for instance argued that Turkey’s 
Eurasian position and argumentation goes hand in hand with its ambition to becoming 
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a member of the European Union: ‘Turkey would see its long-term benefits and 
interests in becoming a more central figure in Eurasia, rather than being a periphery of 
the EU. However, it’s not one or another and there is no hesitation in our orientation 
which is towards the EU. But to maximise our interests in Europe we think we would 
be much more in demand in a Eurasian concept’.195 Similarly, when we go back to 
Ismail Cem, the former foreign minister of Turkey, Turkish foreign policy had two 
principal goals, namely becoming a member of the EU as well as placing Turkey at 
the centre of the new Eurasian region. Indeed, Cem argued that the ‘two goals are not 
at all contradictory: in fact, they complement and reinforce one another’.196 Overall, 
we can thus speak of a pragmatic Eurasianism which has prevailed, and which 
essentially puts Turkey’s economic and political interests in the first place while 
sometimes using Eurasianist logic and ideas as explanation. 
4.3.3 Afro-Eurasia 
The cursory overview above presented the principal strands of Eurasianism in Turkey. 
It has been argued that these ideas have been marginal both politically and 
ideologically. However, after the coming to power of the AKP, a distinctive 
geopolitical vision in Turkish foreign policy, which is close to the third interpretation 
of Turkish Eurasianism, became dominant. 
 
Ahmet Davutoğlu, a former academic and advisor to Prime Minister Erdoğan, who 
then became Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister, developed a new concept and 
vision of Eurasia. He referred to the vast geopolitical region in which Turkey is located 
as ‘Afro-Eurasia’. As Davutoğlu explained in a policy brief written as foreign minister 
in 2014: ‘Turkey used to be known as a Eurasian state, but for the past five to six years 
we have been calling ourselves an “Afro-Eurasian state”, because we are at the center 
of the mainland of all human history’.197 The definition of Afro-Eurasia essentially 
involves the traditional Eurasia inhabited by Turkic peoples and communities with the 
addition of the former Ottoman lands in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). 
As Davutoğlu argued, ‘Turkey holds an optimal place in the sense that it is both an 
Asian and European country and is also close to Africa through the Eastern 
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Mediterranean’.198 This essentially defined Turkey with multiple identities through its 
links to multiple geographical regions. In an article explaining his foreign policy 
vision, Davutoğlu wrote: ‘In terms of geography, Turkey occupies a unique space. As 
a large country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia’s vast landmass it may be defined as a 
central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified 
character’.199 By including the Middle East and North Africa, Davutoğlu enlarges his 
concept of Eurasia to that of Afro-Eurasia. In so doing, his concept strongly resembles 
traditional geopolitical concepts, such as Mackinder’s heartland theory, which equates 
geopolitical control over territory with influence in global affairs.200 In general, 
Davutoğlu’s writing is strongly influenced by classical imperial geopolitics and writers 
such as Mackinder and Mahan, whose concepts he uses in order to demonstrate 
Turkey’s position as a pivotal country and as a justification for an active foreign 
policy.201 Furthermore, Davutoğlu speaks about Afro-Eurasia as the mainland of 
human history while placing Turkey right at its centre and thus defining it as a crucial 
country and a regional power. In a speech at a meeting discussing regional cooperation, 
Davutoğlu stressed the need ‘to embark on a new vision in order to have the Eurasia 
region regain its historical importance’ and he even claimed that ‘if peace and welfare 
do not reign in Eurasia, it is not possible to make peace and welfare reign in the world, 
either’.202  
 
Such strong statements illustrate the geopolitical undercurrents of Davutoğlu’s 
thinking. However, as an academic turned foreign minister, he also has a practical 
political sense defending the interests of his country when outlining a foreign policy 
vision. As such, Afro-Eurasia should be considered a pragmatic and cooperative 
concept aimed at improving Turkey’s position in world politics. Economic and trade-
related aspects are at the forefront of Davutoğlu’s considerations. Contrary to the 
Russian version of Eurasianism, the Afro-Eurasia concept ‘does not seek competition 
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201 Ozkan 2014: 121-125 
202 ‘Davutoğlu calls for a “Eurasian union”’, Today’s Zaman, 5 February 2010, available at 
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with Western civilization but rather seeks cooperation in every field. It is not a political 
creation that seeks to impose monolithic uniformity’.203 Essentially, according to 
Tüfekçi, ‘Davutoğlu’s interpretation of Eurasianism has been instrumental: how to 
reap the maximum benefits by utilizing Turkey’s unique properties, located in a unique 
geopolitical position, and with deep historical connections with Eurasian countries’.204 
As Davutoğlu himself stated at the aforementioned meeting about regional cooperation 
in Eurasia, ‘the western and eastern ends of Eurasia should be reconnected’ so that ‘we 
can become the power engine of the world’s economy’.205 The overall ambition of his 
vision of Eurasia is thus for Turkey to occupy a central position, both politically as 
well as economically, in the region. 
 
Nevertheless, despite not seeking competition with other civilisations, Bilgin and 
Bilgic argue that there is a new element to the geopolitical imagination espoused by 
Davutoğlu and the AKP, which is that Turkey sees itself ‘as the leader of its own 
civilizational basin’ (defined as the former Ottoman territories plus the Turkic 
countries and peoples of Eurasia), a fact that becomes apparent following the above 
discussion of the idea of Afro-Eurasia.206 As a result, Davutoğlu explicitly avoids to 
define Afro-Eurasia in purely ethnic terms but refers to multiple identities and 
historical and cultural links. He thus expands the hitherto traditional Turkish definition 
of Eurasia as a region principally inhabited by Turkic peoples to a vast region 
encompassing also the Middle East and North Africa. Again, this is aimed at increasing 
Ankara’s global political clout by giving ‘expression to Turkey in terms of a plurality 
of identities such as Western, Turkish, Muslim, Kurdish, Eurasian, and secular’ with 
the result that ‘Turkey is thus transformed into an overarching roof that accommodates, 
protects, and assists in the development of all these identities’.207 As such, Davutoğlu’s 
concepts and ideas actually represent a hybrid between Turkish Eurasianism and Neo-
Ottomanism by linking the historical experience of Turkey as the centre of the 
Ottoman Empire with the cultural and linguistic links to the Turkic peoples in Eurasia. 
As Erşen argues, although Davutoğlu’s and the AKP’s foreign policy vision is 
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primarily influenced by the Moslem-world-centred geopolitical tradition, their ‘views 
about Eurasia have not been entirely free from influence of the Turkic-world-centered 
tradition’.208 The main reasons behind this were pragmatic and aimed at increasing 
Turkey’s overall position of power in global politics. Hence, also during Davutoğlu’s 
tenure as foreign minister, Eurasianism did not become an official ideology in Turkey 
but it can be argued, as Tüfekçi does, that ‘during the Davutoğlu era, the application 
of Eurasianism has reached to the highest level within Turkey’.209 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter provided an overview of the eclectic nature of the concept of Eurasia in 
its Russian and Turkish context. In so doing, it lays the foundation for the subsequent 
discourse analysis of a more specific aspect, namely the place and importance of 
Eurasia in Russian and Turkish governing elite’s foreign policy discourse. It has been 
argued that Eurasia emerged as an exciting new object of study following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, which freed up the interpretative space for new 
discussions about the meaning of Eurasia. In both Russia and Turkey, this opportunity 
was seized by ideologues and politicians alike and Eurasia (re)entered the realm of 
political ideas. However, and quite naturally owing to different political realities, there 
are diverging interpretations of Eurasia in the Russian and Turkish contexts. In Russia, 
for instance, there is a long philosophical tradition of Eurasianist thought, developed 
in the early 20th century, which experienced a revival in the post-Soviet period 
receiving much scholarly and political attention. At the same time, the Russian 
government implemented the hitherto biggest regional integration project in Eurasia 
with the idea of fostering a new greater Eurasian area. In Turkey, a similar 
philosophical tradition is absent, but there has been a discussion of Turkey’s Eurasian 
identity ever since the 1990s which experienced significant shifts over the years. In 
addition, in both countries there is also a pragmatic discourse on Eurasia, focusing on 
national interests, security considerations and economic opportunities. 
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Chapter 5: Eurasia in Russian discourse 
This chapter examines the place of Eurasia in Russian government discourse. It is 
structured along two axes: a topical description focusing on the main themes covered 
in the discourses followed by a chronological description of the evolution of the 
discourse. Russia’s governing elite’s discourse on Eurasia is characterised by an 
emphasis on various and interlinked themes, most notably geographical, historical and 
politico-economical aspects. In general, Eurasia is a crucial concept in contemporary 
Russian foreign policy. Putin outlined as much in his inauguration speech as president 
in 2012: 
 
These coming years will be crucial for shaping Russia’s future in the 
decades to come. We must all understand that the life of our future 
generations and our prospects as a country and nation depend on […] 
our ability to become a leader and centre of gravity for the whole of 
Eurasia.1 
 
The geopolitical concept of Eurasia thus is a central element in Russian foreign policy 
and in the elite discourse. At the core of this discourse are geographical images, 
Russia’s geographical location as well as the country’s size which place Russia right 
at the centre of Eurasia. The country’s centrality in the Eurasian geography serves as 
foundation for Russia’s position as a great power in global affairs and its political 
development. This geographical focus is coupled with a strong emphasis on Russia’s 
historical experience, namely the role Russia played as the imperial centre of 
subsequent regional and global empires, and its implications to the present day. Indeed, 
Eurasia is the region in which Russia’s imperial past is grounded and the links which 
had been created between countries in this space are an important element in Russian 
foreign policy. As such, frequent references to the existence of a historic community 
in Eurasia illustrate the importance of this region for Russia’s development. Eurasia 
thus is an important part of Russia’s identity. Lastly, the economy and economic 
integration in Eurasia are a crucial component of Russian government elite discourse 
in the sense that Eurasia occupies an important place as a synonym for regional 
integration. With the implementation of the Eurasian Economic Union, with Russia as 
its principal promoter, Eurasia developed into an independent region in global affairs. 
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Given Russia’s dominant position in this setting and its role as a driving force behind 
Eurasian integration, its position as an important and influential global actor are 
secured. 
 
This chapter has two aims: it analyses the discourse of Russia’s governing elite with 
regard to the geopolitical concept of Eurasia and it traces the evolution of the 
importance of this concept in Russian foreign policy over the period under study 
(2000-2015). Although Eurasia was a constant element in Russian government 
discourse, it developed into the central element following Putin’s return to the 
presidency in 2012. In the early 2000s, Russian discourse strongly focused on the 
country’s European roots and the development of a partnership with Western 
countries. The Eurasian location was important in that it characterised Russia as 
belonging both to the West and the East and offered economic opportunities in both 
directions. In this context, a slight turn to Asia during the Medvedev presidency, which 
was also infused by disappointments caused by a fraught relationship between Russia 
and the West, became apparent. Nonetheless, Eurasia remained a central element in 
government discourse and took centre stage with the start of Putin’s third term as 
president. The project of establishing the Eurasian (Economic) Union was declared a 
key foreign policy goal and in the context of the Ukraine crisis and the subsequent 
confrontation between Russia and the West, Eurasia became even more important. 
Russian government officials continuously emphasised the importance of a multipolar 
world order and Eurasia was positioned as one of the poles in this order. Similarly, 
Russia’s position as a great power was strengthened due to its central location in 
Eurasia and as the main driving force behind Eurasian integration. Hence, Eurasia has 
a crucial meaning for Russian foreign policy and Russia’s political development. 
 
This thesis focuses on the importance of ‘space’ and the geographical situation of a 
country in the formulation of its foreign policy. It has been argued that it is only 
through the discursive practices of foreign policy elites that meaning is attached to 
geopolitical space. This chapter thus analyses the principal themes in Russian foreign 
policy with regard to Eurasia through an analysis of government elite discourse while 
studying how the discourse evolved over the years. In so doing, this chapter will 
identify several characteristics and role perceptions in the geopolitical imagination of 
Russia’s governing elite. This chapter is divided into two parts: the first part focuses 
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on a thematic description of Russia’s Eurasian discourse on the basis of the four main 
themes – geography, history, culture, economy – covered in the discourses, followed 
by a second part which discusses the evolution of the discourse in a chronological 
manner focusing on main events in foreign policy and Russian politics and how they 
influenced Russian officials’ discourse on Eurasia. 
5.1 Prevalent themes 
This section covers the dominant themes in the Russian government officials’ 
discourses on Eurasia. As described in Chapter 2, these themes were determined by 
reading a sample of discourses from Russian officials thereby identifying the principal 
themes and keywords with regard to geographical and geopolitical assumptions in 
Russian discourse and national identity conceptions. Four broad categories – 
geography, history, culture, and economy – were identified and each category 
comprises several keywords which cover the basic conceptions of and references to 
Eurasia in Russian discourse (see Figure 2.2). For the subsequent discussion in this 
section, they are grouped into three overarching and rather general themes. In a first 
part, I will discuss the importance of geography in Russian officials’ discourse on 
Eurasia before moving on to the second category which groups together historical and 
cultural aspects of the discourse. In a third part, the discussion focuses on the economy 
and the issue of regional integration as a dominant aspect in Russia’s Eurasian 
discourse. Each section will take a close look at the main issues within each theme and 
work with direct quotes taken from the Russian officials’ discourses. The main aspects 
and keywords of each theme and the way in which they overlap are schematically 












Figure 5.1 Main themes in Russia’s Eurasian discourse 
 
5.1.1 Geography 
This analysis starts with the year 2000, following Vladimir Putin’s election as 
president of Russia. The official foreign policy concept, approved by Putin in 2000, 
sets the framework for Russian foreign policy. The principal theme in Russian elite 
discourse with regard to Eurasia is geography, or more precisely, Russia’s 
geographical location on both the European and Asian continents. In general, 
geography, or more specifically Russia’s geographical location, and the perception in 
Moscow of Russia’s place in the world, has a major impact on the formulation and 
conduct of Russian foreign policy. As Foreign Minister Lavrov argues in an article 
published in 2013 in the Russian International Affairs magazine, ‘the independence of 
Russian foreign policy is conditioned by its geographical sizes, unique geopolitical 
position, centuries-old historical tradition, culture and self-consciousness of our 
people’.2 Similarly, President Putin stated that one of the reasons why Russia has an 
active foreign policy with global reach is the country’s geographical situation. In a 
speech to Russian diplomats, Putin raises the question, ‘does Russian foreign policy 
remain global in terms of its coverage?’ and then proceeds to answer it himself in the 
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affirmative by stating the reason therefore as being ‘not only because of our military 
or economic potential, but also because of geography. We are present in Europe, in 
Asia, in the North and in the South. Of course we have interests there. It can’t be 
otherwise’.3 In an article discussing Russia’s geographical metanarratives, Laruelle 
argues that the country’s size is an indispensable part of Russia’s self-perception as a 
meaningful and powerful state in global affairs. Therefore, ‘the destiny of the country 
is linked to its geographic scope’ which essentially means that Russia, given its size, 
can only exist as a great power.4 This argument is illustrated by a quote from President 
Putin, taken from a speech at a Russian Geographical Society meeting in 2009, where 
he argued that ‘when we say great, a great country, a great state – certainly, size 
matters. […] When there is no size, there is no influence, no meaning’.5 Hence, 
Russia’s geographical location in addition to the country’s size are critical foundations 
for Russian foreign policy. 
 
Due to the vast expanse of Russia, the governing elite describes their country as 
belonging to various geographical regions. In an interview with Chinese media outlets, 
for instance, Putin said that ‘we know that Russia is both a European and an Asian 
country’ as well as ‘Russia is a large and complex country located both in Asia and 
Europe’.6 Similarly, in a discussion about Russian trade partners, Medvedev reminded 
a US media outlet that ‘Russia is both a European and an Asian country’.7 What is 
more, Russia’s identity is described by the governing elite as not just European and 
Asian, but as Eurasian. The classical argument in Russian discourse is that Russia is 
Eurasian due to its geography, as this quote from an interview Putin gave to Polish 
media illustrates: ‘From the geographical point of view Russia is of course a Eurasian 
country’.8  
 
According to the Russian government view, Russia’s geographical location on both 
the European and Asian continents also predetermines what sort of foreign policy 
Russia should conduct. This is recognised in the foreign policy concepts of 2000 and 
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2008. There it is written that ‘the geopolitical position of Russia as the largest Eurasian 
power’ as well as ‘its status as one of the leading States of the world and a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council’ determines the need for Russia to have a balanced 
and multi-vector foreign policy.9 Interestingly, this same statement was removed from 
the revised 2013 foreign policy concept. However, at the same time, the new foreign 
policy concept makes reference to the existence of three separate spaces, Eurasia, the 
Euro-Atlantic and the Asia-Pacific, and the need to safeguard these space’s ‘indivisible 
security’ in order to counter global destabilisation. In addition, the concept refers to 
Russia’s traditional identity by stating that the country’s foreign policy ‘reflects the 
unique role our country has been playing over centuries as a counterbalance in 
international affairs and the development of global civilization’.10 As will be discussed 
in more detail below, over the three Putin presidencies, Russia’s Eurasian discourse 
has gradually shifted and become a central component of foreign policy. In 2011, Putin 
proposed the establishment of a Eurasian (Economic) Union (EAEU), which was 
mentioned prominently as one of the principal priorities in the 2013 foreign policy 
concept. Therefore, the direct reference to Russia’s Eurasian geopolitical position is 
less important, because it is anyway assumed to be a main characteristic of Russia’s 
identity.  
 
In general, Russia’s geographical location in Eurasia and as the principal Eurasian 
power, is an important factor influencing foreign policy. Members of Russia’s 
government insist on the open and multi-vector character of Russian foreign policy 
which is due to a geographical location at the intersection of regions and continents. 
This of course is also rooted in an opportunistic logic in that Russia wants to keep all 
options open, as Putin explained to an assembly of Russian diplomats and ambassadors 
back in 2001:  
 
it would be wrong to measure whether we have more priorities in 
Europe or in Asia. We cannot afford either a Western or an Eastern 
tilt. The reality is that a power which occupies such a geopolitical 
position as Russia has national interests everywhere.11 
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11 Putin 2001; See also Putin 2003b: ‘Russia, as is well known, is geographically located in both 
Europe and Asia, so we, of course, have interests in both parts of the world’. 
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What is more, Russia’s geopolitical position as Eurasian power also bestows upon it a 
special role. According to Putin, ‘Russia, as a unique Eurasian power, has always 
played a special role in building relations between the East and the West’.12 Uniting 
both European and Asian characteristics is considered an advantage for Russia because 
it represents an added value to its role in global affairs. Sergey Ivanov shared this 
assessment in introducing his speech at the 2001 Munich Security Conference with the 
following words: ‘We base our analysis on the postulate of the Eurasian location of 
Russia, its role of a natural bridge between Europe and Asia, between two civilizations, 
the role Russia has been playing for more than one century.’13 What is interesting here 
is that Russia’s role as a bridge is not just due to its geography, but it is also historically 
rooted. Hence the geographical and historical arguments come together in emphasising 
the particularity and importance of Russia’s Eurasian location.  
 
This is also underlined when looking back at the consequence of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union which presented Russia with a new geographical situation after having 
lost what previously was part of the Russian and Soviet empires. As a result, Russia 
was now simultaneously further away from Asia and from Europe and therefore a new 
Eurasian discourse or a sense of Russia being a Eurasian power emerged. In this 
context, Russia was trying to find ways to formulate a comprehensive foreign policy 
which would encompass both its European identity and its Asian vector. Indeed, as 
Kerr argued, Russian foreign policy in its formative period in the 1990s was strongly 
influenced by ‘the country’s spatial dimensions and its changed geopolitical position, 
in relation to Europe and Asia, or, as it is increasingly expressed, as a Eurasian 
power’.14 With this in mind, the geographical aspects of the Eurasia discourse of 
Russia’s governing elite, such as portraying Russia as belonging to both Europe and 
Asia as well as being a bridge between the two, appears only logical. The same applies 
to the more recent discourse on Eurasian integration which describes the EAEU as an 
‘efficient bridge between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific region’.15 Because 
Russia had to redefine its national and geographical identity in the aftermath of the 
Soviet collapse and make good for the loss of its former imperial lands, it was 
important for Russian policy-makers to be able to refer to Russia’s geographical 
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expanse and link to many regions in order to maintain the country’s special status and 
powerful position in global affairs. 
 
However, the composition of Russia’s Eurasian identity is more complex than this. 
Regarding Russia’s European identity, we see that geography is one aspect, but culture 
is a different one. There are several statements emphasising Russia’s Eurasian 
geography while insisting on the fact that, from a cultural point of view, Russia is 
European. Early on in his first presidential term, Vladimir Putin made this point very 
clearly in an interview with Polish media outlets: ‘Russia is without any doubt a 
European country because it has a European culture. There can be no doubt about it. 
It has always been that way’.16 Sergey Ivanov, speaking at the Munich Security 
Conference in 2001, also left no doubt about Russia’s European roots when stating 
that the ‘composition of its population, spirit, culture and prevailing religions make 
Russia a European country’.17  
 
In general, Russia’s identity as a European state is not really questioned by either the 
Russian elite nor most European countries. Russia’s belonging to the historical and 
geographical European community is frequently stated as a fact by Russia’s political 
leaders. Before the East-West confrontation that characterized the Cold War, Russia, 
in its form as Russian empire, was a part of Europe and the European concert of 
powers. According to Putin, this did not change in the meantime, as he made clear 
when addressing the Russian Federal Assembly in 2005: ‘Above all else Russia was, 
is and will, of course, be a major European power’.18 Historically, Europe always was 
the reference point for Russian development and thus the debate is not so much about 
whether Russia belongs to Europe or not. Indeed, according to Neumann, ‘the idea of 
Europe is the main “Other” in relation to which the idea of Russia is defined’.19 
Similarly, the idea of a Greater Europe, which was advanced by different Russian 
presidents, aims to establish Russia as an important member of this space.20 These 
ideas provide Russia with a new discourse in terms of its European identity and Russia 
can maintain its European identity while re-defining what it means to be European.  
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Coming back to the elite’s Eurasian discourse, it is no coincidence that Russian 
officials highlight their country’s European roots and civilisational belonging to 
Europe and the Euro-Atlantic space. There is also no contradiction between such 
discourses and Russia’s emphasis on its Eurasian nature since the two are actually 
linked. According to a Russian academic, ‘Eurasia is part of Russia’s general vision of 
Wider Europe’, which includes both the Euro-Atlantic community based on NATO 
and the EU as well as the Eurasian community based on the EAEU and the Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).21 It is therefore only logical that Russian 
officials would insist on their country’s European identity. In the 2013 foreign policy 
concept then there is no room for ambiguity and Russia is characterised as having 
‘deep-rooted civilizational ties’ with the Euro-Atlantic states in addition to a common 
geography, history and economic ties.22 The discourse however becomes more blurred 
in the context of the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union. In one of his pre-
election articles published in 2012, Vladimir Putin stated that ‘Russia is an inalienable 
and organic part of Greater Europe and European civilization. Our citizens think of 
themselves as Europeans. We are by no means indifferent to developments in united 
Europe’.23 Therefore, Putin continues to argue:  
 
Russia proposes moving towards the creation of a common 
economic and human space from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean – 
a community referred by Russian experts to as “the Union of 
Europe”, which will strengthen Russia’s potential and position in its 
economic pivot toward the “new Asia”.24 
 
In this article, Putin thus essentially promotes the same vision he already outlined with 
regard to the planned Eurasian Union, which should equally serve as a link between 
Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific region. Hence, in the context of Russia’s 
Eurasian discourse, Europe is characterised in an instrumental manner as an important 
element in Russia’s plans to integrate the wider Eurasian region. This becomes 
apparent in both the security and economic realms with Medvedev’s proposal for the 
establishment of a pan-European security treaty in 2008 (see Chapter 3) and then 
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Putin’s plan to build a Eurasian Union (more details below), which both promote the 
image of Russia as uniting the Eurasian region. 
 
Russia’s European identity is frequently mentioned and an integral part of the 
discourse of Russian officials. The same goes for Russia’s Asian identity, although 
contrary to other European countries’ acceptance of Russia as a European country, 
other countries from Asia perceive Russia differently. Whereas it is clear that from a 
geographical point of view, Russia is part of Asia, Salin argues that ‘it is absolutely 
certain, however, that from a civilizational point of view Russia is not an Asian 
country, especially when viewed by Asia-Pacific nations’.25 Nevertheless, this has not 
refrained Russian officials from stating Russia’s belonging to the Asia-Pacific region 
and indeed over the years Russia’s Asian orientation has become more important. 
Suffice to come back to the above speech by Sergey Ivanov at the Munich Security 
Conference in 2001, where he stated that Russia is a European country but that ‘two 
thirds of [Russia’s] territory and the main part of economic potential are situated in 
Asia’. As a result, Russia has interests in both regions, which for Ivanov is illustrated 
by the official ‘symbols of the Russian Federation [which] include the double-headed 
Eagle looking to the West and to the East’.26 Especially in the context of the so-called 
rise of the East and the shift in economic power to Asia, Russia’s leaders attempted to 
integrate and position their country more closely within this region. The organisation 
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Vladivostok in 2012, 
for instance, was seen as a major step in Russia’s attempts at intensifying relations 
with Asia and promoting its pivot to the East. Hence, the 2013 foreign policy concept 
already places Russia at the centre of the region by stating that ‘strengthening Russia’s 
presence in the Asia-Pacific region is becoming increasingly important since Russia is 
an integral part of this fastest-developing geopolitical zone’.27 
 
Russia’s leaders use the Eurasian location and identity as a justification for Russia’s 
interests and involvement in the Asia-Pacific region. During his term as president, 
Dmitry Medvedev presented the participants of the Valdai Discussion Club meeting 
in 2008 with the following assessment:  
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We frequently call Russia a Eurasian country, not thinking about the 
practical implications of such a term. In any case, perhaps we don’t 
take this fully into account when we talk about making a given 
decision. But in fact Russia is indeed a state one part of which is 
drawn towards Europe, yet an important part of Russia is located in 
Asia. Of course Russia has a large number of ties with its Asian 
partners.28 
 
Other Russian officials also argue along this line. Former Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov, for instance, in a speech at a session of the ASEAN regional council, stated 
that ‘Russia as a Eurasian state is a direct and keen participant of all the processes 
occurring in the [Asia-Pacific] region’.29 Or, as Putin reiterated in 2014, ‘For Russia, 
as a Eurasian country, it is natural to be highly interested in the Asia-Pacific region. It 
is both a huge market and an important source of growth for Russia’s Far East and 
Eastern Siberia’.30 Hence, the geopolitical location is important with regard to Russia’s 
identity as a Eurasian power but also regarding opportunities for economic 
development and the importance of maintaining a multi-vector foreign policy. 
 
In general, as the statement by Medvedev illustrates, references to Russia’s European 
identity and to its Asian identity somewhat differ. While Russia’s leaders always 
emphasise Russia’s dual identity as both European and Asian, the roots of this identity 
and also especially the implications differ. The following statement from Putin in a 
meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club in 2007 is illustrative of this difference:  
 
Russia is a unique country in that part of its territory is in Asia and 
a large part is in Europe. Christian values form the foundation of 
Russian culture and in this sense Russia is a European country. But 
Russia is also home to 15 million Muslims, a large part of our 
territory is in Asia, and we also have interests in Asia.31  
 
Indeed, when taking a closer look, one can see that there is a difference in the way in 
which government officials see Russia’s European and Asian identities. As such, 
Russia is both European and Asian. While the European component grounds in culture, 
history and the cultural foundation of Russia as a European country, the Asian part is 
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more a function of Russia’s geography, which links it to Asia, and with regard to the 
potential of the Asian vector for Russia’s economic development. 
 
In general, Russia considers itself to be part of the three geopolitical spaces Eurasia, 
Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific, if only by nature of its size and geographical 
location.32 However, among these, the Eurasian space occupies a special position 
because it also connects the other two spaces. Indeed, there are different aspects to a 
geographical reading of Russia’s Eurasian identity, from the simple fact that Russia is 
both European and Asian and thus Eurasian, to the opportunities and foreign policy 
focus this offers. There is a geographical component in that Russia does indeed 
consider itself to be at the centre of Eurasia. But there is also a politico-economic 
component, namely that Russia is the main driving force behind economic 
development and integration in the region. Crucially, however, all this is linked to 
Russia’s ‘survival’, in the sense that Eurasia, and Russia’s Eurasian location for that 
matter, becomes the most important scene for Russia’s political and economic 
development. It is also here where Russia’s ambition and self-understanding as a great 
global power is grounded. 
5.1.2 History/Culture 
History matters for Russia. As Bobo Lo argues, history fulfils several roles in Russian 
foreign policy, one of which is as the ‘basis for national pride and assertiveness’, which 
is primarily grounded in Russia’s successful military history (especially with reference 
to Russia’s victory in World War II or, how Russians prefer to call it, the ‘Great 
Patriotic War’) and underpins Russia’s claim for great power status.33 As such, 
Russia’s particular position in global affairs today as a major power with a certain 
status is a legacy of former times (such as Russia being a member of the UN Security 
Council, having inherited the Soviet seat). Russia’s existence is strongly linked to past 
experiences and Moscow’s role as the imperial centre of subsequent regional and 
global empires for many centuries. This left an imprint on future generations of 
Russia’s elite and their attempts to define Russia’s role and identity in international 
politics.34 Indeed, as Clunan argues, in the efforts to re-define Russia’s national 
                                                 
32 Svarin 2016 
33 Lo 2015: 18-22 
34 For a comprehensive study of the impact of history on Russian foreign policy, see Legvold 2007. 
147 
 
identity after the collapse of the Soviet Union, ‘historical memories of Russia’s prior 
self […] served as the primary source’.35 The importance of Russia’s historical 
experience can also be observed in some of the actions of President Putin and the use 
of symbols of the past for the official state emblem, the old Soviet melody for the new 
national anthem and the change of certain national holidays.36 The 2013 foreign policy 
concept, for instance, makes reference to Russia’s past and its importance for 
contemporary Russian foreign policy by postulating that Russian foreign policy ‘is 
consistent and continuous and reflects the unique role our country has been playing 
over centuries as a counterbalance in international affairs and the development of 
global civilization’.37 
 
Putin was candid in his view about the importance of history for Russia. In his first 
address to the Federal Assembly of his third presidential term in December 2012, Putin 
claimed that Russia’s thousand-year long history has a strong influence on the 
contemporary development of Russia’s identity and that it is one of the foundations of 
Russian power and strength:  
 
In order to revive national consciousness, we need to link historical 
eras and get back to understanding the simple truth that Russia did 
not begin in 1917, or even in 1991, but rather, that we have a 
common, continuous history spanning over one thousand years, and 
we must rely on it to find inner strength and purpose in our national 
development.38  
 
Likewise, in his 2003 address to the Federal Assembly, Putin argues that this history 
conditions the character of Russia’s statehood in that it leaves no other option than for 
Russia to be a strong state and power: ‘Our entire historical experience shows that a 
country like Russia can live and develop within its existing borders only if it is a strong 
nation’.39 However, history does not exist in a vacuum, and as the previous and next 
statement illustrate, it is also closely linked to Russia’s geographical reality and 
geopolitical position: 
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Maintaining a state spread over such a vast territory and preserving 
a unique community of peoples while keeping up a strong presence 
on the international stage is not just an immense labour, it is also a 
task that has cost our people untold victims and sacrifice. Such has 
been Russia’s historic fate over these thousand and more years. Such 
has been the way Russia has continuously emerged as a strong 
nation.40 
 
Referring to such concepts as human suffering and the efforts provided by the Russian 
people in building a strong state with a vast territory, this statement illustrates how the 
historical and geographical arguments in Putin’s discourse are closely linked. The 
common denominator between the two themes is Eurasia, the geography in which 
Russia’s imperial past is grounded. As Medvedev wrote in a newspaper article in 2012, 
‘we have centuries-long experience at the crossroads of different cultures and 
civilisations. No wonder Russia is called a Eurasian […] country’.41 Within the 
Eurasian space, a special place is reserved for the other post-Soviet states on the basis 
of a common historical experience, cultural closeness and, as Lavrov calls it, 
‘civilizational commonality’.42 Russia has emphasised the existence of a historic 
community in Eurasia which still today links the countries of the former Soviet Union 
to each other. Vladimir Putin did so in his 2005 presidential address, while making 
allusion to Russia’s imperial past as the main power and economic and cultural centre 
on the Eurasian continent: ‘Russia should continue its civilising mission on the 
Eurasian continent. This mission consists in ensuring that democratic values, 
combined with national interests, enrich and strengthen our historic community’.43 
According to this reading, there is a historic community of states on the Eurasian 
continent, referring to the Commonwealth of Independent States countries, where 
Russia occupies an important position. 
 
This is important in the context of Moscow’s promotion of Eurasian integration and 
the way in which this project is seen by Russia’s political elite. In a speech at a CIS 
forum in 2010, Foreign Minister Lavrov underlined the importance of historical, 
cultural and civilisational links among the CIS countries as well as their influence on 
new political projects: 
                                                 
40 Putin 2003a 
41 Medvedev 2012 
42 Lavrov 2007b 




Our countries share a common geography and a common history. 
We are united by economic interdependence, cultural and 
civilizational commonality, and simply the interlacing of millions of 
human destinies. Therefore, the integration processes within the 
Commonwealth space derive from real life experiences.44 
 
Lavrov then goes on to argue that Russia is not playing geopolitical games and seeking 
a sphere of influence in this region while accusing others, especially NATO, of doing 
so. He laments that these actors seek their own advantages while not respecting the 
interests of the countries in this space to the detriment of regional stability. Lavrov 
thus paints the image of a natural regional order and depicts the CIS as a homogeneous 
and closed space comprising several countries with a common history and shared 
interests. What is more, Lavrov goes on to link the historical to the present and even 
the future in attaching value to this space for the future development of the region by 
stating that ‘[the CIS space] is a common civilizational habitat for all the peoples living 
here that preserves our historic and spiritual heritage and, I am sure, our common 
future’.45 Although this speech took place before President Putin outlined the Eurasian 
Union project, it evokes similar themes in highlighting the importance of the existing 
links between countries in the Eurasian region for the future development of the region. 
Indeed, when describing the nature of the proposed Eurasian (Economic) Union, Putin 
made clear that the CIS states were at the centre of this project, which is obvious given 
that three of them were founding members, and also constituted the principal pool for 
new member states.46 There thus seems to be a direct connection between Russia’s 
discourse on cultural and civilizational ties (‘commonality’) between the CIS states 
and Moscow’s perception of the EAEU, which it thus sees in a similar light. In a speech 
at the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy in Moscow in 2014, Lavrov criticised 
the West for its arrogant attitude towards Eurasian integration even though, according 
to him, the ‘countries intending to join the EAEU have much more in common in terms 
of their economies, history and culture than many EU members’.47 Again we can see 
how Russian government officials emphasise the notion of a cultural and historical 
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connection between their country and the other post-Soviet countries and how this 
connection is particularly beneficial for Eurasian integration. 
 
Such feelings are echoed by some members of the analytical community. With 
reference to the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union, Podberezkin and 
Podberezkina remark that ‘Eurasian ideology recognizes the shared 1,000-year history 
of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and other CIS countries’. 48 Hence, Russia’s history is 
linked to Eurasia and in turn the political community which emerged there is closely 
linked to Russia. For instance, the use of the Russian language further proves this fact 
since it is characterised as the language which has allowed the region to develop: ‘For 
centuries, [Russian] has been the language of interethnic communication for the 
numerous ethnic groups of the Eurasian continent’.49 Such statements cement the 
linking up of the geographical and historical arguments which is a crucial theme in 
defining Russia’s Eurasian identity. 
 
A further notion in this geography-history nexus is the idea that Russia plays the role 
of bridge between East and West, both geographically but also with regard to bridging 
civilisational divides. For instance, in a speech at the Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) summit in Malaysia in 2003, Putin stated that ‘Russia, as a unique 
Eurasian power, has always played a special role in building relations between the East 
and the West’.50 According to Putin, the fact that Russia unites both European and 
Asian civilisations on its territory, makes it the perfect place for a dialogue of 
civilisations: ‘Russia, as a Eurasian country, is a unique example where the dialogue 
of cultural civilisations has become a centuries-old tradition of state and public life’.51 
Putin made this statement during a meeting of the Presidential Council for Culture and 
Art, where he furthermore insisted that the historical existence of many different 
peoples and cultures in Russia is a great strength of the country. Eurasia thus is an 
important characteristic of Russia’s identity and its historical roots influence 
contemporary foreign policy. Sergey Ivanov highlighted this fact in his speech at the 
2001 Munich Security Conference: ‘We base our analysis on the postulate of the 
Eurasian location of Russia, its role of a natural bridge between Europe and Asia, 
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between two civilizations, the role Russia has been playing for more than one 
century’.52  
 
Although this is a recurrent theme in Russian discourse, it was taken up again 
especially in the context of the establishment of the Eurasian (Economic) Union. 
President Putin insisted that this union would serve as an important pole in global 
development while also connecting the two other poles by ‘serving as an efficient 
bridge between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific region’.53 Similarly, Medvedev 
called Russia a connecting link between Europe and Asia in an article published in 
2012 ahead of a summit of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), thus emphasising 
Russia’s position, both geographically as well as culturally, between Europe and 
Asia.54 Medvedev stated that in joining ASEM in 2010, not only Russia, but the entire 
world would benefit because Russia would be able to connect the two most influential 
poles in global affairs. He went on to argue that Russia was particularly well-situated 
to do so because of its ‘centuries-long experience at the crossroads of different cultures 
and civilisations’ as a Eurasian country. According to Medvedev, the country’s 
Eurasian identity should be seen as ‘a major asset in developing cultural dialogue 
between regions and continents and also in building a common economic space from 
the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific’.55 Russian discourse thus mixes geographical 
elements with cultural and civilisational references in order to emphasise Russia’s 
centrality in Eurasia and describes it as a major advantage for the country but also for 
the international system more generally. The nature of the Russian state as a multi-
ethnic entity uniting many cultures and peoples, which had been forged over centuries 
of state-building, is linked to Russia’s Eurasian position and identity. This in turn 
allows the government elite to position their country as an important actor in fostering 
dialogue and acting as a bridge between the different poles of a multipolar world in 
the making. 
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In addition to geography and history, the other big theme in the discourses of Russia’s 
government officials on Eurasia is the economy and more specifically, economic 
integration in Eurasia. In the early 2000s, when speaking about Eurasia, but also in 
Russian foreign policy in general, the Commonwealth of Independent States, or 
Russia’s neighbours are frequently mentioned as a priority. It is made clear that the 
CIS is an important actor in Eurasia because it contributes to stability and economic 
development of the region:  
 
The Commonwealth is an organisation on an international scale. 
And it is well capable not only of projecting influence, but assuming 
the responsibility for the solution of a wide range of issues in a huge 
region. They include security, economic and humanitarian 
cooperation in Eurasia.56  
 
Sergey Ivanov, when speaking at the Munich Security Conference in 2004, also 
underlined the importance of the CIS as a stabilising factor in Eurasia when he says 
that ‘good-neighborly relations with the CIS States […] represent the most important 
stability and security factor over the vast area of Eurasia’.57 However, while the CIS 
is an important organisation in the Eurasian region, it is not considered to be the only 
organisation promoting regional cooperation and integration. During the early years of 
Putin’s first presidency, economic integration across the broader Eurasian region, not 
limited to the CIS, was an important theme in the discourse. Here it also becomes clear 
that the region of Eurasia is not limited to the geographical expanse of the CIS but 
extends beyond it. Medvedev, for instance, mentioned the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO) when speaking about integration processes in Eurasia: ‘Regarding 
wider integration processes throughout the Eurasian region, a very important role 
should be given to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’.58 Such statements 
illustrate the comprehensive nature of Eurasia. While post-Soviet organisations, such 
as the CIS, are frequently mentioned and characterised as crucial to the development 
of the Eurasian region, other organisations like the SCO also play an important role. 
Similarly, Foreign Minister Lavrov underlined the fact that Eurasia is more than the 
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CIS when addressing his colleagues at a meeting of the SCO foreign ministers by 
calling Eurasia ‘our region’.59 
 
Towards the latter years of Putin’s second presidential term, the nature of the 
international system became a concern with direct repercussions for Russia’s view of 
Eurasia. Regional integration started to occupy a more prominent place in government 
discourse. In opposition to what Moscow sees as a unilateral world under US 
dominance, many statements emphasise Moscow’s wish to establish a regional 
organisation and to foster regional integration in general. Sergey Lavrov is a 
particularly strong defender of the idea of regional integration. He speaks about the 
‘integration imperatives of globalization’,60 which push Russia to find ways to deepen 
integration with its neighbours in order to remain powerful in the 21st century. For 
Lavrov, this is important in the context of the ongoing globalisation and regionalisation 
efforts taking place all over the world. In general, the Russian leadership considers 
regional integration and regionalism a crucial development in the 21st century 
international system. Foreign Minister Lavrov left no doubt about Russia’s viewpoint 
when addressing the UN General Assembly in New York in 2011:  
 
In a polycentric world, an effective international architecture can be 
created only if it rests upon regional “building blocks”. The 
enhancement of the regional level of global governance and the 
increasing role of regional organizations are an integral part of the 
modern international relations.61 
 
This is in line with Russia’s vision of the global system as being characterised by 
multipolarity. As Lavrov argued, ‘we see ourselves and really are one of the centers of 
the new polycentric world. This status of Russia is determined by its military, 
geographical, economic opportunities, its culture and human potential’.62 For Russia, 
the quest for a multipolar (or to use Russia’s preferred term, polycentric) world order 
is a key principle of its foreign policy and at the same time a clear message of 
opposition against a US dominated unipolar order.63 As Russian analyst Lukyanov 
argued, Russia changed its foreign policy approach towards the end of Putin’s first 
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presidency and the beginning of the Medvedev presidency, from wanting to integrate 
within Western institutions to a belief that the new multipolar system was one of 
realpolitik and defence of national interests. As a result, ‘Moscow is now convinced 
that the future world order will be based on competitive interactions of principal 
centers of power and not on any one power’s domination. With this belief in future 
power structures, Russia has limited its immediate interests to Eurasia’.64  
 
In this context, Eurasia occupies an important place as a synonym for regional 
integration. The underlying reasoning is that because the 21st century is multipolar, 
every country needs to cooperate with others and regional organisations are 
instrumental in this regard. This in turn, and especially in the case of Russian efforts 
to integrate the Eurasian region, is also a guarantee for Russia to continue to occupy 
an important position as a great power. Hence, Russian domination of Eurasia is an 
important component of Moscow’s foreign policy strategy which seeks to promote an 
image of Russia as a global great power. Indeed, as Lo argues, ‘in the case of Russia, 
its enduring influence in post-Soviet Eurasia substantiates its claim to be a truly 
independent center of global power’.65 Integration with its neighbours and Eurasian 
integration more generally, are thus important for Russia as Medvedev indicated in his 
2010 presidential address to the Russian Federal Assembly, saying that ‘we need to 
work towards creating a common economic space that would stretch from the Arctic 
to the Pacific, all across Eurasia’.66 Eurasian integration is thus seen as a crucial 
development taking place in the context of globalization and therefore something 
Russia cannot neglect. 
 
In 2011 it was Putin, then still the Prime Minister, who set out the principal goal for 
Russian foreign policy in the 21st century in an article in the Izvestia newspaper, 
namely economic integration with its neighbours and the formation of the Eurasian 
Union.67 In the context of what Russia’s leaders see as one of the principal 
developments in the international system, the growth of regional integration 
mechanisms, Putin outlined his vision of the Eurasian Union as ‘a powerful 
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supranational association capable of becoming one of the poles in the modern world’.68 
Economic integration and the formation of a common market in Eurasia are thus key, 
as Putin said at another occasion: ‘A powerful centre of economic development that 
attracts business and investors, a common market is being formed in Eurasia’.69 
Although the idea of setting up a Eurasian Union is not new (Kazakhstan’s President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev made a similar proposal in 1994), Putin’s proposal provided 
new impetus to further develop the existing integration mechanisms among the post-
Soviet states. Shortly after the publication of Putin’s article, the three presidents of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia signed a declaration to further deepen Eurasian 
integration in November 2011. Russia had already formed a Customs Union with its 
neighbouring states Belarus and Kazakhstan in 2010, which was further developed into 
a Single Economic Space in 2012, establishing a single market with the traditional four 
freedoms of movement of labour, goods, services and capital. These agreements and 
their rules and regulations, which represent some of the most serious and concrete 
integration mechanisms in the post-Soviet space, provided the foundation for the 
proposed Eurasian Union project.70 As a result of these developments, the Eurasian 
Economic Commission was established in the beginning of 2012 to regulate 
interactions in the single space, before eventually becoming the principal regulatory 
body of the newly established Eurasian Economic Union. The latter materialised when 
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed the respective agreement on 29 May 2014. In 
October and December 2014, respectively, further agreements on the accession of 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan were signed. Finally, the Eurasian Economic Union came 
into effect on 1 January 2015. 
 
While in theory, and according to Putin’s original idea, the Eurasian Union project is 
open to any country who wishes to join, it is predominantly an affair of post-Soviet 
states. In a speech at the 2014 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, President 
Putin said: ‘Russia and its neighbours are implementing a large-scale Eurasian 
integration project’.71 However, Putin also stated that the Eurasian Union should 
become a bridge between Europe and Asia, similar to the position Russia, with its 
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Eurasian geopolitical location, already occupied in earlier years.72 It thus becomes 
clear that Eurasia is a region which is closely linked to Russia and that Russia is the 
driving force behind integration in the region. Foreign Minister Lavrov emphasised 
this notion in a speech at an international conference in Moscow: ‘We see ourselves 
as the country that has consistently deepened the integration ties with its neighbors. Of 
course, first we are talking about Eurasian integration’.73 The reasoning behind such 
statements is not rooted in historical or cultural arguments but in contemporary 
political considerations and in the idea of maintaining Russia’s role as an important 
power in global affairs. Nevertheless, Vladimir Putin insisted that the link between 
Russia and Eurasia was not only very strong but also unique. One of the most 
illustrative statements can be found in Putin’s 2005 presidential address to the Federal 
Assembly, where he stated that ‘Russia should continue its civilising mission on the 
Eurasian continent. This mission consists in ensuring that democratic values, 
combined with national interests, enrich and strengthen our historic community’.74 
This statement was only put into action several years later by Russia, with first the 
proposal of the Eurasian Union and the eventual establishment of the EAEU in January 
2015. 
 
As we have seen before, Eurasia now stands as an independent region in global affairs 
and the Eurasian Economic Union also serves the purpose to foster good relations and 
cooperation with other regions. In this context, Putin also aimed for the Eurasian Union 
to be an ‘efficient bridge between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific region’.75 Or 
as Lavrov put it in an interview with the Interfax news agency, the integration efforts 
in the context of the EAEU ‘offer new vistas for fruitful cooperation over the vast 
Eurasian territory, including with our Asian-Pacific partners’.76 While the name of the 
union obviously links it to Eurasia, it is also supposed to act as a bridge between 
Europe and Asia: ‘The new union that is being formed on the basis of universal 
integration principles is designed to serve as an effective link between Europe and the 
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Asia-Pacific region’.77 In 2015, Lavrov reiterated the importance of Eurasian 
integration and the idea that the EAEU should serve as a bridge between European and 
Asia-Pacific integration structures: ‘Further promotion of Eurasian integration is our 
absolute priority. […] We believe that our union has every chance of becoming a 
bridge between the integration structures of Europe and the Asia-Pacific Region’.78 
According to one of the interviewees, the EAEU’s function as a link also serves a 
second goal, namely that ‘Eurasian integration is important in the context of Russia’s 
relations with Europe and Asia and its position between the two as a safeguard against 
direct links between Europe and Asia that exclude Russia’.79 Russia’s position at the 
centre of Eurasia thus guarantees it an important position also globally as an influential 
and non-negligible player. 
 
In so doing, it is implied that Eurasia is distinct from Europe and Asia and therefore 
merits its own integration mechanism. Although in other statements, Putin called upon 
Europe and especially the EU to cooperate with the Eurasian Union, it is quite clear 
that in the end the role of the Eurasian Union is to act as a connector between East and 
West and thus contribute to the maintenance of a unique identity for Eurasian 
countries. Similarly, the official foreign policy concept, which was signed into effect 
by Putin in 2013, speaks of the Eurasian Union as serving as an ‘effective link’ 
between Europe and Asia-Pacific.80 In the instances when the speakers make reference 
to the ‘vast Eurasian region’, it is always in conjunction with countries that are not 
considered to be Russia’s immediate neighbours or with organisations that have a 
reach and member base extending beyond the CIS. We can thus extrapolate that for 
Russia’s governing elite, their country is at the core of Eurasia. Similarly, the Eurasian 
Union functions as the institutionalized embodiment of Russia’s Eurasian identity. The 
bridge metaphor is an interesting one in that it illustrates the evolution of Russian 
thinking and discourse on Eurasia. The above discussion on the geographical theme 
has shown that, at first, it was Russia itself serving as a bridge or link between Europe 
and the Asia-Pacific region. With the establishment of the Eurasian Union, Russia gave 
up this role and conferred it upon the new integration structure. Russia is not only the 
driving force behind the new Eurasian Union, it thus also is at its very centre, using 
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similar language in characterising first its own position and then the position of the 
Eurasian Union. 
5.1.3.1 Political and normative aspects of economic integration 
With the official implementation of the EAEU in January 2015, Eurasian integration 
finally became a political and economic reality beyond being an important and 
recurrent theme in the elite’s discourse. As Lavrov said in an interview with the newly 
established Rossiya Segodnya news agency in December 2014, ‘Eurasian economic 
integration has become part of our life’.81 Interestingly, in a short time span, the project 
already reached a new dimension. The main idea behind the Eurasian Union was 
economic integration and the formation of a common economic space and customs 
union in Eurasia. Free movement of people, goods, capital and services – along the 
idea of the European Union – and generally stronger economic development was to be 
the main benefit for members of the Eurasian Union.  
 
Another goal behind the Eurasian integration mechanism is the economic development 
of its member-states. It becomes increasingly clear that the EAEU almost stands as a 
synonym for the Eurasian region at large and vice versa. At the same time, the Eurasian 
Union is not limited to being a simple regional integration model fostering regional 
economies but becomes an instrument for Eurasian countries (Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and other interested CIS states) to integrate into the global community 
while being led by Russia in the process. 
 
However, now that it was established, an additional element was added. According to 
Lavrov, ‘The EAEU is committed to preserving the sovereignty and identity of 
member-states, while taking integration cooperation to a qualitatively new stage of 
development’.82 Hence, the Eurasian Union not only serves as an economic integration 
mechanism, but it also acts as a guarantor of the member-states’ sovereignty. This is 
further substantiated by Sergey Glazyev, Putin’s advisor on Eurasian integration, who 
stated that: 
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mutual respect for national sovereignty is what makes the Eurasian 
integration different from all previous models, including the 
European, Soviet, and imperial ones. It is based on the philosophy 
of Eurasianism, whose basic principles were set forth by 20th century 
Russian thinkers as they pondered over forms of post-Soviet 
unification of the peoples of the former Russian Empire.83 
 
As this statement illustrates, there are different dimensions to the EAEU and its 
significance for Russia and its position in global affairs. As Sakwa argues, ‘while 
Eurasian economic integration may well be a pragmatic and rational response to the 
economic challenges facing the region, it is also embedded in a profoundly ideological 
project that by its very essence is antagonistic to the West’.84  
 
It thus seems that the values attached to Eurasia and Eurasian integration are linked to 
preserving the character of the post-Soviet states and guaranteeing them their own 
model of development. This point is especially emphasised by some Russian 
intellectuals. Alexander Lukin for instance argues that the establishment of the 
Eurasian (Economic) Union is a logical development since ‘the culture and values of 
many former Soviet republics really do differ from what prevails in the West’ and as 
a result, people in these countries elected leaders which shared some of Putin’s vision 
and effectively ‘helped Putin succeed in establishing an independent power center in 
Eurasia’.85  
 
Sovereignty and Eurasian identity are the central elements here. Indeed, as the Russian 
academics Podberezkin and Podberezkina have argued, ‘the originality of Eurasian 
civilization and the need to preserve and develop it as a guarantee of national and state 
sovereignty are currently emerging as the informal ideological basis of efforts to 
promote Eurasian integration’.86 President Putin himself emphasised that the EAEU’s 
mission went beyond economic integration alone, by arguing that the ‘Eurasian Union 
is a project for maintaining the identity of nations in the historical Eurasian space in a 
new century and in a new world’.87 However, in the same speech, Putin also stressed 
that ‘Eurasian integration will also be built on the principle of diversity’ and that every 
                                                 
83 Glazyev 2013 
84 Sakwa 2015a: 17 
85 Lukin 2014b: 92-93 
86 Podberezkin and Podberezkina 2015: 47. 
87 Putin 2013 
160 
 
member state would retain its unique identity.88 There is an interesting ambiguity in 
this statement in that Putin insists on diversity, while at the same time claiming that 
the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union share a similar identity which they 
would like to protect through further integration.  
 
Eurasian integration was one of the major ideas in Putin’s third term as president and 
quickly became a foreign policy priority. However, the discourse around this project 
not only focused on the real economic advantages and the organisation’s cooperative 
nature and function as a bridge between Europe and Asia, as described above, but also 
on the benefits of the EAEU for Russian foreign policy. More generally, the EAEU 
was linked to Russia’s position in Eurasia (and beyond), as an important global player. 
In his inauguration speech as president in May 2012, Putin reflected on the nature of 
the Eurasian integration project and the country’s general future trajectory: 
 
These coming years will be crucial for shaping Russia’s future in the 
decades to come. We must all understand that the life of our future 
generations and our prospects as a country and nation depend on us 
today and on our real achievements in building a new economy and 
developing modern living standards […] on our determination in 
developing our vast expanses from the Baltic to the Pacific, and on 
our ability to become a leader and centre of gravity for the whole of 
Eurasia.89 
 
In this statement, it becomes unequivocally clear how Putin sees the country’s position 
in the Eurasian region: as the dominating power and main leader. Such strong 
statements about Russia’s position in Eurasia are quite rare, but they are indicative of 
the way in which the Russian political elite sees Eurasia. Similarly, the idea of the 
Eurasian Union can be understood in the same context. Russia is the main driving force 
behind this project because it considers itself to be the leader of the region. The 
following statement, which President Putin made at a meeting of the Valdai Discussion 
Club in 2013, provides an illustrative summary of Russian discourse on Eurasia and 
the nature and purpose of Eurasian integration: 
 
The 21st century promises to become the century of major changes, 
the era of the formation of major geopolitical zones, as well as 
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financial and economic, cultural, civilisational, and military and 
political areas. That is why integrating with our neighbours is our 
absolute priority. The future Eurasian Economic Union, which we 
have declared and which we have discussed extensively as of late, is 
not just a collection of mutually beneficial agreements. The Eurasian 
Union is a project for maintaining the identity of nations in the 
historical Eurasian space in a new century and in a new world. 
Eurasian integration is a chance for the entire post-Soviet space to 
become an independent centre for global development, rather than 
remaining on the outskirts of Europe and Asia.90 
 
In this statement, Putin acknowledges the fact that Eurasia has its own identity and that 
Russia has bestowed upon itself the role of the principal guardian of this identity. The 
emphasis on the importance of the Eurasian Economic Union in the context of the 
formation of a multipolar world, consisting of cultural and civilisational areas, 
furthermore demonstrates that a variety of elements underpin the importance of 
Eurasia. In addition, this statement neatly summarises the main points of Russian 
discourse on the EAEU in that it illustrates the focus on sovereignty and the critical 
value of regional integration in order to survive as a state in the 21st century. This is of 
course related to Russia’s dominant position as the main driving force behind Eurasian 
integration. As such, Russia occupies a crucial place in global affairs, not only as a 
regional leader and indispensable part of further global integration and cooperation 
between countries to its East and West, but by deduction from this position also as a 
global great power which participates in the maintenance and promotion of global 
order.  
 
This idea is echoed by Sergey Glazyev, who argues that for Russia to survive and 
thrive as a great power in global affairs, it needs to fully embrace its Eurasian identity:  
 
The Eurasian idea and Eurasian policy are not only about geopolitics 
in its traditional sense of domination in the region, but also about 
fighting for a national system of values, which has in fact become 
an integral part of the fight for sovereignty and national interests in 
Eurasia. […] Russia is facing a clear choice: either become a 
powerful ideological and civilizational centre in its own right (in 
keeping with Russian history over the last millennium), as well as 
an economic and social centre, or integrate with one of the existing 
power centres and lose its identity.91 
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This statement completes the circle by referring back to and linking Russia’s Eurasian 
identity and its push for further Eurasian integration with Russia’s history as an 
influential and strong state (or empire). Although it is not certain that President Putin 
fully shares his advisor’s ideas, it nonetheless illustrates the viewpoint among some of 
the Kremlin’s intellectual elite. 
 
In general, the above statements from both Putin and Glazyev show that Eurasia 
becomes clearly delimited from Europe and Asia, which are seen to have distinctive 
values. Clear statements with regard to Eurasian values are rare. However, there is a 
general consensus emerging from the discourses of Russia’s governmental elite of 
what constitute Eurasian values. On top of the list are the protection of sovereignty 
and self-development of states in the Eurasian space in conjunction with the protection 
of their identity. One the one hand, the addressee of these values is clearly the West 
who is considered aggressively trying to impose its model of development on the 
countries in the Eurasian space. On the other hand, given Russia’s aim to establish 
Eurasia as a key region between (and distinct from) Europe and Asia, such statements 
reflect the necessity for the countries inhabiting the region to develop their own ideas, 
values and characteristics. As we have seen in previous statements, Putin highlights 
the formation of new geopolitical zones at the global level and he makes clear that the 
formation of the Eurasian region is part of this global development. Hence, Eurasia is 
an independent centre of global development while it is clearly understood that Russia 
is at the centre of Eurasia. 
5.2. Evolution of discourse 
Geography, history and regional (economic) integration are the key themes in Russian 
government discourse on Eurasia. As the above discussion demonstrated, Russia’s 
centrality, its status as a global power and its role as the leader of the Eurasian region 
are key determinant issues in Russian foreign policy. Based on the above discussion, 
the next section traces the evolution of Russian foreign policy discourse on Eurasia 
over the last fifteen years or so, starting with Putin’s first election as president of 
Russia in 2000. In general, Russian government discourse on Eurasia in the years 2000 
to 2015 experienced a number of shifts, most importantly due to external events, while 
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the protagonists of Russian foreign policy remained largely the same. Up until around 
2008, when Vladimir Putin was president, the principal focus on Eurasia was with 
regard to Russia’s geopolitical position and the fact that Russia’s territory is part of 
both the European and Asian continents. Because of this, Russia was often portrayed 
as a bridge between Europe and Asia and, due to its Eurasian identity, Russia was in a 
good position to build relations between East and West as well as being a place for 
dialogue between civilisations. After Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, the 
Eurasian discourse reached a new dimension, infused with a civilisational approach as 
well as being supported by the implementation of the Eurasian Economic Union. The 
narrative in this section focuses on the interaction between external events as well as 
domestic developments and aims to highlight the ways in which Russia’s conception 
of Eurasia changed as a result thereof. The following table presents a chronological 
and summarised version of the key events influencing Russian foreign policy (in 
italics) and the dominant keywords in Russian discourse on Eurasia in every year under 
study (2000-2015). 
 
Table 5.1 Chronological description of Eurasian discourse in Russia 
Year Keywords and key events (in italics) 
2000 - Dual European and Asian identity 
2001 - Unique geopolitical position 
- Regional leader 
- Bridge between Europe and Asia 
2002 - Unique geopolitical position 
- Dual European and Asian identity 
2003 20 March: start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, US invasion of Iraq 
November: Rose revolution in Georgia 
- Bridge between Europe and Asia 
2004 14 March: Putin re-elected as President of Russia with 71 % of vote 
29 March: 5th NATO enlargement round, including new members Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia 
1 May: EU enlargement round including Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
November: start of Orange revolution in Ukraine 
- Vast Eurasian space 
- Historic community 
2005 23 January: Victor Yushchenko inaugurated as President of Ukraine (end of Orange revolution) 
- Historic community 
- Common heritage 
- Regional leader 
2006 - Unique geopolitical position 
2007 1 January: EU enlargement including Bulgaria and Romania 
- Unique geopolitical position 
- Centrality 
- ‘Civilisational commonality’ 
2008 17 February: Independence of Kosovo 
2 March: Dmitry Medvedev elected Russian president with 70.5 % of vote 
2-4 April: NATO Bucharest Summit (Georgia and Ukraine not given Membership Action Plan) 
7-16 August: 5-day war between Russia and Georgia 
- Unique geopolitical position 
- Dual European and Asian identity 
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- Geographical size 
2009 6 March: meeting in Geneva where Russia-US ‘Reset’ was officially announced 
1 April: NATO enlargement round including Albania and Croatia  
7 May: EU launches Eastern Partnership in Prague 
 
2010 1 January: Customs Union between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia comes into force 
8 April: The new START treaty was signed 
24 June: Russian President Medvedev visit to the White House 
- Eurasian integration 
- ‘Civilisational commonality’ 
- Common heritage 
- Unifier of Eurasian region 
2011 4 October: Putin publishes ‘Eurasian Union’ article in Izvestia newspaper 
4 December: Parliamentary elections in Russia, won by United Russia party with 50 % of votes 
December (to Feb. 2012): Mass protests against election results and Putin’s return to presidency 
- Eurasian integration/Eurasian union 
- Bridge between Europe and Asia 
- Pole in multipolar order 
- Regional leader 
2012 4 March: Putin elected as president with 63.6 % of vote 
- Eurasian integration 
- Centrality 
- Russia’s status 
- Regional leader 
- Crossroads of cultures 
- Unifier of Eurasian region 
2013 21 November: Ukrainian president Yanukovich suspends planned Association Agreement with EU 
leading to mass protests 
November to February 2014: Euromaidan protests in Kiev 
- Unique geopolitical position 
- Eurasian integration/Eurasian union 
- Historic community 
- Pole in multipolar order  
2014 22 February: Ukrainian president Yanukovich ousted 
19 March: Accession (Annexation) of Crimea to the Russian Federation 
21 May: Russia and China sign $400 billion gas deal 
29 May: Treaty on establishment of Eurasian Economic Union signed by Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Russia 
17 July: Downing of airplane MH17 over Eastern Ukraine  
- Eurasian integration 
- Pole in multipolar order 
- Common heritage 
- Bridge between Europe and Asia 
- Dual European and Asian identity 
2015 1 January: Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) comes into force 
2 January: Armenia becomes member of the EAEU 
6 August: Kyrgyzstan joins EAEU 
30 September: Russia starts carrying out air strikes in Syria 
- Vast Eurasian space 
- Eurasian integration 
- Historic community 
- Bridge between Europe and Asia 
 
The early years of Russian foreign policy (from around 2001 to 2003) were 
characterised by an attempt to foster positive relations with the West, and especially 
the US. One of the basic parameters of Putin’s early foreign policy approach was the 
maintenance of a ‘balanced foreign policy’, a result of Russia’s position as ‘both a 
European and Asian country’.92 Similarly, referring to the country’s unique 
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geopolitical position, Putin emphasised the fact that Russia was a global player with 
interests everywhere.93 Stable relations with the West and the US were part of this 
strategy. In addition, Russia’s leaders promoted the idea of a ‘Greater Europe’, a space 
ranging from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast, from Lisbon to Vladivostok, as a new 
form of cooperation between Russia and the EU, which should eventually lead to 
deeper integration on the continent.94 However, the cooperative relationship between 
Russia and the West proved to be short-lived. At the forefront of mounting tensions 
was the issue of NATO enlargement. In 2004, seven new countries joined the alliance, 
including former Warsaw Pact members and the three post-Soviet Baltic republics of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which was seen by Russia as a hostile act, because it 
pushed the alliance’s borders right up to Russia’s own borders.95  
 
Another break came in 2003 with Washington’s decision to invade Iraq without UN 
mandate. This frustrated the Russian leadership who, as discussed earlier, emphasised 
the importance of sovereignty and non-interference as key principals in global affairs 
and strongly opposed the US’ unilateral actions.96 The question of forcible regime 
change remained a bitter issue in Russia, especially also with regard to its own 
neighbourhood. Already in 2001, Putin made clear that Russia considered the post-
Soviet space a central priority of its foreign policy and itself the main leader in the 
region.97 Hence, the so-called colour revolutions, starting with the Rose revolution in 
Georgia in 2003 and followed by the Orange revolution in Ukraine, which started in 
2004, further poisoned the relationship between Russia and the West. These events, 
happening in Russia’s backyard, also raised fears among the Russian leadership of 
similar events taking place in their own country.98 Ever since, competition for 
influence in the post-Soviet space has remained a contentious issue between Russia 
and the West, including the presence of US military bases in Central Asia, US 
democracy promotion in the region, NATO overtures to Georgia and Ukraine as well 
as EU programmes such as the Eastern Partnership, and has led to multiple crises. 
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In this context, aiming to illustrate that Russia considers the post-Soviet space its 
sphere of privileged interests, the discourse on Eurasia in Putin’s 2005 presidential 
address to the Federal Assembly became more candid. Referring to Russia’s historical 
links to Eurasia and the existence of a historical community on the Eurasian continent, 
Putin stated that Russia has a civilising mission in Eurasia, while simultaneously 
calling upon the post-Soviet states which just joined the EU and NATO to respect the 
rights of Russian citizens abroad as well as human rights more generally.99 This 
statement was a clear hint to the EU and the US, demonstrating Russia’s willingness 
to dominate and influence events in the post-Soviet space. The ultimate statement in 
this regard followed in Putin’s famous speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference 
where he clearly voiced opposition against a unipolar world under US leadership.100 
This speech must be read in the context of potential further NATO enlargement to 
countries in the post-Soviet space (specifically Georgia and Ukraine), which Russia 
saw as Western infringement in its sphere of influence, combined with Russia’s strong 
opposition against US plans to establish a missile defence site in Poland and the Czech 
Republic. As Trenin already argued in 2006, Russia had left the West, instead aiming 
to establish its ‘own solar system’ focusing on improving its presence and influence in 
the post-Soviet region.101 
 
In this political context, the government discourse on Eurasia starts to take on a new 
dimension, which is that of the imperative of regional integration and fostering better 
relations with other countries in Eurasia. The following statement by Foreign Minister 
Lavrov at a meeting of SCO foreign ministers in 2007 is telling in that it highlights 
Russia’s opposition against a unipolar structure by underlining the importance of equal 
and respectful cooperation between countries in Eurasia:  
 
Our region, Eurasia, offers an example of the construction of 
interstate relations in the spirit of equal cooperation, respect for the 
interests of each other and mutual benefit. […] And here, I think, the 
SCO acts as a major factor of the rise of a new international security 
architecture and of real multipolarity, based on truly collective and 
legal principles.102 
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A first hint at the values that seem to be attached to Russian government discourse on 
Eurasia can be seen in this statement. Ideals like multipolarity, sovereignty and 
cooperation among equals are crucial. Also, the focus on the SCO opens up the 
Eurasian realm as a new place for development and economic opportunities. Russia’s 
political elite continued to speak about Eurasia in possessive terms, referring to it as 
“our region”, as the above statement from Lavrov shows, and clearly marking its 
dominating presence there. What is more, when speaking about the countries of the 
CIS, Lavrov refers to a ‘civilisational commonality’, which links all the former post-
Soviet states and facilitates their development and modernisation.103 
 
In 2008, Dmitry Medvedev succeeded Putin to the presidency. Medvedev’s first 
statements with regard to Eurasia reflected the importance of Russia’s geopolitical 
location between Europa and Asia and the ensuing potential for Russia to develop 
better relations and improve trade ties with Asia.  
 
There were two important initiatives with implications for Russian foreign policy in 
the early years of Medvedev’s tenure as president. On the one hand, his modernisation 
programme in various areas of Russian policy and economy, as outlined in his 2009 
article “Go Russia!”,104 and, on the other hand, his proposal for a “pan-European 
security treaty”.105 In order for the former to be achieved, fostering better relations 
with Asian countries and integrating with regional economic initiatives in the Asia-
Pacific, which should have the positive by-effect of helping develop Russia’s Far 
Eastern and Siberian provinces, was a priority.106 As Medvedev argued in front of an 
international audience at the 2008 Valdai Discussion Club meeting, the fact that Russia 
was a Eurasian country had specific implications. Hence, not only relations with 
Europe but also relations with Asia were key to the modernisation and ultimate success 
of Russia’s economy. In Medvedev’s words: ‘We now understand that, without 
diversifying the country’s development to the East, our economy has no future’.107 In 
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general, the importance of the Asian vector in Russian foreign policy increased around 
2009/2010. In his annual address to the Federal Assembly in 2010, Medvedev argued 
that ‘Russia’s integration into the Asian-Pacific economic space is of utmost 
importance’ just as well as fostering better ties to the countries of the region.108 
Similarly, exponents of the academic and think tank community in Russia advocated 
for some time for a stronger engagement with and deeper integration into Asia. For 
instance, in the first of a series of reports, a group of authors under the auspices of the 
Valdai Discussion Club published a report promoting the turn to the East. The authors 
argued that ‘Russia’s economic and political advance into the Asia-Pacific region is a 
prerequisite for its internal stability and international competitiveness’. Furthermore, 
they saw this development as a crucial factor for Russia to be a great power because, 
according to the authors, ‘only by balancing its Western and Eastern development 
vectors and system of foreign relations can Russia become a truly modern global 
power’.109 Hosting the APEC summit 2012 in Vladivostok, for instance, was seen as 
a right step towards this goal. Russia’s turn to the East took place in the context of a 
generally perceived shift of power to the Asia-Pacific region (the US developed its 
‘Pivot to Asia’ at around the same time). In accordance with the recommendations of 
the authors of the Valdai Club report, Russia attempted to diversify its foreign and 
economic relations to loosen its dependence on the West and Europe. On the other 
hand, as a self-perceived global great power, Russia’s status simply demanded a 
stronger Russian involvement in this dynamically developing region. 
 
On another front, Medvedev’s proposal for a pan-European security treaty was an 
attempt by Russia to propose a reformed and more inclusive European security 
architecture. According to Moscow, the existing one was outdated and incapable of 
addressing the security issues facing the Euro-Atlantic region.110 It can also be seen as 
a further attempt by Russia to promote a practical implementation of its Greater Europe 
idea in the security realm.111 Medvedev’s proposal was acknowledged as being the 
first time Russia made a positive and constructive proposition at improving Russia’s 
engagement with the Euro-Atlantic region and becoming a full member within its 
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regional security structures.112 However, as others argue, Medvedev’s proposal should 
also be seen in the context of continued Russian opposition to NATO and plans to 
enlarge the alliance, since it would effectively provide Russia with a veto over many 
NATO actions.113 Similarly, Russia’s military intervention on behalf of the 
secessionist republics Abkhazia and South Ossetia in neighbouring Georgia in August 
2008 can be interpreted as a clear sign to NATO that Russia was willing to defend its 
interests in the post-Soviet space, even by force if needed, thus demonstrating where 
its red lines were.114 The short Russia-Georgia war marked the low-point of an already 
conflicted and complicated relationship between Russia and the West since the end of 
the Cold War.115 
 
In the end, the Medvedev presidency was merely an interlude. In September 2011, at 
the United Russia party congress, Putin announced that he would be running again for 
president in the 2012 elections, which he went on to win. What this meant for Russian 
discourse on Eurasia became explicit following the publication of an article by Putin 
in October 2011 in Izvestia in which he outlined his vision to establish a Eurasian 
Union.116 Once Putin returned to office after the 2012 presidential elections, he started 
work on implementing the Eurasian Economic Union.  
 
Indeed, Putin made Eurasian integration and the establishment of the Eurasian 
(Economic) Union one of the priorities of his foreign policy.117 In 2012 then, at the 
beginning of his third presidential term, Putin made very clear what the new Russian 
discourse on Eurasia was. Russia now considered itself to be at the centre of Eurasia 
as well as the main driving force and leader in the region. Indeed, as Putin emphasised 
in his inaugural speech as third-time president in 2012, Russia’s future prospects were 
dependent on the country’s ‘ability to become a leader and centre of gravity for the 
whole of Eurasia’.118 The project of establishing the EAEU was especially depicted as 
being a foundation for Russia’s position as a strong country in global politics because 
it lent it more credibility and importance in relations with its neighbours in the West 
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and the East.119 Interestingly, in another article written in 2012 shortly before moving 
into office, Putin again called Russia part of Greater Europe and advocated for the 
creation of a ‘common economic and human space from the Atlantic to the Pacific 
Ocean’.120 This statement has to be read in conjunction with Putin’s article on the 
Eurasian Union published a few months before. Indeed, Putin insisted on the 
complementarity between the proposed Eurasian Union and the European Union and 
highlighted the potential benefits of strong cooperation between the two unions. In the 
above-mentioned article, Putin even argued that the ‘Eurasian Union will be based on 
universal integration principles as an essential part of Greater Europe’, thus again 
emphasising the cooperative nature of its integration project.121 However, as Sakwa 
argues, the idea behind the Greater Europe discourse was to propose ‘an alternative 
vision of the character of European unity’. Hence, while placing Russia ‘at the heart 
of an alternative project’, the Greater Europe idea also contained a ‘geopolitical 
objective’ in that it aimed to compete with the EU as the exclusive integration 
mechanism in Europe.122 
 
This demonstrates the mindset which existed at the time Putin returned to the 
presidency: while Eurasian integration was clearly the principal priority of Russian 
foreign policy, its main target audience was the West and the EU, in particular given 
that it promoted an image of Russia as an indispensable part of Europe’s development 
and an ideal link between Europe and Asia. The characterisation of Eurasia also 
changed in this context. Eurasia became a region clearly distinct from the Euro-
Atlantic and the Asia-Pacific. In short, the institutionalisation of Eurasian integration, 
with the eventual implementation of the EAEU, which was accompanied by Russian 
attempts to attract new members, painted Russia as the locomotive of its own Eurasian 
integration project through which Russia intended to cement its place as a pole in the 
multipolar order.123 
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5.2.1 The Ukraine crisis as amplifier of Russia’s Eurasia discourse 
This context is particularly relevant for the analysis of the impact of the Ukraine crisis, 
which started in 2013 and can be considered a decisive event for Russian foreign 
policy, on Russian government discourse with regard to Eurasia.124 Lukyanov, for 
instance, argued that one of the principal goals of Eurasian integration from the point 
of view of Russia was less the general expansion across the former post-Soviet space, 
but most importantly, to integrate Ukraine within its structures.125 Indeed, Russia saw 
itself in a geopolitical struggle with the EU over influence in their shared 
neighbourhood and in this context Ukraine, as the biggest of the remaining post-Soviet 
countries, was at the centre of attention. This had begun before the Ukraine crisis, 
provoked by the launch of the EU’s Eastern Partnership Programme, which had the 
aim to establish a platform for dialogue between the EU and six post-Soviet states.126 
This programme was viewed by the Russian leadership with suspicion. They saw it as 
a geopolitical initiative by the EU to extend its own sphere of influence towards the 
East trying to draw Russia’s neighbours away from Moscow, thus infringing 
Moscow’s own sphere of influence. As Foreign Minister Lavrov stated in a lecture on 
Russian foreign policy in Moscow, the goal of the Eastern Partnership was to ‘expand 
the West-controlled geopolitical space to the east. […] There is a policy to confront 
the CIS countries with a hard, absolutely contrived and artificial choice – either you 
are with the EU or with Russia’.127 Elements of a dynamic of competition between 
Russia and the EU and a geopolitical confrontation for influence in the post-Soviet 
space was thus already present.128 Therefore, the Ukraine crisis – the suspension of the 
planned association agreement between the EU and Ukraine (November 2013), the 
Maidan protests, Yanukovich’s ouster as president of Ukraine (February 2014), the 
emergence of armed movements for self-determination in the Donbas and the ensuing 
war between the central government in Kiev and separatists in Eastern Ukraine, 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea (March 2014) and support for the separatists, leading 
to sanctions imposed by the US and EU on Russia – led to the biggest crisis in relations 
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between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War.129 From the point of view 
of the Russian leadership, the Ukraine crisis demonstrated that the West was unwilling 
to accept Russia’s position as an independent and powerful actor in global politics as 
well as the regional hegemon in Eurasia.130 Furthermore, the Russian government felt 
its claim for a privileged access to the countries surrounding it (the post-Soviet states) 
was not respected. 
 
As a result of the events in Ukraine, the Eurasian discourse in Moscow and the push 
for the expansion of Eurasian integration became much stronger.131 As Russian 
analysts have argued, the Ukraine crisis and concomitant deterioration of relations 
between Russia and the West have ‘boosted’ the ‘Eurasian vector of Russia’s foreign 
policy’.132 Or, as Trenin argued, the Ukraine crisis had an impact on Russia in that it 
‘moved back to its traditional position as a Eurasian power sitting between the East 
and the West’.133 According to Lukyanov, without Ukraine, the EAEU would indeed 
become more Eurasian because it moved further away from Europe with the 
consequence that the future orientation of the organisation was thus conditioned to be 
rather to the East and the South.134 One Russian think tank analyst argued that since 
the start of the Ukraine crisis, there had been a shift in the emphasis of Eurasia away 
from a European notion of Eurasia to an Asian notion (from Greater Europe to Greater 
Asia). According to the same analyst, the implication of this shift was that instead of 
the traditional European values, Eurasia was now dominated by other values based on 
the differences between Europe and Russia.135 Indeed, in Putin’s view, through the 
institutionalisation of the Eurasian (Economic) Union, the Eurasian region now finally 
was able to emancipate itself and become an ‘independent centre for global 
development, rather than remaining on the outskirts of Europe and Asia’.136 
 
This assessment is in line with the general development during the third Putin 
presidency which started to question Russia’s historical and traditional alignment with 
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and emulation of the European model. Hence, the argument that ‘modernity might also 
lie somewhere else than Europe’ became dominant.137 Similarly, another Russian 
analyst claimed that one reason for this shift also lay with tendencies in Europe, which 
sought ever closer alignment with the US. Therefore, Europe ceased to be a part of 
Eurasia and thus facilitated the shift within Eurasia from the notion of Greater Europe 
to Greater Asia.138 The Ukraine crisis and strained relations with the West resulted in 
two further consequences for Russian foreign policy and discourse. On the one hand, 
the ongoing work to implement the Eurasian (Economic) Union was accelerated and, 
on the other hand, Russia’s turn to the East and discourse on the Asian vector of 
Russian foreign policy intensified to the detriment of Russia’s Euro-Atlantic 
discourse.139 
 
As a consequence of Russia’s failure to draw Ukraine into the Eurasian Economic 
Union (which became evident when Ukraine signed the Association Agreement with 
the EU in March and June 2014), Vieira argues that the Russian narrative changed in 
that the EAEU could not be successfully described as a counterweight to the EU. The 
practical result of this, however, was that in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, Russia 
pushed even more strongly for a rapid signing of the treaty and implementation of the 
EAEU.140 Indeed, in 2014, statements about the Eurasian (Economic) Union and its 
importance for the Eurasian region are very frequent. For instance in his meeting with 
Russian ambassadors, President Putin praised the signing of the EAEU agreement as 
a crucial development for the region and one of the long-term strategic priorities of 
Russian foreign policy.141 Foreign Minister Lavrov on his part delivered a lengthy 
lecture on Russian foreign policy where he called the EAEU ‘a project of historical 
significance’ and reiterated the ambitious goal of it acting as a link between the various 
integration mechanisms in Europe and the Asia-Pacific.142 In general, the emphasis on 
Russia’s neighbours and the CIS in particular, is a constant feature of the elite’s 
discourse and integration and good relations with its neighbours are seen as the key, 
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not only for the good working of the Eurasian Union, but also for the successful 
conduct of Russian foreign policy.143 It thus appears that the new Eurasian discourse 
also serves to demonstrate Moscow’s opposition against US dominance and its 
promotion of the multipolar order. As discussed earlier, the Russian government elite 
repeatedly alludes to the importance and inevitability of multipolarity (or 
polycentrism) as a guiding principle of international relations. In his speech at the 
Seliger Youth Forum in 2014, Lavrov argued that the ‘transition to a polycentric world 
order reflects an objective trend according to which the world order should be based 
on the world’s cultural and civilisational diversity’.144 This statement is illustrative 
against the background that Russia emphasises the cultural closeness between Russia 
and its post-Soviet neighbours.145 As a Russian analyst pointed out, the underlying 
assumption of a multipolar world order is that every global power (including Russia) 
is in charge of and represents a region and in the case of Russia, this region is 
Eurasia.146 
 
The unprecedented low in Russia-West relations following the Ukraine crisis not only 
resulted in an intensification of Russian efforts to establish and promote Eurasian 
integration, it also changed the quality of Russia’s discourse about the Euro-Atlantic 
region. While the theme of NATO enlargement always had been a contentious issue 
in Russia-West relations, it became even stronger after the Ukraine crisis. For Russian 
officials, the Ukraine crisis illustrated the US’ and EU’s willingness to exclude Russia 
from the Euro-Atlantic in order to maintain their dominating position. Speaking at the 
UN general assembly in 2014, Foreign Minister Lavrov remarked with regard to the 
Ukraine crisis that: 
 
the situation [in Ukraine] has revealed the remaining deep-rooted 
systemic flaws of the existing architecture in the Euro-Atlantic area. 
The West has embarked upon a course towards “the vertical 
structuring of humanity” tailored to its own hardly inoffensive 
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standards. After they declared victory in the Cold War and the “end 
of history,” the US and the EU opted for expanding the geopolitical 
area under their control without taking into account the balance of 
legitimate interests of all the people of Europe.147  
 
As we have seen above, Russia for a long time insisted on its belonging to the Euro-
Atlantic community and even made proposals for a new organisation of this space (at 
least in the security realm). However, the pan-European security treaty which 
Medvedev presented in 2009 only received lukewarm responses from Western states. 
Therefore, Lavrov lamented that while Russia was seeking cooperative relations, its 
‘western partners have promoted their own agenda, ignoring Russia’s interests in many 
points, expanded NATO, and generally attempted to move the geopolitical space under 
their control directly to the Russian borders’.148 In such a context, the objective of 
Russian integration into the Euro-Atlantic community continued to exist only on 
paper. Despite frequent allusions to Russia’s European character, there has been a shift 
away from Europe to a notion of Russia as an exceptional civilisation. As Tsygankov 
argues, this shift and Russia’s alienation from the West gained impetus due to the 
Ukraine crisis.149 Similarly, Linde argues that Russia’s emphasis on civilisational 
distinctiveness in conjunction with increasing criticism of Western values and 
unilateral actions, while at the same time insisting on Russia’s belonging to the Euro-
Atlantic civilisation, resulted in an inherent contradiction, which ultimately made 
Russia’s pan-European discourse untenable.150 Indeed, Foreign Minister Lavrov also 
recognised the difficulty of maintaining a cooperative partnership with the West in this 
context: 
 
The events in Ukraine were not a manifestation of new trends, but 
rather a culmination of the course implemented by our western 
partners for many years with regard to Russia. In fact, the habit not 
to perceive Russians as being of their kind has been present in 
Western Europe for centuries […] I would not like to go deep into 
contemplations about why we cannot reach true partnership in 
Europe – differences in worldview, historical experience, traditions, 
and finally the size of our country evidently play their role.151 
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The Ukraine crisis not only had important ramifications for Russia’s relations with the 
West. A further crucial consequence of this crisis was an intensification of Moscow’s 
activities in its Asian vector and a turn to the East and China in particular.152 According 
to Alexander Gabuev, in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, Russia was looking for a 
new major partner, which it eventually found in China.153 This also had important 
implications for Russia’s Eurasian discourse and the overall development of the 
Eurasian region. As Putin said in a joint interview with Russian and Chinese news 
agencies, Russia and China should strive to integrate their respective regional 
integration schemes, namely the Eurasian (Economic) Union and the Chinese One 
Belt, One Road project: ‘This is the beginning of a process of coordinating our long-
term development priorities to give a strong impetus to economic activity on the vast 
expanses of Eurasia’.154 During a visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Moscow in 
May 2015, the two countries even signed a joint declaration on cooperation between 
the EAEU and the Silk Road Economic Belt. Nevertheless, Gabuev argues that this 
development is at least partially also due to Russia’s estrangement with the West, thus 
leaving Russia no other choice than to cooperate with China. In this situation, Russia 
accepted the role of junior partner because the benefits of closer cooperation with 
China still outweighed its disadvantages.155 Indeed, the cooperation between Russia’s 
and China’s Eurasian projects and Russia’s idea of forming a Greater Eurasia ‘is 
intended to create the impression that it is Moscow that is taking the initiative in 
Russian-Chinese relations, and thereby to conceal and legitimise the growing 
asymmetry in bilateral relations’.156 
 
In general, Russia’s rapprochement with China had implications for Russian 
discourses on Eurasia. The convergence of the EAEU and the Chinese OBOR initiative 
were the key elements in the formation of what Russian pundits call Greater Eurasia.157 
According to a group of Russian scholars, Russia should exploit the current 
momentum and make the turn towards China permanent because this would also 
cement Eurasia’s role in global politics:  
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Our aim is to make the strategic rapprochement and unprecedented 
trust between Russia and China irreversible. […] This will make it 
possible, as early as in the mid-term, to come close to establishing 
in Eurasia a new international political entity based on common 
interests and many shared values. This will rally Eurasia and make 
it an independent center of power and influence on a global scale.158  
 
In the reading of the authors of the cited Valdai Club report, the dynamism emanating 
from China’s New Silk Road project in conjunction with the establishment and 
development of the Eurasian Economic Union presents Russia with a golden 
opportunity to promote and foster the economic development of the Eurasian region.159 
It is important to note, as mentioned above, that Russia’s push for Greater Eurasia and 
the cooperation between the EAEU and the Chinese OBOR project is also due to 
Russia’s strained relations with the West. Furthermore, as the prominent Russian 
foreign policy analyst Karaganov argues, Russia’s turn to the East not only responded 
to an economic logic, but it was also ‘assuming geopolitical and civilizational features’ 
since Europe refused to treat Russia as an equal while Russia was actually embracing 
European values (which, according to Karaganov, Europe itself had abandoned).160 
However, Karaganov cautions against forcing Russia to choose between East and West 
because Russia represents both a ‘great Eurasian and Atlantic-Pacific power’, which 
has the benefit of ‘absorbing resources and the best practices of its mother civilization 
in Europe and the resurging Asian one’.161 The same logic can be found in some 
statements by Russian officials. From the outset, Putin characterised the EAEU as an 
open project and a link between East and West. Indeed, the principal issue is that 
Russia tries to promote an image of itself as the centre of Eurasia, as a positive force 
that promotes the multipolar global order. It is interesting to note that, according to 
Wilson, Russia was behind the initiative to sign a joint declaration on cooperation 
between the EAEU and the Chinese New Silk Road and that the declaration’s entire 
text was written by Russia without input from China.162 Wilson even argues that the 
main target of Russia’s discourse on Greater Eurasia is actually the West and 
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Europe.163 Hence, the rationale behind the Greater Eurasia idea is similar to the 
rationale behind the Greater Europe idea, namely an attempt by Russia to promote a 
positive and cooperative idea for relations with its neighbours and positioning Russia 
as an indispensable part of developing regional economic cooperation.164 Indeed, 
Russian analysts argue that Europe should be part of Greater Eurasia. Karaganov, for 
instance, argues that ‘the Greater Eurasian Community concept should by all means 
include the western, European, part of the continent, for this will ultimately benefit 
Europe which has entered a period of deep crisis and has to adapt to new realities’.165 
Similarly, Trenin, while cautioning against an overreliance on China, promotes a third 
way by arguing that Russia should indeed aim for a Greater Eurasia. However, in his 
reading, this means instead of integrating with Europe or building a Greater Asia, 
which would mean focusing too much on China, ‘Moscow should aim instead for a 
greater Eurasia, benefiting from its equally close ties with its neighbors east, west and 
south’.166  
 
As we have seen, the Ukraine crisis, the deterioration of relations between Russia and 
the West and the warming of ties with China had an important effect on Russian 
government discourse on Eurasia. The principal focus was on Eurasian integration, not 
surprising given the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union in January 2015. 
On the other hand, the discourse also attempted to shape Eurasia as an independent 
region which was being developed by Russia with the help of other partners, mainly 
China. Despite the enthusiastic calls by some Russian academics for Russia-China 
cooperation and joint development in creating the Greater Eurasia, the government 
elite seems to see the relationship more pragmatically. In a joint interview with 
Chinese and Russian media outlets, Sergey Lavrov made the following statement: ‘we 
don’t oppose Eurasian and other integration processes, but are ready to help correlate 
them and to build bridges between Europe and the Asia Pacific region. China’s Silk 
Road Economic Belt concept has the same constructive essence’.167 Hence, Russia-
China cooperation in Eurasia is important and can help develop the region’s 
infrastructure and economy. Yet, Eurasian integration as defined by Lavrov remains a 
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purely Russian affair. This is needed for Russia to retain its influence in the post-Soviet 
space (also in the context of increasing Chinese pressure and expansion into Central 
Asia) by promoting a positive outlook and providing a framework for cooperation and 
development of the Eurasian region.  
5.3 Synthesis 
This chapter analysed the importance of Eurasia for Russia and the way in which 
Russia’s governing elite attributes meaning to the Eurasian ‘geopolitical space’. 
Through a close reading of discourses by members of the Russian governing elite, four 
overarching and rather general themes have been identified: Russia’s geographical 
location, its historical and cultural experience, the economic potential of Eurasia and 
the need for regional integration. 
 
In general, geography, or more specifically Russia’s geographical location as well as 
the country’s size, have a major impact on the formulation and conduct of Russian 
foreign policy. Due to the vast expanse of the country, Russia’s governing elite places 
their country at the centre of Eurasia as well as in various geographical regions. The 
country’s dual identity as both European and Asian is especially frequently 
emphasised. Russian officials highlight their country’s European roots and 
civilisational belonging to Europe and the Euro-Atlantic space while at the same time 
using their country’s Eurasian location and identity as a justification for Russia’s 
belonging to and involvement in the Asia-Pacific region. In general, Russia’s identity 
is described as not just European and Asian, but as essentially Eurasian on the basis of 
its geographic location. Furthermore, Russia’s geopolitical position as Eurasian power 
also bestows upon it a special role. According to Putin, ‘Russia, as a unique Eurasian 
power, has always played a special role in building relations between the East and the 
West’.168 This role as a bridge, which is a function of the country’s geographical 
location, is a characteristic of Russia. However, this image also has historical roots, 
and it is here where geographical and historical arguments come together in 
emphasising the particularity and importance of Russia’s Eurasian location.  
 
                                                 
168 Putin 2003c 
180 
 
The geographical aspects of the Eurasia discourse of Russia’s governing elite, such as 
portraying Russia as belonging to both Europe and Asia as well as being a bridge 
between the two, appears only logical. The same applies to the more recent discourse 
on Eurasian integration which describes the EAEU as an ‘efficient bridge between 
Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific region’.169 Hence, the EAEU becomes an 
extension of Russia in the sense that it is now through this organisation that Russia 
bridges East and West. In general, Russia considers itself to be part of three 
geopolitical spaces – Eurasia, Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific – if only by nature of its 
size and geographical location.170 However, among these, the Eurasian space occupies 
a special position because it also links the two other spaces. Indeed, there are different 
aspects pertaining to a geographical reading of Russia’s Eurasian identity, from the 
simple fact that Russia is both European and Asian and thus Eurasian, to the 
opportunities and foreign policy focus this offers. There is a geographical component 
in that Russia does indeed consider itself to be at the centre of Eurasia. It is this 
centrality in the Eurasian geography which matters for Russia in that it becomes the 
most important scene for Russia’s political and economic development as well as the 
place where Russia’s ambitions and self-understanding as a great global power is 
grounded. 
 
Russia’s identity and its position in the global system are strongly linked to past 
experiences and Moscow’s role as the imperial centre of subsequent regional and 
global empires. At the foundation lies Eurasia, the geography in which Russia’s 
imperial past is grounded. As Medvedev wrote in a newspaper article, ‘we have 
centuries-long experience at the crossroads of different cultures and civilisations. No 
wonder Russia is called a Eurasian […] country’.171 Russia’s history is linked to 
Eurasia and in turn the political community which emerged there is closely linked to 
Russia. Russia’s governing elite highlighted the existence of a historic community in 
Eurasia, which still today links the countries of the former Soviet Union to each other 
and which has an impact on the future development of the region in the context of 
Eurasian integration. An additional element is the fact that Russia unites elements of 
both European and Asian civilisations on its territory. The Russian discourse thus 
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mixes geographical aspects with cultural and civilisational references in order to 
emphasise Russia’s centrality in Eurasia and to describe it as a major advantage for 
the country but also for the international system more generally. The nature of the 
Russian state, which had been forged over centuries of state-building, as a multi-ethnic 
entity uniting many cultures and peoples is linked to Russia’s Eurasian position and 
identity. Eurasia thus is an important characteristic of Russia’s identity and its 
historical roots influence contemporary foreign policy. 
 
The other big theme in the discourses of Russia’s government officials on Eurasia is 
the economy and more specifically, economic integration in Eurasia. Towards the 
latter years of Putin’s second presidential term, the nature of the international system 
became a concern with direct repercussions for Russia’s view of Eurasia and regional 
integration starts to occupy a more prominent place in government discourses. In this 
context, Eurasia occupies an important place as a synonym for regional integration. 
The underlying reasoning is that because the 21st century is multipolar, every country 
needs to cooperate with others, and regional organisations are instrumental in this 
regard. This in turn, and especially in the case of Russian efforts to integrate the 
Eurasian region, was also seen as a guarantee for Russia to continue to occupy an 
important position as a great power. Putin also stated that the Eurasian Union should 
become a bridge between Europe and Asia, similar to the character ascribed to Russia 
in earlier years due to its Eurasian geopolitical location.  
 
With the official implementation of the EAEU in January 2015, Eurasian integration 
officially became a political and economic reality. President Putin himself emphasised 
that the EAEU’s mission went beyond economic integration alone, by arguing that the 
‘Eurasian Union is a project for maintaining the identity of nations in the historical 
Eurasian space in a new century and in a new world’.172 Eurasia now stands as an 
independent region in global affairs and Russia’s position at the centre of Eurasia thus 
also guarantees it an important position globally as an influential and non-negligible 
player. Putin highlights the formation of new geopolitical zones at the global level and 
he makes clear that the formation of the Eurasian region is part of this global 
development. Hence, Eurasia is an independent centre of global development while it 
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is clearly understood that Russia is at the centre of Eurasia. Put differently, the 
Eurasian Union thus functions as the institutionalised embodiment of Russia’s 
Eurasian identity. 
 
Eurasia has been a constant feature in Russian government discourse from 2000 to 
2015. Over the years, up until the present moment, the theme of Eurasian integration 
has become the most dominant one. Obviously, this discourse is also infused with 
geographical and historical references. Yet, its outlook is future-oriented in that it 
provides a new way for Russia to see Eurasia and its own place within Eurasia. 
Especially in the context of the Ukraine crisis, which started in 2013-2014 and the 
subsequent low in relations with the West, this discourse has been reinforced. 
However, the groundwork for an intensified Eurasian discourse had already been laid 
before, becoming visible when Vladimir Putin took over the presidency for a third 
term in 2012. In his inauguration speech as president, Putin stated that Russia’s destiny 
depended on the country’s ability to promote further economic integration, including 
within Eurasia, and that Russia thus needed to ‘become a leader and centre of gravity 
for the whole of Eurasia’.173 At this moment, Putin made clear how he saw Russia’s 
position in the Eurasian region, namely as the dominating power and the region’s 
leader. Similarly, the idea of the Eurasian Union, which President Putin proposed 
around the same time, can be understood in this context. Russia being the main driving 
force and promoter of the EAEU thus automatically assumes the role of the leader of 
the region. With the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union the status of the 
Eurasian region changed through the addition of an institutional framework which was 
furthermore oriented towards further expansion and cooperation with other countries 
and regional integration projects.  
 
As a result, Russia’s relationship with Eurasia is significantly upgraded. Hence, the 
foreign policy concept of 2013 for the first time makes the distinction between the 
following three regions: Euro-Atlantic, Eurasia and Asia-Pacific. The context for this 
distinction is a statement about the importance of the coherence of regions in order to 
build ‘oases of peace and security’ and how ‘the only reliable insurance against 
possible shocks is compliance with universal principles of equal and indivisible 
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security in respect of the Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian and Asia-Pacific regions’.174 This 
was preceded by a statement by Foreign Minister Lavrov in an interview with Reuters 
in December 2011 where he argued that Eurasian integration, as well as other 
integration efforts globally, are crucial in order ‘to ensure the sustainability of the 
world order emerging before our eyes’. Lavrov then mentions an additional task in this 
context which is ‘to create a space of peace and stability based on universal principles 
of equal and indivisible security, mutual trust, transparency and predictability’, which 
not only applies to Eurasian integration but also to other regions such as the Euro-
Atlantic and Asia-Pacific, which are mentioned specifically.175 Such statements are 
particularly interesting since they discursively ascribe a specific regional character to 
Eurasia, thus shaping it into an independent region and one of the principal poles in 
the new global order. In order for Eurasia to be considered by other states as an 
independent region, Eurasian integration serves an important function. It delineates the 
nucleus of the region and gives Russia a platform to promote Eurasian development.  
 
In this regard, according to Putin, Eurasian integration has an important function, not 
just for Russia, but for the entire post-Soviet space, because it ‘is a chance for the entire 
post-Soviet space to become an independent centre for global development, rather than 
remaining on the outskirts of Europe and Asia’.176 This statement illustrates that 
Eurasia is clearly delimited from Europe and Asia and has gained the identity of an 
independent global centre. While the focus is on economic development, the 
subsequent statement from Putin, made in the same speech, adds another dimension to 
it: ‘The Eurasian Union is a project for maintaining the identity of nations in the 
historical Eurasian space in a new century and in a new world’.177 The Eurasian Union 
thus is clearly linked to the member countries’ national identity in that it becomes an 
important aspect in its definition. It furthermore demonstrates and adds upon the 
previous point that Eurasia is distinct from Europe and Asia. In the context of the 
Ukraine crisis and the subsequent deterioration of relations between Russia and the 
West, this distinction was further accentuated. Not only was this the point where it 
became clear for Russia that integration into the Euro-Atlantic space was impossible, 
it also changed the meaning of Eurasia for Russian foreign policy. As we have seen in 
                                                 
174 Russian Federation 2013 
175 Lavrov 2011b 
176 Putin 2013 
177 Putin 2013 
184 
 
previous statements, Putin highlighted the formation of new geopolitical zones at the 
global level and made clear that the formation of the Eurasian region was a part of this 
global development. Hence, Eurasia became an independent centre of global 




Chapter 6: Eurasia in Turkish discourse 
This chapter examines the place of Eurasia in Turkish government discourse. It is 
structured along two axes: a topical description focusing on the main themes covered 
in the discourses followed by a chronological description of the evolution of the 
discourse. The key feature with regard to the governing elite’s discourse on Eurasia is 
a multiple and interlinked focus on geographical, historical and cultural aspects. These 
aspects are constantly emphasised in different ways by the political leaders of the 
country. This is perfectly illustrated in the following statement by Prime Minister 
Erdoğan, taken from a speech delivered at the Turkish think tank International 
Strategic Research Organization (USAK) in 2010: 
 
Our accumulation of history, our cultural prosperity, human 
potential and geographical position provide us with inimitable 
opportunities and attribute to us very important missions. Turkey, 
with its unique position between regions and continents and also 
with its accumulation of civilization, culture and policy, has great 
strategic importance.1 
 
As the subsequent analysis will show, geography is the dominant theme in Turkish 
government discourse on Eurasia. The key factors here are Turkey’s geographical 
location at the intersection of different continents, its concomitant belonging to both 
Europe and Asia and, as a consequence of these two factors, its centrality in the 
Eurasian or Afro-Eurasian region. Geopolitical images, such as Turkey as a central 
country and Turkey as a bridge, are important elements of the governing elites’ 
discourse. Furthermore, Turkey’s historical experience, which is closely linked to the 
regional geography, and the cultural and ethnic links across the former Ottoman 
imperial lands and the vast Eurasian region are foundations for Turkey’s role in 
Eurasia. Hence, Turkish officials frequently emphasise historical links when 
highlighting the importance of Eurasia and especially the countries in Central Asia in 
Turkish foreign policy. Finally, when it comes to the theme of economy, energy is the 
central element in the foreign policy discourse. Linked both to the country’s 
geographical situation as well as its privileged links to many energy-rich countries, the 
                                                 
1 Erdoğan 2010a 
186 
 
aim of Turkey’s energy policy is to develop into an energy hub at the centre of Eurasia, 
thus connecting the East with the West. 
 
This chapter has two aims: it analyses the discourse of Turkey’s governing elite with 
regard to the geopolitical concept of Eurasia and it traces the evolution of the 
importance of this concept in Turkish foreign policy over the period under study 
(2002-2015). It is argued, that in the early years of the AKP rule, from around 2002 to 
2007, Eurasia occupied a central position in Turkish government discourse, Foreign 
Minister Gül being the key promoter of the idea of Turkey as a Eurasian country. 
However, this image was primarily based on a pragmatic assessment of Turkey’s 
interests and opportunities and less on ideological considerations. After 2007, when 
Ahmet Davutoğlu increasingly moved to the centre of Turkish foreign policy making, 
the place of Eurasia in the elite’s geopolitical imagination experienced a slight shift to 
a wider vision of Turkey as the centre of Afro-Eurasia. Simultaneously, civilisational 
aspects became increasingly central to Turkish foreign policy. Hence, a refocusing on 
the region of the former Ottoman Empire and its immediate neighbourhood in the 
Middle East took place in Turkish foreign policy. Still, as the following discussion will 
show, the idea of Eurasia and its place in Turkey’s geopolitical imagination was kept 
alive. 
 
This thesis focuses on the importance of ‘space’ and the geographical situation of a 
country in the formulation of its foreign policy. It has been argued that it is only 
through the discursive practices of foreign policy elites that meaning is attached to 
geopolitical space. This chapter thus depicts the principal themes in Turkish foreign 
policy with regard to Eurasia through an analysis of government elite discourse while 
studying how the discourse evolved over the years. Furthermore, this chapter identifies 
several characteristics and role perceptions in the geopolitical imagination of Turkey’s 
governing elite, which will be further discussed in the next chapter. This chapter is 
divided into two parts: the first part focuses on a thematic description of Turkey’s 
Eurasian discourse on the basis of the four main themes – geography, history, culture, 
economy – covered in the discourses. This is followed by a second part which 
discusses the evolution of the discourse in a chronological manner focusing on main 
events in foreign policy and Turkish politics and how they influenced Turkish 
officials’ discourse on Eurasia. 
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6.1 Prevalent themes 
This section covers the dominant themes in the Turkish government discourse on 
Eurasia. As described in Chapter 2, these themes were determined by reading a sample 
of discourses from Turkish officials, allowing for the identification of the principal 
themes and keywords with regard to geographical and geopolitical assumptions in 
Turkish discourse and national identity conceptions. Four broad categories – 
geography, history, culture, and economy – were identified and each category 
comprises several key words which cover the basic conceptions of and references to 
Eurasia in Turkish discourse (see Figure 2.3). For the subsequent discussion in this 
chapter, they are grouped into three overarching and rather general themes. In the first 
part, I will discuss the importance of geography in Turkish officials’ discourse on 
Eurasia before moving on to the second category which groups together historical and 
cultural aspects of the discourse. In the third part, the discussion focuses on the 
economy and the issue of energy as a dominant aspect in Turkey’s Eurasian discourse. 
Each section will take a close look at the main issues within each theme and work with 
direct quotes taken from the Turkish officials’ discourses. The main aspects and 
keywords of each theme and the way in which they overlap are schematically 
represented in Figure 6.1 below. 
 





Geography is the dominant theme in Turkish government discourse on Eurasia and its 
importance is constantly emphasised. Turkey’s belonging to both Europe and Asia, its 
centrality in the Eurasian region (or in Davutoğlu’s words Afro-Eurasia), as well as its 
position at the intersection of different regions are the principal factors. In addition, 
the idea of Turkey acting as a bridge between regions and civilisations is another 
constant feature in the discourse. 
 
To give context to the following discussion, it is important to take note of the way in 
which geography influences the thinking of Turkey’s governing elite.2 By simply 
looking at a map of the region, it becomes obvious that Turkey occupies a 
geographically particular and central role since it lies at the intersection of many 
geographical and political regions between Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Indeed, 
as Davutoğlu writes in an article about Turkey’s foreign policy vision, ‘Turkey’s 
geography gives it a specific central country status’, which is distinct from any other 
country.3 As we have seen before and will come back to, the notion of Turkey being a 
central country occupies a prominent role in Davutoğlu’s foreign policy thinking. 
Furthermore, as a result of this position, Turkey has many identities and regional 
belongings as the then Foreign Minister Babacan illustrated in a speech in 2009: 
 
Turkey is a European country, but Turkey is also an Asian country. 
Turkey is a country in the Balkans. Turkey is also a country in the 
Caucasus. Turkey is a Mediterranean country. Turkey is also a Black 
Sea country. Turkey is also a country very close to the Middle East 
as well. […] Turkey is a country in many different regions at the 
same time.4 
 
For Turkish officials, this geographical reality is one of the fundamental principles in 
Turkish foreign policy. This geopolitically infused reading of the country’s unique 
location – sitting at the intersection of different geographical regions and cultures – 
predetermines the role Turkey can play in global affairs. Geopolitics and geographical 
determinism are prevalent in Turkish foreign policy. As Bilgin argues, this has been 
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the case since the 1950s, although originally such notions were confined to military 
actors before also being adopted and promoted by civilian actors and successive 
governments.5 In essence, according to Bilgin, the common vision of all these actors 
is ‘that Turkey’s geographical location is more unique than others are, and that it has 
more deterministic power over Turkey’s policies than in some other countries’.6 
Similarly, Yanik argues that Turkish government officials’ references to Turkey’s 
geography (and its history) by invoking metaphors such as ‘the bridge’ or emphasising 
Turkey’s position on various continents also serve the purpose of portraying Turkey 
as an ‘exceptional’ state.7 Hence, geography is a crucial, ever-present feature in 
Turkish foreign policy discourse. 
 
Babacan’s successor as foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, is one of the foremost 
promoters of a deterministic geographical reading of Turkey’s position. In one of his 
articles he claimed that ‘in terms of geography, Turkey occupies a unique space’ and 
that as a result of this position, Turkey ‘may be defined as a central country with 
multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character’.8 He 
furthermore also strongly emphasised the importance of geography (and history) for 
Turkey and its foreign policy. In an interview with Newsweek magazine he explained 
that geography was the key to understanding Turkey’s stance on a variety of global 
issues: ‘you have to understand the geography and the history of Turkey. We are a 
European country and we are an Asian country’. As a result, Davutoğlu concluded, 
‘Turkish foreign policy has to be multiregional, multidimensional’.9 A few months 
earlier in a speech at the 2009 annual conference on US-Turkish relations, Davutoğlu 
went even further. He contrasted the US’ geographical position to that of Turkey and 
claimed that Turkey’s ‘geographical uniqueness’ differed from the US due to its 
geographically strategic position ‘at the centre of Afro-Eurasia’ and in the proximity 
to Europe, Asia and even Africa. This ‘geographical uniqueness’, however, is not 
negative but, according to Davutoğlu, an asset which ‘can make Turkey a really 
important player in world politics’.10 In short, Turkey’s geography occupies a defining 
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spot in the government officials’ perception of their country’s importance as well as 
in the formulation of its foreign policy. 
 
Turkey’s self-perception as both a European and an Asian country is the basic 
parameter in the official’s discourse with regard to Eurasia. In a number of different 
statements, Turkey’s governing elite made reference to this dual identity. Hence, in 
response to a question from the US TV host Charlie Rose about whether Turkey wants 
to be a part of Europe, Prime Minister Erdoğan responded that ‘if we look at this from 
a geographic point of view, Turkey is part of Europe and Turkey is part of Asia as 
well, geographically speaking’.11 Similarly, in relation to Turkey’s strategic 
importance to Europe and the West, President Gül reminded the readers of First 
Magazine that ‘the world’s economic and political gravity is shifting towards Asia’ 
and Turkey thus is in an ideal position because ‘Turkey is a country that is located in 
both Asia and Europe’.12 As we will see in more detail below, such statements are not 
only anchored in a geographical but also in a historical reading as the following 
statement from Gül illustrates: ‘Throughout history, we have always been a part of 
both Europe and Asia, constituting a natural bridge between these two geographies’.13 
As such, Turkey sits neatly between the two continents providing the connection 
between them. This idea of Turkey acting as a bridge, both literally and 
metaphorically, and to which we will turn later, is an important element in the 
government discourses and has been adopted by a variety of actors.14 
 
In general, the significance of their country’s geography for its foreign policy is 
perceived as an important element by the ruling elite in Ankara. This deterministic 
stance is also emphasised by then Prime Minister Erdoğan who, in a widely distributed 
opinion piece, argued that the ‘geography [stretching from the Balkans to the Middle 
East and the Caucasus] is Turkey’s natural historical and cultural hinterland. […and 
that] Turkey cannot remain indifferent to this geography, for it stands at the center of 
it’.15 In that sense, Turkey is the quintessential Eurasian country regrouping on its 
territory the geographical, historical and cultural links across Eurasia. In general, the 
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idea of Turkey being a central country, also with regard to Eurasia, is an important 
theme and on different occasions Turkey’s government officials highlight this notion. 
This is especially the case with regard to Turkey’s role in global diplomacy as 
exemplified by a statement from President Erdoğan during a state visit to Indonesia in 
2015. Speaking at a local think tank, Erdoğan declared that positive relations between 
Indonesia and Turkey were beneficial for the whole world, especially given the two 
countries’ geopolitical status, Indonesia being the ‘leading country in Asia-Pacific’ 
and Turkey simply ‘the key country in Eurasia’.16 One of course needs to take into 
account the setting of this statement and the probability that Erdoğan used diplomatic 
language to flatter his host (in realistic terms it would be far-fetched to qualify 
Indonesia as the leading country in the Asia-Pacific region). Still, such a statement is 
embedded in the overall discourse and reiterates the theme of Turkey as a bridge 
between regions, while simultaneously illustrating the flexibility of geopolitical 
concepts and references to certain countries being the ‘leader’ or ‘centre’ of their 
region. 
 
Especially with reference to Turkey’s dual identity and position on both the European 
and Asian continents, Abdullah Gül explained that from Turkey’s point of view 
‘Europe and Asia constitute one land mass, which we call “Eurasia”’ and thus ‘Turkey 
is located at the very core of Eurasia’.17 What is more, as Gül stated in his first speech 
as president before the Turkish parliament in 2007, ‘our central position in the Eurasian 
geography […] constitutes [one of] the fundamental axes of Turkish foreign policy’ in 
addition to a strong alignment with the US and the EU accession process.18 This then 
obviously has direct consequences in that Turkey’s position at the centre of Eurasia 
brings with it certain responsibilities and provides Turkey with the opportunity to take 
on a stronger role in regional and even global politics. In this context, in a speech on 
the occasion of Europe Day in 2009, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu claimed: 
 
Turkey with its geopolitical position at the centre of Eurasia brings 
peace not only to the EU and to our neighboring regions such as the 
Caucasus, the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Middle East but also 
to the global system.19 
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As we have seen, the country’s governing elite considers Turkey’s geography to be an 
advantage rather than a handicap when it comes to Turkish foreign policy. Its 
geopolitical position is one of the bases for Turkey’s growing role in global affairs, as 
Erdoğan claimed in a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in 2004: 
‘The position that Turkey occupies in the wider sense, at the heart of the Eurasian 
geography, will assume greater importance on the East-West and North-South axis’.20 
Similarly, speaking several years later at the Turkish think tank USAK, Erdoğan 
reiterated the link between Turkey’s geography and its subsequent prominent role in 
global affairs. He declared that Turkey’s history, vast accumulation of culture, as well 
as its geographical position offer the country ‘inimitable opportunities and attribute to 
us very important missions’ and that thanks to ‘its unique position between regions 
and continents’ Turkey has ‘great strategic importance’.21 According to Erdoğan, all 
these characteristics make Turkey ‘an effective actor, not an ordinary one’.22 Turkey 
is thus characterised as a pivotal country due to its multidimensional geography and 
history.  
 
One of the key architects of this vision, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, discursively 
positions Turkey as a key global actor by stating that Turkey’s ‘geostrategic location 
in the midst of a vast geography […] places us in a position to relate to and influence 
the developments that are key to the future of the world’.23 As a result, Turkey becomes 
an active player in its environment, including in Eurasia. Speaking at the 
Ambassadors’ Conference of Ukraine in 2012, Davutoğlu compared Turkey and 
Ukraine as two countries having a ‘multidimensional geography’ and thus great 
strategic advantages in the international system. He went on to reject the 
Huntingtonian notion of Turkey (and Ukraine) being torn countries, struggling 
between their eastern and western identities, instead emphasising the two countries’ 
importance: ‘we are pivotal countries which will shape East and West, Europe and 
Asia, and we will not be shaped as a passive actor’. Davutoğlu then concluded his 
speech with the strong exclamation that Turkey and Ukraine ‘will be shaping Eurasia 
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again and again’.24 Here, the Turkish foreign minister again refers to his geopolitical 
vision which is based on the importance of a country’s historical experience and 
geographical location.  
 
The argument about Turkey’s centrality in Eurasia is further augmented by the idea 
that due to this centrality, Turkey also acts as a bridge and link between continents, 
regions and cultures.25 The bridge metaphor is not a new element of Turkish foreign 
policy under the AKP. As we have seen above, the charismatic former Prime Minister 
and President Turgut Özal strongly promoted the image of Turkey as a bridge and 
effectively opened up new realms for Turkish foreign policy.26 There are two elements 
regarding the geopolitical concept of bridge country in Turkish elite discourse. On the 
one hand, Turkey is characterised as a bridge and connector between geographical 
regions. In an interview with Foreign Affairs magazine in 2013, Gül stated that 
‘Turkey is a bridge between Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and the Caucasus’.27 On 
the other hand, and this is contingent upon the geographical bridge metaphor, Turkey 
acts as a bridge between cultures and a facilitator for the dialogue between 
civilisations. A good example of this is the Alliance of Civilisations (AoC) initiative, 
which Turkey co-sponsored with Spain under UN auspices (and which will be 
discussed in more detail below), with the aim to contribute to and foster better dialogue 
and mutual understanding between different cultures and religions. In a televised 
interview in 2007, Erdoğan stated that ‘Turkey is a very important bridge between 
different cultures and civilizations’ after having described the country’s special 
geography spanning several regions and continents.28 Likewise, this viewpoint is also 
used by Turkey’s leader to promote Turkey as an important country on the 
international stage. Speaking at the UN general assembly in 2007, and promoting 
Turkey’s candidacy for a non-permanent seat in the UN security council, Erdoğan 
made the argument that Turkey is ideally suited to facilitate dialogue between cultures 
because ‘with its European and Asian identity, [Turkey] can assume a distinctive and 
constructive role in harmonizing and reconciling differing views’.29 Interestingly, the 
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way in which AKP government officials adopted the bridge discourse in their foreign 
policy evolved over the years. As Yanik argues, after the AKP came to power, the 
bridge metaphor in Turkey’s geopolitical vision changed from the dominant reading 
of Turkey bridging continents, which was prevalent in the 1990s, to one of Turkey 
bridging civilisations, which became more important in the 2000s.30 In contrast to 
Özal’s vision, who interpreted Turkey’s bridge character as the promotion of Western 
values to the East,31 the AKP government interpreted the bridge metaphor as Turkey 
having multiple regional belongings and multiple identities. 
 
The bridge discourse is also closely linked to Eurasia. Especially in the 1990s, 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkish officials promoted stronger 
engagement with and foreign policy activism towards the Central Asian states. 
Turkey’s role as a bridge from Europe to these newly independent countries and as a 
model for development was the key component of the discourse. In this geopolitical 
context, Turkey functions as a bridge, especially with regard to Eurasia, as former 
President Demirel argued: ‘Eurasia has come into being, [and Turkey] has become a 
bridge between Europe and Eurasia’.32 During these years, the geographical dimension 
of the bridge discourse was prevalent.33 Furthermore, it also served an instrumental 
purpose in demonstrating Turkey’s strategic importance to the EU in that Turkey acted 
as a ‘door to Eurasia’.34  
 
As argued above, under the AKP government the bridge metaphor evolved and also 
comprised cultural and civilisational connotations. For instance, in a speech at a 
Chinese university in 2009, Foreign Minister Gül said that ‘by virtue of its geographic 
location at the heart of Eurasia and its close historical and cultural ties across a vast 
landscape, it acts as a crucial catalyst for enhancing dialogue and interaction between 
cultures’.35 Several years later, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu made an almost identical 
statement underlining the combination of geographical, historical and cultural factors 
in supporting Turkey’s active foreign policy. In his speech, Davutoğlu argued that one 
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of the goals of Turkish foreign policy was ‘to reconcile the West with the East and the 
North with the South’ and that furthermore ‘Turkey takes both the advantage of its 
geographic disposition and close historical and cultural ties across a vast landscape 
promoting dialogue and interaction between civilizations at the heart of Eurasia and 
Africa’.36 With Davutoğlu’s definition and reference to his ‘Afro-Eurasia’ concept, 
Turkey’s geographical reach in this regard and thus its arena for foreign policy 
activism is enlarged even further. In these statements, we once again see the 
importance of geography in the discourse on Eurasia of Turkey’s governing elite. 
However, we also see how the combination of different elements forms an overarching 
discourse. While geography provides the basis for Turkey’s role in Eurasia, its 
historical experience and resulting cultural links across the region further add 
legitimacy to Ankara’s perceived role as a key player in Eurasia. The next section will 
thus take a closer look at the elements of history and culture in Turkey’s Eurasian 
discourse. 
6.1.2 History/Culture 
Turkey’s historical experience is dominated by the fact that it was at the centre of the 
Ottoman Empire for many centuries. The Ottoman Empire was a geographically 
contiguous entity spanning lands principally in Europe, North Africa and the Middle 
East. At its very core was what is today the Republic of Turkey. As discussed earlier, 
this experience as imperial centre and the Ottoman legacy is one of the ‘structural 
determinants’ of Turkish foreign policy.37 Speaking at the Brookings Institution in 
2013, Prime Minister Erdoğan emphasised this point by declaring that ‘the Republic 
of Turkey was built on the foundations of an old and rich civilization’. He furthermore 
insisted on the critical importance of this factor for Turkey’s stance on a variety of 
foreign policy issues: ‘the reflexes of Turkey with respect to emerging regional and 
global issues is based on this historic heritage and experience’.38 Hence, the historical 
experience of being at the centre of a regional empire and the concomitant links which 
have been forged to a variety of regions and cultures have a lasting impact on Turkish 
foreign policy. 
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While the geographical spread of the Ottoman Empire was vast, it never extended its 
reach deep into what was considered the Eurasian heartland. The competition from the 
Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union was too strong to make this possible. While 
there was an attempt by pan-Turkists in the late 19th and early 20th century to connect 
with the Turkic communities in Central Asia, this opening failed with the eventual 
break-up of the Ottoman Empire, following its defeat in the First World War, and later 
the ideology and ideas of Pan-Turkism moved to the margins.39 However, the central 
idea of close historical, cultural and ethnic links between Turkey and the Turkic 
republics remained vivid and is represented in the idea of the ‘Turkic World’ which 
‘corresponds to the belief in cultural, societal, economic, and political unity among the 
Turkic-speaking peoples of Eurasia’.40 Furthermore, Turkish officials refer to 
historical links when speaking about the importance of Eurasia, and above all Central 
Asia, in Turkish foreign policy. In the 1990s, Turkey attempted an opening towards 
these countries.41 Referring to a shared history and cultural and linguistic ties with the 
Turkic peoples of Central Asia, Ankara presented itself as a ‘big brother’ to these 
countries, facilitating their integration into the global system.42 Prime Minister 
Demirel, in office from 1991 to 1993, for instance promoted the idea of a Turkic world, 
or put differently, a common Eurasian community.43 
 
Later generations of politicians also considered these links to be important and saw 
Turkey’s potential for fostering close ties to the Turkic republics in Eurasia. For 
example, during his 2003 annual speech before the Turkish Parliament, President Gül 
declared that ‘close historical and cultural bonds with Central Asia constitute one of 
the pillars of our Eurasian vision’.44 He goes on to state that Turkey was among the 
first countries to reach out to the newly independent states in Central Asia and that it 
aims to help these countries integrate into the global community of states. A prominent 
think tank analyst echoed this sentiment by arguing that Turkey’s position at the centre 
of Eurasia was not only based on a geopolitical understanding, but also a cultural one.45 
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The importance attached by Turkey to the Eurasian region is thus also justified by 
strong cultural and linguistic bonds. 
 
Furthermore, these close bonds are also linked to general issues in Eurasia such as 
security and stability. As President Sezer stated in a speech in front of the Turkish 
parliament, ‘the establishment of stability and security in Central Asia is a must for the 
security of Eurasia’.46 It becomes clear that the perceived and accentuated cultural 
closeness to the countries of Central Asia and across Eurasia also lies on a pragmatic 
foundation. Turkey obviously is interested in inhabiting a stable and secure 
environment in which business and trade can thrive. In this context, highlighting 
cultural closeness can be considered an advantage in reaching such aims since it 
establishes a direct link between Ankara and Central Asia. A senior Turkish diplomat, 
for instance, argued that Turkey and the EU should cooperate more deeply on Central 
Asia in order to offer these countries a third alternative next to Russia and China and 
thus pulling the region into the Western orbit.47 Similar considerations in the 1990s 
led to the establishment of the Turkish development agency (Turkish Cooperation and 
Coordination Agency, TIKA). This organisation was originally exclusively set up to 
provide a framework for engaging the post-Soviet Turkic states on the basis of shared 
historical and cultural links and as an initiative to integrate them into the global 
system.48 This illustrates the utilisation of cultural and historical images in Turkish 
discourse for pragmatic political reasons as well. 
 
The above discussion revealed the importance of geography in Turkish foreign policy 
discourse. But geography and history are often mentioned in tandem, influencing and 
building upon each other. Davutoğlu is a particularly vivid promoter of this conception 
as illustrated by his strategic depth doctrine. The main tenets of the strategic depth 
doctrine are the importance of ‘historical depth’, which is defined as ‘a characteristic 
of a country that is “at the epicentre of [historical] events”’ often implying that the 
country was once part of an empire, and ‘geographic depth’ which is a function of 
‘historical depth’ and refers to the past and present geographic spread of a country.49 
However, Davutoğlu’s approach is not new. Former Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, for 
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instance, argued that ‘the much-delayed introduction of the “historical dimension” to 
our geo-strategy is what I consider as my modest contribution to Turkish foreign 
policy’.50 So, already before Davutoğlu, this concept gained entry into Turkish foreign 
policy. Cem reiterated this statement by saying: 
 
I stated for the first time on a governmental platform that “…Turkey 
is an Asian country, as well as European”. We developed the concept 
of “Historical Geography” and the strategic value that it has in our 
relations with countries that make part of this geography.51  
 
Comparing this statement to subsequent arguments made by political figures such as 
Gül and particularly Davutoğlu demonstrates some sort of cohesion in Turkish foreign 
policy since the 1990s. It is evident that factors such as Turkey’s geographical position 
as well as its historical and cultural ties across a vast landmass remain foundational 
principles of the country’s foreign policy. 
 
In the context of the discussion of historical and cultural factors in Turkish government 
discourse, a key characteristic is Turkey’s perceived central place on the Eurasian 
landmass. In a lecture at Northwest University in China, Abdullah Gül mentioned 
Turkey’s crucial mediating role in global politics as a promoter of dialogue, a position 
Turkey only occupies ‘by virtue of its geographic location at the heart of Eurasia and 
its close historical and cultural ties across a vast landscape’.52 However, there is no 
specification as to which concrete historical and cultural ties reference is being made 
to. The same goes for a more recent statement made by President Erdoğan during a 
visit to Moscow in September 2015.53 The Turkish President had travelled to Russia 
to attend the inauguration of the newly rebuilt central mosque in Moscow. Erdoğan 
referred to the two countries as ‘the two old cultures of Eurasia’ while speaking 
broadly about the benefits of closer cooperation between Russia and Turkey and 
highlighting the countries’ historical experiences as homeland to a wide number of 
cultures, religions and civilisations.54 The message he intended to convey was that 
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cooperation between two countries with different religions, sharing a common 
neighbourhood on the Eurasian continent, would be positive for the world in general. 
Here again we come back to geographically infused arguments about Turkey as both 
a central country and a bridge country in the vast Eurasian region.  
 
In general, it seems that Turkey’s governing elite wants to put emphasis on Turkey’s 
hybrid identity and cultural diversity as a crucial advantage in its foreign policy. Time 
and again, Turkish officials emphasise this point, like Prime Minister Erdoğan in a 
speech at a Turkish think tank where he emphasised Turkey’s strategic importance 
while linking it to the country’s ‘accumulation of civilization, culture and policy’.55 
Similarly, various Turkish analysts argue that this characterisation of Turkey also has 
an instrumental logic for Turkish foreign policy, be it as a strategic value for the West 
(both EU and NATO), as a connection to Eurasia or for economic purposes in gaining 
access to new markets and energy-rich states.56 As the above discussion demonstrated, 
the image of Turkey as a ‘bridge between different cultures and civilizations’ is 
sustained and represents the single-most important idea with regard to the cultural 
aspect in Turkey’s Eurasian discourses.57  
 
The concept of civilisation has moved to the forefront of Turkey’s geopolitical 
imagination since the AKP came to power in 2002, with both Erdoğan and Davutoğlu 
as chief promoters of this concept.58 Their vision of Turkish foreign policy is 
underscored by a civilisational geopolitics approach, which divides the world into 
different civilisational blocs on the basis of their respective history and culture. In their 
view, Turkey is considered to be at the centre of its own civilisational basin which is 
distinct from the Western/European basin.59 As Bilgin and Bilgic argue, this new 
civilisational discourse of the AKP government also has ramifications for Turkish 
foreign policy towards Eurasia because the Turkic countries in this region are seen as 
culturally and historically close and thus part of the Turkish-led civilisation.60 In this 
sense, Turkey thus adopts the role of a leader within the Eurasian region. Ultimately, 
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Turkey’s civilisational discourse aims at positioning Turkey as a central and influential 
state in global affairs (or at the very least regional affairs) while contributing to the 
formation of a new global order.61 An important initiative in this context was Turkey’s 
co-sponsoring, together with Spain, of the Alliance of Civilisations under the 
patronage of the UN. The AoC was established in 2005 with the aim to promote 
dialogue and foster harmony between nations and especially between religions and the 
Western and Islamic worlds. Turkey thus occupies the above-mentioned role of 
civilisational leader in the context of this initiative, officially representing the Islamic 
community. This is embedded in Turkey’s multidimensional foreign policy as outlined 
by Davutoğlu when explaining the rationale behind Turkey’s engagement in the AoC: 
‘Turkey takes both the advantage of its geographic disposition and close historical and 
cultural ties across a vast landscape promoting dialogue and interaction between 
civilizations at the heart of Eurasia and Africa’.62 Similarly, speaking at the second 
forum of the Alliance of Civilisations, which was held in Istanbul in 2009, Erdoğan 
extrapolates Turkey’s advantages in promoting a dialogue of civilisations by using the 
image of the city of Istanbul: 
 
Istanbul not only connects two continents, namely, Europe and Asia; 
Istanbul is not only located at the intersection of Asia, Europe and 
Africa; Istanbul has also its proper place in the world as a city which 
embraces and harmonizes cultures, civilizations, races, religions and 
languages in the melting pot of history.63 
 
The example of Istanbul here stands as representation of Turkey as a whole. The 
geographical location between continents is coupled with a civilisational 
understanding of Turkey’s identity derived from its religion and cultural and historical 
experience as the leader of the Ottoman Empire. One of the core characteristics of 
Turkey’s discourse on civilisations is the objective to avoid a clash of civilisations. In 
so doing, the debate around the Alliance of Civilisations is closely linked to Turkey’s 
characterisation of its European identity, at least in historical and geographical terms 
in the sense that through accession to the EU, Turkey would contribute to the formation 
of an actual alliance of civilisations. Hence, EU membership for Turkey is instrumental 
and strongly linked to this civilisational discourse. As Ardiç argues, Turkey’s 
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participation in the AoC thus serves a double objective of posing as the leader of its 
region while at the same time enhancing its prospects for EU membership.64 On a 
number of occasions Erdoğan emphasised this point by declaring that Turkey’s vision 
of the changing nature of the EU after its eventual accession would be for it to represent 
an alliance of civilisation instead of being the locus of a clash of civilisations.65 
Similarly, in his 2008 speech at the Munich Security Conference, Prime Minister 
Erdoğan insisted on the strategic utility of Turkey’s accession to the EU for the latter 
due to Turkey’s role in the dialogue of civilisations.66 
 
Turkey’s civilisational discourse is linked to the geopolitical imagination which sees 
Turkey as bridging several continents and civilisations and as a leader of the Afro-
Eurasian region. However, one additional important aspect needs to be mentioned in 
this context with regard to Turkey’s European discourse. Turkey’s leaders consistently 
stress the importance of Turkey’s cultural ties across the Eurasian region, yet at the 
same time they also emphasise their belonging and closeness to Europe. In an 
interview with the US journalist Charlie Rose in 2010, Erdoğan made the following 
unequivocal statement: ‘Turkey is part of Europe and Turkey is part of Asia as well, 
geographically speaking. Now culturally, if that is the interpretation, then I think 
there’s no question that Turkey is a part of Europe’.67 Erdoğan replied to a question 
about the reluctance of some EU member states to accept Turkey into the union and 
emphasised Ankara’s unbroken determination to become a member and to continue on 
its European path. This is echoed by one of the interviewees, a think tank 
representative with close links to the foreign ministry: ‘Eurasia is very important for 
Turkey from an international perspective, but not from a moral perspective. Europe is 
more important for Turkey than Eurasia, because Turkey still sees Europe as a source 
of modernity and democracy and creator of civilization’.68 Similarly, in an interview 
with Foreign Affairs magazine in 2013, President Gül argued that ‘from a values point 
of view, we are with the West’, despite Turkey’s position as a bridge between different 
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regions.69 The reference being made to culture in this context refers to political culture 
and ‘Western’ values such as democracy and rule of law.  
 
There is indeed an ambiguity in the discourse of Turkish officials, which see Turkey 
in several roles as part of Europe, as centre of Afro-Eurasia and as the leader of its 
civilisational basin. In the early years of Erdoğan’s reign in power, the AKP made 
accession to the European Union a major goal of their foreign policy and Turkey 
pushed for domestic reforms in the context of its EU accession bid. At the same time, 
Ankara promoted the image of Turkey as an ideal model of development for countries 
in Eurasia and the Middle East, being both a Muslim and democratic country. The 
same applies to the government officials’ discourse on Turkish EU membership and 
their country’s strategic value for Europe as the historical meeting point of several 
cultures and civilisations with footholds in various regions. In a speech at the Council 
on Foreign Relations in 2014, Erdoğan even argued that Turkey’s engagement with 
and experience in the Middle East was a ‘justification’ for it becoming a member of 
the EU.70 Likewise, in an interview shortly after his election as president, Erdoğan 
claimed that one of the reasons Turkey still wanted to become a member of the EU 
was the fact that Turkey had the ‘important responsibility of bridging the gap between 
the Islamic world and the European Union’.71 Statements like these point to the fact 
that Turkey also hoped to gain more traction globally as an important player in world 
politics (the promotion of the Alliance of Civilisations being a case in point). The 
discourse on bridging cultures and facilitating dialogue between civilisations is further 
proof of this. In sum, Turkey’s Eurasian position functions as the background to its 
cultural diversity which in turn is actively promoted as an important strategic asset and 
advantage for Turkish foreign policy.  
6.1.3 Energy/economy 
Geography is an important factor in the context of Turkey’s foreign policy with regard 
to Eurasia. Likewise, geography has an influence on economic opportunities for 
Turkey, especially in the energy sector. In an article published in 2008, Davutoğlu 
wrote about the importance of energy in Turkish foreign policy and emphasised that 
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the ‘proper utilization of its geography’ was a key national interest for Turkey, which 
essentially means ‘facilitating the transit of energy across its territory, which is central 
to the East-West energy corridor’.72 This is especially relevant given that Turkey itself 
does not possess any significant energy resources, but its strategic position in close 
distance to almost 75 percent of the world’s proven gas and oil reserves, turns it into 
an important player and ‘a natural energy bridge between the source countries and 
consumer markets’, as Davutoğlu explained in an interview with a business 
magazine.73 Therefore, as a former Turkish diplomat argued in a recent report, Turkey 
has the ‘opportunity to become a crucial energy hub for Eurasia as a whole’.74 
Generally speaking, energy is an important factor in Turkey’s foreign policy and 
geopolitics, especially also with regard to establishing good relations with the 
countries in its neighbourhood while maintaining its traditional strategic western 
orientation.75 Similarly, Wigen argues that energy and Turkey’s objective to become 
an energy corridor through which multiple pipelines run, is closely linked to Turkey’s 
geopolitical imagination and the officials’ discourse of Turkey as a central country 
with a unique geographical location at the intersection of continents.76 It is important 
to note that such a discourse is also contingent upon Turkey’s domestic energy 
situation and concerns about energy security. Turkey holds almost no hydrocarbon 
reserves and is thus dependent on imports for its domestic energy consumption. Acting 
as a transit country or energy corridor for oil and gas from East to West, obviously 
also serves the purpose to cover the energy needs for its domestic consumption. 
 
In this context, the Eurasian region occupies an important position. Following the end 
of the Cold War, Turkey adopted a new foreign policy approach, developing closer 
and better relations with its neighbours in Eurasia with the aim to ‘make Turkey an 
energy hub through regional energy projects’ while facilitating the transport of 
hydrocarbons from the region to Europe.77 This is also emphasised by Turkey’s 
governing elite. Speaking at the inauguration of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil 
pipeline, President Sezer made the following statement: ‘Our country lies at the 
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intersection point of energy transport routes, at the centre of Eurasia, one of the world’s 
new strategic regions for its oil and natural gas reserves’.78 Hence, Turkey’s Eurasian 
geography provides it with many advantages and serves as the foundation for Turkey’s 
aspiration to be an energy and infrastructure hub between East and West. Both 
President Sezer and Foreign Minister Gül use almost identical language in describing 
Turkey’s special position and role in this regard. Speaking about the ‘Eurasian 
dimension’ of Turkish foreign policy during his annual speech at the Turkish 
parliament in 2005, Sezer named as one of the principal goals in this context the 
‘unification of Europe and Asia through the establishment of energy and transport 
corridors’.79 Gül restated Turkey’s ambition a year later by affirming that ‘linking 
Europe and Asia through energy and transportation corridors and the creation of new 
dynamics for regional cooperation are the main tenets of our Eurasian vision’.80  
 
The countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus are thus a priority for Turkey not only 
due to the cultural and historical links and ethnic ties but also for pragmatic economic 
reasons. All of the countries of the Caspian littoral are energy-rich and Ankara has 
sought to intensify relations with these countries in order to import energy for its 
domestic consumption as well as to transport these resources along to Europe. As 
Çeviköz argues, in the AKP’s interaction with this region, energy has become more 
important than the common Turkic heritage and as a result, engagement with the 
Caucasus prevails over the more remote Central Asia.81 Indeed, the South Caucasus 
and Azerbaijan, as a provider of energy, as well as Georgia, as transit country, are 
especially important regarding Turkey’s energy foreign policy.82 One of the principal 
projects in this context is the BTC pipeline. This pipeline became operational in 2006 
and transports oil from the shores of the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan and Georgia 
to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan in Turkey. The BTC was seen as a major link and 
a first step for Turkey to become a transit country for energy resources from the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, but also as a part of Turkey’s general engagement with 
and its ‘vision of peace, stability and economic prosperity for the region’.83 As one 
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think tank analyst argued, the BTC is an excellent example of Turkey’s Eurasianist 
policies in the early 2000s which aimed at fostering good relations with the former 
Soviet countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus while retaining the country’s 
traditional Western orientation.84 Indeed, one of the principal driving forces of the 
BTC project was the United States who supported the construction of an alternative 
route, bypassing Russia, to transport energy from the Caspian Sea thus also 
contributing to the development of the newly independent post-Soviet states.85 As 
Erdoğan himself pointed out, the BTC ‘is a symbol of our close cooperation with the 
United States in the Eurasian region’.86 It is interesting to note that the above 
statements from Turkish officials about Turkey’s critical location in Eurasia with 
regard to energy transit routes have been made in the years 2005 and 2006 shortly after 
the BTC pipeline started operating in 2006. This demonstrates the need for Turkish 
officials to actively promote their country’s strategic value as an energy hub and bridge 
between East and West.87 
 
However, in subsequent years, Turkey’s energy discourse has lost some of its traction. 
The completion and inauguration of the BTC took place in the logic of Turkey’s 
western orientation and close relationship with the US and the EU as well as Turkey’s 
ambition to become an energy bridge between the East and the West. However, in the 
later years of the 2000s, Turkey partnered with Russia, signing a number of 
intergovernmental agreements with regard to energy and planning to jointly develop 
new gas pipelines across the Black Sea which would bring Russian gas to European 
and Mediterranean markets.88 Overall, this policy was predominantly one of 
diversification and not re-orientation. Turkey-Russia energy relations with regard to 
Eurasia are complex and oscillate between cooperation and competition, which is also 
due to Ankara’s ambition to develop into an energy hub and not merely an energy 
transit corridor.89 Turkey thus continuously strives to become an energy hub between 
East-West and South, which will transport oil and gas from Russia, the Caspian Sea 
and potentially the Middle East to Europe. Turkish support for the development of 
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both the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) as well as the Turkish Stream pipeline 
is a case in point. The TANAP pipeline, which would bring natural gas from 
Azerbaijan via Georgia to Turkey and from there onwards to Europe and which is 
currently being constructed, is a critical aspect of Turkey’s plan to become an energy 
hub.90 Likewise, the Turkish Stream project foresees the construction of a gas pipeline 
from Russia to Turkey across the Black Sea with the aim to supply the Turkish market 
as well as the European market through onward export. Hence, the central element of 
Turkey’s energy policy is to cover domestic demand through diversified imports while 
developing into an energy hub at the centre of Eurasia which connects the East with 
the West, as outlined on the website of the Turkish Foreign Ministry: 
 
Its unique location provides opportunities for Turkey in terms of 
ensuring its own energy supply security but also brings 
responsibility to Turkey with regard to regional energy security. […] 
The goals of strengthening its position between East-West and 
South-North Energy Corridors and becoming an energy trade hub is 
thus duly reflected in its energy strategy.91 
 
Turkish officials sustained a focus on Turkey’s Eurasian geography in order to 
promote this vision and to claim a central role for Turkey. In a speech at the Brookings 
Institution in 2013, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu described his vision for Turkey in this 
regard with the following words: ‘we want our country, our land to be a bridge of peace 
through energy lines from [the] Caspian to Europe’.92 In the context of new initiatives 
for economic cooperation across Eurasia, such as the Russian-led Eurasian Economic 
Union or the Chinese One Belt, One Road project, Turkey again occupies an important 
position. As a former Turkish diplomat argued, this is also where Turkey’s conception 
of Eurasia differs from Russia’s and where Turkey has a clear advantage. According 
to him, although both countries straddle Europe and Asia, only Turkey can really fulfil 
the function of acting as the ‘Eurasian connection’ between the two, because of its 
European orientation and EU candidate status.93 Again, diverse elements, such as 
Turkey’s geostrategic position and the metaphor of the bridge, come together to 
demonstrate Turkey’s position as an important country in this region. With regard to 
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the economic dimension of the government’s Eurasian discourse, the geographical 
theme is reiterated in describing Turkey as an important energy bridge between Europe 
and Asia with the ultimate aim of developing the country into an energy hub. In this 
context, the cultural and historical links to energy-rich Eurasian countries in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia are underlined to demonstrate Ankara’s central role in the 
region. 
6.2 Evolution of discourse 
Geography, culture, history and energy are the key themes in Turkish government 
discourse on Eurasia. As the above discussion demonstrated, Turkey’s centrality, its 
role as a bridge between regions and civilisations as well as the country’s multiple 
regional identities are key determinant issues in Turkish foreign policy. In what 
follows, and based on the above discussion, this chapter traces the evolution of Turkish 
foreign policy discourse on Eurasia over the last fifteen years or so, starting with the 
first electoral victory of Erdoğan’s AKP in 2002. The narrative focuses on the 
interaction between external events as well as domestic developments and aims to 
highlight the ways in which Turkey’s conception of Eurasia changed as a result 
thereof. The following table presents a chronological and summarised version of the 
key events influencing Turkish foreign policy (in italics) and the dominant keywords 
in Turkish discourse on Eurasia during the period under study (2002-2015). 
 
Table 6.1 Chronological description of Eurasian discourse in Turkey 
Year Keywords and key events 
2002 3 November: AKP wins the general elections in a landslide resulting in 66 % of the seats 
- Eurasia as geopolitical reality 
- Turkic world 
2003 February: Opening of the Blue Stream gas pipeline connecting Russia and Turkey  
14 March: Erdoğan takes over as Prime Minister; Abdullah Gül becomes Foreign Minister. 
- Turkey as bridge between Europe and Asia 
- Turkic world 
- Cultural and ethnic links 
2004 1 May: Cyprus joins the EU 
16 December: EU leaders agree to start EU accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005 
- Turkey at heart of Eurasian geography 
- Bridge between East and West 
2005 25 May: Inauguration of BTC oil pipeline running from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey  
14 July: Launch of the Alliance of Civilizations initiative 
3 October: EU and Turkey officially start membership negotiations  
- Turkey as energy bridge  
- Dual European and Asian belonging 
2006 - Turkey as a regional hub  
- Energy bridge between Europe and Asia 
2007 22 July: AKP wins 46.6 % of votes in general election resulting in 62 % of seats in parliament 
28 August: Abdullah Gül elected president of Turkey by the parliament 
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- Turkey as bridge between cultures and civilisations 
- Multiple regional identities  
- Central position in Eurasia 
2008 7-16 August: 5-day war between Russia and Georgia 
- Geographical uniqueness 
- Dialogue of civilisations 
- Multiple regional identities 
2009 1 May: Davutoğlu appointed foreign minister  
10 October: Turkey and Armenia sign the Zurich Protocols to normalise relations 
- Geographical uniqueness 
- Multiple regional identities 
- Civilisational leader 
- Cultural links 
2010 - Multiple regional identities 
- Historical heritage 
2011 March: start of ‘Arab Spring’: mass protests against regimes in Egypt and Syria, ultimately leading 
to the overthrow of President Mubarak in Egypt and large-scale fighting between a coalition of 
rebels and government forces in Syria. 
12 June: AKP wins 49.8 % of votes in general election resulting in 59.5 % of seats in parliament  
- Regional leader 
2012 17 May: Launch of “positive agenda” programme aimed at accelerating EU-Turkey membership 
negotiations. 
- Geographical uniqueness 
- Multiple regional identities 
2013 May: Gezi Park protests in Istanbul followed by protests in other major Turkish cities 
- Turkey as a bridge between regions  
- Regional leader 
2014 10 August: Erdoğan elected Turkish president with 51.8 % of the vote in the first ever popular 
election of the president 
1 December: Putin announces plans to build a new gas pipeline “Turkish stream” connecting Russia 
with Turkey under the Black Sea 
- Dialogue of civilisations 
2015 7 June: AKP loses majority in parliament after winning only 46.9 % of seats in parliament. 
Negotiations to form a coalition government with other parties failed. 
July: Breakdown of peace negotiations and resumption of hostilities between Turkish government 
and PKK 
30 September: Russia begins military intervention in Syria in support of Assad 
1 November: AKP wins majority of seats in parliament in re-run of general elections 
24 November: Turkey shoots down a Russian fighter jet over Syria 
- Cultural links 
 
When the Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002, for the first time in 
15 years Turkey was ruled again by a single party government. During the 1990s, 
Turkey was governed by several coalition and minority governments headed by 
various prime ministers in relatively quick succession. Turkish politics and foreign 
policy were thus highly instable due to these frequent changes. This was exacerbated 
by a grave economic crisis which peaked in 2001 and further destabilised the country. 
Hence, when the AKP won a comfortable majority in the 2002 general elections, the 
newly elected government had relative liberty in determining its own foreign policy 
outlook and orientation. In the first few years, Turkey’s governing elite’s discourse on 
Eurasia did not differ much from predecessor governments and politicians such as 
Turgut Özal and Ismail Cem. This can be explained by the fact that in the Turkish 
context, the concept of Eurasia only emerged in the post-Cold War world, which 
predetermined the vision of Turkey’s governing elite. For instance, speaking at an 
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annual energy conference hosted in Istanbul in 2002 on the topic of how to integrate 
Eurasian energy markets, President Sezer stated: ‘Following the break-up of the Soviet 
Union in 1990 the Eurasia concept emerged as a new political, economic and geo-
political reality. This new formation gave Turkey new responsibilities, added new 
dimensions to her role and enlarged her horizons’.94 Among these new roles was a 
perceived responsibility for the development of the former Soviet republics in Central 
Asia, which was considered a key axis of Turkish foreign policy with regard to Eurasia. 
As President Gül stated in a speech at the UN General Assembly in 2003, ‘close 
historical and cultural bonds with Central Asia constitute one of the pillars of our 
Eurasian vision’.95 However, the argument went beyond these considerations in that 
the post-Cold War moment was characterised by a power shift to the East and a power 
vacuum in Eurasia with various countries competing for influence. In this context, 
Turkey considered the opening up of Eurasia and the ‘transforming [of] the term 
“Eurasia” into a political and economic reality’, as Gül put it, as a chance for the 
country’s development and foreign policy.96 
 
The AKP’s initial foreign policy was one of continuity rather than rupture and 
subscribed to the traditional vectors of Turkish foreign policy.97 The government 
continued to strive for Turkish membership in the European Union and attempted to 
improve Turkey’s standing in global affairs, goals already outlined by former Foreign 
Minister Cem. The basis for Turkish foreign policy under the AKP and the self-
perception of Turkey’s role in global affairs was also connected to the new geography 
of Turkey’s position in Eurasia. As Foreign Minister Gül declared before a global 
audience in New York, at the Eurasia Summit in 2003: ‘The end of the Cold War has 
brought about a historic opportunity to reconnect Europe and Asia through the bridge 
of the Eurasian land mass’.98 He then went on to speak about the repercussions of these 
changes and new opportunities for Turkish foreign policy. Gül argued that ‘Turkey has 
become a central actor, projecting substantial diplomatic, economic and military 
prowess towards a vast area’.99  
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The attitude and the vision of the AKP leadership thus demonstrate that early in the 
AKP’s power reign, an active foreign policy was chosen. This means that on the basis 
of its history and its geographical position, Turkey was seeking a position of influence 
in different regions. The themes of Turkey’s geographical uniqueness, the country’s 
multiple regional identities and concomitant role as a bridge between regions were 
particularly prevalent. Indeed, as Başer argues, the initial foreign policy under the AKP 
government was not substantially different from previous governments, however, 
there was a change towards a more active and ambitious foreign policy as exemplified 
by the frequent use of the ‘regional leader’ and ‘global systems collaborator’ national 
role conceptions by Turkish officials.100 Regional leadership and ‘an active role in the 
international arena, an active role in international organizations’ was indeed 
considered a key strategic priority for Turkish foreign policy, as Davutoğlu argued. In 
the same speech, he furthermore stated that ‘if you want to be influential in your region, 
you have to be respected in the global scene’ while the reverse was also true.101 This 
active stance for Turkey as a geopolitical powerbroker and influential actor was based, 
among others, on the country’s double westwards and eastwards orientation, the EU 
accession process, as well as its leadership role in the Muslim world. 
 
On the European front, major developments in 2004-2005 affected Turkish foreign 
policy. In December 2004, EU leaders agreed to start accession negotiations with 
Turkey and less than a year later, in October 2005, the negotiations officially started. 
During this period, which Öniş and Yilmaz call the ‘Golden Age of Europeanization 
in Turkey’, Ankara pushed for full membership in the EU and undertook numerous 
efforts, including domestic reforms, in order to comply with EU demands.102 The 
newly elected government under AKP leadership was particularly adamant in its strive 
for EU membership. The reform and democratisation process, which was started as 
part of the EU accession process, also benefited previously marginal political actors 
such as the AKP. This furthermore had an impact on Turkish foreign policy in that it 
led to a more active foreign policy with regard to the Middle East while also using soft 
power tools and economic measures as foreign policy instruments.103 In this context, 
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the Turkish governing elite’s discourse painted an image in which Turkish 
membership in the EU would be an advantage for the EU. In an interview with the 
magazine Spiegel, Erdoğan underlined the notion of Turkey as a bridge by stating that 
‘Turkey is the gateway to the east for Europe, and the gateway to Europe for the east. 
We have a bridging function that Europe shouldn’t underestimate’.104 This of course 
is linked to Turkey’s location in Eurasia, as Prime Minister Erdoğan declared in a 
speech at the Council on Foreign Relation in 2004:  
 
Turkey will most likely become a member of the European Union 
within a reasonable time. The position that Turkey occupies in the 
wider sense, at the heart of the Eurasian geography, will assume 
greater importance on the East-West and North-South axis in line 
with the common interests of the whole region.105 
 
With regard to the new opportunities in Eurasia and Turkey’s links to the countries in 
the region, Turkey now offered the EU to act as an important connecting link to the 
region. As a former Turkish diplomat noted, Turkey’s role in Eurasia was that of a 
‘conduit’ between East and West, a role for which it was ideally suited due to its EU 
candidate status, and as a result, Turkey could maximise its strategic value for Europe 
if it capitalised on this Eurasian dimension.106 The notion of Turkey helping the EU 
spread its reach into adjacent regions such as the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia 
and the Middle East, is central in Turkey’s European discourse. Again, the theme of 
Turkey as a bridge, both in terms of regional linkages as well as economic linkages 
related to energy, as will be shown below, were frequently invoked. 
 
The added value Turkey perceived to be offering the EU due to its role as a gateway 
to Eurasia is particularly present in the energy dimension. In the years 2005 and 2006, 
the discourse of Turkey’s ruling elite focused heavily on energy issues linked to the 
question of infrastructures and Turkey’s role as a hub between East and West. This of 
course did not happen without a reason. On 25 May 2005, the BTC oil pipeline, 
running from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey, was inaugurated ceremonially in 
the presence of the presidents of the three countries. This represents the highpoint in 
Turkey’s efforts to bring oil and gas from the post-Soviet region to Europe, a key 
                                                 
104 Erdoğan 2007a 
105 Erdoğan 2004 
106 Interview with former Turkish diplomat and think tank analyst, Ankara, 5 February 2015 
212 
 
component of Turkey’s energy strategy of securing domestic consumption while 
developing into an energy hub and transit corridor between East and West. Speaking 
at the BTC inauguration ceremony, Turkish President Sezer called for ‘making Turkey 
a transit country in the East-West and North-South axes’ and emphasised the 
importance of Turkey’s geographic position in fostering infrastructure and energy 
links in the region.107 Indeed, ‘linking Europe and Asia through energy and 
transportation corridors’, was according to Foreign Minister Gül one of the ‘main 
tenets of [Turkey’s] Eurasian vision’.108 The focus on energy in Turkey’s discourse 
also served to demonstrate the importance of Turkey as a partner of the West. 
Repeatedly, Ankara stated that regional projects, such as the BTC, had positive 
repercussions far beyond Turkey for the entire Eurasian region and Europe, in 
particular because they would help ‘reinforcing peace and stability in the region’.109 
As we have seen above, Turkish officials continued to maintain the strategic objective 
of turning their country into an energy hub, despite the lack of progress on new 
transcontinental pipeline projects since the inauguration of the BTC pipeline. Still, the 
vision of Turkey as a link between Europe and Asia and an infrastructure and energy 
corridor at the centre of the Eurasian geography was upheld.  
 
At around the same time, a slight reorientation in Turkish foreign policy took place. 
As noted above, around 2005-2006 Turkish foreign policy shifted away from a narrow 
focus on Europeanisation to stronger engagement with other regions.110 This did not 
mean that Turkey abandoned its strive for membership in the EU, but that the European 
axis was no longer the only centre of attention of Turkish foreign policy. Indeed, the 
discourse of Turkey’s governmental elite reflects this shift. The July 2007 general 
elections in Turkey preceded this development. The AKP emerged as the clear winner 
from the elections garnering 46.6 percent of the vote and thus a clear majority of seats 
in the parliament. Abdullah Gül, until then foreign minister, was elected to be the new 
president of Turkey shortly afterwards. Thus empowered, the AKP government grew 
more assertive, leading to a reformulation of Turkish foreign policy and a considerably 
enlarged foreign policy vision.  
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Ankara aimed at playing a bigger role in global politics, notably by improving its 
relations with and increasing its influence in the regional neighbourhood. The Middle 
East in particular started to occupy a more central role in Turkish foreign policy. This 
was due to Turkey’s new-found geopolitical identity as a central country in the 
international system, and consequently as a member of many regional subsystems, as 
well as economic considerations, such as Turkey’s diversification of its trade activities 
and investments in new markets.111 However, the Eurasian geography was still 
considered to be a central factor given that Gül declared Turkey’s ‘central position in 
the Eurasian geography’ as an inherent factor and influence of Turkish foreign 
policy.112 Furthermore, as argued above, stronger involvement in the Middle East was 
also related to Ankara’s relationship with Europe in that Turkey could act as a link 
between Europe and the region thus demonstrating Turkey’s strategic value.113 Hence, 
Turkey’s involvement in what used to be part of the Ottoman Empire was thus part of 
the general foreign policy goal of establishing Turkey as an important actor in regional 
and global politics on the basis of the country’s strategic geographical location and 
cultural diversity. On the same note, Erdoğan brought all these points together when 
mentioning that due to Turkey’s geography which spans not only East and West but 
also South to the Middle East, Turkey acted as a ‘very important bridge between 
different cultures and civilizations’.114 
 
However, for a short interval, Eurasia, and above all the Caucasus, moved to the centre 
of Turkish foreign policy attention in the years 2008-2009, due to both external as well 
as internal events. In the course of this period, Turkey attempted to position itself as a 
major force for peace in the Eurasian region. In August 2008, the short war between 
Russia and Georgia over the break-away territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
destabilised the entire Caucasus and led Turkey to pursue a new strategy of promoting 
its role as stabiliser of the region. In response to the war, Turkey proposed the 
establishment of the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) as a 
confidence-building measure and as a forum for dialogue which would serve to 
facilitate communication between the countries of the region.115 In general, and as the 
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CSCP initiative demonstrates, Larrabee argues that the five-day war was important in 
pushing Turkey to adopt a more pro-active stance towards the Caucasus in order to 
prevent further destabilisation of the region.116 Turkey recognised that due to its 
position at the centre of Eurasia, the Caucasus was a region it could not neglect. 
President Gül clearly emphasised this point in a speech at the International Strategic 
Research Organization in Ankara in 2009: ‘The security and stability in [the] Caucasus 
are important to all of us. If stability is not established in the Caucasus, the Caucasus 
is like a wall which separates the East and the West’.117 Mentioning Turkey’s efforts 
in solving regional conflicts, including the ones in the Caucasus, Gül underlined the 
special capacity of his country which, due to ‘its close historical and cultural ties across 
a vast landscape, it acts as a crucial catalyst for enhancing dialogue and interaction 
between cultures’.118 Hence, Turkey tried to capitalise on its historical heritage in the 
Eurasian region in order to position itself as an important regional promoter of peace.  
 
With regard to the importance of the region for Turkey, Babacan made the following 
statement in a speech at the Council of Foreign Relations, shortly after the end of the 
August war between Russia and Georgia in 2008:  
 
To many academicians who study geopolitics, the diverse regions 
surrounding Turkey are all fascinating case studies. For us, they are 
a fact of daily life where, unfortunately, there is never a dull 
moment. The Caucasus, the Balkans, the Middle East, Central Asia, 
North Africa; these are all regions with their distinct dynamics and 
intractable issues. This is why Turkish foreign policy is endeavoring 
to find feasible solutions to the many regional disputes and frozen 
conflicts we are faced with.119 
 
This statement illustrates Turkish officials’ perception of the supposedly intractable 
influence of geopolitics on Turkish foreign policy. Once again it is shown how 
Turkey’s geographical position is seen as a determinant factor leaving Ankara no other 
choice than to be an active peace broker and influential player in the region. As a result, 
and according to Davutoğlu, ‘Turkey with its geopolitical position at the centre of 
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Eurasia’ acts as an important force for peace in the Caucasus and in all of Turkey’s 
neighbouring regions.120  
 
In May 2009, Erdoğan appointed his chief advisor, the academic Ahmet Davutoğlu as 
foreign minister. His ideas and writings had influenced Turkish foreign policy since 
the AKP came to power. As we have seen earlier, the new foreign minister introduced 
a slight change of meaning with regard to the government discourse on Eurasia. 
According to Davutoğlu, ‘Turkey is in a unique position in geopolitical terms, in the 
midst of Afro–Eurasia’.121 Focusing on Turkey’s neighbouring regions and the former 
Ottoman lands, a new dimension to Turkey’s Eurasian identity was thus added. In a 
policy brief published by Davutoğlu in 2014, the foreign minister explained that 
‘Turkey used to be known as a Eurasian state, but for the past five to six years we have 
been calling ourselves an “Afro-Eurasian state”, because we are at the center of the 
mainland of all human history’.122 This definition of Afro-Eurasia goes beyond the 
traditional Eurasian region inhabited by Turkic peoples and includes also the former 
Ottoman lands in the Middle East and North Africa. As Davutoğlu argued in a previous 
article in 2008, ‘Turkey holds an optimal place in the sense that it is both an Asian and 
European country and is also close to Africa through the Eastern Mediterranean’.123 
This essentially defines Turkey as having multiple identities through its links to 
multiple geographical regions. As outlined in his strategic depth doctrine, which 
stipulates that countries have both geographical and historical depth, Davutoğlu 
promotes the idea of Turkey having a central position in global affairs.124  
 
Two aspects are particularly relevant with regard to this new focus in Turkey’s 
Eurasian discourse. On the one hand, it signifies a shift away from a narrow definition 
of Eurasia based on Turkey’s interaction with the Turkic republics in Central Asia to 
a stronger interaction with the Middle East and what essentially were formerly the 
lands of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the new focus on Afro-Eurasia gives 
Turkey a somewhat larger space for action and thus elevates its status in the global 
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system as an important regional and even global player (due to the strategic importance 
of the region it inhabits). 
 
This change of tone is also reflected in the discourses of the Turkish government elite. 
In the years following Davutoğlu’s appointment as foreign minister, the discourse on 
Eurasia became more diluted. We can observe an expansion of the meaning of Eurasia 
with Davutoğlu’s Afro-Eurasia concept as well as a general trend to merely emphasise 
Turkey’s strategic geopolitical location and concomitant policy to pursue its interests 
in a variety of regions. Indeed, as Prime Minister Erdoğan explained in an article 
written for Project Syndicate in 2010: 
 
Turkey’s posture – looking both East and West – is neither 
paradoxical nor inconsistent. On the contrary, Turkey’s 
multidimensional geopolitical position is an asset for the region. 
There are few countries that can play such a critical role. Turkey 
constitutes a new synthesis because of its ability to link such diverse 
qualities and backgrounds. Turkey is thus capable of overcoming the 
dichotomies of East-West, Europe-Middle East, and North-South.125 
 
In this context, another element decreased the importance of Eurasia in Turkish elite 
discourse. Under the AKP government and especially following the major electoral 
win in 2007, Turkey’s engagement with the Middle East became stronger, which even 
provoked debates about a ‘Middle Easternization’ of Turkish foreign policy.126 Indeed, 
on the basis of its Muslim identity, Ankara sought to reconnect with its neighbours in 
former Ottoman lands and expand its influence in the Middle East.127 Under 
Davutoğlu, the focus was on civilisational geopolitics, moving the country’s Islamic 
heritage and its Ottoman historical experience to the centre of Turkish foreign policy, 
thus naturally leading to more involvement in the Middle East.128 The gradual shift 
towards deeper engagement with and interest in the Middle East became even stronger 
in the years 2010 and especially in 2011, triggered by what was generally called the 
Arab Spring. As a result, Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East became more 
interventionist.129 
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The general elections in Turkey on 12 June 2011, in which the AKP won a resounding 
victory with 49.8 percent of votes, helped cement this foreign policy course. As Parlar 
Dal argues, the large number of votes obtained by the AKP can also be read as a reward 
for the government and as the result of a positive assessment of the latter’s regional 
foreign policy activism by the electorate.130 Indeed, as discussed earlier, the place of 
the Middle East in Turkey’s foreign policy had been growing ever since the AKP came 
to power in 2002. Gradually, the interest in and engagement with the region became 
stronger and reached a new dimension in 2011. The combination of a decisive election 
victory by the ruling AKP, as well as the turmoil in the region following the events of 
the Arab Spring, proved to be an important cocktail in fostering Turkey’s Middle 
Eastern foreign policy. 131 In the early months of the Arab Spring, Davutoğlu stated 
that: 
 
If we fail to understand that there is a need to reconnect societies, 
communities, tribes and ethnicities in our region, we will lose the 
momentum of history. Our future is our sense of common destiny. 
All of us in the region have a common destiny.132 
 
Turkey’s governing elite strongly identified with the claims and principles of the 
protest movements in the surrounding countries. Their call for democracy and freedom 
from dictatorship resonated in Turkey and prompted the government to promote a 
vision of Turkey as a big brother, supporter and role model to these countries.133 The 
Arab Spring thus offered Turkey a unique opportunity to implement its new foreign 
policy and to become a regional leader.134 As Stein argues, Turkish foreign policy 
became more interventionist along the lines of Davutoğlu’s geopolitical ideas and his 
strategic depth doctrine.135 As a result, starting in 2011, the government discourse on 
Eurasia lost much of its weight due to the strong focus on the Middle East. However, 
despite Turkey’s initial support for the emerging protest movements in Egypt and Syria 
as well as its determination to contribute to regime change in Syria, Robins argues that 
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the Arab Spring, and especially the situation in Syria, have proven that Turkey’s 
orientation towards the Middle East and claim of becoming a leader in the region were 
premature.136 Having become too embroiled in the domestic affairs of some of the 
countries of the Middle East, which had negative consequences for Turkey’s influence 
in the region, the limits of Turkey’s vision as a dominant regional power became 
apparent.137 
 
During this episode, Turkey nonetheless occasionally turned towards its traditional 
Western orientation and the discourse again focused on Turkey’s image as a bridge 
and indispensable part in East-West relations. When pressed in an interview in 2010 
about Turkey-EU relations, Erdoğan also had the need to emphasise that from a 
cultural point of view there was no doubt Turkey belonged to Europe.138 In this period, 
the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and the Turkish Minister of EU Affairs also 
jointly launched the “positive agenda” programme in May 2012, which aimed at 
accelerating EU-Turkey membership negotiations. Hence, the emphasis was put on 
Turkey’s cultural alignment with Western values such as democracy and rule of law 
in order to demonstrate the continued relevance of Turkey to the West. President Gül, 
in an interview with Foreign Affairs magazine in 2013, argued that: 
 
Turkey is a bridge between Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and the 
Caucasus. Each of our neighboring countries has a different 
government and administrative style. In Turkey, we have a vast 
majority-Muslim population along with democracy, human rights, 
and a free-market economy, and this makes us unique in the region. 
From a geographic and geopolitical point of view, Turkey belongs 
to this region, and we have historical relations with all our neighbors. 
But from a values point of view, we are with the West. If we look at 
the future, it’s almost a mathematical fact that the world’s economic 
and power balance will shift toward Asia. So politics must shift, too. 
The United States and Europe must start recognizing Turkey and its 
importance. And Turkey must become more important for them.139 
 
This statement neatly summarises how, despite Turkey’s stance as self-declared leader 
in the region in the context of the Arab Spring, the orientation of Turkish foreign policy 
once again became more global. Furthermore, it illustrates the various interlinked 
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elements of Turkey’s discourse such as the country’s unique and central geopolitical 
position between continents and concomitant belonging to various regions and the 
strategic value it derives from this characteristic, including in its relations with its 
traditional partners in the West. The governing elite in Ankara even argued that 
Europe’s and the EU’s global geopolitical relevance were dependent on their capacity 
to include Turkey among its own, as Davutoğlu argued in a speech at the LSE in 2013: 
‘If Europe wants to be geo-politically relevant, it should have access to Asia, should 
have access to Middle East, should have access to Caspian Sea, Indian Sea and even 
Africa. They need Turkey’.140 What is more, Erdoğan also claimed that Turkey had a 
particular responsibility as a promoter of dialogue between civilisations in ‘bridging 
the gap between the Islamic world and the European Union’.141 In these instances, 
Turkey moved the focus again on its geostrategic location between regions and 
civilisations. In so doing, Turkey was presented as a model and leader for the Muslim 
world and a crucial actor not just in regional but also global politics. 
 
Ankara’s relations with the EU in the 2010s proved to be complex and frustrating for 
both sides. Turkey’s perception of the EU stalling accession negotiations and treating 
Turkey unfairly, combined with the rejection of Turkish membership by some EU 
member states’ leaders, led to a decisive decline in Turkey’s desire to join the EU, 
both among the government as well as the population,142 and thus to an emancipation 
of Turkish foreign policy from its traditional Western/European outlook. The 
increasingly antagonistic relations with its Western partners, such as the EU, was 
paired with a growing instability in Turkey’s regional neighbourhood, especially in 
Syria. These years thus proved complicated for Turkish foreign policy. While in the 
preceding decade, Turkish foreign policy was guided by a number of clearly defined 
principles, such as Davutoğlu’s ‘zero problems with neighbours policy’, regional 
developments and the turmoil in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, effectively rendered 
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these principles as well as Turkey’s quest for regional leadership somewhat 
obsolete.143 
 
Given the above described political events in its neighbourhood, Turkey’s concerns in 
the years 2014 and 2015 were focused less on Eurasia. Following these developments, 
the governing elite’s discourse on Eurasia, focusing on Turkey as a bridge, an energy 
corridor or promoter of dialogue between East and West, became all but absent in 
Turkey. Even supposedly prime opportunities to present Turkey’s geostrategic value 
in a positive light were missed. For instance, when Turkey and Russia announced in 
December 2014 that they were planning to build Turkish Stream (and subsequently 
signed a memorandum of understanding to this effect), a new gas pipeline connecting 
Russia with Turkey under the Black Sea, Turkish government discourse remained 
silent about the potential strategic value of such a project for Turkey and for Turkey’s 
position in the region. In earlier years, Turkey’s location at the centre of Eurasia, and 
the role it thus played as a major energy hub, was frequently highlighted as a crucial 
element of Turkish foreign policy and its role in Eurasia. Arguably, the absence of 
prominent mentions of this project was due in part to Turkey’s reluctance to go ahead 
with the Turkish Stream project in the first place,144 but it was also indicative of a 
larger shift in Ankara’s geopolitical imagination in which Turkey’s role as a bridge, or 
in this case a corridor, had been replaced by Turkey as a central country and regional 
powerhouse. 
 
Especially the continuing civil war in Syria and its increasing spill-over into Turkey, 
with a large influx of refugees, but also the rise of the so-called Islamic State and 
terrorist activities on Turkish soil, demanded much attention. The intrinsic nexus 
between domestic politics and the regional environment, which was present since the 
Arab Spring, remained a central concern and bound many resources. Eurasia as a 
previously important arena for Turkish foreign policy moved to the background. At 
the same time, the civil war in neighbouring Syria escalated with Russia’s decision to 
intervene militarily in support of Syrian President Bashar al Assad in September 2015. 
The situation got even more complicated when Turkey, after repeated violations of its 
airspace by Russian fighter jets, shot down a Russian jet in late November, leading to 
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a breakdown of hitherto cooperative relations between Russia and Turkey. The events 
taking place in Turkey’s region and their implications for domestic politics, dominated 
the perception of Turkey’s leaders. Turkish foreign policy and Ankara’s geopolitical 
imagination remained heavily focused on the country’s immediate neighbourhood. 
Given the turmoil in Turkey’s neighbouring countries and the general security 
predicament in the wider region, Ankara had almost no other option than to adopt a 
reactive, rather than a proactive stance, in its foreign policy.145  
 
Hence, the joint challenges of Turkey’s regional environment and its domestic politics 
acted as a brake on its foreign policy vision of becoming a regional leader and 
important actor globally. In large part as a result of failed policies and decisions in 
response to the Arab Spring, Turkish foreign policy was in shambles.146 Furthermore, 
the domestic instability due to terrorist activities, repeat elections and the renewal of 
fighting between the government and the PKK in the summer of 2015 absorbed much 
attention and resources. While the general mindset of Turkish foreign policy, as 
defined by Davutoğlu and discussed above, was still present, it was less reflected upon 
in the governing elite’s discourse. A rare exception was the statement by President 
Erdoğan before the Turkish parliament in October 2015. While maintaining Turkey’s 
ambition to join the EU, Erdoğan reiterated the importance of Turkey’s location and 
the shared history and culture with this region as a guiding principle of its foreign 
policy. Speaking about the ‘brothers and sisters’ in Syria, Iraq, as well as ‘in the 
Balkans, Central Asia, North Africa, Africa and other regions of Asia’, the Turkish 
President insisted on the importance of ‘our common history, cultural proximity, 
civilization partnership and the humane values we share with these brothers and 
sisters’.147 This statement should of course be read in the context of the ongoing crisis 
and civil war in Syria with its repercussions on Turkey, but it nonetheless demonstrated 
that the underlying vision of Turkey as a country with multiple identities was still 
present. However, in contrast to the early years of the AKP leadership, when there 
were frequent references to Turkey’s central country status, its role as a bridge between 
continents and civilisations and as the centre of the Afro-Eurasian landmass, in more 
recent years, since around 2013-2014, this discourse lost a lot of traction, mainly due 
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to the political turmoil in the region. Still, the references to and perception of Turkey 
as being a part of Eurasia remained. On two occasions in 2015, during a speech in 
Indonesia and a visit in Moscow, President Erdoğan made general references to Turkey 
as a key Eurasian country and as one of the old cultures in Eurasia.148 These statements 
need of course to be read in their respective contexts to properly assess their value. 
Still, despite the described re-orientation of Turkish foreign policy and the expansion 
of Turkey’s geopolitical realm to Afro-Eurasia, the concept of Eurasia did not 
disappear entirely from Turkey’s geopolitical imagination. 
6.3 Synthesis 
The aim of this chapter was to analyse the importance of Eurasia for Turkey and the 
way in which Turkey’s governing elite attributes meaning to the Eurasian ‘geopolitical 
space’. Through a close reading of discourses by members of this governing elite, 
several central themes have been identified. Geographical, historical, cultural and 
economic characteristics are the central features of Turkish foreign policy discourse 
with regard to Eurasia. 
 
Geography is the dominant theme in Turkish government discourse on Eurasia. At the 
heart of this discourse are Turkey’s belonging to both Europe and Asia, its centrality 
in the Eurasian region (or in Davutoğlu’s words, Afro-Eurasia) as well as its position 
at the intersection of different regions. Indeed, Turkey sits neatly between continents 
and acts as a link between them. This idea of Turkey as a bridge is an important 
element in the government discourse.149 In this sense, Turkey is almost the 
quintessential Eurasian country because it regroups on its territory the geographical, 
historical and cultural links across Eurasia. In general, the idea of Turkey being a 
central country, also with regard to Eurasia, is an important theme in Turkey’s 
government discourse. On the basis of its centrality in Eurasia, Turkey also acts as a 
bridge and link between continents, regions and cultures.150  
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While geography provides the basis for Turkey’s role in Eurasia, its historical 
experience and resulting cultural links across the region further add legitimacy to 
Ankara’s perceived role as a key player in Eurasia. In general, the historical experience 
of being at the centre of a regional empire and the concomitant links which have been 
forged to a variety of regions and cultures had a lasting impact on Turkish foreign 
policy. Turkish officials refer to historical links when speaking about the importance 
of Eurasia, and above all Central Asia, in Turkish foreign policy. For instance, it is 
argued that Turkey’s position at the centre of Eurasia was not only based on a 
geopolitical understanding, but also a cultural one and the importance being attached 
to the Eurasian region is thus also justified by strong cultural and linguistic bonds.151 
Turkey’s perceived central place on the Eurasian landmass is a key characteristic when 
discussing historical and cultural factors in Turkish government discourse. Turkey’s 
governing elite puts emphasis on Turkey’s hybrid identity and cultural diversity as a 
crucial advantage in its foreign policy. As such, the image of Turkey as a ‘bridge 
between different cultures and civilizations’ is sustained and represents the single-
most important idea with regard to the cultural aspect in Turkey’s Eurasian 
discourses.152 Furthermore, Turkey’s Eurasian position functions as the background to 
its cultural diversity which in turn is actively promoted as an important strategic asset 
and advantage for Turkish foreign policy. 
 
When it comes to the theme of economy in Turkish government discourse, energy is 
the dominant factor in Turkey’s foreign policy and geopolitics. Having to respond to 
an increasing domestic need for energy while at the same time maintaining the goal to 
become a transit country or energy corridor for oil and gas from East to West are the 
central issues. In this context, the Eurasian region occupies an important position. 
Following the end of the Cold War, Turkey adopted a new foreign policy approach, 
developing closer and better relations with its neighbours in Eurasia. Energy was at 
the centre of such efforts and according to President Gül, ‘linking Europe and Asia 
through energy and transportation corridors and the creation of new dynamics for 
regional cooperation are the main tenets of [Turkey’s] Eurasian vision’.153 However, 
this discourse has considerably weakened after 2005/2006 (when the BTC pipeline 
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was completed). Still, the central element of Turkey’s energy policy is to cover 
domestic demand through diversified imports while developing into an energy hub at 
the centre of Eurasia thus connecting the East with the West. With regard to the 
economic dimension of the government’s Eurasian discourse, the geographical theme 
is reiterated in describing Turkey as an important energy bridge between Europe and 
Asia with the ultimate aim of developing the country into an energy hub. In this 
context, the cultural and historical links to energy-rich Eurasian countries in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia are underlined to demonstrate Ankara’s central role in the 
region. 
 
The time period under study in this chapter ranges from the year 2002, when the AKP 
came to power in Turkey, to the end of 2015. Although the concept of Eurasia is a 
recurring feature in Turkish government discourse over this period, the discourse on 
Eurasia evolved both in terms of the meaning of Eurasia as well as its importance for 
Ankara.  
 
In the early years of the AKP rule, more or less overlapping with the first electoral 
term from 2002 to 2007, Eurasia repeatedly entered the Turkish government discourse. 
Foreign Minister Gül can be considered a promoter of the idea that Turkey is a 
Eurasian country. However, this should not be read as an ideological discourse but 
rather as a pragmatic assessment of Turkey’s interests and opportunities. In general, it 
can be argued that pragmatic considerations are the key element in the discourses of 
Turkey’s governing elite on Eurasia. As such, many discursive elements actually serve 
concrete foreign policy objectives. For instance, the bridge metaphor which was 
frequently used to illustrate Turkey’s role as a bridge between regions and 
civilisations, served to demonstrate Turkey’s importance in global politics and above 
all as a partner for the West and the EU. Hence, the start of membership negotiations 
between the EU and Turkey in 2005 was accompanied by an emphasis in Turkish 
discourses on Turkey being an indispensable partner for the EU for the latter to spread 
its reach and influence globally. Likewise, the focus on civilisational aspects in 
Turkish discourse follows a similar logic in that it aims to showcase Turkey as a pivotal 
country in its own geopolitical space, which Davutoğlu called Afro-Eurasia, and an 
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important actor in regional and global politics.154 During these years, Turkey was 
divided between its traditional Western orientation, resting on pillars such as NATO 
membership and the aim to join the EU, and an increased focus on its neighbourhood 
and geography with which it had historical and cultural links dating back to the era of 
the Ottoman Empire. Due to both domestic and international developments, a shift 
from a Europe and Eurasia-centric to a Middle East-centric discourse can be observed. 
 
On the domestic front, the major development contributing to this trend was the 
continued and uninterrupted domination of Turkish politics by the AKP. Having won 
every single general election since 2002, allowing it to rule the country single-
handedly without forming a coalition with another political party, the AKP and its 
Prime Minister Erdoğan grew much more assertive. While at first, they continued the 
country’s traditional orientation towards Europe, over the years this changed. Coming 
from a conservative and Islamist background, the Middle East and generally Muslim 
countries in its neighbourhood became more central in Turkish foreign policy. 
Secondly, the increasing weight and role played by Ahmet Davutoğlu, the architect of 
the AKP’s foreign policy vision, also contributed to this development. Hence the shift 
from a discourse focusing on Eurasia to one focusing on Afro-Eurasia. 
 
In addition to these domestic trends, the external environment played an important part 
in the shift in Turkish foreign policy discourse. Growing opposition among some 
members of the EU, above all France (during Sarkozy’s presidency) and Germany, to 
Turkish membership somewhat weakened Turkey’s motivation and drive to join the 
European club. But also the tumultuous changes in the Middle East, starting with the 
US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and reaching a new level with the outbreak of the Arab 
Spring in 2011 and concomitant civil war in Syria, prompted Turkey to focus more 
strongly on its unstable neighbourhood. With regard to the key Eurasian countries, the 
Turkic republics in Central Asia, Ankara quickly realised that it lacked the power to 
compete against a resurgent Russia for influence in the latter’s backyard.  
 
Interestingly, all these developments led to a narrowing of Turkey’s foreign policy 
potential in that its influence and reach was challenged both on its Western and Eastern 
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side. At the same time, given its comparatively powerful position in its own 
neighbourhood, as a stable and prosperous Muslim country, Turkey’s leaders 
constantly portrayed their country as a pivotal actor in regional and global politics. In 
so doing, Turkey’s reach extended even beyond the traditional Eurasian and Afro-
Eurasian realm. In this context, Turkish officials characterised Turkey as both a central 
country and as a bridge and there seems to be some ambiguity between these two 
metaphors. As a central country, Turkey attempts to evolve into a regional leader and 
important actor in the global system, while as a bridge, Turkey utilises its geographic 
location and cultural identity to bridge continents and civilisations. These two concepts 
do not necessarily need to be in contradiction to each other. For instance, as a country, 
Turkey is not a bridge between regions, but as the leader of its civilisational basin, 
Turkey becomes a bridge between civilisations. Nevertheless, under Davutoğlu’s rule, 
the Turkish bridge identity has moved to the background while concepts such as 
Turkey as a regional leader and global actor have moved to the forefront.155 Indeed, 
Başer’s study on the evolution of national role conceptions in Turkish foreign policy 
nicely illustrates how the ‘bridge’ role was dominant from 2003 to 2008 before being 
replaced by the ‘regional leader’ role around 2008.156 
 
Despite a trend towards a refocusing of Turkish foreign policy on the MENA region, 
the idea of Eurasia has not been abandoned completely. With direct references to its 
geostrategic location and concomitant importance of Turkey as a global actor, which 
over the years and due to the crisis in its neighbourhood actually increased, Turkey 
still sees value in a focus on Eurasia. What changed was Turkey’s own agency in the 
process. Having realised that it lacked the power to influence the development of a 
Eurasian vector, Ankara saw strength in its position in-between different regions and 
cultures. As a former Turkish ambassador put it in a personal interview: 
 
Eurasia cannot be a potential new orientation for Turkey. Eurasia is 
a concept. Turkey cannot create Eurasia, but Turkey would like to 
see the creation of Eurasia. If the chips come down to where we 
belong, we belong to the West. There’s no doubt on that. But that is 
not our full interest. We want to keep our Janus face: we cannot deny 
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or detach ourselves from our Asian properties and we don’t want to 
neither.157 
 
In sum, the key elements of Turkish government discourse on Eurasia are an 
overarching focus on the country’s geopolitical situation sitting at the intersection of 
various regions. Having strong links to each of these regions and being open to both 
East and West, Turkey is characterised as a pivotal country in global affairs. The 
concomitant discourse is anchored in references to historical links based on Turkey’s 
Ottoman heritage, its cultural and linguistic closeness with the Turkic republics in 
Eurasia and pragmatic economic considerations of being an energy and infrastructure 
hub connecting East and West and North and South. Turkey thus situates itself as the 
crucial piece in the formation of an interconnected Eurasia. 
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Chapter 7: Eurasia and the meaning of ‘geopolitical space’ 
This chapter offers a synthesis of the observations and discussions in previous 
chapters. It starts by offering an analysis of the place of Eurasia in Russian and Turkish 
discourse on the basis of the theoretical framework – the triangular relationship 
between geopolitical imagination, foreign policy and national identity – as outlined in 
Chapter 2 and expands upon a discussion of four factors which define the function of 
Eurasia in Russian and Turkish discourse. In a second step, despite not being a 
comparative research, the similarities and divergences between the Russian and 
Turkish conception of Eurasia are briefly discussed in order to draw some general 
observations. Given that Eurasia does not evolve in a vacuum, the final part of this 
chapter analyses challenges to the Eurasia concept. These include other geopolitical 
discourses and orientations in Russian and Turkish foreign policy. 
7.1 Eurasia in Russian and Turkish foreign policy 
This research is based on a theoretical framework at the centre of which stands the 
triangular relationship between national identity, geopolitical imagination and foreign 
policy. This framework postulates that a country’s foreign policy is equally influenced 
by the governing elite’s geopolitical imagination as well as their perception of the 
country’s national identity. However, foreign policy options and external events also 
influence the elite’s understanding of their country’s identity as well as their 
geopolitical imagination. Through an analysis of the governing elite’s foreign policy 
discourse, I aim to uncover the place of Eurasia in Russian and Turkish foreign policy. 
Whereas the previous chapters focused on an analytical and chronological description 
of the principal themes in Russian and Turkish discourse (such as the country’s 
geographical location at the centre of Eurasia or the manifold cultural and historical 
links across the Eurasian space), this chapter is interested in understanding how the 
concept of Eurasia is linked to the Russian and Turkish governing elites’ understanding 
of their country’s place in the global system. In order to do so, I identified four factors 
which relate to the function the concept of Eurasia occupies in Russian and Turkish 




The way in which these factors should be used in interpreting foreign policy is outlined 
by the following questions. First, it is important to analyse whether the discourse on 
Eurasia is related to the issue of power, namely Russia and Turkey as important 
regional or great powers. The second question refers to the way in which Eurasia is 
characterised as an inherent part of the country’s national identity or not. Third, this 
study is also interested in whether the discourse on Eurasia is a pragmatic discourse 
that evolves around the notion of political and economic opportunities. And, fourth, it 
analyses whether Russia and Turkey speak about Eurasia in a way which defines their 
respective role in the international system. From the outset it can be stated that the 
issues of power and role, the two obviously being connected, are at the centre of both 
country’s discourse on Eurasia. 
7.1.1 Russia 
In general, Russia’s status as a leading global power is a key component of the way in 
which Russia’s governing elite regards their country’s role in the international system. 
This is combined with a strong discourse emphasising the importance of establishing 
a multipolar (polycentric) order and opposition against a unipolar world order. Within 
this understanding, Russia takes on the role of a great power which balances the power 
of other states, and thus contributes to a stable and equal global order. The 2013 foreign 
policy concept refers to ‘the unique role our country [Russia] has been playing over 
centuries as a counterbalance in international affairs and the development of global 
civilization’.1 Time and again, Russia’s governing elite emphasised this notion while 
also arguing that the 21st century was characterised by the development of a new 
multipolar order. Indeed, as Lavrov argued in a keynote speech on Russian foreign 
policy in 2012, ‘we see ourselves and really are one of the centers of the new 
polycentric world’.2 President Putin further elaborated on this notion early on in his 
third term in office in a prominent speech at the Valdai Discussion Club forum: ‘The 
21st century promises to become the century of major changes, the era of the formation 
of major geopolitical zones, as well as financial and economic, cultural, civilisational, 
and military and political areas’.3 The notion of geopolitical zones or Russia as centre 
of the polycentric world are central to understanding the geopolitical imagination of 
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Russia’s governing elite. What is more, these notions are also tied up with Russia’s 
geographical position and understanding as the key Eurasian country. 
 
Going back to Putin’s 2013 speech at the Valdai Club, we can see how the President’s 
geopolitical imagination ties together the existence of a multipolar order with global 
political developments and Russia’s position in Eurasia. In the second part of the 
quote, Putin goes on to argue that integration with other post-Soviet states is crucial in 
this context and that the Eurasian Union was a project helping to maintain ‘the identity 
of nations in the historical Eurasian space in a new century and in a new world’, 
eventually leading to the formation of a Eurasian geopolitical zone.4 In combination 
with the above cited understanding of Russia as a counterbalance in the international 
system as well as the continued competition between Russia and the West which 
increased following the Ukraine crisis in 2013, we can see how Russia’s political 
leadership perceives the international system. What they see is a system of competition 
between different geopolitical zones, Eurasia being one of them.  
 
Hence, Russia’s role in global affairs (as a great power and influential actor) is 
inherently tied to Eurasia. Putin made this clear in his inauguration speech, when he 
argued that Russia’s political survival and relevance in global affairs was connected to 
its role as the leader of Eurasia: ‘We must all understand that the life of our future 
generations and our prospects as a country and nation depend on our ability to become 
a leader and centre of gravity for the whole of Eurasia’.5 This quote is key to 
understanding the place of Eurasia in Russia’s geopolitical imagination and how it is 
tied to Russia’s governing elite’s understanding of their country’s place and role in the 
international system. As we can see, this was a rather recent development which started 
principally with Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, and then took a new turn in 
the wake of the Ukraine crisis starting in 2013. While Russia always considered its 
role to be that of a great power and influential actor in global affairs, it also attempted 
to integrate with Euro-Atlantic security structures in the early 2000s, sought to build 
Greater Europe while at the same time also creating a new community of like-minded 
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states in its environment. In recent years, a reinforced geopolitical imagination 
emerged in which Russia truly became the creator of a new Eurasia. 
 
In this reading, Eurasia is being developed as an independent centre for global 
development standing between the West/Euro-Atlantic and the East/Asia-Pacific. 
Through this development, Russia also takes on an additional role, namely that of a 
link between the East and West, considering itself to be representative of both worlds. 
The prime mechanism through which this should take place is the EAEU, acting as a 
connector between the regional integration mechanism in the West, such as the EU, 
and the emerging regional order in the East under Chinese leadership. This role, which 
Russia takes on in the context of regional integration within Eurasia, also helps 
consolidate Russia’s position as the hegemon in Eurasia, and in consequence, as a 
global great power. Russian efforts to harmonise its Eurasian union project with the 
Chinese OBOR initiative is a case in point in that Russia attempts to utilise its position 
in Eurasia to support China’s move to the West, while gaining a stake in these 
developments at the same time.6 This tripartite understanding of the world in which 
Eurasia co-exists as an independent global centre next to the Euro-Atlantic and Asia-
Pacific region is not new to Russia’s geopolitical imagination.7 However, with the 
establishment of the EAEU, Russia now has an institutional vehicle to promote its 
leadership in the region while also remaining open to cooperation with integration 
mechanisms in the West, such as the EU, as well as actors in the East, such as China. 
Hence, Eurasia is an inherent part of the Russian governing elites’ understanding of 
their country’s role in the international system as a global power and as a link between 
the East and West. 
 
As we have seen above, Eurasia is a key component in Russia’s role perception. This 
is closely linked to the issue of power, namely Russia as the regional hegemon and a 
global great power. In this sense, Russia’s Eurasian location and Eurasian identity are 
linked to the country’s future development. As such, Eurasia is considered to be the 
centre of Russian power and the place where Russia’s principal economic interests and 
its future political development are grounded. The establishment of the Eurasian 
                                                 
6 As we have seen above, according to Wilson, Russia was the driving force behind the agreement on 
harmonisation of the EAEU and OBOR signed in May 2015 (Wilson 2016: 119). 
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Economic Union serves as the foundation which sustains Russia’s position in this 
regard. 
 
In general, in the Russian case, Eurasia as a geopolitical concept is constructed in order 
to justify Russia’s quest for regional leadership and its global power ambitions. Hence, 
in conjunction with discourses on Russia’s imperial past and its vast geographical 
spread (covering the Eurasian territory), Russia emphasised the importance of Eurasia 
as a region in which it has privileged interests as well as special relations with other 
countries from the region and in which it does not want to see the influence of other 
actors. Hence, Eurasia as a geopolitical space becomes a typical geopolitical concept 
where the notions of competition and influence are crucial. Similarly, with the 
establishment of the EAEU and especially the cooperation with the Chinese OBOR 
initiative, Russia also fosters an image of itself as a crucial actor which connects 
regions and opens up new spaces for cooperation and economic development. This has 
the added benefit of portraying Russia as an indispensable actor in the process. Hence, 
the Eurasian discourse is clearly linked to Russia’s great power discourse. 
 
In the preceding discussion of the discourse of Russia’s governing elite, it has become 
apparent that members of this elite mostly refrained from clearly defining Russia’s 
national identity in terms of a geographical belonging. Russia thus claims to be 
European, not just historically, but also culturally, as well as Asian, although mostly 
based on a geographical reading, and thus uniting different identities on its territory. 
In this context, Eurasia is a central aspect as the meeting point of Europe and Asia. 
While Eurasia is more than just Russia, Russia’s governing elite embraces their 
country’s Eurasian identity. For example, the claim that the Russian language is the 
natural language in Eurasia, or in Putin’s words, ‘the language of interethnic 
communication for the numerous ethnic groups of the Eurasian continent’,8 
demonstrates the intrinsic link between Russia and the Eurasian space. Similarly, the 
notion of a ‘civilisational commonality’ between Russia and the other post-Soviet 
countries highlights the joint Eurasian identity which is formed on the basis of a 
common historical experience in Eurasia and the concomitant links Russia developed 
with other countries in the region. 
                                                 




With the development of Eurasian integration and the eventual establishment of the 
EAEU, the discourse on identity gained an additional quality. As President Putin 
claimed in his 2013 speech at the Valdai Discussion Club, ‘the Eurasian Union is a 
project for maintaining the identity of nations in the historical Eurasian space in a new 
century and in a new world’.9 The focus thus not only lies on economic integration but 
also on fostering the pre-existing cultural and historical ties among the Eurasian 
countries in order to maintain those links for the future development of the region. 
With the Eurasian integration project, specific values are being attached to this 
Eurasian identity and to the countries participating in the EAEU. According to 
Tsygankov, these values consist of the promotion of ‘state-centered national unity, 
traditional religious ties, and respect for cross-cultural relations, and sovereignty/non-
interference from large powers in the region’.10 In general, according to Lukin, these 
values, and the values of post-Soviet states in general, differ quite strongly from the 
West.11 Through such values, the Eurasian space is also being characterised as a 
distinct and independent entity. This helps foster the image of Russia as an independent 
power, on the basis of its position as the key country in the region. This development 
is amplified by the Ukraine crisis because Russia moved even further away from 
Europe and the West and, as a result, the country’s Eurasian identity and the 
importance of Eurasian values, became much stronger.12 
 
Eurasia as a pragmatic discourse, evolving around the notion of political and economic 
opportunities, seems to be less relevant in the Russian case because in any case Russia 
considers itself to be a great power with global reach and with interests everywhere. 
In combination with the perception of Russia’s role as a link between East and West, 
the Eurasian location obviously also offers opportunities to develop Russia’s economy. 
In this context, it is only natural that Russia’s governing elite considers Eurasia to be 
full of opportunities. In the early 2010s, for instance, Eurasia and Russia’s Eurasian 
location were considered to be a crucial component and an important advantage in 
Russia’s pivot to the East and Asia in particular. In this vision, it is essentially Russia’s 
Eurasian identity and its Eurasian geography which serves as the premise for Russian 
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11 Lukin 2014b 
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actions in Asia. This became especially prevalent in the context of Medvedev’s 
presidency and his modernisation programme, as illustrated in a speech at the Valdai 
Discussion Club early on in his presidency. Medvedev argued that calling Russia a 
Eurasian country had important ‘practical implications’ for the country’s development 
and that ultimately, ‘without diversifying the country’s development to the East, our 
economy has no future’.13 The fact that Russia is a Eurasian country thus stretches its 
economic opportunities in both directions to the East and the West. 
 
Furthermore, Eurasia as Russia’s backyard is linked to Russia’s position as a global 
great power with global reach and interests. In that sense, Eurasia and the newly 
established EAEU offer Russia the opportunity to develop its ‘own geopolitical zone’ 
which in turn forms the basis of its great power status. At the same time, it also cements 
Russia’s status as an independent centre of power between the Euro-Atlantic and the 
Asia-Pacific regions. And, finally, through the implementation of the EAEU, a 
regional cooperation mechanism, Russia can face the EU on eye-level and potentially 
conclude new deals on a multilateral level from one cooperation mechanism to 
another. Hence, Russia’s power is augmented and diversified by the EAEU and in that 
sense, Eurasia is an opportunity for Russia to institutionalise its power. In addition, 
and this is an important point, the EAEU also serves to secure the strong political and 
economic links which currently exist between Russia and the other member-states in 
the long run, somewhat shielding them from current and potentially changing political 
realities.14 
7.1.2 Turkey 
The AKP government’s geopolitical vision, especially under the influence of Foreign 
(and later Prime) Minister Davutoğlu, conceptualised Turkey as an important country 
and regional power within its own geopolitical sphere. Referring to its geographically 
strategic position ‘at the centre of Afro-Eurasia’, Davutoğlu highlighted Turkey’s 
‘geographical uniqueness’ through which it became an actor in all of its surrounding 
regions. As a result of this position, Turkey had the chance to become ‘a really 
important player in world politics’.15 Hence, Turkey’s role in the international system 
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is that of an important player and as a power broker, both of which is related to its 
Eurasian location. Or, as Cohen argued, ‘Turkey’s role as a regional power has taken 
on global dimensions as it has begun to exploit its pivotal location within Eurasia’.16 
Furthermore, on the basis of this geostrategic location, Turkey also has the potential 
to act as a bridge or connecting agent between different regions and, according to 
Cohen, Turkey thus ‘can become a key balancing agent within the world geopolitical 
system’.17 
 
Exponents of Turkey’s governing elite equally emphasised this point and promoted 
the image of Turkey as a gateway between different regions. Given the country’s 
traditional Western orientation, exemplified by Turkey’s NATO membership and its 
sustained quest for membership in the EU, Turkey’s role as a gateway for the West to 
the East is particularly prevalent. What is more, such a geopolitical characterisation of 
Turkey also underlines the country’s potential and regional power. For instance, in a 
speech in 2013, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu argued that the EU needed Turkey in 
order to retain its global geopolitical relevance because only Turkey could provide the 
EU with access to the geopolitically important regions in its neighbourhood.18 Indeed, 
as a former Turkish diplomat argued, Turkey plays the unique role of acting as a 
Eurasian connection for the West, given the country’s geographical location as well as 
its historical European orientation and status (at least officially) as a prospective EU 
member state.19 
 
What is more, given the strong emphasis on the notion of civilisation in world politics 
in Turkish foreign policy under the AKP, the idea of Turkey not only as a gateway but 
also a bridge or promoter of dialogue between cultures and civilisations is prevalent in 
Turkish discourse. Turkey thus acts as the leader of its own civilisation. In that role, 
Turkey promotes dialogue and interaction between civilisations, while retaining a 
Western orientation, which facilitates and to some extent justifies this role.20 Speaking 
at the UN general assembly in 2007, for instance, Prime Minister Erdoğan argued that 
‘with its European and Asian identity, [Turkey] can assume a distinctive and 
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constructive role in harmonizing and reconciling differing views’.21 Hence, the notion 
of Eurasia is important in characterisations of Turkey as a promoter of dialogue 
globally and thus as a contributor to a stable and peaceful global environment. 
Similarly, Foreign Ministers Gül and Davutoğlu successively noted Turkey’s position 
at the ‘heart of Eurasia’ as a crucial element in promoting dialogue and interaction 
between cultures and civilisations.22 The fact that Turkey belongs to different regions 
and thus has different identities is a central element in the governing elite’s geopolitical 
vision and serves to position Turkey as a power broker. This allows Turkey to play the 
role of facilitator and connector between regions and civilisations and thus ultimately 
to become a crucial actor in global affairs. 
 
In the Turkish case, it seems that Eurasia, as a geopolitical concept, was constructed 
in order to justify the country’s quest for regional leadership. Hence, in conjunction 
with discourses on its imperial past and geographical location, Turkey emphasised the 
importance of Eurasia as a region in which it occupies a special position and entertains 
special relations with other countries from the region. As such, the Eurasian discourse 
is an extension of attempts to position Turkey as the regional hegemon and leader in 
the region of the former Ottoman Empire. At the same time, there is a strong emphasis 
on the notion of Turkey as a bridge between regions and civilisations, further 
illustrating the country’s importance in global affairs. For instance, Prime Minister 
Erdoğan argued in 2004 that Turkey was an important country and would become even 
more important, merely because of its geographical location in Eurasia: ‘The position 
that Turkey occupies in the wider sense, at the heart of the Eurasian geography, will 
assume greater importance on the East-West and North-South axis’.23 The way in 
which Turkey draws power from its Eurasian location is thus simply as a country that 
has important links to all these regions and that furthermore serves as a connector and 
mediator between them. In addition, positioning itself as a model for other countries 
in the wider region (especially for the Central Asian republics) and as the West’s 
permanent and most important link to the Eurasian region while upholding the 
continuous discourse on EU membership, Turkey defines itself as a crucial actor. 
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Due to its geographical location, Turkey has multiple identities, which is an important 
component of Turkish foreign policy in that it makes Turkey an influential actor. This 
viewpoint is reflected in writings by Ahmet Davutoğlu. For instance, the Turkish 
foreign minister argued that ‘in terms of geography, Turkey occupies a unique space’ 
as a result of which, Turkey ‘may be defined as a central country with multiple regional 
identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character’.24 Under Erdoğan’s 
leadership and with the influence of Davutoğlu, a civilisational approach became 
central to the AKP’s foreign policy. This civilisational approach is key in that it also 
signifies that Turkey moved away from Europe to a distinct civilisation. As Bilgin and 
Bilgic argue, Turkey is considered to be at the centre of its own civilisational basin 
which is distinct from the Western/European basin.25 However, as the above quote by 
Davutoğlu illustrates, Turkey’s governing elite nonetheless perceive their country to 
belong to various regions and thus have various identities. As such, Eurasia is part of 
Turkey’s civilisation basin, but it is not the only nor the most dominant part. This is 
especially relevant given that Davutoğlu defined Turkey’s new identity as being at the 
centre of Afro-Eurasia. Turkey’s identity thus evolved in part by enlarging the 
country’s geopolitical vision from Eurasia to Afro-Eurasia, a development which is 
also linked to a new role of Turkey as a global power with a larger reach. Indeed, as 
Erşen argues, Turkey’s geopolitical vision expanded, and the Middle East and North 
African region became more important. Still, Eurasia remained a core concept due to 
its inclusive nature and Turkey’s role as ‘a bridge or a passage point between many of 
the Eurasian sub-regions’.26 
 
As we have seen above, Turkey’s Eurasian location is linked to the role the country 
plays in global affairs. In addition, the potential for the country’s development and the 
opportunities this location offers are also important. On the basis of its Eurasian 
location, Turkey is characterised as a bridge, thus occupying an important function for 
both East and West by linking the two. This function is seen as an advantage in that it 
offers Turkey a direct access to new markets in its East and South while at the same 
time acting as a transit country for goods from these markets. Indeed, as some Turkish 
analysts argued, characterising Turkey in such a way is highly instrumental and 
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responds to an opportunistic logic in Turkish foreign policy in that it highlights 
Turkey’s strategic value for the West (both EU and NATO) as a connection to Eurasia 
while also developing economic opportunities such as gaining access to new markets 
and energy-rich states in Eurasia and beyond.27 
 
The dominant issue with regard to the opportunities linked to Turkey’s governing 
elite’s Eurasian discourse is the issue of energy, notably Turkey as an energy hub 
and/or a transit country. In this context, Eurasia is a crucial notion in Turkish foreign 
policy in that it is almost exclusively due to Turkey’s Eurasian location that Turkey 
becomes the perfect energy hub and gateway between East and West. This is 
exemplified by a statement from President Gül, who argued that ‘linking Europe and 
Asia through energy and transportation corridors and the creation of new dynamics for 
regional cooperation are the main tenets of our Eurasian vision’.28 It is important to 
note at this point that Turkey itself is highly dependent on energy imports since it only 
manages to generate around 26 percent of its energy demand domestically.29 It thus 
has a strong incentive to utilise its geostrategic location in close proximity to a vast 
amount of the world’s energy reserves to generate energy imports. However, what is 
more, Turkey also aims to leverage this position to become an energy hub, thereby 
increasing its role in the international energy trade and, as a consequence, also 
becoming a more powerful actor globally. Although Turkey has not yet fulfilled this 
potential, the former Turkish diplomat Çeviköz argues that ‘its geographical location 
and its need for energy imports, particularly in the field of natural gas, make Turkey a 
key partner’ and that transforming Turkey into an energy hub would be an important 
opportunity for the country.30 Being located at the crossroads of regions, and at a 
strategic position in the vast Eurasia territory, thus is an important asset for Turkey. 
7.1.3 Synthesis 
The aim of this thesis is to uncover the meaning of Eurasia in Russian and Turkish 
foreign policy discourse, that is the place Eurasia occupies in these countries’ 
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geopolitical imagination. The basic tenet adopted here is that geographical space is not 
a fixed entity but is shaped and defined through discourse. This signifies that 
geopolitical spaces are being made meaningful through the discursive practices of 
foreign policy elites. In general, it can be noted that Eurasia serves as a flexible concept 
in Russian and Turkish discourse. Indeed, Eurasia is conceptualised in the geopolitical 
imagination of Russia’s and Turkey’s governing elite with reference to all of the four 
factors discussed above (power, role, identity and opportunity). However, most closely 
linked to Russia’s and Turkey’s Eurasian discourse are the issues of role and power, 
which in turn are intrinsically linked to each other. The above discussion about these 
four factors has demonstrated how the Russian and Turkish governing elite perceives 
the importance of Eurasia in their foreign policy. What at its most basic is simply a 
geographical location or a point on a map, becomes something much bigger and more 
important through the attributes attached to it by the elite’s discourse. 
 
In sum, the place of Eurasia in Russian discourse influences the way in which Russia 
sees its role in the international system. The basic tenet here is Russia’s status as a 
leading global power and a pole in the multipolar order which are connected to the 
country’s Eurasian location. As we have seen above, Russia characterises Eurasia as 
an independent centre of global development and itself as the leader of Eurasia. As a 
consequence, Russia also takes on the role of a counterbalancing force in the global 
system, defending a balanced (in the sense of a balance of power) and multipolar order 
while at the same time acting as a link between the major geopolitical zones in the 
West and the East. This role perception is of course intrinsically linked to the issue of 
power and Russia’s status as a global power in the sense that Russia’s power is 
grounded in Eurasia. In conjunction with the characterisation of Eurasia as an 
independent geopolitical zone, the definition of Russia as the centre of gravity for the 
whole of Eurasia thus leads back to Russia’s position as one of the principal poles in 
the global system. This is also manifested by the Eurasian integration project which 
institutionalises Russia’s power in the region and its position as hegemon, while 
linking it permanently to other post-Soviet states. 
 
The place of Eurasia in Russian discourse and identity conceptions is less clearly 
evoked, but it is nonetheless present. There is an intrinsic link between Russia and 
Eurasia both historically but also through cultural aspects and especially the position 
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of the Russian language as the principal language in Eurasia. The issue of identity then 
comes to the forefront with the establishment of the EAEU which, according to 
Russia’s governing elite, helps maintain the identity of nations in the historical 
Eurasian space. Furthermore, Eurasia and the EAEU are also being linked to specific 
values, such as an independent model of state development, the importance of 
sovereignty and non-interference from outside powers, which differ from values in the 
West but are shared by the countries in the region. Through such conceptualisations it 
becomes clear that Eurasia is part of Russia’s identity, both historically as well as 
politically. What is more, Eurasia obviously also offers concrete opportunities for 
Russia. As the leader of Eurasia, Russia is shaping the region’s development while 
also benefiting from the improved economic conditions derived from the workings of 
the EAEU. Furthermore, Russia acts as a link between East and West on the basis of 
its Eurasian position, which offers prime opportunities for Russia’s economic 
development, especially also in its Far Eastern regions. Russia leverages its Eurasian 
position in fostering regional integration and economic cooperation through the 
EAEU, but also in benefiting from its location to support China’s New Silk Road 
initiative. Hence, Eurasia offers Russia the opportunity to be a connecting link between 
the economically more developed West and the more dynamic and rising East. 
 
In the Turkish case, Eurasia influences the way in which the governing elite perceives 
the country’s role in the global system. Hence, Turkey is a central country on the basis 
of its Eurasian (Afro-Eurasian) location and as such is being defined as a regional 
power. Furthermore, it acts as a power broker in the global system through its role of 
a bridge or connecting link between regions and civilisations. In so doing, Turkey 
helps to foster dialogue between cultures but also serves as a gateway for the West, 
and European countries in particular, to the East. Related to this is Turkey’s role as a 
global energy hub and a transit country for energy between East and West. All this is 
linked to the issue of power and Turkey as an important regional power. The Turkish 
governing elite characterises the country as the leader of its civilisational basin on the 
basis of its geostrategic location and imperial legacy, thus empowering itself to speak 
on behalf of the region on the global stage. In its essence, Turkey’s central position, 
which is related to Eurasia, provides the country with manifold links to other countries 




A key characteristic of Turkey’s identity is related to its geographical situation, or put 
differently, its geographical uniqueness. Due to this uniqueness, Turkey has multiple 
identities and cannot be reduced to a single regional belonging. At the core of this 
vision lies the idea of Turkey as the centre of Afro-Eurasia, a rather large landmass in 
which Turkey occupies a prime position both in terms of geography as well as due to 
cultural and political links. All this is also linked to concrete opportunities, especially 
in the economic realm. Hence, Turkey’s role as a bridge between regions offers the 
country access to new markets while at the same time acting as a link between these 
markets and the European market. At the core of this is the issue of energy and the 
unique opportunity offered by its Eurasian location to become a major energy hub and 
transit country between the producing regions to the East and South of Turkey and the 
consuming markets in Europe. 
 
In short, the concept of Eurasia is a central element in Russian and Turkish government 
discourse. It is also an instrumental concept which serves a variety of purposes in 
attributing a number of different characteristics to Russian and Turkish foreign policy. 
Indeed, Eurasia is a flexible concept which is being shaped and re-shaped by the 
governing elite’s discourse on the basis of changing geopolitical visions. 
7.2 Comparison between Russian and Turkish discourse  
The principal aim of this thesis is to analyse the meaning and place of Eurasia in 
Russian and Turkish government discourse. As such it is not comparative in nature, 
focusing on each country individually. However, given the number of similarities 
between Russia and Turkey, such as their Eurasian geographical location, their 
imperial past and concomitant ethnic, cultural and political links to other countries in 
the region as well as their marginal European location, it seems relevant to briefly 
compare their respective conceptions of Eurasia. In a first step, I will briefly look at 
the weight and characterisations of the principal themes (geography, culture/history, 
economy) in Russian and Turkish discourse. The second part then presents a brief 




7.2.1 The importance of the four themes in Russian and Turkish discourse 
With regard to geography, both Russia and Turkey characterise their country as being 
at the heart of the vast Eurasian geography while belonging to both the East and the 
West. Especially in the case of Russia, the notion of being both European and Asian, 
while at the same time acting as a bridge between them, is frequently emphasised. 
Interestingly, both countries refer to the notion of centrality but in slightly different 
ways. For Russia, as the quintessential Eurasian country on the basis of its historical 
development, its centrality in Eurasia is key. In addition to Russia’s historical 
experience, this is also related to the country’s size and its unique geopolitical position 
covering a large part of Eurasia. In the case of Turkey, the central country status is also 
strongly emphasised, but the focus is less clearly on Eurasia given the civilisational 
aspect of Turkish foreign policy and the notion of Turkey as the centre of Afro-Eurasia 
as developed by Davutoğlu. It is this general geographical uniqueness which stands at 
the centre of Turkish foreign policy discourse. 
 
With regard to history and culture there are clear similarities between the Russian and 
Turkish case, but also clear divergences. As such, Turkey often refers to the notion of 
the Turkic world and the concomitant cultural and ethnic links across Eurasia. This is 
related to the countries of Central Asia which share ethnic and religious ties with 
Turkey. Russia’s governing elites, on the other hand, mostly emphasise historical and 
civilisational commonalities with other countries in Eurasia. Based on its historical 
experience as a Eurasian empire (first in the form of the Russian Empire, then the 
Soviet Union), Russia is the nucleus of a historic community in Eurasia. In that role, 
it also acts or acted as a meeting place of civilisations and cultures which are united in 
Eurasia and which share a number of similarities, among them the prevalence of the 
Russian language for instance. This common political heritage and concomitant 
political identity is an important aspect, especially also in the context of the future 
development of the region through Eurasian integration. Although Turkey uses similar 
notions of being a bridge between cultures and civilisations, this is less clearly related 
to its Eurasian geography, but more strongly to its historical legacies, imperial past 
and religious identity. Hence, Turkey perceives itself to be a civilisational leader and 





Economy is where the two cases most strongly diverge, and it is this issue which also 
has a determinant impact on the future development of the Eurasian discourse in 
Russia and Turkey. Hence, Russia’s elite shaped the vision of their country as the 
centre of Eurasia both politically and economically through the institutionalisation of 
the Eurasian (Economic) Union, with Russia at its core. Although for the moment only 
a small number of Eurasian countries participate in the EAEU, it is nonetheless, at 
least discursively, one of the most important projects of Russian foreign policy in 
recent years. While the EAEU offers obvious economic benefits through stronger 
integration, it also helps Russia cement its status as leader of the region and 
consequently, as a pole in the multipolar world and a global great power. Furthermore, 
and here Russia’s and Turkey’s position actually come close to one another, it aims to 
establish Russia as a bridge between Europe and Asia, linking the two economically. 
This has the added benefit to assure Russia’s continued relevance in Eurasia as a link 
and balancing actor between the economically more dynamic regions both in the East 
and West. For Turkey, in the economic realm, Eurasia is primarily important with 
regard to energy. Whereas its status as a central country also helps it develop economic 
ties with a large number of countries and regions, it is the energy nexus that is 
emphasised most strongly. Not only concerning its geographical location between 
energy rich countries in Eurasia and the Middle East, but also given its strong cultural 
and ethnic links to the Turkic republics in Central Asia, Turkey is ideally positioned 
to become an energy hub and transit country. Linking Europe to Asia, while improving 
its own standing and economic prospects as an energy hub, are central aspects of 
Turkish foreign policy with regard to Eurasia. 
7.2.2 Comparison between Russian and Turkish role conceptions 
Both Russia and Turkey perceive Eurasia as an important factor in defining their role 
in the global system. For Russia, its status as a global power is key, while for Turkey 
the fact that it is a regional power dominates. Still, given its geopolitical position, 
Turkey is seen as a central country whose power in the global arena is augmented 
because of its perceived role as a power broker and a bridge as well as a promoter of 
dialogue between regions and civilisations. Russia, on the other hand, as the centre and 
also central country of Eurasia, forms one of the poles of the multipolar order and 
through that role has an influential position in global affairs. In general, both countries 
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consider their Eurasian location an important influence in shaping their respective role 
as a link between East and West. For Russia, this pertains to its role as a balancing 
power in the tripartite global system with three principal poles of power (Euro-
Atlantic, Eurasia, Asia-Pacific), while for Turkey the focus is more on making the 
country an indispensable actor through its linking function between Europe and the 
MENA region as well as the Islamic and Western civilisations. 
 
Similarly, Eurasia is linked to Russia’s and Turkey’s position as powerful countries. 
Again, for Russia the outlook is more global, whereas for Turkey the main focus is 
regional, or put differently, with regard to its civilisational basin. A difference between 
the two cases is that for Russia, Eurasia is clearly the arena where its future 
development and thus the maintenance of its global power status are grounded, a fact 
which is underlined by the strong focus on Eurasian integration and the promotion of 
and establishment of the EAEU. For Turkey, on the other hand, Eurasia is less central 
given not only the enlarged definition of Turkey as the centre of Afro-Eurasia but also 
the civilisational geopolitics of the AKP government which puts the focus on 
civilisation, or put differently, an Islamic culture on top of its geographical centrality. 
Indeed, as a Turkish expert argued, Eurasia for Turkey is more of a geographical 
definition, but not a civilisational one.31 
  
The same goes for the identity realm which seems to be more prevalent in the case of 
Russia than in Turkey’s case. In general, identity considerations are not at the forefront 
of Russian and Turkish elite discourse on Eurasia. It is important to note that there is 
a constant emphasis on a dual or multiple identity defining each country. As such, 
Russia is not only considered to be a part of Europe (culturally and historically), but 
also of Asia (mainly due to its geography), while of course being the quintessential 
Eurasian country. Turkey’s case is somewhat different in that Turkey is characterised 
as having multiple identities such as being European (in terms of values and history), 
but also Middle Eastern (through its culture and imperial legacy) and Eurasian (ethnic 
ties with Eurasian countries). Over the years, however, in the Turkish case, and 
especially following the arrival of Davutoğlu, this multiple identity has evolved into 
one overarching identity, namely that of Turkey as being at the heart of Afro-Eurasia. 
                                                 
31 Interview with think tank analyst, Ankara, 5 February 2015 
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This in turn signified a strong focus on Turkey’s regional environment and its 
historically imperial hinterland in the Middle East and North Africa while highlighting 
the country’s geographical uniqueness as a defining feature. There is also an evolution 
to be observed in Russia’s case in the sense that the Ukraine crisis, which started in 
2013, can be seen as the culminating point of a shift away from Europe to a strong 
focus on Eurasia. This is underlined by arguments emphasising the difference in values 
between Europe and Eurasia with the development of Eurasian values promoted 
through vehicles such as the Eurasian union. 
 
The area in which both Russia and Turkey converge is in considering their country’s 
respective Eurasian location as a prime opportunity for their country’s economic and 
political development. This is a central aspect, especially in the case of Russia, which 
considers Eurasian integration to be a crucial element in Russia’s future development. 
At the same time, it also offers Russia the possibility to foster better ties with other 
integration processes and initiatives, such as the Chinese OBOR project, but also the 
EU. Furthermore, providing a link between the East and the West by acting as a 
corridor for trade and commerce also guarantees Russia’s continued importance on the 
Eurasian continent. The same can be said for Turkey, which focuses on its Eurasian 
location in order to promote the vision of Turkey as an energy hub and transit country. 
The emphasis on the economic opportunities and potential Eurasia offers remains 
relatively strong in both cases and is an important element in Russian and Turkish 
discourse. 
7.3 Challenges to the Eurasia concept 
The main focus of this thesis was the place of a single geopolitical concept, that of 
Eurasia, in Russian and Turkish governing elite discourse. However, in both the 
Russian and Turkish cases, other geopolitical concepts are also present in the 
respective elite’s geopolitical imagination. Indeed, as argued earlier, a discourse does 
not evolve in a vacuum and in the case of Russia and Turkey, the discourse of Eurasia 
cohabited with discourses on Europe, the Middle East and other geographical regions. 
The aim of this section is thus to briefly focus on other geopolitical concepts. For 
instance, in the case of Turkey, Eurasia is just one discourse and discourses focusing 
on Turkey’s European character or its renewed interest in the Middle East are also 
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dominant in the public discourse. With regard to Russia, it is essential also to focus on 
the discourse on Europe, the Euro-Atlantic and the Asia-Pacific. 
 
As argued earlier, Eurasia is certainly a central geopolitical concept in Russian and 
Turkish discourse. Nevertheless, there is also room for other discourses. This is 
illustrated by a close look at the data collected for this thesis. Out of a large overall 
sample of collected texts and interviews, only a relatively small number was actually 
used in the detailed analysis presented in Chapters 5 and 6. Put differently, only a 
minor number of texts referred to or spoke about Eurasia. In the case of Russia, out of 
288 collected speeches, interviews, articles and official documents, only 50 made 
directly reference to Eurasia and were thus used in the analysis. In the case of Turkey, 
out of 174 collected speeches, interviews and articles, only 46 texts were retained for 
the analysis on the basis of their references to Eurasia. Nevertheless, given that this 
thesis is not interested in a quantitative analysis but a qualitative analysis of the place 
of Eurasia in Russian and Turkish government elite discourse, this fact is not 
inhibiting. As illustrated above, Eurasia indeed occupies a relatively prominent and 
central position in Russian and Turkish discourse. Still, the presence of other 
geographical imaginations in Russia’s and Turkey’s governing elite discourse is 
obvious and it is these geopolitical imaginations and their potential to influence the 
place of Eurasia in the elite’s discourse which are briefly analysed in the next section. 
 
In the geographical imagination of Russia’s governing elite, two additional 
geopolitical zones are present: the Euro-Atlantic and the Asia-Pacific region.32 
Russia’s political elite described their country as being a member of both regions, in 
addition to the country’s Eurasian identity. However, as the following brief overview 
will demonstrate, the intensity of the elite’s discourse is significantly weaker than with 
regard to Eurasia. In the case of Turkey, the governing elite also places their country 
as an important actor in the Middle East, and generally the region of the former 
Ottoman Empire, while also referring to the country’s European nature and its 
willingness to become a full member of the European community. 
                                                 
32 Much of the next two sections is based on earlier work (see Svarin 2016). 
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7.3.1 Russia and the Euro-Atlantic 
Historically, Russia and its predecessor entities were always part of Europe, or at least 
participated in European politics. Even during the Cold War, when the confrontation 
between East and West led to a division of Europe, Russia still occupied large parts of 
the European continent. During the 1990s and in the early 2000s, Russia indeed 
oriented itself towards the West and Europe. Russia’s political leaders emphasised this 
by claiming that ‘above all else Russia was, is and will, of course, be a major European 
power’33 or that ‘Russia has always been and remains a European power’.34 Russia’s 
identity as a European state and the country’s belonging to the historical and 
geographical European community is presented as a given by both Russian and many 
European political leaders. Indeed, going back in history, Europe was the principal 
reference point for Russia, and the country’s development was shaped along the 
European model. Neumann, who studied the dialectical relationship between Russia 
and Europe over the last two centuries, argued that ‘the idea of Europe is the main 
“Other” in relation to which the idea of Russia is defined’.35 
 
Based on its European identity, Russia considers itself naturally to be a part of the 
Euro-Atlantic space. Russian discourses on the Euro-Atlantic are closely linked to 
Russia’s approach to Europe and the long historical relationship that unites them. As 
such, Russia’s Euro-Atlantic policy is an extension of its European identity and is 
considered a separate track in its foreign policy, distinct from policies towards other 
geographical regions. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and especially in 
the early 2000s, Russia’s elite sought ways to integrate with and become a full member 
of the Euro-Atlantic community. Despite its long-standing roots in the region, the 
Russian Federation was a relatively new ‘member’ of the Euro-Atlantic region and 
also one that occupied a special position because it was not accepted as a full member 
of the Euro-Atlantic community.36 The Russian debate about the Euro-Atlantic thus 
strongly focused on how to form an understanding between the dominant forces in the 
region and how to reform the Euro-Atlantic security community, which effectively 
meant how to better integrate Russia. For instance, speaking to students at Russia’s 
                                                 
33 Putin 2005 
34 S. Ivanov 2006 
35 Neumann 1996: 1; see also Neumann 2016 
36 See Sakwa 2017 
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elite university MGIMO, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called for a change of 
paradigm by stating that ‘perhaps it is time to think of a new definition of Atlanticism 
that does not exclude Russia’.37 
 
Such a reading of Russia’s position in the Euro-Atlantic corresponds to the general 
Russian tendency to position itself as a major power in global politics. Having 
consolidated its power resources, Russia’s leaders started to see their country as one 
of three poles in the Euro-Atlantic power structure. Indeed, Foreign Minister Lavrov 
argued that ‘it wouldn’t hurt the part of the world customarily known as the Euro-
Atlantic region to have a triple understanding – between the US, Russia and the 
European Union’.38 At this point, Russia sought closer relations and integration with 
the Euro-Atlantic while seeing itself as one of the great powers in this space. For 
instance, as discussed earlier, during the Medvedev presidency, Russia also proposed 
a reform of the European security community in the form of the pan-European security 
treaty. The goal was to form a more comprehensive security regime for the entire 
region, preventing the further exclusion of Russia while at the same time dismantling 
the traditional security structures formed around NATO. By proposing new security 
structures to replace traditional Euro-Atlantic organisations and structures, Russia 
tried to assume leadership and present itself as a major great power. Positioning Russia 
as an equal partner in the Euro-Atlantic region at the same level as the US and the EU 
would give credence to Russia’s quest for great power status and influence in 
international politics. 
 
However, this stance and Russia’s involvement in the Euro-Atlantic region 
experienced a major turn with the start of the Ukraine crisis in 2013. The relationship 
between Russia and the West was already fragile due to a number of factors, such as 
continued talks on a possible NATO enlargement in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, 
Russia’s war with Georgia in 2008, the launch of the EU Eastern Partnership in 2009, 
and a general misunderstanding about their respective role and position in global 
affairs. The Ukraine crisis thus signified the ultimate end of Russian ambitions to 
become integrated into the structures of the Euro-Atlantic space. Foreign Minister 
Lavrov clearly outlined Russia’s viewpoint in his speech at the UN general assembly: 
                                                 
37 Lavrov 2007b 




The West has embarked upon a course towards “the vertical 
structuring of humanity” tailored to its own hardly inoffensive 
standards. After they declared victory in the Cold War and the “end 
of history,” the US and the EU opted for expanding the geopolitical 
area under their control without taking into account the balance of 
legitimate interests of all the people of Europe.39  
 
The discourse with regard to the Euro-Atlantic space thus took a new turn. The Ukraine 
crisis signified to Russia that the West was willing to sustain a geopolitical competition 
in Europe and, as a result, a deep partnership between Russia and the West was no 
longer possible. Advocating a pluralist and multipolar global order and positioning 
itself as a great power, Russia now rather seeks recognition as an opponent of the West 
or as an important strategic partner which helps maintain the global order.40 
7.3.2 Russia and the Asia-Pacific 
In addition to the Euro-Atlantic space, the Asia-Pacific is a second point of reference 
for Russia. Stretching the European continent all the way to the far east, it is only 
natural that Russian leaders perceived the Asia-Pacific as an important geopolitical 
space for Russian foreign policy. In addition, the development of the Far Eastern 
Russian provinces is closely linked to forging cooperative ties with countries in the 
Asia-Pacific. All of this is underscored by the ‘rise of the East’ and the general 
tendency in global politics to perceive power shift from West to East. In this context, 
Russia and its political elite also developed a stronger interest in and engagement with 
the East. This has gained entry in the official foreign policy discourse, as for example 
in the 2013 foreign policy concept: ‘Strengthening Russia’s presence in the Asia-
Pacific region (APR) is becoming increasingly important since Russia is an integral 
part of this fastest-developing geopolitical zone’.41 There is also a domestic dimension, 
namely the need for the development of the Russian Far Eastern regions, which are far 
from the Russian economic centres in the country’s West, but close to economically 
dynamic countries in Asia. In this context, it is important for Russia to foster strong 
links with countries in the region, to participate in regional initiatives and to gain 
memberships in regional organisations. As such, the issue of the development of the 
                                                 
39 Lavrov 2014c 
40 See Sakwa 2017 for a detailled discussion of these developments. 
41 Russian Federation 2013 
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Russian Far East and, more generally, its importance in Russia’s policy towards the 
Asia-Pacific, is central in Russian discourses as well as in public debate.42 
 
Keeping in mind the underlying ambition of Russian foreign policy, namely to position 
Russia as a great power in global affairs, it is only natural that Russia’s elite increased 
its attention to developments in the Asian region. Hence, Russia pursued the goal of 
becoming a member of regional organisations and integrating existing regional 
structures, which would allow it to grow a stronger presence in the region. Still, 
Russian leaders only recently attributed importance to the Asia-Pacific. Nevertheless, 
in their view, Russia moved from being a passive member of the Asia-Pacific to an 
active participant. Simultaneously, over the years, the discourse of Russia’s leaders 
put more emphasis on Russia’s belonging to the Asia-Pacific, and Russia evolved from 
being a beneficiary of the region’s economic potential to a contributor to its future 
development. Hence, concrete issues such as economic development and security 
cooperation increasingly also emerged in the policy-makers’ discourses. 
 
In general, the importance of the Asian vector in Russian foreign policy is a more 
recent development and corresponds to the overall trend in international politics (the 
US for instance launched its ‘pivot to the East’ in 2012). Hence, stronger engagement 
with all countries in the Asia-Pacific and deeper integration into the region as a whole 
was seen as an important step for Russia in order to maintain its power. As a group of 
prominent Russian experts argued, ‘Russia’s economic and political advance into the 
Asia-Pacific region is a prerequisite for its internal stability and international 
competitiveness’. 43 Russia’s belonging to the Asia-Pacific is justified by the country’s 
geography and thus proximity to the region, as well as with pragmatic interests, such 
as promoting potential new avenues for development in the country’s East. Russian 
interests in the Asia-Pacific are of a pragmatic nature in terms of keeping its position 
as a great power. According to the same Russian authors, this is important because 
‘only by balancing its Western and Eastern development vectors and system of foreign 
relations can Russia become a truly modern global power’.44 
 
                                                 
42 Kuhrt 2012 
43 Valdai Discussion Club 2012: 5 
44 Valdai Discussion Club 2012: 5 
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However, Russia’s involvement in Asia and the elite’s discourse on the Asia-Pacific 
are not the most important components of Russian foreign policy. Next to Russia’s 
historical orientation towards the West and the newfound focus on Eurasia, Asia 
remains a sideshow in Russian foreign policy. Nevertheless, the future development 
of Russia’s relations with the Asia-Pacific needs to be observed. After the Ukraine 
crisis and the rupture with the West, most strongly exemplified by the political and 
economic sanctions which the US and the EU imposed on Russia, Moscow’s turn to 
Asia and especially China became more important.45 Economic interests, trade, the 
harmonisation of their respective regional initiatives (the EAEU and OBOR) and a 
shared reluctance towards the US’ global leadership are major uniting themes. In this 
context, Russia’s pivot to the East and its belonging to the Asia-Pacific has become a 
reality and the elite’s discourse about the Asia-Pacific might well gain a new quality 
in the future.46 
7.3.3 Turkey and Europe/the West 
After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the official foundation of the Turkish 
republic in 1923, Turkey looked westwards and oriented itself towards Europe. The 
republic’s founding father and first president, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, had a vision of 
turning Turkey into a secular and modern democracy, modelled on European values. 
Turkey joined Western and Euro-Atlantic institutions, such as NATO in 1953, and 
applied for EU membership in 1987, eventually leading to the opening of accession 
negotiations with the EU in 2005. Given this context, it is not surprising that Turkey’s 
political leaders frequently emphasise their country’s belonging to Europe and the 
West. Turkey’s ambition to become a member of the EU is frequently mentioned in 
speeches by government officials and EU accession is characterised as the 
‘fundamental priority’ of Turkish foreign policy.47 Similarly, Prime Minister Erdoğan 
was no less adamant when he made clear in 2004, at the beginning of his tenure, the 
direction in which Turkey would look: ‘one of the main points of departure of Turkish 
foreign policy is its place and membership within the structures of the Western 
World’.48 In general, the Western orientation of Turkish foreign policy is clearly 
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46 Lukin 2016 
47 Babacan 2008b 
48 Erdoğan 2004 
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emphasised, as in Abdullah Gül’s speech at Ljubljana University: ‘Turkey’s political, 
cultural and economic engagement with Europe has a background of more than two 
centuries. And, from its inception about eighty years ago, the Turkish Republic has 
pursued a policy of integration with Western institutions’.49 As a result, there is a 
historical continuity in this aim because, according to Gül, ‘EU membership will mean 
anchoring more than a century old western vocation’.50 
 
This was the mindset of Turkey’s governing elite at the beginning of their long reign 
in power in the early 2000s. In recent years, and increasingly since the AKP came to 
power, Turkey’s European vocation started to be questioned – not only by European 
countries but also by Turkey’s political elite. Due to its new, multi-dimensional foreign 
policy, which directed Turkey’s interests increasingly also towards other regions, 
membership in the Western/European club has become less of a priority. Or put 
differently, the articulation of Turkey’s European vision changed in the sense that 
Turkish foreign policy-makers started to depict Turkey’s accession to the EU as a 
mutually beneficial process in which Turkey could significantly contribute to the EU’s 
pursuit of greater influence in the world and thus ‘transform the EU into a global 
actor’.51 As already described earlier, Turkey’s European policy in these years went 
through two phases, from ‘the golden age of Europeanization’ to a ’loose 
Europeanization’.52 This development came hand in hand with the realisation that 
Turkey should aim at playing a bigger role in global politics, notably by developing a 
stronger posture in its regional neighbourhood. As a result, other regions started to 
become more important in Turkish foreign policy. 
 
At the same time, Turkey’s image of Europe changed. According to Macmillan, who 
studied the discourse of the AKP with regard to Europe: 
 
The AKP stance reveals a much more self-confident and 
independent attitude towards Europe; it no longer aims for complete 
Europeanisation or views Europe as “the enemy” but views Europe 
simply as a neighbour among others, from which it can learn much 
but to which it also has much to teach.53 
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This illustrates the evolution in Turkish foreign policy from wanting to become a 
European country to being an independent country in Europe while perceiving itself 
as an important country that would add weight to the EU. Similarly, Oğuzlu argues 
that Turkey has moved away from its Westernisation approach to a ‘Turkey-centric 
westernism’.54 This concept exemplifies the idea that Turkey still accepts and adopts 
liberal Western values, however, it does not follow them to the detriment of pragmatic 
interests it might have in other regions. Hence, one could speak of an emancipation of 
Turkish foreign policy from its traditional Western/European outlook. In this context 
and given the AKP’s civilisational geopolitics outlook, the region of the former 
Ottoman Empire, became increasingly central in Turkish foreign policy. 
7.3.4 Turkey and the Middle East 
Over the last decade, Turkey’s relations with the Middle East grew closer. Since the 
AKP’s rise to power, its Islamist background has spurred debates about Turkey’s 
policy towards the Middle East. Some observers spoke of the ‘rediscovery’ of the 
Middle East and even of a ‘Middle Easternization’ of Turkish foreign policy.55 It is 
clear that Turkish foreign policy in the region has become much more active in recent 
years. However, this was not only due to an ideological shift but rather due to the 
general changes in Turkish foreign policy towards a more active and multi-vector 
approach. According to Turkey’s new-found geopolitical identity as a central country 
in the international system and, consequently, as a member of many regional 
subsystems, the Middle East became more important.56 
 
The main reasons for Turkey’s renewed interest in the Middle East were economic and 
civilisational concerns.57 Admittedly, the religious background of the AKP helped 
foster a new image of Turkey in the Middle East and ‘led to an increase in the country’s 
consciousness toward a potential regional leadership role based on a new civilizational 
rhetoric’.58 Indeed, as Abdullah Gül maintained in a speech in 2003, Turkey had a 
responsibility to get engaged in the Middle East and contribute to the region’s 
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development on the basis of a ‘a humanitarian and moral imperative rooted in 
history’.59 
 
In addition to this discourse and the general tenets of the ‘zero problems with 
neighbours’ policy, economic considerations played an important role. Since the AKP 
came to power, in an attempt to diversify its exports and find new markets for Turkish 
products, Turkey increased its trade activities with states in the Middle East. In 
addition, Turkey’s relations with the West and the accession process with the EU also 
provided some impetus for Turkey’s involvement in the Middle East. As such, Turkey 
perceived itself as an important link between Europe and the Middle East, not just 
economically, but also in civilisational terms, fostering a good understanding between 
these regions (the Alliance of Civilisations, as discussed earlier, being a case in point). 
Positioning itself as an important economic actor and regional stabiliser in the Middle 
East, the governing elite saw Turkey as adding a lot of beneficial impact to the EU’s 
policies in the region should it be accepted as a member one day. 
 
Under the AKP government, Turkey wanted to see its role in the Middle East grow 
and be perceived as a positive actor and mediator as well as a reliable business partner. 
In general, according to Erdoğan, Turkey perceives itself as a major player in the 
Middle East, being guided by a ‘historical and regional mission’ which is principally 
to bring peace and stability to the region.60 There is a strong undertone and reference 
to Turkey’s historical legacy as heir of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, under the new 
civilisational approach of Turkish foreign policy, promoted by Erdoğan and 
Davutoğlu, the Middle East and the region of the former Ottoman Empire became 
more important. This refers to the vision of Neo-Ottomanism, in which Turkey 
embraces its ‘Ottoman great power legacy’, and which ‘calls for a redefinition of 
Turkey’s strategic and national identity’.61 As discussed above, the Turkish discourse 
on Eurasia lost its weight in the context of the AKP’s civilisational discourse, focusing 
on a much larger geopolitical concept of Afro-Eurasia, covering the region of the 
former Ottoman Empire. 
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The focus of this chapter was the analysis of the way in which the concept of Eurasia, 
as described in previous chapters, is linked to the Russian and Turkish governing 
elites’ perception of their country’s place in the global system. Put differently, the aim 
was to analyse which function the concept of Eurasia occupies in Russian and Turkish 
discourse. Concretely, this means finding answers to four questions: whether the 
central element of the discourse on Eurasia is related to the issue of power, namely 
Russia and Turkey as important regional or great powers; whether Eurasia is an 
inherent part of the two country’s national identity; whether pragmatic notions such as 
political and economic opportunities are at the centre of the discourse on Eurasia; or 
lastly, whether Eurasia’s function is primarily to define Russia’s and Turkey’s role in 
the international system. 
 
One of the main arguments of this thesis is that geographical space is not a fixed entity 
but is shaped and defined through discourse, and thus is being made meaningful 
through the discursive practices of foreign policy elites. The place of Eurasia in the 
geopolitical imagination of Russia’s and Turkey’s governing elite is then also 
conceptualised referring to the notions of power, role, identity and opportunity. Yet, 
the analysis above revealed that the issues of role and power, which are closely related, 
are most central to Russia’s and Turkey’s Eurasian discourse. 
 
Russia’s governing elite sees their country as one of the great powers and an influential 
and important pole in a multipolar global order. This is one of the fundamental 
principles of Russian foreign policy. The concept of Eurasia occupies a central position 
in the conception of Russia’s role in the international system in the sense that Russia’s 
power is grounded in its role as the centre of gravity and hegemon in the Eurasian 
region. 
 
The way in which Turkey’s role is characterised by the governing elite in Ankara is as 
a central country and influential actor. This is based on a geopolitical reading of 
Turkey’s position at the centre of (Afro-)Eurasia and thus as the leader of its own 
civilisational basin. Hence, Turkey’s central position, which is related to Eurasia, 
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provides the country with manifold links to other countries and regions thus making it 
a powerful country on the global stage. 
 
Eurasia is an important concept in Russian and Turkish elite discourse and foreign 
policy. However, and quite naturally so, it is not the only geopolitical space which 
matters to these countries. Europe and the Euro-Atlantic region occupy an important 
position in both Russian and Turkish foreign policy, especially in the economic realm 
but also with regard to these countries’ historical and political development. 
Furthermore, the Asia-Pacific region started to attract more attention from Russian 
policy-makers due to economic considerations as well as current political 
developments in Europe. For Turkey, the Middle East and the lands of the former 
Ottoman Empire increasingly are a central geopolitical zone on the basis of the 
country’s civilisational identity and historical legacy. 
 
The concept of Eurasia is a central feature in Russian and, to a lesser degree, Turkish 
government discourse. It is also an instrumental concept in that it allows the attribution 
of different characteristics to Russian and Turkish foreign policy. As such, Eurasia 
functions as an important zone for Russia’s and Turkey’s economic development, their 
political power or role as powerful and influential players in the international system. 
Most importantly, for both Russia and Turkey, Eurasia is thus a flexible concept which 
is being shaped and re-shaped by the governing elite’s discourse on the basis of 
changing geopolitical visions. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Eurasia is what Russia and Turkey make of it. Eurasia is a contested zone, a contested 
concept. There is no single Eurasia but many Eurasias. Its importance lies in the 
imagination of foreign-policy making elites. Russia and Turkey decide what Eurasia 
is about and therefore it is important to analyse the way in which Russia and Turkey 
attribute meaning to it. This thesis argues that geography is more than a fixed entity, 
that it is a structure upon which meaning is attached through discourses by different 
actors. The way in which geography is seen, the boundaries it sets and the options it 
offers, varies according to the geopolitical imagination of a state’s governing elite. 
 
This thesis argues against a deterministic interpretation of geography. For instance, a 
country’s position on the global map, for instance, does not determine what kind of 
foreign policy it will conduct, which alliances it will engage and what its ideological 
foundation will be. In that sense, geography has more than one dimension. There is 
indeed the physical dimension, however, there are also a number of other factors, such 
as historical, cultural and political elements which are attached to a specific 
geographical location. With regard to international relations, geography does not exist 
in an ideational vacuum, but is being attributed meaning through the actions and 
discourses of a variety of actors. 
8.1 The Meaning of Eurasia 
Eurasia is not a fixed entity. Eurasia serves as a flexible concept which is being shaped 
and re-shaped through the discourse of Russia’s and Turkey’s governing elite. It is 
through this discourse that Eurasia takes on meaning. Changing geopolitical visions 
lead to different meanings of Eurasia. Political developments and global events 
influence the way in which Russia and Turkey perceive their position in the global 
system. Their respective geopolitical imagination is fluid and so is the concept of the 
geopolitical space of Eurasia. Eurasia is not the same for Russia and Turkey. When 
the governing elites speak about Eurasia, they might refer to the same region, but they 




For Russia, Eurasia is crucial, a foundational idea for the state’s position in global 
affairs and for its foreign policy. For Turkey, Eurasia is less important, given that the 
state currently emphasises other geographical imaginations. However, in both cases, 
the interpretation of Eurasia can change at any moment and it can become a very 
different concept, acquire a new meaning or also lose its relevance. At the same time, 
what exactly Eurasia means, where it is located, and, for example, which states are part 
of it, is subject to interpretation and changes. 
8.1.1 Russia 
As we have seen, there exist other geopolitical imaginaries in Russia such as discourses 
about the Euro-Atlantic or the Asia-Pacific region. Of course Eurasia does not exist in 
a vacuum. However, the essential and unique feature of Eurasia in Russian discourse 
is its almost uncontested nature. In that sense, Eurasia is the geopolitical space which 
Russia claims to control and where it does not have to subjugate to the hegemonic 
order of another state actor. That this is a concern becomes clear in Russia’s discourse 
on the Euro-Atlantic, where Russia sought to position itself on par with the US and the 
EU, calling for a ‘triple understanding’ between these actors.1 Indeed, as I argued 
elsewhere, Russia strived for integration in the Euro-Atlantic space and argued for a 
balance between the US, the EU and Russia, a tripartite understanding, which would 
have cemented the status of each with mutual recognition. Since the Ukraine crisis put 
an end to such ideas, the importance of Eurasia increased.2 
 
Keeping in mind the underlying concern of Russia’s governing elite, namely gaining 
recognition of Russia’s status as a great power, it is crucial to be able to claim its own 
hegemonic geopolitical space, which in addition also acts as a counterhegemonic 
project to the dominant Western neoliberal space. Eurasia thus comes to exemplify 
Russian exceptionalism essentially acting as a justification for Russia to be recognised 
as a great power. Lewis, who studies the evolution of the concept of Greater Eurasia, 
argues that the value of this idea lies in providing a ‘discursive frame for a Russian 
elite that has the self-confidence to articulate not only a new Russian identity in 
international affairs but a new world order in which Russia plays a leading role’.3 
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Furthermore, Eurasia, or any geopolitical vision outlined by the governing elite, can 
develop into something bigger, finding appeal in other states. Lewis argues that the 
values attached to the Greater Eurasia project could find sympathisers in many regions 
and states from the West to the East, leading to a new formation of like-minded states.4 
Precisely this is the value of geopolitical concepts and how they are discursively 
shaped into something which fits several purposes and caters to a variety of audiences. 
Hence, Eurasia as a geopolitical space functions as a counterhegemonic narrative and 
idea, providing the Russian elite with a framework and vision for the future 
development of their country. 
8.1.2 Turkey 
Turkey occupies an uneasy position in Eurasia. At times, especially in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, the country’s governing elite claimed to be a central Eurasian country and 
attempted to foster special ties to the newly independent Central Asian republics. More 
recently, however, the focus of Turkey’s geopolitical imagination has shifted, and the 
Middle Eastern region moved to the centre of Turkish foreign policy. As we have seen 
in previous chapters, there is a number of reasons for this shift and with regard to the 
governing elite’s discourse, the shift was clearly identifiable with a decrease in the 
discourse’s intensity. Yet, what is important to note with the idea of geography as a 
discursive practice, is its fleeting nature. This opens up different realms and 
developmental options for Turkey, all essentially contributing to the idea of the 
country’s central status. Turkey’s governing elite can easily fall back on previous 
Eurasian discourses to claim a new role for their country in the region, or they can 
simply redefine what Eurasia means for them and adjust their foreign policy 
accordingly.  
 
This has potentially relevant consequences. Turkey currently seems to have scaled 
down its interests in Eurasia and consequently its challenge to Russia’s position in the 
region. However, both discursively and with its actions, Turkey could easily and 
quickly change its stance and start to put more emphasis on its Eurasian vector or 
identity. For example, Turkey could step up its defence of ethnic Turkic communities 
in Eurasia, such as the Crimean Tatars (who were opposed to Russia’s annexation of 
                                                 
4 Lewis 2018: 1633. 
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Crimea) or engage more closely with Muslim communities in Russia’s north 
Caucasus. This would potentially lead to the emergence of two concepts of Eurasia 
and two diverging geopolitical imaginations of what Eurasia is and means. Both of 
them authentic in their own sense, yet in conflict with each other. Neither of the states 
could claim ownership over a supposedly objective and fixed geographical entity 
called Eurasia. Considering the profound ideological and ideational meaning of 
Eurasia for Russia, such a shift in Turkey’s position would presumably be followed by 
a growing competition and potentially conflict between the countries, the potential 
negative consequences of which are difficult to assess. 
8.2 Summary of main findings 
Two countries, Russia and Turkey, and their discourse on the geopolitical space of 
Eurasia, were analysed in this thesis. I have argued that Russia and Turkey see 
themselves as important countries, not only in regional but also global politics, 
pursuing the objective to achieve a status of powerful and central countries in the 
international order. The foundation for this vision is built by their respective historical 
experience as centres of regional and global empires, as well as their geographical 
position at the centre of and in-between different continents and regions. In the case of 
Russia, its status as a global great power and its role as a balancing force in the 
multipolar international system are key concepts in the governing elite’s geopolitical 
imagination. Similarly, the vision of Turkey as a central country, in geographical terms 
as well based on a civilisational reading as the leader of its civilisational basin, is a 
crucial element in guiding the country’s foreign policy.  
 
The geopolitical space of Eurasia occupies a place in both Russia’s and Turkey’s 
foreign policy vision. However, as this thesis has demonstrated, the importance and 
centrality of the concept of Eurasia differs considerably from one country to the other. 
For Turkey, Eurasia is essentially a pragmatic geopolitical concept which is linked to 
the country’s geographically central position between different continents. It is this 
centrality and the concomitant status of a ‘central country’, which in turn provides 
Turkey with an important role in global affairs. For Russia, Eurasia gradually became 
more important as its exclusive sphere of influence, but also as the geopolitical region 
in which its future political and economic development is grounded. As the centre and 
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leader of Eurasia, which Russia vocally claims to be, Russia gains the position as one 
of the global great powers and thus as a crucial actor on the global stage. The ways in 
which Eurasia is characterised in the discourse of Russian and Turkish governing elites 
and which are the main elements of this discourse on Eurasia have formed the core of 
the analysis presented herein. 
8.2.1 Russia  
The analysis of Russia’s Eurasian discourse was structured along four themes which 
were dominant in the discourse. First, geography or Russia’s geographical location. 
Second, history or Russia’s historical experience. Third, culture and cultural links 
across Eurasia. Fourth, the economy, that is the economic potential of Eurasia and the 
need for regional integration. Each of these themes was frequently emphasised by 
Russia’s governing elite at various points in their discourse and they also remained 
constant, albeit to different degrees, in the evolution of the discourse. 
 
In general, geography is an important element in Russian foreign policy and discourse. 
The fact that Russia is the biggest country on earth is central and the concomitant 
geographical reality for Russia’s governing elite is that Russia belongs to different 
geographical regions, while the nucleus of Russia’s geographical power lies in Eurasia. 
A function of its Eurasian location, Russia also acts as a link between the Euro-Atlantic 
region in the west and the Asia-Pacific region in the east. However, the fact that 
Russia’s governing elite perceives their country to be at the centre of Eurasia is of 
utmost importance, not only in terms of defining the country geographically but also 
because it offers real opportunities. As such, the geographical location at the centre of 
Eurasia acts as a promise for Russia’s future economic development, be it as part of 
the EAEU or as an important link in East-West trade. In political terms, Eurasia is also 
crucial, as the foundation for Russia’s self-understanding as a great global power. 
 
Russia’s past experiences and its history as a regional and global empire left an imprint 
on the geopolitical imagination of Russia’s governing elite and thus influences foreign 
policy. A central element in this regard is Eurasia, the place where Russia’s imperial 
past is grounded. Russia’s governing elite perceives a special link to the peoples in 
Eurasia and the countries which emerged from Russia’s former imperial lands. The 
post-Soviet states occupy a special position in this regard, being considered a political 
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and historic community by the Russian leadership. Hence, Eurasia and the historic 
community formed by countries in Eurasia, which are all linked to Russia, is crucial 
for the future development of Russia and the Eurasian region. 
 
The structure of the international system is a major concern for Russia’s governing 
elite. As we have seen, they characterise it as a multipolar system (or in their words, 
polycentric), while Russia, as the centre of Eurasia, acts as one of the poles. In this 
context, the theme of the economy and economic integration is fundamental. Regional 
economic integration is important for Russia to retain its role as the leader of the 
Eurasian region. Hence, the importance of Eurasia is not only tied to the potential for 
the future economic development of Russia, but also to its survival in an increasingly 
interconnected and multipolar world. The fact that Eurasia is characterised as an 
independent region in the international system, also thanks to its own regional 
integration scheme, in combination with Russia’s dominant position in the region, is 
an essential element in Russian government discourse on Eurasia. 
 
After Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, the theme of economic integration in 
Eurasia took centre stage. Being of course strongly infused by historical and 
geographical references to Eurasia, this discourse served the purpose to paint a 
particular image of Russia in the 21st century. For Russia’s governing elite, the 
geopolitical space of Eurasia serves as the foundation for the future development of 
Russia. Being the motor of development for the entire Eurasian region, elevates 
Russia’s position and provides it with the status as a global great power.  
 
The Eurasian Union acts as the vehicle for Russian influence in Eurasia. In addition, 
it provides a link to other regions through the idea of integrating the various existing 
regional integration schemes. Eurasia is thus one of the poles or geopolitical regions 
in the new global system. The idea of the existence of a competition between 
geopolitical zones, as expressed by President Putin,5 gained new impetus in the 
aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, starting in 2013, which marked the culmination of 
tensions between Russia and the West, leading to an unprecedented low in their 
relations. Previously, Russia’s governing elite spoke about Russia’s belonging to 
                                                 
5 Putin 2013 
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various geopolitical regions, including the Euro-Atlantic and the Asia-Pacific. 
However, events in Ukraine demonstrated to Russia’s leadership the impossibility of 
integration within the structures of the Euro-Atlantic. The Ukraine crisis and the 
problematic relationship between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community more 
generally, has epitomised these sentiments and Eurasia’s value to Russia. The idea of 
Eurasia as a Russia-dominated space which acts as a pushback against the encroaching 
Western world and institutions, such as the EU and NATO, while at the same time 
offering an alternative model for development against the neoliberal world order, has 
emerged as a central narrative in Russian foreign policy. Political events, taking place 
inside as well as outside Russia, thus have an important impact and influence on the 
Russian governing elite’s geopolitical imagination and consequently determine the 
way in which Eurasia is conceptualised by said elite. 
 
The essence of the geopolitical imagination of Russia’s governing elite consists of 
seeing Russia, as a global great power, stuck in competition with other great powers. 
Being at the centre of Eurasia and simultaneously the leader of the Eurasian region is 
a crucial element in this context. This position serves as the backbone for Russian 
power projection while at the same time offering actual economic and political 
opportunities. Hence, Eurasia is also important for the future development of Russia. 
All this put together, leads to a vision of Russia as the quintessential Eurasian country 
and the centre of gravity for the entire Eurasian region, which guarantees it the 
continued status as one of the principal poles and great powers in the current 
international system. 
8.2.2 Turkey 
In Turkish elite discourse on Eurasia, four themes are central: geography, history, 
culture and economy. Of these themes, geographical elements are predominant. 
Turkey is described as a central country on the basis of its geographical location at the 
intersection of Europe, Asia and the Middle East. In this regard, Turkey perfectly fits 
the description of a Eurasian country. Under Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, the 
geopolitical concept of Afro-Eurasia became the foundation of Turkey’s geopolitical 
imagination. The combination of Turkey’s geographically strategic position in 
conjunction with its role in the cultural and historical development of the Afro-
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Eurasian region, occupies an important place in the discourse of Turkey’s governing 
elite. 
 
While geography, or Turkey’s geographic location, serves as the foundation for 
Turkey’s role in Eurasia, its historical experience as the former centre of a regional 
empire and the ensuing cultural and ethnic links to countries in the vast Eurasia region, 
further positions Turkey as an important actor in Eurasia. This is particularly visible 
in Turkish elite discourse with reference to the countries of Central Asia. On the basis 
of ethnic and kinship ties, a special relationship and even responsibility for these 
countries is described. As a result of this unique position, Turkey at times aimed to 
play an active and formative role in Eurasia. Hence, cultural and historical arguments 
add weight and substance to the geographical argument in supporting the 
characterisation of Turkey as a central country in Eurasia. 
 
The final theme, the economy, combines all the elements in Turkey’s Eurasian 
discourse. While generally speaking, Turkey’s Eurasian position in-between the East 
and the West is described as an advantage for the country’s political and economic 
development, at the forefront of Turkish government discourse on Eurasia with regard 
to the economy stands the issue of energy. As such, Turkey aims to act as an important 
energy hub and transit country. The discourse of Turkey’s governing elite paints an 
image of Turkey as a Eurasian energy bridge. Exploiting its various links to energy-
rich countries in the Eurasian region, Turkey’s leadership sees opportunities for its 
country to benefit economically, while at the same time enhancing its status as an 
influential regional player. Future opportunities and pragmatic economic 
considerations are principal elements increasing the meaning of Eurasia for Turkey. 
 
Various exponents of Turkey’s governing elite evoked geopolitical images, such as 
Turkey as a central country and Turkey as a bridge, and they have become fixed 
notions in Turkish conceptions of Eurasia. What becomes clear is that Turkey does not 
consider Eurasia to be a defining trait in terms of its national identity. In general, 
Turkey’s identity oscillated between multiple identities such as European, Eurasian, 
or Middle Eastern. However, over the years, and in particular due to the increasing 
influence of Ahmet Davutoğlu, this multiple identity evolved into one dominant 
identity, namely that of Turkey as a Afro-Eurasian country. What this meant in terms 
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of policy was an increased focus on Turkey’s regional environment and its historical 
Ottoman territories while emphasising the country’s geographical uniqueness as a 
defining feature. 
 
The place and importance of Eurasia in Turkish elite discourse from 2002 to 2015 was 
not stable. Broadly two distinct periods can be identified: the early years of the AKP’s 
rule, followed by the period marked by the ascension of Davutoğlu (although he is not 
to be credited alone for the change in discourse) as well as the cementation of the 
AKP’s power in Turkey. In general, pragmatic considerations are at the centre of 
Turkey’s Eurasian discourse. This was especially true in the early period. During this 
period, Turkey developed close relations with Western partners and aimed to benefit 
from its geographical location and ties to countries in Eurasia, and especially in Central 
Asia, by acting as a link between Europe and this region. Over the years, however, the 
focus of the Turkish governing elite’s geopolitical imagination shifted to a stronger 
emphasis on civilisational geopolitics. The former territories of the Ottoman Empire, 
as well as the MENA region more generally, gained importance. While Turkey’s 
leadership foresaw a more prominent role for their country globally as an influential 
actor, its geopolitical vision was enlarged. The concept of Afro-Eurasia and Turkey’s 
location at the centre of this geopolitical space became determinant factors. Hence, the 
Turkish discourse on Eurasia reveals the perception by the governing elite of Turkey 
as a crucial country sitting in-between different regions and cultures, while linking 
them to each other. 
 
At the foundation of Turkish foreign policy is the understanding by the governing elite 
that Turkey occupies the position of a central country and concomitantly as an 
influential global actor. This is primarily based on a geopolitical reading of Turkey’s 
position at the centre of (Afro-)Eurasia. However, this is also coupled with a historical 
understanding, because the country’s legacy as the heir of the Ottoman Empire and its 
role as a bridge between civilisations, positions Turkey as the leader of its own 
civilisational basin. Hence, Turkey’s central position, which is also related to Eurasia 
both geographically and culturally, provides the country with manifold links to other 




In addition to strong cultural and ethnic links to countries in the vast Eurasian region 
as well as Turkey’s historical weight as former imperial power, this elevates Turkey 
to the status of a central country in global affairs. What is more, serving as a link 
between East and West, both with regard to civilisational dialogue between different 
cultures as well as based on economic considerations and Turkey’s role as energy hub, 
positions Turkey as an important piece in the formation of an interconnected Eurasia. 
8.3 Geopolitical space as a discursive concept 
At the centre of this thesis was a critical geopolitical analysis of the meaning of Eurasia 
for Russia and Turkey. As stated at the outset, two objectives were central to this 
research. First, to analyse the importance of the place of Eurasia in Russia’s and 
Turkey’s foreign policy outlook in terms of their regional and geographical orientation, 
and more generally, in Russian and Turkish self-perception of their place in the 
international system. The purpose was to contribute to a deeper understanding of the 
nuances of Russia’s and Turkey’s geopolitical discourses and imaginaries. The second 
objective was to study the concept of ‘geopolitical space’ and the way in which 
geographical and geopolitical imaginations influence Russian and Turkish foreign 
policy, thus essentially uncovering the structures of meaning within the Russian and 
Turkish foreign policy elite. 
 
Traditional geopolitics is static in that it is considered essentially as being related to 
statecraft with the aim to gain political power through the exploitation of geography. 
Similarly, geographic determinism, such as often in display in more popular 
descriptions of global politics,6 postulates that geography determines the way in which 
political leaders think about their state’s position and options in world politics. For 
example, Russia’s historical expansion into Eastern Europe or its current policies in 
Eurasia with regard to its neighbours in the East, such as in Ukraine but also with 
regard to Belarus, is explained by the need for Russia to gain strategic depth and 
control territories which, in the case of war, prevent external aggressors to reach the 
Russian heartland.7 While such arguments and geographical imaginaries might 
                                                 
6 See for example such popular books like Kaplan 2012 or Marshall 2015, who basically argue that 
looking at maps is sufficient to understand (and even foresee) international relations and global 
conflicts. 
7 See Marshall 2015: 11-39 for his detailed discussion of Russia’s geopolitical predicament. 
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contribute to an understanding of Russia’s geopolitical imagination and its foreign 
policy, they are by no means the only explanation. Ignoring the emotional and cultural 
aspects of Russian foreign policy, the beliefs and visions of the state’s leaders will 
only present a partial image. 
 
Geographic determinism fails to account for what Toal defined as ‘geopolitical 
culture’, namely ‘how states see the world, how they spatialize it and strategize about 
the fundamental tasks of the state’.8 This thesis contributes to the critique of classical 
geopolitical thought in that it highlights how geopolitical imaginations are influenced 
by a variety of factors, ranging for example from political to historical and cultural 
factors, as well as how they evolve in relation to the outside world. Hence, the concept 
of Eurasia is not necessarily identical in the Russian and Turkish imaginary and it is 
not a static entity.  
 
A central element in this regard is the notion of geopolitical space as a discursive 
concept. This places the emphasis on actors, in this case the Russian and Turkish 
governing elite, and the way in which they comprehend their geographical 
environment. This thesis thus agrees with Toal, who argued that ‘there is no objective 
relationship between the geographic location of a territorial entity and its geopolitical 
culture. Geography as earthly location and resource endowment is what states make of 
it’.9 What follows from this is that in order to analyse and understand the meaning of 
Eurasia for Russian and Turkish foreign policy, we have to look at it from the angle of 
the governing elite’s geopolitical imagination. Hence, I argue that Eurasia as a 
geopolitical concept, is a construct which functions primarily in the discursive realm 
for it to take on any significance. 
 
The notion of geopolitical space is not new. As an analytical concept it is flexible and 
broad and can thus serve many purposes. Hence, every country has its geopolitical 
spaces to which it attributes meaning in relation to current priorities and foreign policy 
principles. The analytical value of the concept is precisely this, namely that it is a 
discursive concept which changes (or can be changed) and which is inherently linked 
                                                 
8 Toal 2017: 10 
9 Toal 2017: 40 
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to and attached to a country’s geopolitical culture and geopolitical imagination as well 
as its foreign policy. 
 
Although discourse is a central element in critical geopolitics, there remains a gap in 
presenting methodologically thorough applications of the concept in research. Or, to 
put it differently, there exist a variety of ways of doing discourse analysis. Indeed, as 
Müller argues, ‘there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the analysis of discourse. Every 
discourse analytic methodology must be attuned to the different requirements and aims 
of the respective case study’.10 What this calls for is a transparent description of the 
framework or approach chosen by the researcher. I developed and applied a two-step 
model clearly outlining a potential framework for doing critical geopolitical discourse 
analysis in the field of International Relations. Its application to the study of foreign 
policy builds upon and contributes to the advancement of future studies linking the 
fields of critical geopolitics and foreign policy analysis. Even though critical 
geopolitics is not interested in positivist research methodologies, introducing an 
explanatory variable into discourse analysis fosters a more practice-oriented research, 
aimed at not only uncovering structures of meaning in a state’s foreign policy, but 
trying to explain the origins, impact and potential consequences of these structures. 
 
Critical geopolitics focuses on actors and how they attribute value to places and it 
considers geopolitics not as a given, but as an ideological and politicised form of 
analysis. Russia and Turkey are not what Eurasia makes of them, but Eurasia is what 
Russia and Turkey make of it. This thesis aimed to demonstrate that geopolitical 
visions are shaped by the ideas and identities of actors, in this case Russia’s and 
Turkey’s governing elites, and are not given by the geographical realities of these 
countries. The analysis above illustrated how the meaning of Eurasia changed and 
evolved over time and how certain events (which might or might not be related to 
Eurasia) or political beliefs influenced the way in which Eurasia was conceptualised. 
Hence, we cannot expect to know what Eurasia will mean for Russia and Turkey in 
the future and what form or shape it will take in these countries’ elites’ geopolitical 
imagination. For policy-makers, especially in the West, this might be an unsatisfactory 
outlook, because they want to know what Russia or what Turkey are going to make 
                                                 
10 Müller 2010: 15 
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next. If it is their ambition to understand Russia’s and Turkey’s geopolitical visions, 
they need to continue to listen to what these actors actually say, how they say it and 
how it is received by the audience in question. 
 
An additional point is that Russian and Turkish discourse on Eurasia do not evolve in 
a vacuum. The way in which these states define their identity and define the 
geopolitical space of Eurasia, also has implications for the West and above all for 
Europe. There is a dialectical relationship between discourses. Morozov and Rumelili, 
for example, have used Russia’s and Turkey’s European discourse to demonstrate how 
Russia and Turkey have contributed to the construction of Europe’s identity through 
‘the historically varying ways in which Turkey and Russia, as Europe’s liminal Others, 
have responded to discourses on European identity through their own representational 
practices’.11 Hence, in presenting their definition and interpretation of the space of 
Eurasia, Russia and Turkey influence the discursive space of other actors, such as the 
EU and other Western institutions, and influence their own identity-building. 
 
In the case of Turkey, for example, the discourse on Eurasia has been labelled as a 
pragmatic discourse focusing on the positive effects of Turkey’s Eurasian location for 
its status in global affairs but also for its relationship with Europe in portraying Turkey 
as an important link between Europe and Eurasia. In that sense, Turkey’s Eurasian 
discourse is a transcending discourse. It is not geared towards challenging the West 
but finding a place for itself in that West,12 while transforming the Western discourse 
on a civilisational and cultural basis. In the case of Russia, Eurasia functions as a 
counterhegemonic discourse portraying Russia as a great power, as the leader of the 
‘geopolitical zone’ of Eurasia. This wasn’t always the case. At first, Russia’s 
governing elite emphasised the cooperative nature of the Eurasian integration project 
and the need for positive relations with the EU. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov for 
example called for ‘the integration of integrations’, meaning the convergence of 
European and Eurasian integration projects.13 However, since the Ukraine crisis, the 
discourse has become competitive and much more value-based, offering an alternative 
model for state development to the Western model and thus challenging the Western 
                                                 
11 Morozov and Rumelili 2012: 29 
12 One might argue that technically, as a member of NATO, Turkey is already part of the West. 
13 Lavrov 2014e 
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discourse. The Russian Eurasia discourse thus has a dialectical impact on the Western 
hegemonic discourse in that it contributes to the consolidation of this discourse in the 
Western community and reinforces the boundaries between the discourses and indeed 
between Russia and the West. 
 
In current geopolitical debates, Russia is often characterised as the Eurasian empire, a 
role it has held for the last few centuries. However, Eurasia is not just the new form of 
Russian empire, there is more to it. And of course, there are also other states which 
claim agency in Eurasia, not only Turkey, which has been treated in this thesis, but 
countless other states, for example China or Kazakhstan, as well as social groups. 
Eurasia has to be considered as a ‘geopolitical field’ in the understanding of Toal, 
namely as ‘the sociospatial context of statecraft and the social players, rules, and 
spatial dynamics constituting the arena’.14 Eurasia is subtle and nuanced, as this thesis 
set out to demonstrate. 
 
The value of this research thus lies in its emphasis on the limits of binary 
representations of geography and politics and the need for analytical flexibility. The 
way in which Russia and Turkey act, is not purely determined by supposed 
geographical realities, but by the way in which these realities are articulated, 
interpreted and transformed by the Russian and Turkish governing elite. Indeed, 
Eurasia is what Russia and Turkey make of it. 
 
                                                 
14 Toal 2017: 9 
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Chapter 10: Appendix 
Below is the complete list of all the collected speeches and interviews of Russian and 
Turkish government officials in chronological order and in the standard format year-
mm-dd-speaker-occasion. The documents that have been used in the discourse analysis 
are referenced in the reference list (see 9.1 Primary sources). 
10.1. Russia: speeches, interviews and articles 
1) 2000-06-02-Putin-Interview with NBC News Channel 
2) 2000-07-08-Putin-Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian 
Federation 
3) 2000-07-16-Putin-Interview with Renmin Ribao, News Agency Xinhua and 
RTR TV Company 
4) 2001-01-26-Putin-Remarks at a Meeting of Top Members of the Russian 
Diplomatic Service 
5) 2001-02-04-S.Ivanov-Speech at the 37th Munich Conference on Security 
Policy 
6) 2001-04-03-Putin-Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian 
Federation 
7) 2001-07-16-Putin-Interview with Corriere della Sera 
8) 2001-07-18-Putin-Press Conference for Russian and Foreign Journalists 
9) 2001-09-19-Putin-Interview with the Focus Magazine 
10) 2001-09-21-I.Ivanov-Speech at Nixon Institute Washington 
11) 2001-11-14-Putin-Speech at Rice University 
12) 2002-01-15-Putin-Interview with Gazeta Wyborcza and TVP Channel 
13) 2002-02-03-S.Ivanov-Speech at the 38th Munich Conference on Security 
Policy 
14) 2002-04-18-Putin-Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian 
Federation 
15) 2002-05-06-I.Ivanov-Speech at Meeting of Foreign Ministers of States of the 
SCO 
16) 2002-05-22-Putin-Remarks at State Council Presidium Meeting on Foreign 
Policy Issue 
17) 2002-06-24-Putin-News Conference for Russian and Foreign Journalists 
18) 2002-07-12-Putin-Speech to Heads of Russian Diplomatic Missions Abroad 
19) 2002-07-31-I.Ivanov-Speech at the 9th Session of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum 
20) 2002-12-03-Putin-Speech at Beijing University 
21) 2003-02-08-S.Ivanov-Speech at the 39th Munich Conference on Security 
Policy 
22) 2003-03-26-I.Ivanov-Speech at Federation Council Meeting 
23) 2003-05-16-Putin-Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian 
Federation 
24) 2003-06-20-Putin-Press Conference with Russian and Foreign Media 
25) 2003-07-03-Putin-Interview with the Malaysian New Straits Times 
26) 2003-09-01-I.Ivanov-Speech at MGIMO 
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27) 2003-09-25-Putin-Speech at the 58th session of the UNGA 
28) 2003-10-04-Putin-Interview with New York Times 
29) 2003-10-16-Putin-Speech at OIC Summit 
30) 2003-11-25-Putin-Address at a Meeting of the Presidential Council for 
Culture and Art 
31) 2003-11-26-Putin-Speech at Columbia University 
32) 2004-02-07-S.Ivanov-Speech at the 40th Munich Conference on Security 
Policy 
33) 2004-05-26-Putin-Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian 
Federation 
34) 2004-07-09-Lavrov-Interview with Rossiiskaya Gazeta  
35) 2004-07-12-Putin-Speech at Russian Federation Ambassadors and Permanent 
Representatives Meeting 
36) 2004-07-13-S.Ivanov-Speech at IISS 
37) 2004-09-09-Lavrov-Interview with Voice of Russia Radio Station 
38) 2004-09-09-Lavrov-Interview with Vremya Novostei 
39) 2004-09-10-Lavrov-Interview with Al-Jazeera TV Channel 
40) 2004-12-03-Putin-Speech at a Conference in the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial 
Foundation 
41) 2004-12-23-Putin-Press Conference with Russian and Foreign Media 
42) 2005-02-12-S.Ivanov-Speech at the 41st Munich Conference on Security 
Policy 
43) 2005-04-25-Putin-Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian 
Federation 
44) 2005-05-03-Lavrov-Interview with Political Journal 
45) 2005-05-16-Lavrov-Speech at the Third Summit of the Council of Europe 
46) 2005-05-21-Lavrov-Speech at State Duma Session 
47) 2005-09-15-Putin-Speech at the 60th Session of the UN General Assembly 
48) 2005-10-31-Putin-Interview with Television Channel Nederland 1 and 
Newspaper NRC Handelsblad 
49) 2005-12-06-Lavrov-Speech at OSCE Ministerial Council 
50) 2006-01-31-Putin-Press Conference for the Russian and Foreign Media 
51) 2006-02-05-S.Ivanov-Speech at the 42nd Munich Conference on Security 
Policy 
52) 2006-03-08-Lavrov-Interview with Rossia TV Channel 
53) 2006-03-15-Lavrov-Interview with Arab Media 
54) 2006-05-10-Putin-Annual Address to the Federal Assembly 
55) 2006-06-27-Putin-Speech at Meeting with the Ambassadors and Permanent 
Representatives of the Russian Federation 
56) 2006-09-09-Putin-Meeting with Members of the Valdai International 
Discussion Club 
57) 2006-12-04-Lavrov-Speech at OSCE Ministerial Council 
58) 2007-01-18-Putin-Interview for Indian Television Channel Doordarshan and 
Press Trust of India News Agency 
59) 2007-02-01-Putin-Press Conference with the Russian and Foreign Media 
60) 2007-02-10-Putin-Interview with Al-Jazeera 
61) 2007-02-10-Putin-Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy 
62) 2007-02-11-S.Ivanov-Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security 
Policy 
63) 2007-02-28-Lavrov-Interview Rossiiskaya Gazeta 
64) 2007-03-17-Lavrov-Speech at the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy 
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65) 2007-04-26-Putin-Annual Address to the Federal Assembly 
66) 2007-05-13-Lavrov-The Present and the Future of Global Politics-Article in 
Russia in Global Affairs 
67) 2007-07-09-Lavrov-Speech at SCO Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting 
68) 2007-09-03-Lavrov-Speech at MGIMO 
69) 2007-09-14-Putin-Meeting with Members of the Valdai International 
Discussion Club 
70) 2007-10-24-Lavrov-Interview with Helsingin Sanomat 
71) 2007-11-26-Lavrov-Interview with Magazine Itogi 
72) 2007-11-29-Lavrov-Speech at OSCE Ministerial Council 
73) 2007-12-19-Putin-Interview with TIME Magazine 
74) 2007-12-26-Lavrov-Interview with Vremya Novostei 
75) 2008-02-10-S.Ivanov-Speech at the 44th Munich Conference on Security 
Policy 
76) 2008-02-14-Putin-Press Conference with Russian and Foreign Media 
77) 2008-03-31-Lavrov-Interview with Izvestia 
78) 2008-05-07-Medvedev-Speech at Inauguration Ceremony as President of 
Russia 
79) 2008-05-22-Medvedev-Interview with Chinese Media 
80) 2008-06-25-Medvedev-Interview with Reuters 
81) 2008-07-03-Medvedev-Interview with journalists from the G8 countries 
82) 2008-07-15-Medvedev-Speech at the Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and 
Permanent Representatives to International Organisations 
83) 2008-08-28-Medvedev-Speech at a Meeting of the Council of Heads of State 
of the SCO 
84) 2008-09-12-Medvedev-Meeting with the Participants in the International Club 
Valdai 
85) 2008-09-01-Lavrov-Speech at MGIMO 
86) 2008-09-11-Putin-Meeting with Valdai International Discussion Club 
87) 2008-10-08-Medvedev-Speech at World Policy Conference 
88) 2008-10-25-Lavrov-Speech at the Bergedorf Forum 
89) 2008-11-05-Medvedev-Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian 
Federation 
90) 2008-11-13-Medvedev-Interview to Le Figaro 
91) 2008-11-15-Medvedev-Speech at the G-20 Summit 
92) 2008-12-05-Lavrov-Speech at the OSCE Ministerial Council 
93) 2009-02-06-S.Ivanov-Speech at the 45th Munich Conference on Security 
Policy 
94) 2009-03-25-Lavrov-Interview with Financial Times 
95) 2009-03-29-Medvedev-Interview with BBC 
96) 2009-04-06-Lavrov-Interview with Rossiiskaya Gazeta 
97) 2009-04-09-Lavrov-Interview with RIA Novosti, the Voice of Russia Radio 
Station and the Russia Today TV 
98) 2009-04-10-Lavrov-Interview with Interstate Television and Radio Company 
‘Mir’ 
99) 2009-04-13-Medvedev-Interview with Novaya Gazeta 
100) 2009-04-20-Medvedev-Speech at Helsinki University 
101) 2009-04-23-Lavrov-Interview with BBC Russian Service 
102) 2009-05-16-Medvedev-Interview with Rossiya TV Channel 
103) 2009-06-03-Medvedev-Interview to CNBC TV channel 
104) 2009-06-15-Medvedev-Interview to the China Central TV Host 
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105) 2009-07-05-Medvedev-Interview to RAI and Corriere della Sera 
106) 2009-09-10-Medvedev-Article Go Russia! 
107) 2009-09-15-Medvedev-Meeting with Valdai International Discussion Club 
Participants 
108) 2009-09-18-Medvedev-Interview for the Swiss Media 
109) 2009-09-20-Medvedev-Interview with CNN 
110) 2009-10-16-Lavrov-Interview with RIA Novosti News Agency, Russia Today 
TV and Voice of Russia Radio Station 
111) 2009-11-12-Medvedev-Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian 
Federation 
112) 2009-12-01-Lavrov-Speech at the OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting 
113) 2010-02-06-S.Ivanov-Speech at the 46th Munich Conference on Security 
Policy 
114) 2010-02-06-Lavrov-Speech at the 46th Munich Security Conference 
115) 2010-02-25-Lavrov-Interview with RIA Novosti, Russia Today TV and Voice 
of Russia Radio Station 
116) 2010-03-05-Lavrov-Speech CIS Member States International Economic 
Forum 
117) 2010-04-12-Medvedev-Interview with ABC News TV channel 
118) 2010-05-07-Medvedev-Interview with Izvestia Newspaper 
119) 2010-05-21-Putin-Speech at meeting of the EurAsEC Interstate Council’s 
heads of government 
120) 2010-06-11-Lavrov-Interview with Kommersant 
121) 2010-07-07-Lavrov-Interview with Mir Television and Radio Company 
122) 2010-07-12-Medvedev-Speech at the Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and 
Permanent Representatives to International Organisations 
123) 2010-11-30-Medvedev-Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian 
Federation 
124) 2010-12-06-Medvedev-Interview to Polish media 
125) 2011-01-26-Medvedev-Speech at the WEF in Davos 
126) 2011-04-12-Medvedev-Interview with China Central Television 
127) 2011-04-13-Lavrov-Interview with Xinhua News Agency 
128) 2011-05-18-Medvedev-News conference by President of Russia 
129) 2011-06-01-Lavrov-Interview with Bloomberg 
130) 2011-06-20-Medvedev-Interview with Financial Times 
131) 2011-06-30-Lavrov-Speech at Meeting of the Committee on International 
Affairs of the State Duma 
132) 2011-07-07-Lavrov-Interview with Vesti 24 Television Channel 
133) 2011-09-01-Lavrov-Speech at MGIMO University 
134) 2011-09-27-Lavrov-Interview with Rossiya 24 TV Channel 
135) 2011-09-27-Lavrov-Speech at the 66th Session of the UN General Assembly 
136) 2011-10-04-Putin-Article in Izvestia: A New Integration Project for Eurasia 
137) 2011-11-07-Putin-Speech at meeting of the SCO heads of government 
138) 2011-12-22-Medvedev-Address to the Federal Assembly 
139) 2011-12-23-Lavrov-Interview with Reuters 
140) 2011-12-26-Lavrov-Interview with Interfax News Agency 
141) 2012-01-23-Putin-Article in Nezavisimaya Gazeta: The Ethnicity Issue 
142) 2012-01-27-Lavrov-Interview with Izvestia 
143) 2012-02-27-Putin-Article in Moskovskiye Novosti: Russia and the changing 
world 
144) 2012-03-20-Lavrov-Interview with Kommersant FM Radio Station 
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145) 2012-03-23-Medvedev-Speech at RIAC conference 
146) 2012-04-26-Medvedev-Interview to Russian TV networks 
147) 2012-04-27-Lavrov-Interview Russia 24 TV channel 
148) 2012-05-07-Putin-Speech at Inauguration as President of Russia 
149) 2012-06-03-Lavrov-Interview with Hinhua News Agency 
150) 2012-09-01-Lavrov-Speech at MGIMO 
151) 2012-09-03-Lavrov-Interview with RIA Novosti 
152) 2012-09-06-Lavrov-Interview with China Central Television 
153) 2012-09-06-Putin-Interview to Russia Today TV Channel 
154) 2012-09-13-Lavrov-Interview with International Affairs journal 
155) 2012-09-25-Lavrov-Interview with PBS 
156) 2012-10-03-Lavrov-Interview with Kommersant 
157) 2012-10-25-Putin-Meeting with Valdai International Discussion Club 
participants 
158) 2012-11-02-Medvedev-Article: Russia ASEM’s Connecting Link 
159) 2012-11-08-Lavrov-Interview with RIA Novosti, Moscow News and Russia 
in Global Affairs 
160) 2012-11-13-Medvedev-Interview with Finish Media 
161) 2012-11-26-Medvedev-Interview to France Presse and Le Figaro 
162) 2012-11-29-Medvedev-Interview to Kommersant newspaper 
163) 2012-12-01-Lavrov-Speech at International Conference ‘Russia in the world 
of force of the XXI century’ 
164) 2012-12-07-Medvedev-Interview with 5 Russian TV Channels 
165) 2012-12-12-Putin-Annual Address to the Federal Assembly 
166) 2012-12-19-Lavrov-Interview with Euronews TV 
167) 2012-12-20-Putin-News conference of Vladimir Putin 
168) 2013-01-16-Medvedev-Speech at the 4th Gaidar Forum 
169) 2013-01-23-Medvedev-Interview with Bloomberg TV 
170) 2013-01-23-Medvedev-Speech at the WEF Davos 
171) 2013-01-24-Medvedev-Interview with NTV 
172) 2013-01-25-Medvedev-Interview with Swiss newspaper NZZ 
173) 2013-01-26-Medvedev-Interview with Rossiya TV 
174) 2013-01-27-Medvedev-Interview with CNN 
175) 2013-02-02-Lavrov-Speech at the 49th Munich Security Conference 
176) 2013-02-23-Medvedev-Interview with Prensa Latina news agency 
177) 2013-02-26-Medvedev-Interview with the Brazilian TV network Globo 
178) 2013-03-21-Medvedev-Interview with European media 
179) 2013-03-28-Lavrov-Article published in International Affairs magazine 
180) 2013-06-19-Lavrov-Interview with KUNA Kuwait news agency 
181) 2013-06-20-Lavrov-Interview with Rossiya 24 
182) 2013-08-04-Medvedev-Interview to Russia Today TV channel 
183) 2013-09-19-Putin-Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club 
184) 2013-09-25-Lavrov-Interview with The Washington Post 
185) 2013-09-27-Medvedev-Article The time of simple solutions is past 
186) 2013-09-28-Medvedev-Interview with Rossiya 24 TV channel 
187) 2013-11-01-Medvedev-Interview with Reuters 
188) 2013-11-04-Putin-Interview to Channel One and Associated Press news 
agency 
189) 2013-11-12-Putin-Interview to Korean Broadcasting System 
190) 2013-12-06-Medvedev-Interview with 5 Russian TV Channels 
191) 2013-12-19-Putin-News conference of Vladimir Putin 
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192) 2013-12-21-Lavrov-Interview with Interfax 
193) 2013-12-24-Lavrov-Interview with Russia Today 
194) 2014-01-05-Medvedev-Speech at 5th Gaidar Forum 
195) 2014-01-15-Medvedev-Interview with RBC-TV 
196) 2014-01-22-Medvedev-Interview with CNN 
197) 2014-02-01-Lavrov-Speech at Munich Security Conference 
198) 2014-02-13-Lavrov-Article published in Kommersant 
199) 2014-03-18-Putin-Address by President of the Russian Federation in 
Sevastopol 
200) 2014-03-20-Lavrov-Speech during the plenary session of the State Duma 
201) 2014-03-27-Lavrov-Article published in the European Club magazine 
202) 2014-04-11-Lavrov-Interview with Russia 1 TV channel 
203) 2014-05-14-Lavrov-Interview with Bloomberg TV 
204) 2014-05-20-Medvedev-Interview with Bloomberg TV 
205) 2014-05-23-Lavrov-Speech at Moscow International Security Conference 
206) 2014-05-23-Putin-Speech at 18th St. Petersburg International Economic 
Forum 
207) 2014-05-25-Medvedev-Interview with the Rossiya-1 TV channel 
208) 2014-06-03-Putin-Interview with Radio Europe 1 and TF1 TV channel 
209) 2014-06-04-Lavrov-Speech at Russian International Affairs Council 
210) 2014-07-01-Putin-Conference of Russian ambassadors and permanent 
representatives 
211) 2014-07-18-Lavrov-Interview with Russia 24 TV-channel 
212) 2014-08-27-Lavrov-Speech at International Youth Forum Seliger 
213) 2014-09-08-Medvedev-Interview with Vedomosti Newspaper 
214) 2014-09-10-Lavrov-Interview with ITAR-TASS 
215) 2014-09-17-Lavrov-Interview with Russia Beyond the Headlines 
216) 2014-09-27-Lavrov-Speech at 69th session of the UN General Assembly 
217) 2014-09-28-Lavrov-Interview with Channel Five 
218) 2014-10-15-Medvedev-Interview with CNBC 
219) 2014-10-19-Lavrov-Interview with NTV 
220) 2014-10-20-Lavrov-Lecture on Russia’s current foreign policy 
221) 2014-10-25-Putin-Valdai Discussion Club Final Plenary Session 
222) 2014-10-27-Lavrov-interview with Life News television and Izvestia daily 
223) 2014-11-06-Putin-Interview to China's leading media companies 
224) 2014-11-13-Putin-Interview to German TV channel ARD 
225) 2014-11-19-Lavrov-Speech at Government Hour in the State Duma 
226) 2014-11-22-Lavrov-Speech at the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy 
227) 2014-12-04-Lavrov-Speech at meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council 
228) 2014-12-04-Putin-Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly 
229) 2014-12-09-Putin-Interview to the Indian Information Agency PTI 
230) 2014-12-09-Lavrov-Interview with Rossiya Segodnya news agency 
231) 2014-12-10-Medvedev-Interview with 5 Russian TV Channels 
232) 2014-12-18-Putin-News conference of Vladimir Putin 
233) 2014-12-25-Lavrov-Interview with Kommersant newspaper 
234) 2014-12-25-Lavrov-Interview with Russiya-1 TV Channel 
235) 2015-01-04-Medvedev-Speech at the 6th Gaidar Forum 
236) 2015-01-21-Lavrov-News conference on Russia’s diplomatic performance 
237) 2015-02-07-Lavrov-Speech at Munich Security Conference 
238) 2015-02-23-Putin-Interview with VGTRK 
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239) 2015-02-27-Lavrov-Address at Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
240) 2015-03-21-Lavrov-Interview with TV channel Rossiya 1 
241) 2015-04-05-Medvedev-Interview with Vietnamese media 
242) 2015-04-06-Lavrov-Interview with Rossiya Segodnya 
243) 2015-04-08-Medvedev-Interview with Nation Thai media group 
244) 2015-04-16-Putin-Direct Line with Vladimir Putin 
245) 2015-04-22-Lavrov-interview with Sputnik, Ekho Moskvy and Govorit 
Moskva 
246) 2015-04-27-Lavrov-Interview with Rossiya-24 
247) 2015-05-06-Lavrov-interview for Russia Beyond the Headlines supplement to 
Handelsblatt 
248) 2015-05-23-Medvedev-Interview with Rossiya 1 TV network 
249) 2015-05-29-Lavrov-Interview to Rossiya 24 TV channel 
250) 2015-06-02-Lavrov-Interview with Bloomberg Television 
251) 2015-06-06-Putin-Interview to Il Corriere della Sera 
252) 2015-06-19-Lavrov-Interview with the RBK TV channel 
253) 2015-07-24-Medvedev-Interview with Slovenian radio and television 
company RTV Slovenija 
254) 2015-07-25-Medvedev-Interview with Slovenian newspaper Delo 
255) 2015-07-27-Putin-Interview with Swiss media 
256) 2015-08-24-Lavrov-Article for Rossiyskaya Gazeta and Renmin Ribao 
257) 2015-09-01-Lavrov-Speech at MGIMO University 
258) 2015-09-01-Putin-Interview to TASS and Xinhua news agencies 
259) 2015-09-04-Putin-First Eastern Economic Forum 
260) 2015-09-13-Lavrov-Interview with Voskresnoye Vremya TV programme 
261) 2015-09-15-Putin-CSTO summit 
262) 2015-09-23-Medvedev-Article The new reality Russia and global challenges 
263) 2015-09-29-Lavrov-Interview with the “Russia Today” TV channel 
264) 2015-09-29-Putin-Interview to American TV channel CBS and PBS 
265) 2015-10-02-Lavrov-Interview with Venezuelan state television 
266) 2015-10-12-Putin-Interview to Rossiya-1 television channel 
267) 2015-10-13-Lavrov-Interview with NTV 
268) 2015-10-15-Lavrov-Remarks at Government Hour at the State Duma 
269) 2015-10-16-Putin-Meeting of the CIS Council of Heads of State 
270) 2015-10-17-Medvedev-Interview with Rossiya TV 
271) 2015-10-22-Putin-Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club 
272) 2015-10-24-Lavrov-Interview with Saturday news show Vesti v Subbotu 
273) 2015-11-05-Putin-World Congress of Compatriots 
274) 2015-11-11-Medvedev-Interview with Rossiiskaya Gazeta 
275) 2015-11-13-Putin-Interview to Interfax and Anadolu 
276) 2015-11-19-Lavrov-Interview with Radio Rossii 
277) 2015-11-25-Lavrov-Interview with Russian and foreign media 
278) 2015-12-03-Putin-Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly 
279) 2015-12-09-Medvedev-Interview with 5 Russian TV Channels 
280) 2015-12-09-Lavrov-Interview with Italian media 
281) 2015-12-11-Lavrov-Interview with Rossiya Segodnya 
282) 2015-12-13-Medvedev-Interview with Renmin Ribao 
283) 2015-12-17-Putin-Vladimir Putin’s annual news conference 
284) 2015-12-28-Lavrov-Interview with the Interfax News Agency 
285) 2015-12-30-Lavrov-Interview to Zvezda TV channel 
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10.1.1 Official documents 
286) 2000-06-28-The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 
287) 2008-07-12-The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation  
288) 2013-02-13-The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation  
10.2 Turkey: speeches, interviews and articles 
1) 2002-06-25-Sezer-Speech at Opening Ceremony of the “A tale of three seas” 
energy conference 
2) 2003-04-08-Gül-Speech at Summit of South East European countries 
3) 2003-05-28-Gül-Speech at the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OIC 
4) 2003-06-09-Gül-Speech at Atlantic Partnership Program meeting 
5) 2003-06-22-Gül-Speech at Extraordinary meeting of the WEF 
6) 2003-07-03-Gül-Speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
7) 2003-07-25-Gül-Speech at the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy 
8) 2003-09-24-Gül-Speech at the Eurasia Summit of 2003 
9) 2003-09-26-Gül-Speech at the 58th General Assembly of the United Nations 
10) 2003-10-01-Sezer-Speech at Opening Session of TBMM 
11) 2004-01-26-Erdoğan-Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations 
12) 2004-02-10-Gül-Speech at College of Europe Natolin 
13) 2004-04-04-Gül-Speech at the Maastricht School of Management 
14) 2004-09-13-Gül-Speech at North-South Europe Forum 
15) 2004-09-23-Gül-Speech at the 59th General Assembly of the United Nations 
16) 2004-10-01-Sezer-Speech at Opening Session of TBMM 
17) 2004-12-01-Gül-Speech at Ljubljana University 
18) 2005-03-14-Gül-Speech at Bloomberg 
19) 2005-03-14-Gül-Speech at London School of Economics 
20) 2005-06-07-Gül-Speech at American Turkish Council 
21) 2005-06-28-Gül-Speech at the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OIC 
22) 2005-09-13-Erdoğan-Speech at Council on Foreign Relations 
23) 2005-09-14-Erdoğan-Interview with Charlie Rose 
24) 2005-09-15-Erdoğan-Speech at 60th session of the UN General Assembly 
25) 2005-09-21-Gül-Speech at the 60th General Assembly of the United Nations 
26) 2005-10-01-Sezer-Speech at Opening Session of TBMM 
27) 2005-10-14-Gül-Speech at the second Bosporus Conference 
28) 2006-05-03-Gül-Speech at Meeting of Wisemen on West and South Asia 
29) 2006-06-19-Gül-Speech at the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OIC 
30) 2006-07-06-Gül-Speech at Brookings Institution 
31) 2006-07-13-Sezer-Speech at Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Official 
Inauguration Ceremony 
32) 2006-09-22-Gül-Speech at the 61st General Assembly of the United Nations 
33) 2006-09-26-Gül-Speech at ECO Council of Ministers 
34) 2007-02-08-Gül-Speech at the German Marshall Fund 
35) 2007-02-09-Gül-Speech at the Meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations 
36) 2007-04-16-Erdoğan-Interview with Der Spiegel 
37) 2007-04-19-Gül-Speech at BSEC Council of Ministers 
38) 2007-06-01-Gül-Speech in front of visiting foreign statesmen 
39) 2007-09-27-Erdoğan-Speech at Council on Foreign Relations 
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40) 2007-09-27-Erdoğan-Interview with Charlie Rose 
41) 2007-09-28-Erdoğan-Speech at 62nd session of the UN General Assembly 
42) 2007-10-01-Gül-Speech at The Turkish Grand National Assembly 
43) 2007-10-03-Gül-Speech at The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 
44) 2007-10-25-Gül-Speech at Council of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
BSEC 
45) 2007-10-25-Babacan-Speech at 17th Meeting of the BSEC Council of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
46) 2007-11-29-Babacan-Speech at Fifteenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial 
Council 
47) 2008-01-02-Davutoğlu-Article in Insight Turkey 
48) 2008-01-16-Babacan-Speech at closing session of the first Forum of the 
Alliance of Civilizations 
49) 2008-02-09-Erdoğan-Speech at the 44th Munich Conference on Security 
Policy 
50) 2008-02-12-Babacan-Speech at Reception for the Member of the Diplomatic 
Corps in Ankara 
51) 2008-02-14-Babacan-Speech at Black Sea-Europe Meeting at the Ministerial 
Level 
52) 2008-03-13-Gül-Speech at the 11th Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) 
Summit 
53) 2008-03-28-Babacan-Speech at Leiden University 
54) 2008-04-01-Babacan-Speech at Wilton Conference 
55) 2008-04-14-Babacan-Interview with Financial Times 
56) 2008-04-14-Babacan-Speech at Royal United Services Institute 
57) 2008-05-08-Babacan-Speech at 11th WDR Europa Forum 
58) 2008-05-09-Babacan-Speech at Occasion of May 9 Europe Day 
59) 2008-05-28-Babacan-Speech at European Parliament Committee on Foreign 
Affairs 
60) 2008-06-03-Babacan-Speech at Atlantic Council Global Leadership Speaker 
Series 
61) 2008-06-18-Babacan-Speech at 35th Session of the OIC Council of Foreign 
Ministers 
62) 2008-08-01-Gül-Speech at Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars 
63) 2008-09-22-Babacan-Speech at Council on Foreign Relations 
64) 2008-09-24-Babacan-Speech at Alliance of Civilizations Group of Friends 
Meeting 
65) 2008-09-23-Gül-Speech at the 63rd General Assembly of the United Nations 
66) 2008-10-11-Babacan-Speech at Boğaziçi Conference 
67) 2008-10-23-Babacan-Speech at 19th Meeting Of the BSEC 
68) 2008-11-13-Erdoğan-Speech at 63rd session of the UN General Assembly 
69) 2008-11-14-Erdoğan-Speech at Brookings Institution 
70) 2009-02-07-Babacan-Speech at 45th Munich Security Conference 
71) 2009-02-20-Babacan-Speech at Vilnius University 
72) 2009-04-06-Erdoğan-Speech at the Second Forum of the Alliance of 
Civilizations 
73) 2009-04-07-Babacan-Speech at the Second Forum of the Alliance of 
Civilizations 
74) 2009-04-08-Gül-Interview with Financial Times 
75) 2009-04-15-Babacan-Speech at Vienna Diplomatic Academy 
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76) 2009-04-16-Babacan-Speech at 20th Meeting of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers of the BSEC 
77) 2009-04-24-Babacan-Speech at Aspen Atlantic Group's 2009 Annual Meeting 
78) 2009-05-08-Davutoğlu-Speech on the Occasion of Europe Day 
79) 2009-05-23-Davutoğlu-Speech at 36th Session of the OIC Council of Foreign 
Ministers 
80) 2009-06-02-Davutoğlu-Speech at the 28th Annual Conference on US-Turkish 
Relations 
81) 2009-06-22-Davutoğlu-Interview with Der Spiegel 
82) 2009-06-27-Gül-Speech at Xi'an North Western University 
83) 2009-09-24-Erdoğan-Speech at 64th session of the UN General Assembly 
84) 2009-10-01-Gül-Speech at Commencement of the Legislative Year of the 
TBMM 
85) 2009-11-03-Gül-Speech at Comenius University 
86) 2009-11-04-Erdoğan-Interview with the Guardian 
87) 2009-11-28-Davutoğlu-Interview with Newsweek 
88) 2009-12-01-Davutoğlu-Speech at OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting 
89) 2009-12-03-Gül-Speech at USAK 
90) 2009-12-07-Erdoğan-Speech at SETA Foundation 
91) 2009-12-08-Erdoğan-Interview with Charlie Rose 
92) 2010-02-03-Erdoğan-Speech at USAK 
93) 2010-03-03-Davutoğlu-Speech at Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the 
Member States of the Arab League 
94) 2010-05-01-Davutoğlu-Speech at Oxford University 
95) 2010-05-29-Erdoğan-Speech at The Third Forum of the Alliance of 
Civilizations 
96) 2010-05-31-Davutoğlu-Speech at United Nations Security Council 
97) 2010-06-01-Erdoğan-Speech at AK Party Parliamentary Group Meeting 
98) 2010-06-01-Davutoğlu-Interview with PBS 
99) 2010-06-28-Erdoğan-Interview with Charlie Rose 
100) 2010-09-21-Gül-Interview with PBS 
101) 2010-09-23-Gül-Speech at 65th Session of the UN General Assembly 
102) 2010-09-24-Gül-Speech at Columbia University World Leaders Forum 
103) 2010-10-01-Gül-Speech at Commencement of the Legislative Year of the 
TBMM 
104) 2010-11-08-Gül-Interview with First Magazine 
105) 2010-11-08-Gül-Speech at Chatham House 
106) 2010-11-09-Gül-Interview with BBC 
107) 2010-11-28-Davutoğlu-Interview with Foreign Policy Magazine 
108) 2010-11-29-Davutoğlu-Speech at Brookings Institution 
109) 2010-12-02-Gül-Speech at OSCE Summit 
110) 2010-12-03-Erdoğan-Article Turkey.The new indispensable nation 
111) 2011-01-24-Davutoğlu-Speech at Parliamentary Assembly Strasbourg 
112) 2011-02-17-Gül-Interview with Iranian Press TV 
113) 2011-03-15-Davutoğlu-Article in the Guardian 
114) 2011-04-06-Gül-Speech at University of Indonesia 
115) 2011-05-11-Erdoğan-Interview with Charlie Rose 
116) 2011-06-06-Gül-Speech at Natolin College of Europe 
117) 2011-06-09-Davutoğlu-Interview with Der Spiegel 
118) 2011-09-09-Gül-Interview with Russian Daily Moskovski Komsomolets 
119) 2011-09-16-Gül-Interview with Süddeutsche Zeitung 
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120) 2011-09-21-Erdoğan-Interview with Charlie Rose 
121) 2011-09-22-Erdoğan-Speech at United Nations General Assembly 
122) 2011-09-25-Erdoğan-Interview with Fareed Zakaria on GPS 
123) 2011-09-26-Erdoğan-Interview with Time magazine 
124) 2011-10-01-Gül-Speech at TBMM On the Occasion Of The New Legislative 
Year 
125) 2011-11-22-Davutoğlu-Speech at Turkey Investor Conference 
126) 2011-12-09-Gül-Speech at 4th World Policy Conference 
127) 2012-03-12-Davutoğlu-Interview with AUC Cairo Review 
128) 2012-05-01-Davutoğlu-Interview with the Business Year magazine 
129) 2012-05-22-Gül-Speech at Chicago Council on Global Affairs 
130) 2012-08-30-Davutoğlu-Speech at UN Security Council 
131) 2012-09-07-Erdoğan-Interview with CNN 
132) 2012-09-20-Erdoğan-Interview with Washington Post 
133) 2012-09-28-Davutoğlu-Speech at 67th United Nations General Assembly 
134) 2012-09-28-Davutoğlu-Speech at Alliance of Civilizations Group of Friends 
Ministerial Meeting 
135) 2012-09-28-Davutoğlu-Speech at OIC Ministerial Annual Coordination 
Meeting 
136) 2012-10-01-Gül-Speech at TBMM on Occasion of the New Legislative Year 
137) 2012-10-02-Davutoğlu-Speech at Ambassadors’ Conference of Ukraine 
138) 2012-11-15-Davutoğlu-Speech at 39th Session of the OIC Council of Foreign 
Ministers 
139) 2012-11-29-Davutoğlu-Speech at UN General Assembly 
140) 2012-12-15-Davutoğlu-Speech at 27th Ministerial Meeting of BSEC 
141) 2013-01-01-Gül-Interview with Foreign Affairs 
142) 2013-03-07-Davutoğlu-Speech at LSE 
143) 2013-03-21-Davutoğlu-Article in Foreign Policy magazine 
144) 2013-03-26-Davutoğlu-Speech at 24th Summit Meeting of the League of Arab 
States 
145) 2013-05-17-Erdoğan-Speech at Brookings Institution 
146) 2013-05-17-Erdoğan-Speech at SETA Foundation Washington 
147) 2013-06-21-Davutoğlu-Speech at 28th Ministerial Meeting of BSEC 
148) 2013-06-29-Davutoğlu-Speech at 22nd Annual Session of the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly 
149) 2013-09-24-Gül-Speech at 68th Session of the UN General Assembly 
150) 2013-09-26-Gül-Speech at Council on Foreign Relations 
151) 2013-10-01-Gül-Speech at Commencement of the New Legislative Year of 
the TBMM 
152) 2013-10-04-Gül-Speech at 4th Istanbul Forum 
153) 2013-11-18-Davutoğlu-Speech at Brookings Institution 
154) 2013-11-20-Gül-Speech at 4th Bosporus Regional Cooperation Summit 
155) 2013-11-26-Davutoğlu-Speech at the 21st Meeting of the Council of Ministers 
of the Economic Cooperation Organization 
156) 2013-12-12-Davutoğlu-Speech at 29th Meeting of the Council of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of BSEC 
157) 2014-01-23-Davutoğlu-Interview with CNN 
158) 2014-05-03-Gül-Speech at Harvard Kennedy School 
159) 2014-05-28-Davutoğlu-Speech at the Ministerial Conference of the Non-
Aligned Movement 
160) 2014-08-01-Davutoğlu-SAM Vision Paper No.7 
308 
 
161) 2014-09-22-Erdoğan-Speech at Council on Foreign Relations 
162) 2014-09-22-Erdoğan-Interview with Charlie Rose 
163) 2014-09-24-Erdoğan-Speech at 69th session of the UN General Assembly 
164) 2014-10-01-Erdoğan- Speech at Opening Session of TBMM 
165) 2014-10-14-Gül-Interview with Al-Hayat 
166) 2015-01-19-Çavuşoğlu-Speech to the Participants of the Young Diplomats 
Programme 
167) 2015-03-05-Davutoğlu-Speech at Council on Foreign Relations 
168) 2015-04-20-Çavuşoğlu-Speech at Carnegie Peace Endowment 
169) 2015-07-08-Çavuşoğlu-Interview with Nikkei 
170) 2015-07-31-Erdoğan-Address at Indonesian National Resilience Institute 
171) 2015-09-23-Erdoğan-Speech at Moscow Central Mosque Opening Ceremony 
172) 2015-09-30-Davutoğlu-Speech at UN General Assembly 
173) 2015-10-01-Erdoğan-Speech at Speech at Opening Session of TBMM 
174) 2015-11-09-Davutoğlu-Interview with CNN 
175) 2015-12-03-Çavuşoğlu-Speech at OSCE ministerial council 
10.3 Interview questions 
The interviews with academics, think tank analysts and policy makers in Russia and 
Turkey were semi-structured. In each interview I asked the same set of questions, 
while leaving room for the interlocutor to guide the interview in his or her preferred 
direction. Below is the list of standard questions which were used in every interview. 
10.3.1 Russia 
- Is Russia a Eurasian country? 
- What is Russia’s position in Eurasia? 
- How is Eurasia defined? 
- What does Eurasia mean for Russia? How important is Russia being Eurasian 
for the country? 
- Does Russia see itself as the centre of Eurasia? Are there competitors or other 
powers in Eurasia? What is Russia’s relationship with Turkey in the context of 
Eurasia? 
- What are Russia’s principal interests and stakes in Eurasia? 
- What is the importance of the following elements in Russia’s conception of 
Eurasia: geography; security considerations; cultural and ethnic ties; history? 
- What is the influence of Eurasian(ist) ideas on policy? 
- Is Eurasia an exclusive concept? 
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- How is Eurasian integration related to other concepts (e.g. OBOR; EU; Greater 
Europe)? 
10.3.2 Turkey 
- Is Turkey a Eurasian country? 
- What is Turkey’s position in Eurasia? 
- How is Eurasia defined? 
- What does Eurasia mean for Turkey? How important is Turkey being Eurasian 
for the country? 
- Does Turkey see itself as the centre of Eurasia? Are there competitors or other 
powers in Eurasia? What is Turkey’s relationship with Russia in the context of 
Eurasia? 
- What are Turkey’s principal interests and stakes in Eurasia? 
- What is the importance of the following elements in Turkey’s conception of 
Eurasia: geography; security considerations; cultural and ethnic ties; history? 
- What is the influence of Eurasian(ist) ideas on policy? 
- What is the relationship between Eurasia and other geopolitical concepts (e.g. 
Neo-Ottomanism, Europeanisation)? Are they in competition?  
 
